THE KĀVYĀNUŚĀSANA OF *ACHARYA HEMACHANDRA* A CRITICAL STUDY



DR. A. M. UPADHYAY
M.A. PH.D.

FOREWORD BY
DR. V. M. KULKARNI
M.A. PH.D.

THE KĀVYĀNUŚĀSANA
OF
ACHARYA HEMACHANDRA
A CRITICAL STUDY

DR. A. M. UPADHYAY M.A., PH.D.

FOREWORD
DR. V. M. KULKARNI M.A., PH.D.

WORDS OF WELCOME
DR. T. S. NANDI M.A., PH.D.

AHMEDABAD
INDIA
1987

The Kāvyānuśāsana of Āchārya Hemachandra
A Critical Study

by
Dr. Amrut M. Upadhyay, M.A., Ph.D.
B/22, Krupa Apartments,
Near Lavanya Society, Vasana,
Ahmedabad 380 007, India

First Edition, October, 1987

Price Rs. 250/-

Cover Design : Shailesh Modi

This book can also be ordered from :

1. M/s. Motilal Banarsidass
41 U. A., Bungalow Road,
Jawahar Nagar, **Delhi 110 007** (India)
2. Parshva Prakashan,
Nisha Pole, Relief Road, **Ahmedabad** 380 001 (India)
3. Saraswati Pustak Bhandar,
Hathi Khana, Ratan Pole, **Ahmedabad** 380 001 (India)
4. Students' Agencies,
Swadeshi Mill Compound, Girgaum,
Bombay 400 004 (India)
5. Vidyarthi Book Depot, Girgaum, Bombay 400 004

Printers : Haresh J. Patel
Darshan Printers, 2-Bandhu Samaj Society,
Usmanpura, Ahmedabad 380 013

Binders : Kumar Binders, Ahmedabad 300 001

This book is dedicated to the

पूर्वाचार्यs

both

ancient and modern

तं पूर्वाचार्यसूर्योक्तिज्योतिस्तोमोद्गमं स्तुमः ।
यं प्रस्तूय प्रकाशन्ते मद्गुणास्त्रसरेणवः ॥

– चन्द्रालोके (१.४) पीयूषवर्षजयदेवकविः ।

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GRATITUDE

First and foremost I would like to thank Acharya Shri Rajayashasūri, Acharya Devendrasagarasūri, Acharya Vijaya Rāmsūri, Acharya Vijaya Bhadrankarsūri, Acharya Padmsagarasūri and their worthy disciples for blessing my venture.

Some well-wishers have provided me with the necessary warmth and encouragement throughout the period of the preparation and publication of this book. Sincere thanks are due to Shri Gulabdas Broker, Dr. Ishvarbhai Patel, Dr. (Smt.) Sarayu Doshi, Dr. D. T. Shah, Dr. Y. R. Trivedi, Shri Nanalal Vasa, Dr. D. G. Vedia, Dr. M. S. Bhat, Prof. Jayanand Dave, Dr. A. V. Shenoy, Shri Ganapatlal Jhaveri, Shri K. P. Shah, Dr. K. M. Sangani, Dr. Vikram Parikh, Prof. N. S. Yajnik, Dr. Shantikumar Pandya, Dr. Gautam Patel, Shri Y. M. Shah, Shri Lalitkumar K. Kolsawala, Shri Bharatkumar D. Mansawala, Shri Jayesh C. Bhansali, Dr. S. S. Jhaveri, Dr. Mrs. S. S. Amonkar, Prof. S. A. Upadhyay, Shri D. D. Mehta and Smt. Bhavana Mehta, Shri Dinesh Shah and Smt. Onita Shah, Shri Ramesh Joshi, Shri Ramesh Shah, Shri Gautam G. Mehta and Smt. Charu G. Mehta, Shri Mahendra Nanavati and Dr. Bhanuben M. Nanavati, Prof. Ramesh Kher, Shri Arvind R. Athavale, Acharya Bhajshankar Purohit and Dr. N. J. Shah.

Many well-wishers have rendered assistance in the publication of this work with love and affection without which this work would not have seen the light of the day. In this connection sincere thanks are due to Shri Chandrakant Doshi, Shri Nagin M. Doshi, Shri Narendra M. Mehta, Shri & Smt. Surykant S. Shah, Shri Manubhai C. Shah, Shri Kanubhai Mehta, Shri Rasiklal Mohanlal Shah, Shri Shachin Nanavati, Shri Haresh Shroff, Dr. Vikram Parikh, Dr. Vihang Vahia, Dr. Ajit Shah, Shri D. S. Upadhyay, Shri Bharatkumar Upadhyay, Shri Harsh Doshi, Shri Ramesh Shah and many other friends.

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this book which is based on the thesis presented by my friend, Prof. A. M. Upadhyay for the Ph.D. Degree in Sanskrit of Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. There are eleven Chapters in this book and, with the exception of the concluding chapter, A Synoptic View of Ācarya Hemacandra's Life and Works, each chapter treats of some of the leading topics or Concepts in Sanskrit Poetics (and Aesthetics) – a subject in which Indian mind has achieved particular excellence.

The present work mainly deals with a critical study of Āchārya Hemacandra's **Kāvyānuśāsana.** This work has been generally belittled and undeservedly criticised by the historians of Sanskrit Literature and Sanskrit Poetics. Keith dismisses it in four lines: "In the contemporary of Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, we find a placid borrowing from Mammaṭa, Abhinavagupta, Rājaśekhara, the **Vakrokti-jīvita** and so on. His **Kāvyānuśāsana,** with the Viveka by himself, is destitute of originality, but contains a section on dramaturgy." P. V. Kane condemns it in these words: "The **Kāvyānuśāsana** is a compilation and exhibits hardly any originality. It borrows wholesale from the **Kāvyamīmāṁsā** of Rājaśekhara, the **Kāvyaprakāśa**, the **Dhvanyāloka** and from Abhinavagupta's works." S. K. De in his **Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics** charges Hemachandra of plagiarism. These historians are however not fair to Ācarya Hemacandra and his **Kāvyānuśāsana.** It is indeed surprising that such a scholarly, carefully designed, well organized work on poetics should have remained almost entirely unacknowledged. The work makes no claim to originality like **Dhivanyāloka** but **Kāvyānuśāsana** deserves to be treated as a respectable compendium of previous noteworthy writings, like **Kāvya-prakāśa.** Instead of briefly summarising in his own language the theories and doctrines of his predecessors, too illustrious to be mentioned by name, he presents them in their original form. We will be only betraying

poverty of imagination and scant respect for Ācarya Hemacandra's intelligence if we were to insinuate that he pretended that all the excerpts and extracts which he quoted would pass as his own. The truth is that he regards the masterpieces of his predecessors as the property of the entire world.

It is gratifying that Prof. Upadhyay's approach to **Kāvyānuśāsana** is markedly free from strong prejudices of the historians mentioned above. His remarkably fine study of Hemacandra's **Kāvyānuśāsana** will help restore or set right the balance and lead to a proper evaluation of Ācārya Hemacandra's encyclopaedic compendium. He brings to the study of **Kāvyānuśāsana** a mind adequately equipped in literature and literary criticism. He has imbibed and assimilated the ideas and critical thought embodied in the wellknown works and research papers of modern Sanskrit scholars and critics and made their judicious use in explaining and elucidating Hemachandra, whose encyclopaedic scholarship and eclectic attitude and lucid exposition has produced this masterly manual of Sanskrit poetics. Prof. Upadhyay's approach is marked by sympathetic attitude and he is fair and just in his praise of Ācārya Hemacandra and his **Kāvyānuśāsana**. His exposition of the various topics dealt with by the Ācārya is very clear and methodical. The analytical table of contents with which the thesis is prefaced will greatly facilitate readers. His command of language and fascinating style of writing are praiseworthy. It is chiefly on the expository side that the excellence of Prof. Upadhyay's work lies.

We warmly welcome this study as a notable addition to the number of works in English on Sanskrit Poetics (and aesthetics).

5, Suruchi Society,
Dixit Road Extension,
Vile Parle (East),
Bombay 400 057

V. M. Kulkarni

WORDS OF WELCOME

It was first Prof. R. C. Parikh and then both Prof. Parikh and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni who placed before the learned a critical text of the Kāvyānuśāsana of Ācārya Hemacandra. Both the editors have brought out the real worth of the work which covers the entire span of Sanskrit Alaṁkāraśāstra and also dramaturgy, a unique feat not performed by any earlier author. True, Hemacandra was not a founder of any system of thought as is the case with the great Ānandavardhana, but the latter's ideas got rooted in the minds of literary critics and were fully explained, established and accepted in the literary world of later ālaṁkārikas, chiefly through the efforts of such stalwarts as Abhinavaguptapāda, Mammaṭa and Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and others. In fact Ācārya Hemacandra was the instrument in the spread of the tenets of the Kashmir School of thought in Gujarat, to the disadvantage of the Mālava School as represented by Bhoja and others. The real value of His Viveka was brough out by Dr. Kulkarni when with its help he reconstructed almost the whole portion of Abhinavabhāratī on the 7th Ch. of the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata. Hemacandra fully inherited the wisdom of his predecessors and presented it in a neat fashion for the next generations to come. The undue criticism advanced by Dr. Kane, Dr. De and Dr. Keith and scholars belonging to that generation should be rightly forgotten. And it is exactly here that Dr. Upadhyay's thesis shows the way. He has not only interpreted Hemacandra in the right perspective but has tried to place him on the high pedestal to which he belongs. I welcome Prof. Dr. Upadhyay's work.

Ahmedabad 380 009 **T. S. Nandi**

ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. bh.	Abhinavabhāratī
A.P.	Agnipurāṇa
Av.	Avaloka
D.R.	Daśarūpaka
Dhv.Āl/(Dhv.)	Dhvanyāloka
Ek.	Ekāvalī
K.K.	Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa of Kṣemendra
K.M.	Kāvyamīmāṁsā
K.P.	Kāvyaprakāśa
K.P.P.	Kāvyaprakāśapradīpa
K.Ā.	Kāvyādarśa
K.A. (Bhāmaha)	Kāvyālaṁkāra of Bhāmaha
K.A (Rudraṭa)	Kāvyālaṁkāra of Rudraṭa
KASS	Kāvyālaṁkārasārasaṅgraha
KAS/KASV/VKASV	Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti of Vāmana
K.A.S.	Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemachandra (with Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi and Viveka)
Viveka	Kāvyānuśāsana-Viveka of Hemachandra
N.D.	Nāṭyadarpaṇa
N.S.	Nāṭyaśāstra
R.G.	Rasagaṅgādhara
S.D.	Sāhityadarpaṇa
S.K.	Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa
Śr.Pr./S.P.	Śṛṅgāraprakāśa
S.T.	Śṛṅgāratilaka
V.J.	Vakroktijīvita
V.P.	Vākyapadīya

PREFACE

This publication of 'The Kāvyānuśāsana of Āchārya Hemachandra : A Critical Study' represents, for me, the fulfilment of a fond dream of supplying the commonly felt need for a comprehensive, analytical, critical and comparative study of the entire three-tier text of Āchārya Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana. This work is a thoroughly revised and considerably improved version of my Ph.D. thesis which was submitted to the Gujarat University in 1985.

The Study presented here represents a fresh look at the three-tier text of the Kāvyānuśāsana and its manifold conceptual and theoretic facets. In view of the fact that a proper theoretic basis of this work was not sufficiently realised, it was adjudged a mere text book modelled on the Kāvyaprakāśa. But, from a theoretical standpoint, the Kāvyānuśāsana constitutes a very prominent work in the Kashmirian tradition of Sanskrit poetics as also in the realm of Rasadhvani theory. The present Study concentrates on the doctrinaire as well as the eclectic aspects of the Kāvyānuśāsana, and I am glad to say that a novel approach of study has been brought to bear upon this study so as to highlight the fact that the Kāvyānuśāsana is written in the best tradition of the Dhvani School, and it deserves to be rated very highly as a standard treatise on Indian Poetics and Dramaturgy. In fact, its theoretical affiliations make it a milestone in the early history of the Dhvani doctrine and, by any yardstick, it is an authoritative spokesman of the aesthetics of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in the same way as Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa is an authoritative work of the Rasadhvani School.

I am grateful to Dr. V. M. Kulkarni for his illuminating foreword to this volume, which, I believe, will serve as an authoritative introduction to my work. I also thank Dr. T. S. Nandi, my esteemed guide, for his 'Words of Welcome.'

In preparing such an exhaustive study on a complete technical, three-tier text like the Kāvyānuśāsana, I have utilised a number of ancient and modern critical works and I would like to acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to these Pūrvasūris. In this connection, I must mention the works of Prof. R. C. Parikh, Prof. R. B. Athavale, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthi, R. Gnoli, Masson and Patwardhan, Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De, Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya and several other eminent scholars from which I have derived much guidance and help.

I thank Dr. R. C. Dwivedi and Dr. M. C. Pathak for their kind words about this work.

I am happy to mention that the late Prof. R. B. Athavale, with whom I had a long association took a lot of interest in my thesis and, on two occasions, just before his passing away, expressed the desire that the work should be publishad and also blessed my work.

Shri Haresh J. Patel, proprietor of Darshan Printers and and his dedicated Staff have done a commendable job of printing and they deserve sincere thanks. I must also thank Shri Jagadish L. Upadhyay of the Gujarat Univrsity Press for his help in correcting the proofs.

It may be noted That I have romanized all Sanskrit words except the name Acharya Hemachandra.

I would like to thank Hon. Kum. Chandrika P. Kenia, Minister of State for Education, Maharashtra State, and Prof. J. H. Dave, Hon. Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, for their association with the inanguration of this book at a function on the 2nd Oct., 1987 in Bombay.

Vijaya Dashami, October 2, 1987

A. M. Upadhyay

B/22 Krupa Aparments,
Near Lavanya Society,
Vasana, **Ahmedabad** 380 007

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XI-XXVI

Chapter Eight : Types of Literary Compositions or Forms of Literature **420-447**

PRELUDE

The Kāvyānuśāsana of Āchārya Hemachandra is an important work on Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra, and is well known to scholars both in India and abroad. Hemachandrāchārya needs no introduction to the students of Indian Literature because, in the words of Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, he "is known to the students of Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa literatures as a writer who utilized to the full his extensive and varied scholarship in whatever department he worked and racorded what he thought worth recording for the benefit of posterity".[1] Hemachandrāchārya's versatility and encyclopaedic knowledge embraced many fields of Sanskrit and Prakrit learning and in the galaxy of Jain writers, Hemachandra is the "brightest star", having been a voluminous writer who wrote on numerous branches of study.[2] His prolific writings includs works on a variety of important subjects ranging from Grammar, Lexicography, Prosody, Poetics and Dramaturgy to Philosophy, Logic, Biography, Psychology as well as several poetical or creative-narrative works.

Among the scientific works of Hemachandra, his Anuśāsana series – the Śabdānuśāsana, the Kāvyānuśāsana and the Chando'nuśāsana – deserves special mention. In writing this series, Hemachandra's aim appears to have been to provide excellent authoritative works on such subjects as Grammar, Poetics and Prosody for the students of Sanskrit Composition.

What strikes us most about this series of the Anuśāsana works is the inter-connection between the different Anuśāsanas. Thus, while the Śabdānuśāsana, his **magnum opus**, is his first important scientific work on Grammar or Śabda, the Kāvyānuśāsana is his second comprehensive and authoritative scientific treatise on Kāvyaśāstra or Poetics. The inter-connection between these two works, apart from the identity of authorship, is that, while the first Anuśāsana deals with the topic of "correct speech", the second one, i.e., the Kāvyānuśāsana, deals with the poetic aspect of the "correct speech", i.e. Poetics. In fact, Hemachandra himself points out this inter-connection when he says (K.A.S. I.2) : "The correct speech was discussed by us in the Śabdānuśāsana; now its poetic aspect is being laid down by us in its correct form." In the first verse of his Chando'nuśāsana too he states that having completed Śabda-Kāvya-Anuśāsanas, he now speaks of the Anuśāsana of the Chandas or metres useful for poetry.[3] Of these three Anuśāsanas, while the first one viz. the Śabdānuśāsana (the science of language) was written at the request of Siddharāja Jayasiṃha, the other two Anuśāsanas were significantly meant for the people in general or as the introductory verse divulges Hemachandra's aim, the Kāvyānuśāsana was composed to delight 'the learned ones'.

The काव्यानुशासन : A Brief Introduction

The Kāvyānuśāsana, as the title suggests, is a work on the science of Poetry or Poetics. It is a comprehensive treatise on all the different aspects of poetry. Within the space of eight chapters and two hundred and eight Sūtras or aphorisms, it deals not only with all the important topics connected with the creation and appreciation of Poetry, but also with the different types of heroes and heroines, the themes and forms and other aspects of dramatic and poetic compositions. Thus it is an authoritative and extensive work on Indian Poetics in its many aspects. In the history and field of Sanskrit Poetics, therefore, the Kāvyānuśāsana should rank side by side with

the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa, the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhojarāja and the Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha. Indeed at the time of its composition, the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa must have been the only comprehensive work on Poetics and Dramaturgy, since, although the Kāvyaprakāśa was an important work on Poetics, yet it did not cover the topics on Dramaturgy and consequently it did not satisfy the requirements of a comprehensive work dealing both with Poetics and Dramaturgy. Again, even as far as the subject of poetics is concerned, Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa followed a method of treatment which was a bit tough and its language and style were a little too terse and abstruse for a beginner. On the other hand, Bhojarāja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa was much too large and bulky a treatise, and it followed a poetic tradition which was somewhat off-beat in tenor and treatment when compared to the Kashmirian tradition of Poetics.

The Kashmirian Tradition of Poetics

It is an acknowledged fact that Kashmir has produced a galaxy of brilliant authors on Indian Poetics and Aesthetics. It is no exaggeration to say that the subject of Sanskrit Poetics received a tremendous momentum from its early beginning and reached its zenith at the hands of the various Kashmirian authors. For, "Kashmir, from early times and particularly in this period, has been the land that furnished the material groundwork and gave the signal to start for investigations by writers all over the country."[4] The sincere and tireless efforts of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa need a particular mention in this connection because with these authors, the theory of Dhvani, with its emphasis on the "Resadhvani", came to dominate the scene in Poetics not only in Kashmir but also elsewhere in the country; and the advent of the Dhvani-theory revolutionized the concepts of poetry and poetics. The Dhvani theory necessitated a reorganisation of all the other elements of poetry viz., Guṇa, Doṣa, Alaṁkāra, etc., since it posited Dhvani or Rasa as the most important principle of Literary Criticism.

Hemachandra's Theoretical Objective

Hemachandra's composition of the Kāvyānuśāsana, viewed against the background of the Dhvani-theory, reveals the fact that, being an ardent admirer of the Dhvani principle and the theory of Rasadhvani, Hemachandra must have felt the need to prepare a comprehensive work on Poetics representing the predominance of the principle of Dhvani. And it can be stated without any hesitation that the Kāvyānuśāsana fulfils this task of following, in the main, the trend set up by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, followed by Mammaṭa, admirably. For, "In the department of poetics, where as an early Nibandha writer, he (i.e. Hemachandra) made his name, constructive work had given place to systematizing and co-ordination by the end of the century and it had become the fashion to formulate, elucidate or tabulate whatever was taught by great masters."[5] Undoubtedly, therefore, the Kāvyānuśāsana occupies an important place in the field of Sanskrit Poetics, faithfully following as it does, the all-important Rasadhvani doctrine in all its ramifications.

While remaining loyal to the Dhvani School, the Kāvyānuśāsana attempts to be as comprehensive as possible, since its main objective is to bring together all the important discussions on the relevant topics both of Poetics and Dramaturgy. So, it was with a view to preparing a complete text-book on all the relevant topics of Poetics – whether they traditionally belonged to the science of Poetics or to that of Dramatics – that Hemachandrāchārya undertook to compose this work.[6] And his credit lies in thrashing and systematizing things utilized and in modifying them when that is necessary as evidenced in his incorporation of the Alaṁkārasamīkṣā of the Dhv.Āl. Ch. II which Mammaṭa did not incorporate in the K.P.; in his finding fault with Mammaṭa's eightfold division of Guṇībūtavyaṅgya; and, in his use of Kuntaka's approach towards figures of speech.[7]

Hemachandra's Style of Composition

The Kāvyānuśāsana has been composed in the sūtra style so far as the main topics are concerned, but the author has supplemented it with a gloss called the "Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi" for explaining the views presented in the Sūtras. This gloss consists of a prose exposition as well as illustrations to facilitate easy comprehension of the topics dealt with in the body of the Sūtra text. Thus the Sūtras, numbering 208, together with the gloss and the illustrations cited to bring home the various concepts under explanation, constitute the text of this work, the Kāvyānuśāsana. And this text of the Kāvyānuśāsana provides a fairly complete, systematic and lucid exposition of and information on the subject of Sāhityaśāstra with the express purpose of imparting proficiency to the general student of this Śāstra. However, from the point of view of the advanced student, it was necessary to achieve completeness of information and fullness of treatment in regard to the several complex and intricate aspectis of poetics and Dramaturgy. Hence, to achieve that goal, Hemachandra composed another commentary, a kind of super-commentary or Ṭikā, in which he incorporated "all the available discussions of the previous writers on the subject treated". Hemachandrāchārya calls this super-commentary by the name of "Viveka". Thus, when we speak of the Kāvyānuśāsana, we not only mean the Sūtras, the Vṛtti or gloss with illustrations, but also the Viveka Ṭikā – especially when we are critically looking at it as a comprehensive, authoritative and useful text-book on Indian Literary Criticism. And it is, actually, due to the three-tier method adopted by the author of Kāvyānuśāsana that the work has been considered dependable for the study of Sāhityaśāstra, and it has retained its currency as a text-book during the past several centuries.

The Nature and the Division of the Contents

The Kāvyānuśāsana is divided into eight chapters and, on an analysis of the contents of these chapters, it is

obvious that, while the first six chapters are devoted to an exhaustive treatment of all the relevant aspects of Sanskrit poetics, the seventh and the eighth chapters furnish a general description of the different types of the hero and the heroine in a literary composition and the various kinds of poetic compositions or literary forms in which Drama occupies a very important place. Thus, within the span and expanse of eight chapters, Hemachandra has concentrated on exhaustively dealing with the subject of Sāhityaśāstra as a whole. And, as already mentioned, in this work, we get a detailed tratment of each important topic, furnished with interesting discussions and critical observations on many major and minor matters and a large number of lively as well as instructive verses cited from numerous works from the vast Sanskrit and Prakrit Literatures, to explicate important literary concepts such as the purpose of poetry, the grounds of poetry, the equipment of a poet, the nature or definition of poetry, the essential constituent elements of poetry – Word, Sense, Sentiment, Excellences, Poetic Blemishes and Figures of Speech, the theories of word and meaning, various linguistic, semantic and poetic processes that aid the aesthetic or poetic enjoyment, the factors that hinder this process, the characteristics and types of the heroes and heroines and the divisions of compositions with their sub-divisional characteristics.

The Siginficant Title of the Work

Thus the Kāvyānuśāsana systematically deals with all the different aspects of Kāvya in its broadest sense and justifies its existence and name. Kuntaka, the author of the Vakroktijivita, says that writers must name their works in such a way that the name itself reveals the core of the subject. This is a sound piece of advice which stipulates that works should be significantly named. Tested on this touch-stone, the title of the Kāvyānuśāsana appears entirely appropriate and significant. Because, while the word Kāvya was generally utilized by the earlier authors either with Alaṁkāra or Prakāśa

(as in the case of Kāvyālaṁkāra or Kāvyaprakāśa) to signify certain view-points, but in the case of Hemachandra, the work, viz. the Kāvyānuśāsana, is part of a series of works to deal scientifically with the Sanskrit Language and Literature. This is the significance of the words Śabda, Kāvya and Chanda being compounded with Anuśāsana. In this sense, this work is a treatise on the science of Literature or Kāvyaśāstra. It will be noticed that Hemachandra's employment of the title "Kāvyānuśāsana" is a departure from the general trend since he wanted to treat of Poetics and Dramaturgy as an independent discipline or Departmeht of Letters. A study of this work reveals that with its Sūtras, the gloss, the super-commentary and a wealth of critical and illustrative material as well as with its systematic arrangement and treatment of the subject-matter, the name "Kāvyānuśāsana" given to the work stands fully vindicated and as such the work deserves the title of the 'Science of Poetry' or the treatise on Literature, i.e., Sāhityaśāstra.

The Purpose and Method of the Critical Study

In view of the fact that Hemachandrāchārya himself develops the subject-matter of his work by keeping in view the logical connection of the topics with the central idea of Literature, and in order to study the rich critical material presented under the different topics in the different chapters in a graded manner, it has been thought advisable to attempt a critical study of the Kāvyānuśāsana with its gloss and the illustrations in the gloss along with the Viveka Commentary which is full of critical and illustrative material, **chapter-wise,** by critically studying the contents of the three-tier text in each chapter, together with a comparative assessment of the topics and concepts so studied. Thus the poetical concepts dealt with in the eight chapters have been critically studied in the first seven chapters and the study is finalised by reviewing Hemachandra's "Theory of Literature" and by attempting a "Critical Review of Hemachandra's Achievement" in the

Kāvyānuśāsana as a whole, thus showing its importance today in the field of Indias Aesthetics.

Thus almost the whole of the study has been taken up by the conceptual and critical study of the text. And the last chapter attempts to consider synoptically the questions connected with the life and works of Hemachandrāchārya as well as such allied matters as are of historical and general interest.

Study of the Viveka Commentary

It is well known that the Viveka Commentary on the Kāvyānuśāsana is a mine of much valuable critical as well as illustrative material. In view of this, a sincere attempt is made to provide a detailed and thorough study of the Viveka Commentary in so far as its critical as well as the illustrative aspects are concerned. And, it can be confidently stated that the study of the body of the Kāvyānuśāsana text including the gloss along with the whole of the Viveka spread over the whole work shows the Kāvyānuśāsana in a new light and brings out much aesthetically stimulating information which has great critical value. The gloss is intended to extend the views of the Sūtrakāra, while the Viveka Commentary aims at 'explaining in great detail.' In other words, the Viveka of the Kāvyānuśāsana serves to further explain the Sūtras as well as the gloss, and to add something new to what is given in the body of the text. Hence its importance.

Hemachandra's unconventional and independent views on several major and minor issues found lying scattered in the gloss and the Viveka Commentary have been carefully correlated in detailed expositions in the course of the study of the text and critically reviewed in order to provide a new perspective to judge this work. Thus, this whole study is made with a view to (1) appreciating Hemachandra's approach to Poetry, (2) reviewing its merits and short-comings in a critical manner, and (3) bringing out the importance of the critical and literary

material found in the three-tier text, explaining its theoretical implications.

The method of study is so devised as to help the understanding of the text in all its three layers and aspects as also to bring out the sense of each and every passage – especially of the Viveka text which has been only partially handled so far. Care is taken to evaluate the views presented here so as to help judge the work of Hemachandra and realize his place in Sanskrit Poetics.

This study thus deals with all such topics of the Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra as are intimately connected with poets, poetry and poetics, and reviews critically many major or minor issues arising out of the text in so far as the composition and appreciation of poetry are concerned. It also attempts to correlate scattered opinions and views and comments and observations with the author's Theory of Literature and studies carefully the complex interplay of a wide range of factors in the creative process.

It will be seen that Hemachandra's three tier text tackles theoretical ideas and concepts in an integrated manner. Hence the method of this critical and analytical study is essentially an integrated one. As a result, it has become possible to systematically highlight Hemachandra's considered views on the highways and byways of Sanskrit literary criticism. As our chief concern here has been with Hemachandra's Poetics–Aesthetics, I have followed the method of presentation of this study as under :

Chapter One : The Poetic Universe

Chapter Two : The Poetic Meaning

Chapter Three : The Aesthetic Experience

Chapter Four : The Poetic Blemishes or Doṣas

THE POETIC UNIVERSE

1

Broadly speaking, the first chapter of the Kāvyānuśāsana is concerned with the aim, the scope and the province of the science of poetry in consonance with the then latest theories of poetry. The author of the Kāvyānuśāsana, Āchārya Hemachandra, therefore, picks and chooses such topics of the Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra as are intimately connected with poets, poetry and poetics, and, after arranging them in a graded manner, sets about dealing with them in this chapter as systematically and comprehensively as possible. Thus he treats of the topics of,

(1) the "correct speech" and the "poetic speech",

(2) the purpose of poetry,

(3) the grounds of poetry,

(4) the training and equipment of a poet,

(5) the poetic conventions,

(6) the problems of originality and plagiarism,

(7) the definition of poetry,

(8) the constituents of poetry and their inter-relation and their relation with the soul of poetry,

(9) the definitions of Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, i.e., the Poetic Blemishes, Excellences and Embellishments, respectively,

(10) the creative and aesthetic principle of Rasa and Dhvani,

(11) the nature and functions of the word and the sense

(12) the suggested meaning – its varieties and examples, its relation with the primary and the secondary powers of the word, and

(13) the best type of the suggested sense : Rasa-Dhvani, its definition, varieties and illustrations.

The array of the different topics connected with the various aspects of the composition and appreciation of Kāvya, impressive as it is, reveals at once, on the one hand, the importance of these topics in the author's Theory of Literature and, on the other, the complex interplay of a wide range of factors in the creative process. But, on an analysis of the various poetical concepts treated of in this chapter, we find that it is not only the wide range of the topics, terms and concepts that is impressive here, but it is also the logical and graded arrangement of these topics and concepts as well as the extensive and intensive discussions that are attempted in relation to these topics, terms and concepts that both attract and satisfy the reader.

As mentioned in the Prelude, the author of the Kāvyānuśāsana has adopted a three-tier method, a novel method indeed, which involves the composition of the aphorisms, of an explanatory gloss (Vṛtti) with examples and of a super-commentary (Ṭīkā). It seems the name Kāvyānuśāsana applies to the aphorisms which state the topics and define them in a traditionally accepted terminology of poetics while the gloss or Vṛtti called the Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi explains and makes the Sūtras or aphorisms easy or intelligible through the method of elucidation, discussion and illustration. The purpose of the super-commentary or Ṭīkā called the Viveka seems to be to

supply additional theoretical information and to attempt an in-depth discussion of several important terms, ideas and concepts related to the topic under discussion for the more advanced reader of the text. The Viveka as also the Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi, contains a large number of interesting and instructive verses culled from the vast Sanskrit literature in order to illustrate and bring home to the reader the abstract concepts dealt with in the body of the text.

The Benedictory Verses

The first chapter opens with two verses which purport to be benedictory verses. Of these two verses, the first one briefly states that Āchārya Hemachandra, after tendering his obeisance to the Supreme Soul, composes the (tretise calleld) Kāvyānuśāsana with a view to delight the learned (in the filed of Poetics). It appears that this opening verse of the Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi is merely an introductory verse in which the title of the treatise as well as the author's name are mentioned in all humility. The author, therefore, composes another benedictory verse (1.1) – a regular benedictory verse, a Maṅgalaśloka which marks the commencement of the Kāvyānuśāsana proper in keeping with the time-honoured practice of ancient Sanskrit writers who usually begin their works with a salutation or benediction with a view to propitiating the appropriate diety and warding off obstacles in the path of the successful completion of the work undertaken.[1] In the present verse (I.1), Hemachandra propitiates the Jainī speech,[2] viz. the Ardhamāgadhī language in which the religious literature of Jainism has found expression. This propitiation of the speech of the Jina by Hemachandra is appropriate because, as the author himself points out, the speech of the Jina is the Samucitā Iṣṭadevatā in the present context; firstly, since speech is the medium of poetry, it is intimately connected with the subject-matter of the present work which is a work on poetics and, secondly, as the author of this work, Āchārya Hemachandra, is a renowned Jain author

and preacher, it is but natural for him to offer his obeisance, most fittingly, to the Speech or the language of the Jina i.e., the Ardhamāgadhī language, the language of the sacred literature of the Jainas. On both these counts, Hemchandra's attampt to praise and worship the Jainī language is fully justified. But, apart from the formal sense in which the praise of and salutation to the Jainī speech can be justified, there are more weighty reasons that impell the Jaina Āchārya to propitiate the Jainī language. According to the author, the Ardhamāgadhī language which became the language of the Jina, or the conqueror of the evil passions that assail the human mind, viz. attachment etc., and came to be regarded as the sacred language of the Jainas since their sacred books are contained in it, has three important qualifications which make it eminently suited for propitiation by a Jaina. These reasons are :

(1) Every word of it is full of natural sweetness. It can also be easily understood even by children, women and dull persons; that is to say the lofty ideals and profound religious and philosophical tenets of Jainism can be easily understood in this sweet, non-artificial and simple language,

(2) It leads to final emancipation or beautitude by imparting knowledge of right conduct along with right knowledge and right faith; conveys the true nature of things with its three characteristics as well as the science of numbers; and contains the religious tales. In short, it contains all the four divisions of the sacred literature in it,

(3) It was the only language at the start of creation, but, subsequently it transformed itself ihto all the different languages of the gods, of the human beings, of the barbarians and the animals.

The author quotes two verses to substantiate the view that the Ardhamāgadhī language makes for easy reading by children

and the like and that the later languages of gods and the like called Daivī etc. are but transformations of the divine Ardhamāgadhī which is a variety of the Prākṛata language very much like water which undergoes a change of form when it resides in different reservoirs. Thus the verse, in short, means that Hemachandra holds the Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit in the highest regard because it is the language in which Lord Mahāvīra preched his doctrines and also because it is the oldest and the purest of all languages. Hence he offers a fuller exposition of the different terms used in the second verse and brings out the essentially sacred and ancient characteristics of the Jainī speech. This, according to him, reveals the purity of the origin of the speech which, therefore, is highly preise-worthy and eminently useful. In the same gloss, he goes on to explain what the word 'speech' signifies. That which is uttered is speech, and it is a transformation of the Dravya or the existent thing as it is made up of syllables or letters, words, sentences, etc. while explaining the first characteristic of the Jainī speech, Hemachandra states in his gloss that the natural sweetness and simplicity of this language may be confused with such qualities of music, song etc. and therefore, the second epithet that it contains profound religious principles which ensure final beautitube, is added. The Viveka commentary supplements the discussion on the unique qualities of the Ardhamāgadhī language by explaining the fourfold division of things in conformity with the Jain religious tenets. Accordingly, the fourfold division includes,

(1) right conduct,

(2) knowledge of the true nature of things,

(3) knowledge of Gaṇīta, and

(4) an acquaintance with the religious and didactic literature consisting of parables and biographics of great men.

In view of such vital significance of this language for the Jainist faith, and also in view of the greatest blessing that this language brings in for the larger and ultimate

good of all the creatures, it is natural for this apostle of the Jaina church to dwell on the simplicity, beauty and miraculous powers of the Jaini speech with deep reverance and meditation.

The Object of the Work and its Title

Having introduced the name and qualifications of the author, the title and subject-matter of the work and having meditated upon the miraculous powers of the Jaini speech, the author has prepared a proper background for the present work to get off to a good start. It is, therefore, but proper now that the author should proceed to deal with the practical aspects of the study of this work or the four requisities of a literary work. As per the practice of the writers of scientific treatises it is necessary to state the subject of the treatise, the aim of the treatise, their inter-connection or relationship and the qualified reader of the work.[3] So, with a view to introduce the subject of the treatise and to show its purpose, Hemachandra states in the next verse (I. 2) that the nature of 'correct speech' having been fully explained by him in his preceding treatise on Grammar, called the Śabdānuśāsana, he now proposes to scientifically and systematically deal with the subject of the poetic speech or the theory of literature. To elaborate this statement, Hemachcndra adds in the gloss of this verse that prior to the composition of the present work, he composed a work on Grammar entitled the 'Siddhahema' in which he distinguished 'correct words' from 'incorrect words' and, now, in this work, composed by himself, he plans to discuss the nature and the different aspects of poetry in a scientific and thorough manner. This is possible because, when the correctness of speech[4] is determined, it is easy to impart instructions about poetry which has the speech for its medium. And, due to the identity of the authors of the two works, he, himself being the author of both the works, and moreover, as both the works are complementary to each other, it is not necessary to deal with what has been explicity taught in the Śabdānuśāsana.

From this statement of the author, it is clear that a thorough discussion of the nature of poetry (i.e., poetics) is to form the subject matter of the present work called the Kāvyānuśāsana. But, not being satisfied with the above statement of the author, the reader may want to know the purpose of poetry before knowing the nature of poetry. In order to satisfy such readers and also to comply with the tradition of the writers of yore, Hemachandra proceeds to state (I. 3) the aim or purpose of poetry.

The Purpose of Poetry (I. 3)

Poetry leads to Delight and Fame, and results in advice like that of a beloved wife. Poetry, according to the gloss, is the extra-ordinary creation of a poet. In two well known quotations - one from Bhaṭṭa Tauta and another from Bhāmaha - furnished in the gloss, the terms Pratibhā, Kavi and Kāvya are explained and their inter-connection described. Thus, when a poet is gifted with the facund powers of poetic creativity and imagination, he is able to describe things in the most graphic way and it is this creation of the poet, inspired and impelled by poetic genius, that is called 'poetry' or Kāvya.[5]

(1) Poetic delight

Coming to the **three** distinct effects or consequences of reading or creating poetry. Hemachandra first explains the first concept of poetic delight in his gloss. The nature of this delight or supreme joy is (a) that it is born instantly on enjoying or relishing the sentiments in a poem and (b) that, under its influence, the enjoyer becomes oblivious of everything else; (c) hence this joy is of the nature of self-realisation. This delight or supreme joy is the highest of all the aims of poetry and it is enjoyed both by the poet and the reader. In the Vivek commentary, Hemachandra makes a further remark on this joy as being the highest purpose of poetry. He observes that, while it is true that fame and knowledge result from poetry, in the ultimate analysis, it is the poetic delight

2

or supreme joy or aesthetic rapture which everywhere ranks highest among all the aims of poetry. In fact, even the fame that a poet acquires, results in making the poet happy. Thus it is Joy or Bliss that matters most in a poetic experience. This is borne out by the experience of all the connoisseurs of art, viz. that, though they derive knowledge of the world from acquaintance with poetry, still their cheif object is to enjoy the pleasure of an aesthetic experience. For, if knowledge without joy was favoured by a reader, why would the third aim of poetry, viz., the delectable advice in the manner of a beloved wife, find a place among the aims of poetry in preference to knowledge imparted by the Vedic commands and the Epic exhortation ? Again, even if Kāvya helps one to achieve the fourfold goal or values of life by imparting Knowledge about it, the final aims or fruit thereof is Bliss which is another name for Supreme Joy.

(2) Fame or the glory of the Poetic Art

Hemachandra declares that the second consequence of poetry is fame and it always accrues to the poet alone. It is the exclusive prerogative of the poet that by writing immortal pieces of literature, he should win lasting fame. Poets like Kālidāsa and others, though centuries have passed since they flourished and composed their works, are remembered and praised even to this day by appreciative readers and responsive critics. It is due to the glory of their poetic art that they have become immortal in the hearts of their readers.

(3) Poetic Advice : Poetry teaches while it pleases

As for the third fruit of poetry, which consits in advice in the sweet manner of a beloved wife, Hemachandra gives a succinct exposition of the phrase 'Kāntātulyatayopadeśāya ca' in his gloss. He states that all advice or beneficial instruction is communicated in three different ways : (a) like a master, (b) like a friend and (c) like a beloved. The words of the Vedas, in which the word is important, express peremptory

commands which have to be unquestionably obeyed. In such authoritative texts, the meaning is literal and direct. The words of the ancient epics and such other legendary works, wherein the meaning is persuasive (and it is the spirit in which the advice is given that is important), are like a friend's words. Here the spirit behind the advice is to be taken into account. But the way of poetry in which both word and sense occupy a subordinate position, and wherein the sentiment is the principle thing, is like a beloved's way.[6] Just as a beloved wife's advice is brought home to us in the most agreeable manner, so also poetry reveals its sentiment, which is a source of supreme joy or bliss, through a process called 'suggestion'. Thus the delightful advice which a poem tenders is compared to the sweet and persuasive advice of the beloved who delights us as she advises us. What poetry does is that it creates in us a state of blissfulness through poetic relish and thus makes us favourably disposed to receive the advice, if any. Thus, the advice tendered by poetry is never direct or given in so many words; on the contrary, it teaches while it pleases. This is the peculiar difference between the method of poetry on the one hand and those of the Vedas and the Purāṇas in so far as the communication of advice is concerned. It tells us to behave like Rāma and not like Rāvaṇa, absolutely indirectly–exactly like a loving wife makes us do something by winning us over through her charming and loving behaviour.[7]

The Connoisseur of Poetry

It may be noted here that Hemachandra's first and third aims of poetry are intimately connected. And even the second aim, viz., fame, according to Hemachandra, is related to the first one, that is, Joy. This third fruit of poetry, viz., advice which is conveyed in a sweet and indirect manner, like a sugar-coated pill as it were, accrues to the sensitive reader or enjoyer of poetry. Hemachandra uses the word Sahṛdaya for this responsive reader and explains it in the super-commentary

called Viveka (para 4). Accordingly, the Sahṛdaya is a men who has a mind rendered clear and pure by constant parusal of poetry, who has the capacity to identify himself with the subject-matter of the poem and who is thus able to respond to the sentiments delineated in it. According to Hemachandra, poetry comes before its appreciation and though the same person may be a poet and a responsive reader, the two faculties are distinct. In this connection, he quotes with approval what Abhinavagupta has said in his commentary 'Locana's (page 1), viz., that the art of literature reveals two aspects – that of the creator and that of the connoisseur. Hemachandra also elaborates on poetry's capacity both to delight and instruct in his Viveka (page 5). He holds that as compared to the other means of instructing young princes in the various means of state policy, poetry is the best means in as much as it wins them over through delighful advice. Poetry provides the way to their hearts through the delectation of the various sentiments. And these sentiments, being delineated by means of a conjunction of poetic apparatus, suggesting the fourfold goals of life as well as the means thereof, cause the enjoyers to imbibe unconsciously practical wisdom while relishing poetic sentiment. Hence it is delight that induces reception of knowledge. To sum up this discussion on poetic advice, Hemachandra quotes in his gloss three lines of a verse by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the author of the lost work called the Hṛdayadarpana whose theory of aesthetic enjoyment involves a peculiar process known as Sādhāranikaraṇa. Herein Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka distinguishes between Śāstra and Ākhyāna on the one hand, and Kāvya on the other by stating that whereas Śāstra and Ākhyāna emphasize the importance of the word and the sense respectively, poetry consists in the prominence of the poetic process (of suggestion) and the subordination of the word and the sense. Bhaṭṭa Nayāka posits Abhidhā, Bhāvakatva and Bhogikṛti as the three powers of a word.

Poetry and Morality

Now, Hemachandra clarifies one point connected with the instruction that a poem may provide. The poetic advice may be good or bad. One may point out examples of poems with distinct immoral overtones. As an example of such a poem, he quotes in the Viveka, a verse containing a harlot's indecent, unsocial and queer advice to her daughter, which is attributed to the Karnatic poetess Vijjikā in the anthologies. Such poems provide immoral advice. So the conclusion is unavoidable that such advice is unfit to be accepted. To this contention, Hemachandra agrees, but says : "Such verses are only apparently immoral in tone; but in real terms, they serve to dissuade the readers from acting in the way shown in the verses." This forthright stand of Hemachandra on an important question of morality in literature is noteworthy.

Mammaṭa's Aims of Poetry Criticised

While Mammaṭa has laid down six purposes of poety, Hemachandra has mentioned only three, viz. Ānanda, Yaśas and Kāntātulyatayopadeśa. He has thus omitted Mammaṭa's wealth, culture and knowledge and freedom from evil. And he has very good reasons for his selectiveness here because in his gloss as well as in his commentary, Hemachandra defends his stand and refutes criticism of his choice. In the gloss, he makes it clear that he has deliberately avoided the mention of wealth, wordly knowledge and removal of evils in the list of purposes of poetry as wealth is not definite and of poetry alone and knowledge can be accomplished by reading the scriptures and evils can be warded off by other means as well. He reverts to this question in his commentary Viveka and criticises Mammaṭa and others for giving examples of Śrīharṣa and Dhāvaka, as also for stating that wealth, shrewdness in worldly life and warding off of evils accrue from poetry. Wealth, for instance, can not definitely be said to accrue from poetry at all times. He reinforces his position on

this point by quotation from the Śāntiśataka (3. 32) which implies that "it is futile to expect wealth as a fruit of the seed of learning which results in quietitude; for things which have their fruit determined, can not be made to yield other fruits, indeed it is not possible for the seed of wheat to produce a sprout of barley !" Thus it is futile to connect wealth with poetry, so also it is wrong to affirm worldly wisdom and the removal of evil, of poetry.

The cause of Poetry : Pratibhā[9]

After detailing and defending the effects of poetry, Hemachandra proceeds to state the cause or grounds of poetry. According to him, the main cause of poetry is poetic genius. This genius or Pratibhā is a vivid imagination or faculty of bright conception. In the gloss, he elucidates his statement about Pratibhā by defining it as an in-born poetic talent marked by the ability to create ever new things. This in-born poetic ability is the main cause of poetry. Though learning and constant practice in the composition of poetry are the two other factors that enhance the power of the in-born or innate poetic genius, Hemachandra does not give them a berth in the definition of the ground of poetry since he is of the firm opinion that these latter two factors only help train and refine the in-born genius, and so they are not the grounds of poetry. They are thus relegated to a secondary position as aids to the poet's power of creation.

An off-beat Interpretation of the Twofold Creative Power

The genius or Pratibhā is twofold. In-born and Produced. In-born or Sahajā Pratibhā is defined in terms of the technical notions of the Jain philosophy of Karma. The key terms in the Sūtra are Āvaraṇa, Kṣaya and Upaśama, and they mean 'obstruction', 'total destruction' and 'checking' or 'preventing from taking effect' respectively. Thus the first kind of Pratibhā, viz., the Sahajā Pratibhā manifests itself when the obstacles which impede its course are totally destroyed and when the

future obstacles are removed beforehand. Acording to the Jaina Philosophy of Karma, various Āvaraṇas such as the Jñānāvaraṇa, Darśanāvaraṇa, etc., are created by the different Karmas such as Jñānavaraṇīyakarma, etc., and they cumulatively create obstructions for the soul by tainting its pure nature. It is only when these obstacles are either totally destroyed or removed before their rise that the soul regains its pristine glow or purity. To bring out the sense of this Sūtra (No. 5), Hemachandra explains the abstract idea of the purity of the Sahajā Pratibhā on the analogy of the Sun, the clouds and the clear light of the Sun. When clouds etc. obstruct the light of the Sun, which is a self-luminous celestial body, it cannot shine; when, however, the obstacles such as clouds and the like are removed, the Sun, once again, shines in its natural lustre; much in the same way, when obstacles such as Jñānāvaraṇa are totally destroyed and when no further possibility of any impediment being there exists, the in-born genius of a man shines out in its innate lustre. No outside aid is required to produce such a genius. 'Mātra' in the Sūtra serves to suggest that no external causes such as charms and incantations are needed for the birth of the natural talent in a poet. To illustrate the extraordinary power of the in-born genius, Hemachandra mentions the case of the disciples of Lord Mahāvīra, the Gaṇadharas who, through the immense power of their natural genius, composed the Dvādaśāṅgī, the twelve sacred scriptures of Jainism.

The second division of Genius is the artificial or conditional talent called Aupādhikī Pratibhā which is produced by means of (muttering) the mystic incantations and such other aids. It must be noted that Kṣaya and Upaśama of the Āvaraṇas are equally necessary in bringing about the artificial genius, as Hemachandra clearly points out in the gloss. But the difference, which is emphasized in the gloss, is that, while in the Sahajā variety of Pratibhā, the Kṣaya and Upaśama

of the Āvaraṇa take place naturally, in the second kind of the Aupādhikī Pratibhā the Kṣaya and Upaśama of the Āvaraṇa are caused by artificial means such as Mantra, Devtānugraha etc.

Vyutapatti and Abhyāsa : Aids of Pratibhā

Although Hemachandra has empatically declared that Pratibhā is the sole cause of poetry, yet he does not rule out the importance of Vyutpatti or learning and Abhyāsa or practice. He, therefore, treats of them in a separate Sūtra and concedes that the in-born talen in a poet needs to be cultivated by means of learning and study. However, he makes it clear that these are never the direct causes of Pratibhā but they only enhance the power of Pratibhā and thus help it indirectly, for, without poetic gen us or in-born disposition to create, learning and study are futile.

Since Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa aid the creative power of the poet, Hemachandra defines these two concepts. Vyutpatti is the proficiency one acquires in the knowledge of the world the, close study of the different Śāstras and the poetical compositions of previous writers. Thus the topic of Vyutpatti deals with a thorough knowledge of humanity as a whole and the observation of human nature and of the vast world made up of animate and inanimate things. It also implies profound learning and extensive acquaintance with numerous subjects such as grammar, prosody, lexicons, Vedic and allied branches of Literature, history, logic, dramaturgy, erotics, the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya, systems of Yoga and poems composed by great poets of yesteryears.

Like Vyutpatti, Abhyāsa also aids the creative activity of a poet. Hence, Hemachandra emphasizes the importance of constant practice in writing poetry under proper and able guidance of those who know how to compose literature or to judge it. Thus he accords equal place to both Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa as factors necessary for the devel opment and cultivation

of the in-born Poetic genius. Nevertheless, Hemachandra sticks to his **original stand** that the pride of the place in the creative process belongs to Pratibhā as the latter is the sole cause of poetry and that Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa help in the cultivation of that innate creative faculty that goes by the name of poetic genius or Pratibhā. While the aphorism (No. 7) serves to introduce the twin concepts of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa, the gloss on the same aphorism serves to make Hemachandra's position clear on the issue of poetic genius. He, therefore, states explicity that Vyutpatti and Abhyāsā are not the direct causes of poetry; but they are only aids to Pratibhā which causes poetry to be created. Thus, without in-born genius, mere proficiency in the knowledge of the world, the rules of composition as well as lots of labour in application or practice are of no use. For, knowledge and practice are seen to be pointless in a man who is devoid of poetic talent.

As a matter of fact, Hemachandra wants to reinforce the point made in his gloss on aphorism No. 4 in which he defined Pratibhā as the sole cause of poetry. It was in this gloss that he declared that Pratibhā is the imaginative faculty of creating new things ceaselessly and hinted that the twin help-mates of Pratibhā viz., Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa would be dealt with subsequently.

Vyutpatti Defined

So, after demonstrating the mutual relation between Pratibhā on the one hand and Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa on the other, Hemachandra turns to the definition of Vyutpatti in the next Sūtra (8). Vyutpatti, thus, is the proficiency in poetry, all sciences and the things of the world around us. This brief statement about Vyutpatti is elaborated in the gloss. Vyutpatti includes an extensive knowledge, on the part of the poet, of the vast world around us both animate and inanimate as well as a keen observation of the nature and behaviour of people. It also implies that the poet should be well-versed in

the different branches of knowledge. In other words, Vyutpatti means deep learning and extensive acquaintance with manifold branches of literature such as the science of words, i.e. grammar, the science of metres, i.e. Prosody, Lexicography, the scriptural literature called Śruti, the Smṛtis, the Purāṇas, the Epics and historical books, the Āgamas, Logic, Dramaturgy, Politics and Economics, Erotics, Yoga Philosophy and Psychology as well as special practical sciences like treatises on Elephants, Horses, Swords, jewellary, matallurgy, gambling, magic, archery and the auxiliary sciences such as Astronomy, Astrology, Phonetics etc. Some of these sciences are enumerated by name in the list given in the gloss, while the minor sciences are hinted at by the word Ādi (etc.) used at the end of the expression. Thus, the range of the poet's knowledge is indeed formidable and staggering.

The poet is to be sufficiently conversant with these systematic bodies of knowledge so that he can press it into service while composing his creative works. To emphasis this point, Hemachandra provides in his sub-commentary, Viveka, a long list of illustrations to prove that the Sanskrit poets actually displayed versatility of genius and tremendous powers of scientific discription when they dealt with the different situations in their literary works so as to make them realistic. Thus, he explains in his Viveka that the word Loka includes all kinds of objects animate as well as inanimate, and their behavour. This Loka is of numerous types based on location, time and the like, and a detailed discussion of this is attempted in the Chapter[10] devoted to the flaws of the sentiment, particularly in relation to the sevenfold nature of the universal objects. So far as the literary, philosophical, religious, mythological as well as the organic and inorganic physical disciplines are concerned, the Viveka commentary provides a large number of poetical illustrations to demonstrate the practical utility of the poet's knowledge of the different scientific and creative disciplines. Examples of

the concrete and efficient use of grammar, prosody, glossaries of words and dictionaries, Smṛti literature, the Purāna literature, History, the scriptures of the Shaiva and Buddhist faiths, Logic or philosophy of the Jainas, the Buddhists, materialists, the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāyavaiśeṣika schools, Dramaturgy, Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, Erotics, Science of Medicine, Astronomy, reatises on Elephants, Horses, Jewellary, Metallurgy, Gambling, Magic, Painting and Archery are given. Here the method adopted by the author is first to state a scientific principle and then to show how the essence of that principle is correctly and poetically applied in the verse.

Poetry and the various Sciences

In most of the cases, the Viveka commentary defines and explains terms such as Śabdānuśāsanam, Chando'nuśāsanam, Abhidhānakośa etc. and points out its relevence to poetry before illustrating the poet's proficiency in the various arts and sciences. In order to make his point convincing and his exposition authentic as well as of immense practical values to the novice pupil, Hemachandra has selected his examples with care from well known sources. Moreover, in the course of his exposition of the gloss on the definition of Vyutpatti, particularly in the gloss on knowledge, the Viveka commentary contains significant remarks and comments. Thus, for instance, he illustrates Śabdānuśāsana by means of a well known couplet of Bhaṭṭa Muktikalaśa which contains the name of the six types of compounds (Samāsas) treated in the treatises on Grammar. Thus he illustrates the poet's proficiency in the subject of grammar though, in this particular verse, the words, Dvigu, Dvandva, Avyayībhāva, Tatpuruṣa, Karmadhāraya and Bahuvrīhi are so used and constructed as to yield two senses, one, traditional grammatical sense and another poetically interesting but humurous sense. Another point to be noted in connection with his illustrations of the various sciences is that the author always introduces the illustration by explaining the meaning and utility of the science under

illustration. Thus, while refering to Śabdānuśāsana, he first explains that it is grammar and that from a study of grammar, purity and chasteness of language results, and then quotes the verse Dvigurapi etc. Similarly, with reference to Chando'nuśāsana he says it is known as Chando'viciti (Metrics) and then explains that, although a good deal of metrics can be known from reading poetry, still an exact knowledge of the measurement of particularly difficult metres can be definitely obtained from the science of metres. Then he illustrates the poet's proficiency in metrics by quoting an example from his own work on matrics, the Chando'nuśāsana (Chapter 2, Sū. 48). The third systematic work that a poet has to consult on and off is the Dictionary of names, viz. Abhidhānakośa which is described as a 'string of names' (Nāmamālā). This is a constant companion of the poet in as much as it helps the poet in determining the precise meanings of a word and its synonyms. Thus by means of a lexicon, the budding poet improves his vocabulary as also ascertains the precise senses of the different words. Now, while illustrating the poet's knowledge of words and their precise meanings as well as a clever use by him of these in his compositions, Hemachandra introduces a discussion as to whether or not a poet is at liberty to select totally new words from the dictionary for employment in his composition.[11] Incidentally, Hemachandra borrows a passage from the third Chapter of the First Adhikaraṇa of Vāmana's Kāvyālaṁkārāsūtravṛtti,[12] where Vāmana has discussed this question. The passage means that the employment of a new word (which is never before used by well known authors) by the poet, by virtue of his knowledge of the dictionary is not **proper**; for, an unprecedented use of such words is considered to be a flaw in the composition and this flaw is known as the fault of the word (Padadoṣa). Now, if it be objected that, since here a word already employed is to be employed, then what is there to create a doubt about the meaning of that word ? In other words, proficiency in the lexicons is not necessary

because such proficiency is superfluous. However, as Vāmana points out, this kind of objection is misplaced. For, the new word's incapability of being employed amounts to its inability to help communication of meaning without delay. And the communication of a meaning is always by means of common sense. For example, someone has a definite idea that the Sanskrit word "Nīvī" means the knot of the lower garmet (an undergarment), but he entertains a doubt as to whether the garment belongs to a woman or a man. So he looks up a standard dictionary wherein it is clearly mentioned that "Nīvī" means a "knot of the under-garment of a woman". Vāmana proceeds further, and takes a concrete example in which the word Jaghana occurs with a horse. Now, for a student of literature, who is aware that the word Jaghana refers to three things – a back (of a horse), the race or breed (of a being) as also the lower part (of the body) – the sense of 'the knot of an under-garment' will definitely arise in his mind though he will not know whether the word "Nīvī" refers to a man or woman. It is here that the dictionary will clinch the issue in favour of a woman's garment. Thus, a reference to a certain chapter of the dictionary proves to be of great help to a budding poet. Hemachandra has abridged Vāmana's gloss on Sūtra-5 of Chapter 3 of Adhikaraṇa-I, since, if you take the whole discussion in Vāmana's work, it contains a very interesting and instructive argument. Incidentally. Hemachandra seems to have kept the Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti of Vāmana before him while dealing with the list of the different scientific subjects. This is clear from his adoption and adaptation of Vamana's phraseology while dealing with the sciences of grammar, matrics and lexicons. One only regrets that he has not cared to mention Vāmana's name in his Viveka commentary.

Hemachandra has mentioned Śruti, Smṛti, Purāṇa, Itihāsa, Āgama, Tarka, Nāṭyaśāstra, Arthaśāstra, Kāmaśāstrā and Yogaśāstra in his gloss on the word Śāstra in the Sūtra. Consequently, he takes up each of these subjects for explanation

and illustration in the Viveka commentary. Proceeding to explain these terms, he states that Śruti means the revealed texts of the Vedic literature such as the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, and first quotes a line from tne Śatapath Brāhmaṇa which, when translated, means "Urvaśī, a nymph, verily desired Pururavas, the son of Ilā", and then quotes a verse expressing the same idea poetically. Smṛti means recollection of the revealed texts and quotes a smṛti texts ordaining that if a person is found in possession of a part of any stolen property, he should be held responsible for stealing the whole property. He then quotes a verse from Kālidāsa's play called the "Vikramorvaśīya" (Act IV). Proceeding along the same lines, Purāṇa is explained as consisting of narratives of Vedic episodes and quotes a couplet from the Agnipurāṇa which refers to the fright created in the minds of the gods by the powerful demon Hiraṇyakaśipu. Now, this simple idea of the Purāṇa has been admirably and quite poetically conveyed by the great classical poet Māgha in his Śiśupālavadha (I. 46).

History is explained as a sub-division of the Puraṇic form of literature. Traditionally, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are classified as Itihāsa or Historical texts. Hence, Hemachandra quotes a couplet from the Rāmāyaṇa (IV. 34. 18) wherein the monkey king Sugrīva is advised to behave and keep his promise lest he should follow his brother Valin slain by Rama. This simple, direct verse is transformed into a forceful threat to Sugrīva in Kumārādāsa's Jānakīharaṇa, a well known classic of the Sanskrit language. To illustrate the poet's assimilation of the scriptures, first, a Shaivite verse is quoted in the Viveka Commentary and then appears a verse in which the Bodhisattva extremely selflessly wishes to suffer for the evil deeds of the people at large and wants the people to enjoy the happiness produced by his own good deeds. Content with quoting this typically Buddhistic verse full of benevolence, Hemachandra does not consider it proper to multiply examples of this type from other scriptures such as the Jaina scriptures. Under Tarka or Philosophy, Hemachandra quotes

from the Ārhata or Jain Philosophy, a statement regarding the Jain doctrine that the soul is of the same size as the body and quotes a verse, which utilises this doctrine though, frankly, in a different context. The Buddhist doctrine of prior intention in language (Vivakṣā) is again exemplified in a rather strange context. As for the materialistic doctrine which denies any sentient principle and admits only matter, the poetic proficiency of such a doctrine is illustrated in a verse wherein a believer in the existence of a sentient self in the body is mocked, But the two illustrations of the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāyavaiśeṣika doctrines are taken from the Bhagvadgītā (2.16) and the Śivamahimnastotra (5) respectively, and they constitute very appropriate examples indeed. The Sāṅkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda and the Nyāyavaiśeṣika doctrine of the inscrutable nature of the lord and his boundless power have both found a most effective and moving expression in these verses. However, there is a another, equally effective four-line stanza to illustrate the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the all-prevading nature of Prakṛti (Viveka-18).

The Technical Sciences

Among the other technical science, Hemachandra illustrates Dramaturgy, the science of Polity and the psychological science of Yoga. Bhaṭṭa Śrī Śivaswamin's Invocatory verse serves to bring out all the salient teatures of the theory of Drama as laid down by the sage Bharata. The whole of the Mudrārākṣasa play of Viśākhadatta examplifies the artistic use of the principles of the science of Polity. The Kuṭṭanīmatam of Dāmodaragupta is a work on Erotics. Hence it provides Hemachandra with an apt observation on Erotics couched in poetic parlance. An example of Yoga philosophy of 'turning the search-light inwards' has bees extracted from the Citrabhāratanāṭaka.

The gloss on "Sāstra" (K.A.S.I. 8 ff) ends in Ādi which means 'et cetera'. According to Hemacachandra, this is meant to include other Śāstras also. They are the science of medicine,

astronomy etc. A verse from the Padyakādambarī (Kādambarī, in verse) describes the visible symptoms of fever (of love) and shows the author's proficiency in the Āyurveda branch of medicine. The verse of Vidyānanda utilises the terminology of astrology to delineate a love-theme. (Viveka-24). The next few verses of the Viveka commentary (Vv. 25-32), which has vowed at the outset to supply additional reference material, gives illustrations of proficiency in treatises on elephants, horses, gems, metals, gambling, masmerism, painting and archery. The example from Kanakajāṇakī, a well known ancient work, illustrates how as poet can successfully describe the minute characteristics of an animal like an elephant and his inner feelings by a knowledge of the details that constitute the treatise on elephants. Similarly a verse from the Amṛtataraṅgakāvya describes the ocean in high tide and finds therein the various characteristic of a horse in great speed. The knowledge of the characteristics of a gem was also considered useful for the poetic art. The viveka commentary, therefore, includes a verse on Ratnaparīkṣā. A stanza from the viddhaśālabhañjikā illustrates how a poet can demonstrate his acquaintance with the science of metallurgy or that of paints, specially to attempt a graphic description of a loverlorn lady. A poet is also expected to have a modicum of acquaintance with the arts and sciences connected with social pastimes such as gambling, a sleight-of-hand (Indrajāla), painting etc. Examples of verses showing the poet's deftness in using such knowledge are presented in the body of the commentary text. A verse from Candraka shows an artistic use of the vocabulory of the game of dice. Similarly, the well known Indrajāla scene from Śrīharṣa's play, the Ratnāvalī (4. 11) examplifies how an author can surprise the audience by his knowledge of mesmerism by creating an illusory appearance of the heavenly world. A reference to the art of painting is contained in the next verse by Vyāsa. The Kankajānakī, a Rāmāyana poem, describes vividly Rāma poised to shoot an arrow. With this rather exhaustive treatment of the topic of

the poet's adeptness in the different arts, sciences and human nature, the Viveka commentary closes the discussion by remarking that other sciences not included here may suitably be illustrated. This shows that the list of the arts and sciences beneficial for the poetic creation was never final as these arts and sciences grew in volume and number with the growth of civilisation.[13]

The third factor which makes for poetic culture is described as proficiency in the poems of master poets : 'Kāvyeṣu nipuṇatā.' This phrase in the Sūtra clarifies that it is not only necessary for a budding poet to cultivate a general acquaintance with the great works of literature composed upto his time, but it is also imperative that he should know the essence of these masterpieces. In other words, Hemachandra advises the apprentice to feel the throb of the great ancient poetic tradition both from the point of view of creative technique as well as the sublime height of genius revealed therein. In this connection, the concluding line of the gloss on this Sūtra is very significant. Winding up the discussion regarding the importance of culture which consists in the apprentice's proficiency in the worldly subjects as also human nature, in the differents scientific works as well as in the literary masterpieces, Hemachandra aptly remarks in the last sentence of the gloss that it is undoubtely true that a poet, whose in-born creative genius is brightened and sharpened by such proficiency in the different arts, sciences and human nature invariably succeeds in composing excellent poetry without transgressing the bounds of the world, the human nature or the arts and the sciences or the great poetic tradition. Those students of Sanskrit poetics who are familiar with the concept of 'Aucitya' or propriety in poetics will readily realise the purport of Hemachandra's words in लोकादिनिपुणतासंस्कृतप्रतिभो हि तदनतिक्रमेण काव्यमुपनिबध्नाति (K. A. S. I. 8 ff) supported by a line quoted from Bhāmaha (V. 4) which means all arts and sciences help poetry : "There is no word, no object, no smart adage or an art which

poetry does not comprise. Infinitely heavy is the task of a poet." Such is the importance of poetic culture.

Abhyāsa Defined

Poetic culture or Vyutpatti and constant practice in poetic composition or Abhyāsa have been declared by Hemachandra to constitute the refinement of the genius of a poet. As he has dealt with Vyupatti rather elaborately, he now turns to the cognate concept of Abhyāsa (K.A.S.I. 9). In the ninth Sūtra, he, therefore, takes up the treatment of Abhyāsa by stressing the fact that constant practice is nothing but repeated poetic efforts on the part of an apprentice, of course, under the guidance of either one who knows how to write poetry or one who knows how to understand and appreciate poetry or both. In the gloss that follows the Sūtra, the different terms of the definition of Abhyāsa are discussed thereadbare. The key-words of the Sūtra are Kāvyavid and Śikṣā. The word Kāvyavid admits of a two-fold interpretation depending on the meaning of the word Vid in it. Thus, it means Kāvyaṁ vetti, i.e., one who knows how to compose a poem and Kāvyaṁ vinte, i.e. one who knows how to judge a poem, a critic. Thus, a budding poet needs guidance with regard to the practical side as well as the theoretical side of the literary art during his repeated attempts at composition. The word Śikṣā, a topic of considerable interest in Sanskrit poetics, generally means Upadeśa or instruction but Kāvyaśikṣā means guidance in the art of composition from those who are well-versed in writing as well as juding poetry. But guidance alone is not enough. It must be accompanied by enthusiastic and constant creative attempts by the apprentice. For, it is the poetic genius sharpened and refined by assiduous practice that becomes a wish-yielding divine cow capable of producing the nectar of poetry. In support of this statement, a passage from the well-known rhetorician Vāmana (I. 3) is quoted. According to this quotation, "it is through ceaseless efforts that perfection can be acheived in any field of activity. For, a single drop of water cannot wear out a stone."

Poetic Training or Śikṣā defined

As the word Śikṣā is a technical word of Sanskrit poetics, Hemachandra defines the concept of Śikṣā or Kaviśikṣā as it is known to students of Sanskrit poetics.[14] Śikṣā consists of (i) the poetic conventions such as non-mention of things which exist, mentioning non-existent objects, artificial restriction of wide-spread objects to a particular place only and, (ii) dependence in the form of shadow and so on. While adapting and adopting portions both in the body of the text as well as in the commentary from Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṁsā (Chapters XIV, XV), Hemachandra's has been selective. Thus Śikṣā which means training of a poet, is two-fold : (a) consisting of poetic conventions and (b) consisting of imitations of well-known authors in various respects.

Kavisamaya or Poetic Convention

While dealing with the subject of poetic convention or Kavisamaya, the gloss on Sūtra No. 10 (K.A.S.I. 10ff) explains that non-mention of even the actual pertains to genus, substance, quality and action, etc., non-mention of even the not actual relates to genus, substance, quality, action, and so on, restriction means confining to one application, a more widely applicable genus, substance, quality and action etc.

Borrowing or Dependence

Borrowing or Dependence (उपजीवनम्) in the form of 'shadow and so on' (छायादि), can be by way of a sort of 'imaging', 'painted copy-sketch', 'corporeal equivalence' and 'foreign-city-entrance-likeness'. Borrowing can further include 'dependence' in word, line, etc., as may seem proper, on another poem, as well as 'filling-up verses and son on' by virtue of the word Ādi (so on) in the Sūtra (K.A.S.I. 10). These are the instructions of a poet. This analysis of the relevant Sūtra and the Vṛtti thereon clearly shows that Hemachandra restricts

the scope of Kaviśikṣā to only two aspects, viz., Kavisamaya and Haraṇa, as Rājaśekhara has named them rather broadly. Of these, the aspect of Kavisamaya is elaborately dealt with in the Vṛtti. Hemachandra takes up the four-fold division of each of the three poetic conventions.

The three-fold poetic convention

First and foremost, he explains the non-mention of things. Certain objects actually exist in a particular place or at a particular time but the poets' convention regards them as not existing. For example, the Mālati flowers are in fact seen blooming in Spring, the sandal trees put forth flowers, the Asoka tree has fruits, but the poetic convention does not recognise these facts of nature. Consequently, the poets regard Mālati flowers as not at all existing in Spring. The sandal trees do not get flowers and the Asoka tree does not produce any fruit as per the peculiar poetic tradition. Thus the **first poetic convention** consists in not describing things as existing even when they actually exist. Four types of non-mentioning can be distinguished. It may pertain to Jāti called Sāmanya in the above instances (Vivek-61-63) of Mālati, the sandal tree and the Asoka tree; Dravya or substance; Guṇa or quality; and Kriyā or action. Examples of non-mention of Dravya are the absence of moon-light in the dark half of the month in the poetic descriptions, though it actually exists, so also darkness which exists in the bright half of the month, does not figure in poetry at all. As for the absence of Guṇa, the convention regards the quality of redness as not existing in the Kunda buds and the teeth of lovers, the quality of greenness as not residing in the lily and the bud, and the quality of yellowness as not being there in the Priyaṅgu flowers, though all these qualities or colours do characterise these different objects of nature. The fourth characteristic of Kriyā is said to be absent in certain objects, though it is in fact present and observable. For instance, the blue lotus actually blooms by day and the Shefālikā flowers fall off at night, yet the poetic

convention disregards these phenomena, and does not allow the poet to mention these facts at all.

Proceeding to **the second poetic convention** which consists in describing things which are not actually found in a particular place असतोऽपि निबन्धः,the gloss first explains the mentioning of a thing in regard to its genus or Jāti, called Sāmānya here, though not existing. Thus, for instance, all rivers are supposed to possess lotuses of various kinds at all times, all reservoirs of water without exception contain swarms of swans in them, and all mountains are veritable mines of gold and gems, though, in fact, these sweeping statements are contrary to facts. But the poetic convention allows it. Similarly, the presence of substantially (Dravyatva) is affirmed with reference to darkness by describing it as capable of being grasped by hand or as a substance that can be caught in the palm of one's hand or that can be pierced through with a needle, or with reference to moonlight by stating that it can be carried in pots or collected with pots. The presence of qualities such as whitness in glory and laughter, blackness or darkness in infamy and sin, redness in anger and attachment, though not existing in these abstract notions, are poetically conventionalised to be always present in them. The activity of drinking the moonlight is ascribed to the Cakora bird, that of resorting to two different banks or sides of a river at night is attributed to the pair of loving Cakravāka birds, is poetically present, though difficult to verify.

The third poetic convention is stated to be Niyama or restriction. It is defined as restriction of Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya in application, though each of these is capable of being more widely applied. However, on going through the gloss (under Sūtra 10), we find that Hemachandra interprets the word Niyama in two ways : one, restriction of a thing to a particular place or time. This restriction is four-fold, i.e. as pertaining to Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā or Dravya. Secondly, Niyama may simply mean a poetic convention in general. It

is nothing but a peculiar type of poetic convention in virtue of which certain things are considered identical though in actual life they are seen to be different from one another. As per this poetic regulation, the colours dark and green or yellow and red, though different, are considered identical. Similarly, the here and the deer observed in the moon as well as crocodiles and fish in relation to the god of love, are identical. The moon born of the ocean and the moon born of Atri, the goddesses of wealth and beauty, cobras and serpants, all the different seas and the oceans as also the various epithets of the demons--all these different things are regarded as identical in virtue of a peculiar poetic convention. By the same token, our eyes are credited with having various colours, the moon on the crest of Lord Śiva, though not of recent origin, is described as ever young. Cupid, the god of love is described both as having a body and as not having a body. Under this head, the gloss treats of numerous poetic conventions with concrete examples so that a budding poet may first understand what these conventions are as well as with reference to what things, classes, substances, qualities and actions they are observed. He thus takes the first four varieties of Niyama as a restriction and explains that, restriction as to the class of objects invariably associated, can be seen in crocodiles being present only in the river Tāmraparṇī, restriction as to substance like sandal and barch leaf being only associated with the Malaya mountain and the Himalayas respectively, restriction of the quality of redness alone to the gems, of whiteness alone to flowers, of darkness alone to the clouds, and finally, restriction of the action of warbling by cuckoos in Spring, though it occurs in the Summer as well and the dancing and singing of the peacocks only in Monsoon though it is present in other seasons as well.

Thus the topics of (a) non-mention (b) mention and (c) restriction, as different aspects of poetic conventions, are elaborately treated, and their nature and variety explained

in detail in the body of the text. But not content with this, Hemachandra goes into greater detail and gives a host of examples in the super-commentary, viz., Viveka. Thus, the Viveka commentary, keeping close to its avowed aim of sometimes elaborating (i) the text and (ii) providing additional explanatory and illustrative material, begins to demonstrate the practicability in poetry of the **three-fold poetic convention** i.e. mentioning the presence of non-existing things, the absence of existing things as well as restriction or regulation. He thus takes each of the explanatory examples of the gloss for fuller poetic illustration (Viveka-vv.61-125). Thus, a poet complains that, though the Spring season brings forth flowers in abundance, it is strange that it should shun the Mālati plant. Another poet lauds the sandal tree, which is devoid of flowers and fruits by nature, as it removes the heat (pain) of others by its own body. Though Aśoka has no fruits, its radiant sprouts surpass the leaves of the other trees. Another poet characterises the two fortnights of a month as totally white and non-white. So Śuklapakṣa is conventionally all white and Kṛṣṇapakṣa is all-dark. The Śiśupālavadha (2.7) of Māgha refers to the whitening effect of the Kunda buds and the lovers' teeth, thereby denying the redness of these objects. An illustration of the absence of greenness in lotus-buds compares the white teeth of the Primordial Boar with the colour of the lotus-bud. Similarly, the Priyaṅgu blossoms are described as devoid of yellowness; instead, they are painted as dark in complexion in the poetic illustration. Another illustration (69) does not mention the budding and blooming activity of the blue lotus by day. On the contrary, it is shown as blooming at night. The Śefālikā has no flowers by night, still an example is given to poetically state the opposite (70).

Examples, depicting presence of non-existent objects with their classes, substances, qualities and actions, are also given in the Viveka commentary (71-75). Thus a verse from

the Meghadūta (1-31) describes blooming lotuses in a river and another verse does the same with regard to blue lotuses (Kūvalaya). The presence of swans in each and every reservoir is suitably described in a verse which gives a graphic picture of a river full of rising waves with swans and cranes warbling in it. Two verses describe the presence of gold and gems in every mountain. The first describes a large mountain which resembles the ocean on account of its possessing elephants, various fauna and lots of gold etc.

In regard to non-mention of a class, the gloss gives the examples of (a) the Mālati flower not being described in Spring, (b) the sandle tree being described as without flowers and fruits, and (c) the Asoka tree as devoid of fruits. The Viveka commentary supplies illustrations (verse numbers 61, 62 & 63). A poet is pained to see the averseness of the season of Spring to Mālati flowers, particularly since it is a season that causes bloom all around. Another verse lauds the Sandal tree, which has no flowers or fruits, but still it serves others by its own body. A third verse (63) states that though Nature did not favour the Aśoka tree with fruits, yet the leaves of no other tree bear comparison with the sprouts of Aśoka. As for showing the absence of substance in a thing, the gloss refers to the non-mention of moonlight in the dark half of the month as well as the non-mention of darkness in the bright half of the month. This particular poetic convention is explained in the Viveka commentary by illustrations (vv 64-65). A couplet mentions the appearance of Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa, comparable to the bright half and the dark half of a month respectively. Another verse (65) states that though every month has moonlight equally present in both the bright and the dark halves of the month, yet only one fortnight is fortunate enough to be called the bright fortnight.

Examples of non-mention of Guṇa relate to absence of natural colours, e.g. redness not described as a quality of the

buds of Kund flowers, greeness not described with regard to buds of the lotus and yellowness not affirmed of the Priyaṅgu flowers. Illustrations (66, 67, 68) bring out the truth of this convention. Verse 66 quoted from the Śiśupālavadha of Māgha states that, by the internal glow of the smiles of Krishna, who had teeth as white as the buds of a Kund flower, the goddess of speech became as though well-bathed, though her own complexion is pure (white). The next verse (67) describes the primordial Boar's extraordinary feat of lifting the earth effortlessly with its tusks fancied to resemble the white lotus-buds. Here evidently the lotus-buds are said to be very white. Verse 68 illustrate the absence of yellowness – its natural colour–in the Priyaṅgu flowers. It means that the ocean produces the wealth of transparent pearls to beautify the circular breasts, dark like the Priyaṅgu bloossom, of the Āndhra damsels. Here darkness is attributed to the Priyaṅgu blossoms instead of yellowness which characterizes them.

Of the absence of action, though it is present in a thing, we have three examples in the gloss : (a) The blooming of the blue-lotus during day time. This is illustrated in verse 69 of the super-commentary Viveka. Herein a girl–friend of the heroine, very fondly made up the face of the heroine, which resembled the evening moon in beauty, and thereafter she painted a blue-lotus as she wispered in the heroine's ears that "the time for the blooming of this (lotus) has arrived." The following verse (70) describes the pathetic condition of a Śefālikā flower which was scorched by the fierce rays of the sun during day and so she emits sighs of vapour (tears) as if crying, while describing her pain to the moon. Here the poet hides the fact that Śephālikā flowers fall down at night. The second type of Kavisamaya admits of four divisions. It is concerned with the mention of non–existent things in respect of (i) Jāti (ii) Dravya (iii) Guṇa and (iv) Kriyā. In regard to the presence of a non–existent class of things, we have the examples of lotuses of different types ever present

in rivers, of swans residing in each and every reservoir of water, and of gold and previous metals present in every mountain. Verses 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75 illustrate these sub-varieties of the second type of poetic convention. The verse (71) from the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa describes the presence of lotuses in the Śiprā river. The next verse (72) contains a description of the river Gaṅgā which was rendered beautiful by the blue lotuses. While the Ṭīkā (Viveka) does not illustrate the presence of a night lotus, the author mentions in passing that illustrations of night lotuses being present everywhere can be adduced (एवं कुमुदान्यपि). Presence of gold in every mountain is evident in verse 74 where a mountain, compared by paranomastic adjectives to the ocean, is well-known all around for its wealth of gold. Presence of gems and precious stones is described in the verse that follows (75). Here the mention of Nīlāśma provides the illustration of the presence of previous stones on any and every mountain.

So far as the mention of a thing in respect of substance is concerned, the gloss refers to the poetic convention which approves description of darkness as a substance, though no substantiality of darkness is present. As a result of this, darkness is said to be capable of being held in the palm of our hand or as being pierceable by the needle. Similarly, moon-light is said to be measurable by a pot or by the cavity of a hand. This is illustrated by two verses (76, 77) in the Viveka commentary. A beautiful couplet from the well-known play Viddhaśālabhañjikā of Rājaśekhara describes the power of intense darkness, held in a palm, makes, as it were, the quarters stick to our frame (of body), the entire globe of earth as only traverseable by foot, and the heaven as though carried on our heads. Here darkness reduces the size of the universe, since it is so pitch dark, so dense that you can almost hold it in your palm. Darkness is so dense that it is described as Sūcīmukhāgranirbhedya i.e. fit to be pierced by the point of a needle (77). The moonlight on a full moon

day looks like so much dazzling white liquid that you almost think it is a substance to be carried in a pitcher or a vessel. In a four-line verse (78), the poet describes the moonlight by comparing its intensity on an earlier óccasion when it appeared as charming as the juice obtained by mechanically crushing the petals of a Ketaka plant and possessed the beauty of the weaving of a pearl-necklace and today, when the moon is shining in its full glory, it has become fit to be collected in a pitcher, in the cavity of the folded hands and to be drunk by lotus-stalks.

The mention of a quality which does not actually exist in a thing is explained in the gloss as evident in the acription of whiteness to glory, laughter, etc., of blackness to infamy, sin, etc., of redness to anger and attachment. In all, six verses (79-84) are quoted to illustrate these qualities. The verse (79) which describes the whiteness of glory states that a certain king's boundless glory filled the three worlds and made them dazzingly white like the milky ocean. Here the **quality of whiteness** is shown to be **present** in glory. In the same way, laughter is conventionally depicted as all white. Verse No. 80 describes the uproarious laughter of Lord Śiva which is fancied to be the milky ocean drunk by him at the time of total destruction of the universe. Here the poet wants to bring out the extreme whiteness of the laughter of Lord Śiva. Just as glory and laughter are all white, so infamy or bad fame as well as sin are supposed to be black, atleast poetically. Verse 81 of the super-commentary describes the glory of the hero and the infamy of his enemies as spreading together like the (white) Mālati garland interspersed with the dark lotuses. Here glory is compared to the white Mālati flowers whereas infamy bears likeness with the blue or dark lotuses. In the next verse, the poet utilises the popular convention that sin is black. Hayagrīva, a demon who had committed the sin of vowing to destroy the race of Keśava, lost the lustre of his body which became black like the blades of a drawn sword as if through

his sinful intention. Anger and attachment are regarded as red in poetic tradition. The next verse (83) describes the dreadful demeanour of the demon Bhauma whose body appeared red through the spread of the rays of his anger. The verse after this (84), treats of the redness of attachment. A certain king's love for virtues results in a red forehead mark on the faces of the quarters.

The mention of a non-existing thing may relate to an action. According to the gloss, the proverbial drinking of moonlight by the Cakora bird and the conventional separation of the Cakravāka pair at night are examples of this convention. Illustrations of these two poetical aspects of imaginary activity are found in verses 85 and 86 of the Ṭīkā. The first verse contains a reference to the mythical Malaya region with its river-banks where Cupid practises archery and where the Cakora females drink the moonlight in the dark fortnight, having waited a long time. The second verse praises the summer which, by shortening the nights and drying up the water of the river, has favourably acted towards the pair of the Cakravāka bird. Thus the **second type of poetic convention** is exhaustively explained in the Viveka commentary.

The third type of Poetic Convention called Niyama consists in restricting or regulating. According to the gloss, restriction is four-fold, e.g. pertaining to Jāti, Dravya, Guṇa and Kriyā. So, we have Jatiniyama, Dravyaniyama, Guṇaniyama and Kriyāniyama. Now, Jātiniyama is evident in the restriction of crocodiles to the ocean only and of the pearls to the river Tāmraparṇi alone. Verses 87 and 88 illustrate the two instances of Jātiniyama. The first verse lauds the pride of the crocodile due to whose residence in it the ocean is called Makarālaya. The second verse (88) declares that the mythical river Tāmraparṇī is a veritable wish-fulfilling cow in respect of pearls, though many other well-known reservoirs exist. Dravyaniyama is evidenced in the Sandal tree growing only on the Malaya mountain and the birch-leaf (writing paper) being

found on the Himalayas alone. A verse (89) which praises the several excellent qualities of the unique sandal tree mentions that it is not found anywhere except in the Malaya mountain. Similarly another verse (90) from the Kumārasaṁbhava (I.7) of Kālidāsa romantically refers to the Bhūrjapatra as growing in the Himalayas. The examples of Guṇaniyama generally in poetic descriptions, state that the gems are only red, the flowers are white alone and the clouds are always dark. A verse illustrative of the redness of gems describes the gems being fancied as the red orb of the Sun. Another verse (92) compares the whiteness of flowers to the smile of Pārvatī spreading over her lustrous and red lips. The next verse (93) describes the Puṣpaka air-plane with Rāma, dark like a cloud sitting in it, appearing like a heap of gems studded with a dark precious jewel. Examples of Kriyāniyama (क्रियानियम) are conventions that describe the cuckoo bird warbling only in the Spring, though it does warble in real life in the Summer and the other seasons, and the singing and dancing by the peacock in the monsoon only (94–95).

The second interpretation of Niyama means regulation of colours such as black and blue, black and green, black and dark, yellow and red, white and fair as identical colours, and of the hare and the deer in the moon, the crocodile and the fish on the Cupid's banner, etc., as nondistinct. Illustrations of all these different examples are given. A verse (96) describes the crossing of the river Varṇā by a king called Karṇa. Here the Nīla stream of the river appears to match the dark mass of a damsel's hair. Here Nīla and Kṛṣṇa are identical. An instance of the identity of black and green is met with in the verse (97) that follows. It invokes the blue sapphire-like waters of Yamunā and the green crystal-like waters of the Gaṅgā, which mingle like Kṛṣṇa and Śiva. Verse 98 illustrates the identity of black and dark (Kṛṣṇa and Śyāma) by describing the nights in the celestial garden as dark, though they are black. Verse 99 presents identify of the red and the yellow

shades of colour by describing the red jaws of the Primordial Boar as having a yellow lustre. Kālidāsa's famous verse (Raghuvaṁśa - 2.35) illustrates the poetic convention of non-discrimination between the white and fair shades of colour as it represents the white Kailāsa mount as fair or tawny. This poetic convention extends to cover cases of the identity of the other shades of colours as well. So Hemachandra winds up the discussion here by stating that instances of the other colours can also be cited.

The poetic convention in the sense of regulation of meanings is evident when the hare and the deer seen in the moon are considered as identical; the crocodile and the fish as emblems of love are identical; the moon as born of the ocean is the same as the moon born out of the sage Atri; all the twelve Ādityas are identical; Nārāyaṇa, Mādhava, Viṣṇu, Dāmodara, the Lord's incarnation as a tortoise etc., refer to the self-same Lord; the goddess of wealth and the goddess of Beauty are identical; cobras and serpants, the milky ocean and the saline ocean, the seas and the oceans, and the demons known as Daityās, Dānavas and Asuras are all identical. Illustrations of such identity are available in the verses (101-108) cited in the Viveka commentary. In verse 101, the moon is called शशाङ्क whereas in verse 102, he is described as अङ्काधिरोपितमृगः (चन्द्रमाः), मृगलाञ्छनः in the Māghakāvya (II. 53). In three verses (103, 104 and 105), the God of Love is described as मकरकेतनः, मीनध्वजः and मत्स्यचिह्नः The next two verses (106 and 107) point out the identity of the moon born of the sea and the eyes of the sage Atri. Here we have a clear allusion to the mythological story of the moon's birth from the ray of light from the eye of the sage Atri which was set up in the sky and that became the moon. However, as the mythological reference is incomplete in verse 106, Hemachandra adds another verse (107) from Murāri's Anargharāghava (1.58) which alludes to the birth of the moon from the ocean.

The verse No. 108 alludes to the identity of the twelve Ādityas or Suns. The verse (109) following this verse illustrates the synonymity of the different names of Lord Viṣṇu. But the verse (109) has a double meaning – one, applying to Lord Śiva and another to Lord Viṣṇu. The next verse (110) in the first part alludes to the identity of Dāmodara and Mādhava and in the second part Lakṣmī, the goddess of wealth, is shown to be identical with Pṛthvī and Sampad as the wealth in the houses of the Lord's devotees. The next verse (111) refers to Vāsuki, the Nāgrāja who is not defferent from the serpent which Lord Śiva wears aroand his neck as an ornament. The next verse (112) depicts the ocean both as the milky ocean or Kṣīrasamudra in which the Lord of the world resides and from which the goddess of wealth arises, and as Kṣārasamudra or the salty ocean in which the thirst of creatures can not even be quenched !

Pointing out the sameness of the sea as well as the ocean, the next verse (113) mentions the river Gaṅgā as the beloved of the seven seas. Finally, on the question of identity of different objects and names in the field of conventional poetry, the author winds up the discussion on this aspect of Niyama as a poetic convention by illustrating the identity of the Daityas, the Dānavas and the Asuras with passages (114, 115, 116, 117 and 118) selected from well-known Sanskrit classics. The Kādambarī of Bāṇa, for instance, explains the three terms and then points out their identity in a verse wherein Bāṇāsura, though he belongs to the race of the Daityas is called an Asura, even though he is a Daitya. Hayagrīva, despite the fact that he is an Asura, is described as a Daitya in verse 116. The same Hayagrīva, though an Asura is called Dānavādhipati in verse 117. Finally, in verse 118, all the different Dānavas, Daityas and Asuras are dascribed by the term Asura, thus leaving no doubt in our minds that all of these terms mean one and the same race.

Now, according to the second interpretation of Niyama,

miscellaneous items of the poetic conventions also come to be regarded as arising from Niyama or regulation of meanings in poetry. Thus the gloss mentions that eyes can be described as having various colours, the moon on the crest of Lord Śiva is always young and the god of love, Cupid, is described as corporeal and incorporeal, etc. The Viveka commentary provides concrete illustrations of these last three concepts. Thus, to take the case of the eyes being described as white, dark black and as having mixed hues. In verse (119) we have the description of the beauty of the side-long glances of a damsel surpassing the **whiteness** of the moon. Thus the whiteness of the glances reveals the whiteness of the eyes in this case. The next verse (120) from the Raghuvaṁśa (11.93) describes the city of Ayodhyā as possessed of the **dark** lotus-lattices in the form of the ladies' **eyes**. Here the **eyes** of the ladies are compared with **blue** or **dark** lotuses. In an illustration from the Meghadūta, the **glances** of the harlots are compared to the rows of **black bees**. But, an illustration from the same lyrical poem describes the mixed hues of the eyes of Daśapur ladies - the eyes which resemble the bees chasing the tossed Kund flowers.

The next verse (123) describes the crescent moon on the crest of Lord Śiva as Bālendukhaṇḍa i.e. a very young moon. Two more verses (124 and 125) deal with the corporeality and incorporeality of Cupid. In the first verse (124), Kāmadeva, the god of love, claps the hand of his beloved with his own hand, implying his embodied form, while in the second verse (125) Kāmadeva is called Anaṅga - bodyless or formless and his activities are attributed to flowers, bees, ladies, the mind and words. This marks the end of the exposition of the topic of Poetic Conventions as a part of Kaviśikṣā which is an essential and important aspect of Abhyāsa by which the poet's genius is brightened and sharpened.

Another aspect of Kaviśikṣā treated by Hemachandra is that of Dependence or Borrowing. Hemachandra remarks in the

Viveka Commentary (p. 10) that Śikṣās also include Mahākāvyārthacarvaṇā, Parakṛtakavyapātha and so on, and they must be taught.

What is Literary Borrowing or Dependence ?

Now, the concept of poetic conventions requires a thorough study of the Kāvyas of classical poets before they can be appropriately pressed into service in actual composition. While carefully going through well-known works of his predecessors, the apprentice cannot escape the influence of great poets. Thus he borrows from or depends upon, consciously or otherwise, the structure, style, thoughts, feelings, words, phrases, lines, etc., of his predecessors' works. This borrowing or dependence is described in Manuals meant for budding poets and they form a part of the training of a poet called Kaviśikṣā in Sanskrit. Hemachandra too attempts a fairly exhaustive exposition of this topic, though he is greatly indebted to two well-known works in the field, viz., the Kāvyamimāṁsā (Chapters 11 and 12) of Rājaśekhara and the Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa of the Kashmirian polymath Kṣemendra.

It will be seen that, while Hemachandra has included the topic of "Dependence in the form of a shadow and so on" by inserting the terms Chāyādi and Upajīvanādi in the Sūtrā (I. 10) itself, there is further clarification of the concept of dependence or borrowing in the gloss. While he deals with the topic of Kavisamaya rather elaborately in the gloss, he relegates elaborate reference to Chāya or Upajīvana to the Ṭikā. However, as things stand, it appears that he (i) considered the topic to be a popular one, and (ii) that he has nothing much new to offer on the subject. Therefore he is content to relegate this topic to the super commentary (Viveka) wherein he closely follows Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṁsā and copiously draws upon the material readily available in that work. He has also utilised the Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa of the Kashmirian polymath Kṣemendra.

Four Types of Borrowing or Dependence

Hemachandra elaborates the idea of dependence or borrowing in the gloss. He explains that dependence in the form of a shadow means that a poet aspirant may imitate ideas or words of his predecessors in the manner of (a) imaging or reflection (Pratibimba) (b) 'painted copy sketch' or a picture (Ālekhyaprakhaya) (c) 'corporeal equivalence' or a person appearing quite similar to another person (Tulyadehitulya) or (d) 'foreign-city-entrance-likeness' or a person entering a foreign town (Parapurapraveśasadṛśa). Thus Chāya, a shadow, or a counterpart includes **all the four types** mentioned here. (The Viveka commentary remarks that **Chāya means a shadow of original and dependence on it means sometimes imitation by way of an image or reflection**). The word Ādi (so on) in the expression Chāyādi serves to include borrowing of a word (Pada) or a line (Pāda) and so forth from another poem. Again, the word Ādi in the expression Upajīvanādi means trainings like Samasyāpūraṇa and so on. Samasyāpūraṇa is the poetic pastime consisting in filling up the verses.

Abhyāsa, Śikṣā and "Haraṇa"

These ideas on poetic borrowing, or plain plagiarism (Haraṇa), as Rājaśekhara calls it, formed a part of the poetic training concerning **Abhyāsa** or **constant practice in writing poetry**. The well-known poetic theorist Rājaśekhara has dealt with this topic exhaustively in Chapters 12, 13 and 14 of his Kāvyamīmāṁsā and Hemachandra has freely drawn upon it in respect of both ideas and concepts as well as illustrations. Much of this material is arranged topic-wise in the Viveka commentary. We can understand the concept of imitation or borrowing or dependence better if we read the gloss together with the Ṭīkā (Viveka pp. 14-20).

Hemachandra's Indebtedness to Rājaśekhara

The gloss has not explained in detail the terms Pratibiṁbakalpatayā, Ālekhyaprakhyatayā, Tulyadehitulyatayā,

Parapura-pratimatayā, copajivanam as also Padapādādinām-yathocitamupajivanam and Samasyāpūranādi as Hemachandra wants to deal with all these topics in greater detail, by quoting in the Viveka text the theoretical authority of Rājaśekhara with examples.

Thus the Viveka commentary contains the following explanation of the different varieties of poetic imitation.

Shadow of the sense. Dependence on the **sense** consists in some cases by way of imaging (Pratibimbakalpatāyā) as pointed out by Rājaśekhara (K. M. Chapter 12). "The sense is almost the same but the setting is in other expressions. That poem, not fundamentally different, would be a kind of imaging or "poetic paraphrase". In some cases, it is in the manner of a 'copy-sketch' or just like a picture (Ālekhyaprakhya) as has been said (by Rājaśekhara): "Through a moderate elaboration (slight change) of particulars, a subject appears as if different." In other words, an idea is imitated by a slight change of particulars. This poem is called a copy-sketch or just like a picture. In some cases, borrowing is done by way of 'corporeal equivalence' (Tulyadehitulyatayā). Rājaśekhara defines it "where, despite difference of subject-matter, identity or similarity is apprehended through extreme resemblance, that poem is called similar by corporeal equivalence or similar in respect of phraseology."

In some instances, imitation is attempted by way of 'entrance into a foreign town'. Rājaśekhara defines this kind of imitation: "The basis is substantially identical, but the garnishing is widely different. Such a poem representing imitation in the manner of 'a foreign city entrance', is enjoyed by good poets." And of these four types of imitation, the superiority is in an ascending order.

Now the gloss and the Ṭikā mention that, in addition to the **four main** varieties of borrowing (like a shadow of the sense), there are other ways of borrowing such as (1) borrowing a word (Pada, or (2) a line (Pāda) or (3) two lines

(Pādadvaya) or (4) three lines (Pādatraya) or (5) a fraction of a word (Padaikadeśa) or (6) a phrase or saying (Ukti).

What is Plagiarism ?

The Viveka Commentary proceeds to illustrate the imitation or borrowing of a word, a line, two lines, three lines, but declares that borrowing all the four lines or a whole verse from another author's poem constitutes plagiarism of the first magnitude and therefore, it is neither defined nor mentioned nor illustrated. Such a wholesale borrowing is considered as complete theft: 'Paripūrṇaṁ cauryameva', the Viveka Commentary affirms unequivocally and proceeds further with the illustration of the borrowing of a part of a word and that of a phrase or saying (Ukti)

Here, a statement from the Kāvyamīmāṁsā (Chapter 11) is quoted (10) to the effect that when expressions or sayings (Ukti's) of the ancient poets are employed to convey another meaning, it is not possible to recognize them. On the contrary, they are enjoyable. However, borrowing the meanings of these sayings is worse than plagiarism. So it must not be recommended. This view is attributed to yāyavarīya, i.e. Rājaśekhara himself.

In Defence of Plagiarism

Continuing the discussion on plagiarism, the Viveka Ṭīkā quotes (11) another passage of considerable theoretical interest. If it be felt that this (borrowing of a saying or phrase) should never be preached, since they say "With the passage of time, the other thefts of a man may pass; but the theft of speech (poetical plagiarism) does not pass away even till one's sons and gransons," to meet this apprehension, the author replies: "In keeping with norms of propriety."[14] For as Avantisundarī says (12): "This poet is unknown, I am a celebrated poet; this one is not established, I have established

myself; his subject-matter (Samvidhānaka) or plot is not prevalent, mine is prevalent; his words are like medicine (gudūci), mine are like grape-wine; this poet disregards the specialities of the different dilects or his language is not distinguished, mine is distinctive." 'This work is obsolete', 'This is by a foreign author', 'This one has a worn out origin or theme', 'This was composed in a mere unrefined language' – due to these and such other considerations, borrowing of word and borrowing of meanings or subject may be resorted to. And it is also well-known that "There is no poet who is not a thief, there is no trader who is not a thief. But he, who knows how to conceal, thrives. One poet is a creator, another an adapter, another knows how to hide or cover-up and still another is a developer. Whoever discovers something novel in a word, sense and saying and copies from the old masters is looked upon as a great poet."

Samasyāpūraṇa

Hemachandra now turns to illustrate the topic of the filling of verses, called Samasyāpūraṇa, since the practice of composing is generally extended to cover verse-filling and such other things. Samasyapūrāṇa means completing a verse when one line or two lines or three lines, which mean nothing till they are completed, are given and the remaining line or lines are to be supplied so as to make a homogenous verse with a poetic sense. Thus this process helps a novice to have practical training in composing meaningful poems. Hemachandra, therefore, has dealt with Samasyāpūraṇa and poetic conventions in detail.

Classification of Subject–matter or Artha and Dependence

As for illustrations presented in connection with the topic of borrowing in the form of a shadow, etc., we find that verses 33 to 60 provide concrete illustrations of both borrowing and filling up the verses. The four major varieties of borrowing or imitation, Chāyādi, viz, (1) Pratibiṁbakalpa, (2) Ālekhyaprakhya,

(3) Tulyadehitulya and (4) Parapurapraveśapratima are illustrated first. Rājaśekhara includes all these four under Artha which is three-fold : (1) Anyayoni, (2) Nihnutayoni and (3) Ayoni. Anyayoni is Chāyādi. This is Pratibiṁbakalpa and Ālekhyaprakhya. But Nihnutayoni is Tulyadehitulya and Parapurapraveśasadṛśa. Ayoni is one only. So, in all, five, not four; but as Ayoni is original, no discussion is attempted here for obvious reasons. "Among the Ālaṁkārikas it is Vāmana, the author of the Kāvyālaṁakārasūtra (A. D. 800) who for the first time classifies the subject-matter, Artha, in poetry and vaguely refers to plagiarism."[15] Vāmana analyses and examines Artha in poetry for the first time and discovers that "Arthodvividhaḥ, Ayoniḥ, Anyacchāyayoniḥ vā", i.e. Artha in poetry may be original or derivative. Both these have three sub-divisions each (1) that which is easily intelligible, (2) that which is subtle but can be grasped after giving some thought to it, and (3) that which is subtle and is understood only after careful attention and deep thought (VKASV 3.2.7 to 9). Ānandavardhana further developed this idea (Dhv. Āl. IV. 12). The examples here of Nihnutayoni and Parapurapraveśasadṛśa are an improvement upon Vāmana and Ānandavardhana. Ekādṛta (not Ekādṛśa) is 'Ayoni'.

Hemachandra has taken over the portion dealing with Pratibiṁbakalpa etc. It means he has incorporated all these four divisions as recorded by Rājaśekhara along with their definitions and illustrations in his Kāvyānuśāsana-Viveka (p. 8). So we can read the four-fold Arthacchāyā as Tulyadehitulya-arthacchāyā, Parapurapraveśa-arthacchāyā, Pratibiṁbakalpa-arthacchāyā and Ālekhyaprakhya-arthacchāyā. Arthacchāyā means 'shadow of a meaning', i.e., dependence on meaning or subject-matter or plot.

To revert to the illustrations, the **first** major variety of shadow dependence (Pratibiṁbakalpa) is explained by means of two verses (33 and 34). As this variety consists in borrowing the sense of another's poem by couching it in different

words and sentences, it is also described as "poetic paraphrase" or 'imaging' or reflection. Here the apprentice tries to given an exact reflection of the idea of his predecessor. The first verse (33) here invokes the serpents worn around Śiva's throat and describes their appearance and effect in charming words and adjectives. Now the poet-aspirant faithfully copies this idea by reflecting it in another, a little less effective, verse. Here he not only retains the idea but the sense of invocation as well. However, it should be noted that the meanings of the two verses slightly differ on account of the change of the expression Candrāmṛtāmbu to Galadgaṅgāmbu.

The **second** main type of Arthacchāyopajīvana is illustrated in verse No. 35. This variety, called Ālekhyaprakhya, consists in borrowing the idea of another poem with only a slight change. Therefore this variety is called 'imaging' or just like a picture. Owing to this reason, Hemachandra (or rather Rājaśekhara) quotes another verse (35) which retains the central idea of the original kept before him by the novice while practising the Pratibiṁbakalpa variety with slight variations in details about the serpents etc. So here, as Rājaśekhara says, there is some polish or garnishing given to the old idea with the result that the subject appears as though it is a different subject that is being treated of. The **clever** people call it 'imaging' or copy-sketch ! Some cleverness this !

The **third** way to borrow or imitate consists in having different subjects or senses expressed in a similar phraseology or word-construction. This variety is called Tulyadehitulya and is recommended as good for adoption by well-known critics (e.g., Ānandavardhana, Dhv. Āl. IV. 4).[16] To illustrate this, two verses (36 and 37) are quoted. The first verse contains the idea of a good horse and a bad elephant whereas the second verse describes the simple stone in every house which, being of frequent use, is respected and worshipped, but the bright lustre of the jewel resides either in a place or in a mine. Here the ideas or objects of description differ, but

the method of description is similar. Hence the imitation strikes us as charming.

The fourth variety of imitation, called Parapurapraveśa-pratima consists in sameness of basic principles; however, the manner of presentation is wholly different. It is like entering the form of another person, as put metaphorically by Rājaśekhara. **This variety is not mentioned by any early authority.** Two verses (38 and 39) illustrate the true nature of this variety. In both the verses, the appearance of the Kadamba blossom, a sure sign of the advent of the rainy season, is described as an occasion of unprecedented joy for the wives of the enemies of a certain king, since kings do not undertake war-campaigns during the rainy season but remain at home. Thus the authors of these two different verses have their poetic idea based on the same principle but their manner of presentation is entirely different, because the second verse is superior in excellence to the first verse : "The wives of his foes.....took away the new Kadamba blossom from their husbands' hands and... overwhelmed by joy, kissed it, placed it on the eyes, laid it on the heart, put it on the head and then made it an ear-ornament."

As he finishes with illustrating the **four major varieties of imitation**, Hemachandra makes a cryptic remark : "Of these four (types) the importance is (determined) on an ascending order." This means that the last one Parapurapraveśasadṛśa : is the best, the third one Tulyadehitulya comes next and the second Ālekhyaprakhya occupies the third place and the first one Biṁbapratibiṁba ranks last.

The Minor Varieties of Imitation

The Ṭīkā elaborates on the minor varieties of imitation by illustrating the borrowing of (a) word (40, 41), (b) a line (42, 43), (c) two lines (44, 45) and (d) three lines (46, 47). **As for borrowing four lines, he categorically denounces it as 'complete theft'**

Since the word Ādi (etc.) in Padapādādi in the gloss serves to include Padaikadeśopajīvana and Uktyupajīvana, the last two minor varieties. Hemachandra also illustrates them in the Ṭīkā. (pp. 16-18).

Looking more closely at the illustration of all these varieties, one by one, we find that the verses 40 and 41 illustrate the Pādopajīvana variety (described as 'Śliṣṭasyāśliṣṭapadena haraṇam' in the Kāvyamīmāṁsā) with paranomastic words such as Kirāta, Śilīmukha, Palāśa, Kesarī etc. occuring in both. In point of truth, the author of the second verse (41) borrows the words Śilīmukha and Kirāta from the first verse (40). (Incidentally, the last verse is cited by Kṣemendra in his Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa). The borrowing of sentences or lines (Pādopajīvana) is illustrated by two verses (42, 43), the first one from Amaru (173) and the second one from Kṣemendra's Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa. In both these illustrations we find, apart from words like Gantavyam, that the last whole line is common to both. This is called Vyastārthaprayoga in the Kāvyamīmāṁsā (151). The next two verses (44 and 45) illustrate the minor variety of borrowing two lines. Here we have at least two whole lines common to both the verses. The next two verses (46 and 47) have three lines in common. Now as Rājaśekhara points out "Pāda evānyathātrakaraṇaṁ nasvikaraṇaṁ pādonaharanameva" and quotes Araṇye Nirjane etc. **This type of borrowing of three lines means you are changing only one line. According to Rājaśekhara, this is not adoption or adaptation, but stealing a whole verse less one line :** In the verse (Nāradasmṛiti 2.30) under reference, there were four lines, but the apprentice or plagiarist removes just one line from the second half and inserts his own line to complete the verse so as to call the verse as his own ! Fortunately for us (and unfortunately for the poet-aster) the plagiarist cannot copy the whole verse without laying himself open to the charge of blatant, complete and indefensible **theft of the first order.**

The minor varieties of borrowing a word, a line etc., also cover, as stated earlier, two more varieties : Pādaikadeśopajīvana and Uktyupajīvana. The verses 48 and 49 illustrate the variety of borrowing only a part of a word.

The last of these types of borrowing is called Uktyupajīvana or Uktiharaṇa in Rājaśekhara. To illustrate this, a saying or quotation is given; the pair of thighs (of a damsel) resemble the juicy trunks of a plantain tree. Now this saying is very cleverly woven in a fresh verse. "Such sayings, when they produce a new idea, cannot be identified and become enjoyable," says Rājaśekhara.

The next topic, indicated by the word Ādi in Upajīvānādi in the Sūtrā, is that of Samasyāpūraṇa etc. The question that may arise here is what does 'etc.' after the expression Samāsyāpūraṇa refer to ? The answer is : "Etc." here implies other poetic trainings like Vākyārthasūnyaśabdavṛttābhyāsaḥ and Purātanavṛtteṣu padaparāvṛttyabhyāsaḥ.

Taking up the topic of verse-filling for a brief explanation and illustration, the author first mentions Pādasamasyā wherein lines such as Mṛgāt simhaḥ palāyate and Samudrāddhūlirutthitā as forming the fourth quarter (line) of a four-line verse, when the first three lines are given. Such poetic exercises, as we know, can become very interesting for young apprentices. So in verse 52, the idea that a lion capable of tearing apart a mighty elephant's temples starts fleeing, when fate is unfavourable, from an ordinary animal (like a stag), becomes complete only when the line Mṛgātsimhah patāyate is supplied. It should be noted that such verses are very ingeniously composed and supplied to the beginners in composition.

Another variety of 'verse-filling' involves the supplying of two lines-the second and the fourth lines, when the first and the third lines are already given. The point here is that sometimes one line is given, sometimes two or three lines are given, but the meaning is not tangible until after the remaining lines are supplied. Then the meaning comes out as a single and coherent idea.

Now Hemachandra gives three verses (55, 56 and 57). The first of these verses means that the mythical bird Cakravāka, living as he does constantly under the fear of separation from his beloved as soon as the night descends, goes about asking all the birds as to whether they know of any place, somehow, where the Sun does not set. The second verse (56) describes Lord Siva's appearance and invokes him. The poet refers to Siva's grotesque form because he wears white serpents, yellow, matted hair with the waters of the Ganges flowing here and there, and the crescent Moon, and a throat as dark as the blue-throated bird and holds the dreadful Pināka bow. The last verse (57) selected from the Śisupālavadha of Māgha describes the irony of bad luck because under its influence creatures experience strange consequences as, when the Sun rises and the Moon sets, the night lotuses lose their beauty, the day-lotuses bloom beautifully, the owl becomes sad while the Cakravāka bird is over-joyed. Now, Hemachandra introduces a novel kind of verse-filling exercise by means of taking the first lines of the first verse (55), the second line of the second verse (56) and the fourth line of the third vrese (57) and frames a three-lines Samasyā and then fills the third line as, e.g., verse 58 which means: "Have you ever seen or heard an indescribable place here where the holder of the Pināka bow, with floods of the Ganges water roam about in his dark and tawny, matted hair, resides? (Why ?) I wish to go there (Why ?) This is the strange condition of those struck by ill-fate!" (This means, I want to go away to a place where the effect of ill-fate does not exist.) Now, here in this new verse, though only one line belongs to the imitator poet, still it does not appear to be 'stealing' or 'borrowing'; on the contrary, the combination of three disparate lines, unconnected by any single idea, scattered in three different verses, with a single, new line, produces a special charm or strikingness for the sensitive mind.

Next, the author illustrates Vākyārthaśūnyavṛttābhyāsa in verse No. 59. Here the poet has arranged words so as to make a line of a certain number of syllables as per the measurement involved in writing the metre, but he has not paid any attention to the sense. This, therefore, serves the purpose of a beginner. Much in the same way Padaparāvṛttyabhyāsa (changing or substitution of the different words of a master poet's verse without changing either (1) the sense or (2) the metre). The last verse No. 60 of this section, naturally, deals with this poetic exercise. Here the apprentice is first given the opening verse of Kālidasa's well-known epic, the Raghuvaṁśam (I. 1) : Vāgarthāviva etc. and then he is asked to practice making a new verse by substituting synonyms of the key words of the verse without altering the sense and the metre. The resulting verse is also numbered 60.

This exercise has been taken over by Hemachandra from the Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa (I. 21) **of the Kashmirian polymath Kṣemendra.** He prescribes the exercise for the second type of student (I. 14 ff) who can be trained with difficulty.

The Mothers of Poetry

Finally, before closing the discussion on the subject of **Kāvyahetu,** Hemachandra quotes a couplet from the Kāvyamīmāṁsā of Rājaśekhara (Chapter X) to the effect that "Health, genius, application, devotion, discourses by the learned, varied knowledge, a vivacious memory and freedom from dejection – these eight are the mothers of poetry". Rājaśekhara quotes this to reinforce his statement in the first paragraph of Chapter X of his Kāvyamīmāṁsā that **apart from the knowledge of the sciences and arts and human nature, a poet's own natural and cultural endowments also count in the birth of a poem. So he is convinced that the company of a poet who is a source of support for good people, tidings of the country, charming words and quotations from the learned men, journey around different places, meetings and discussions with learned people and a close study of the compositions**

of the ancient poets – these are the sources of poetry. After this, Rājaśekhara prescribes a set of norms for the personal life and conduct of a budding poet as he is of the firm opinion that purity of conduct pleases the goddess of learning. 'Śuciśīlanaṁ hi sarasvatyāḥ Saṁvananamāmananti' (K.M.X.).

Theory of Literature

Poetics proper begins with the next Sūtrā (I. 11). It embodies *the definition of poetry*. And **this definition of poetry is the most important part of the first chapter–nay, of the whole of the present treatise or any other treatise on Poetics for that matter**, since it is the kernel of the subject of poetics. And, as the author has already stated and explained at some length the aims of poetry, he now thinks it proper **to define poetry itself**.

The Definition of Poetry

Hemachandra defines poetry as "a combination of word and sense, free from faults, full of excellences, having in it figures of speech as well". In the gloss that follows, it is made clear that the word 'ca' appearing in the definition is intended to signify that poetry is possible, at times, even when it is devoid of a figure of speech. The commentary Viveka adds by way of elucidation that the phrase, Niralaṁkārayorapi in the gloss is intended to stress the point that poetic excellences are absolutely essential in poetry, inasmuch as speech, though devoid of embellishment, can be enjoyed if it is possessed of excellences or good qualities. This is to be illustrated by means of the well-known stanza from the Amaruśataka (82) in the body of the text : शून्यं वासगृहं etc. The verse depicts a love scene in which a bride in her private moments with her lover, who was pretending to be in sleep, slowly rises from her bed and after surveying his face at leisure, heartily kisses him; then, suddenly notices that his cheeks are thrilling with joy, she blushes and looks down, when her lover seizes the opportunity to kiss her lingeringly. Here in this verse, according to the

author, there is the sentiment of love fully developed by means of its appropriate Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas but no distinct figure of speech is in evidence, since the sentiment is predominant here. Thus this verse, despite the absence of any clear-cut figure of speech in it, is considered to be good poetry. This is due to the fact that it is possessed of excellences such as sweetness and is completely free from any poetic blemishes. This example proves that a poem without a figure can be legitimately called poetry. But, a poem without an excellence is difficult to imagine. In other words, a poem, though it is possessed of embellishments of speech or sense, yet if it is not possessed of excellences, does not become enjoyable, as the following verse illustrates (Viveka, verse 126). The verse describes the condition of ladies in separation. It contains three metaphors and a smile-in all four figures of speech of sense. And still it is lack-lustre and insipid without poetic excellences to aid the sentiment of love intended to be depicted. This can be explained by a reference to the fact that in this verse the breasts of the ladies are compared to two pot-sherds and these are covered by the petals of lotuses which are compared to plates of clay and it is further stated that the ladies, due to the excessive heat of the fire of separation from their lovers, resemble pots put on a fire place ! Clearly, the comparison of the ladies' breasts with pot-sherds, of the lotus-leaves with plates of clay, and the idea of baking of a pot applied to the plates of lotus leaves is hardly a poetic presentation of the idea of love-sickness. Now, in this verse, though we have three figures of speech, yet as no sweet qualities that help the predominant sentiment are present, the verse fails to appeal to sensitive readers. It is a flat verse, so to speak. So Hemachandra's remark is very apt : "Alaṁkṛtamapi niragunaṁ na svadate."

As it stands, Hemachandra's definition of poetry echoes the definition of Kāvya as given by Mammaṭa in the **first flash** of the Kāvyaprakāśa (I. 4). However, Mammaṭa introduces the

expression by using Tat to suggest togetherness of word and sense, since Tat refers to Kāvya in the singular number. Hence Śabdārthau means 'word and sense' **together** constitute poetry, for both the word and the sense contribute to the enjoyment of poetry. But Śabda is mentioned first because it is the abode of Artha. Thus "poetry" according to Hemachandra "is constituted by word and sense, which are (a) free from blemishes (b) possessed of qualities and (c) which have, as a rule, figures of speech also." Our author believes, with Mammaṭa, that poetry is rarely without figures of speech (of 'Sarvtra sālaṅkārau' of Mammaṭa with 'Sālaṅkārau' of Hemachandra) but a poem, even if it is without any figure of speech, cannot be denied recognition as a poem, for that reason. It is, thus, quite clear that poetry is both word and sense together with excellences or poetic qualities and without blemishes or flaws of any kind, generally having adornments but at times without these last.

Now so far as excellences are concerned, we know that they are attributes of a sentiment (or poetic flavour or the emotive content or the soul of the poem) in which they directly reside, still, since they are suggested by words and sense, they are only **metaphorically** said to be the attributes of the words and the senses.

Traditionally all good poems are expected to be free from blemishes. Hemachandra's definition, therefore, begins by stating that a poem should be free fr om poetic blemishes or faults In this respect, Hemachandra is in good company, for Mammaṭa and others also emphasize that poetry should be faultless. Thus in all three respects, viz., in respect of Guṇa, Dosa and Alaṁkāra, Hemachandra's definition toes the line of Mammaṭa (K. P. 1.4)

Hemachandra's definition of poetry,like Mammaṭa's, in stating that (a) word and Sense constitute poetry, (b) they must be free from faults or blemishes, (c) they must be marked by excellences, and (d) in rare cases, they can be devoid of figures,

attempts to accommodate all the promiment views on the conception of poetry. Thus he includes the Śabdārthaśarira school, the Rīti school which considers Guṇas to be the essence of poetry and also by implication the Dhvani school which considers Doṣas and Guṇas as pertaining to the sentiment, which is the soul of poetry. This last aspect of Guṇa and Doṣa is, therefore, taken up for definition and explanation immediately after this Sūtra. Hemachandra hastens to add these two Sūtras (I. 12-13) as he wants to make up for the non-inclusion of Rasa in the definition. In fact, without mentioning the most essential thing in poetry, viz., its soul, the Rasa or sentiment, the mere mention of the adjectives Adoṣa, Saguṇa and Sālaṁkāra tends to make the definition a jumble of secondary expressions. In other words, it appears to be a description, not a definition, strictly speaking. But, we should remember the phraseology of Rasa employed in the gloss on Sūtra No. 3, wherein our author has pointed out that poetry is unique in having Rasa as the predominant element and hence word and sense are subordinated in it: "Śabdārthayorguṇabhāve Rasaprādhānye ca Vilakṣaṇaṁ Kāvyam". The next Sūtra (12) also clearly states that Guṇa and Doṣa relates to Rasa directly and to Word and Sense only indirectly. This implies that in poetry, those Śabdārthas alone are meant which are capable enough to suggest a Rasa. But, as he is going to point out in Sūtra 13, Alaṁkāras belongs to the body, i.e., Śabda and Artha, the vesture of poetry.

An Analysis of Hemachandra's Definition of Poetry

Thus, on an analysis of the definition as given in the Sūtra (11), as well as of the gloss and the comments in the Viveka Ṭīka, it becomes abundantly clear that Hemachandra's conception of poetry embraces all the essential elements of poetry, viz., Rasa, Guṇa, faultlessness and embellishments, although Rasa is not expressly mentioned but tacitly accepted as the soul of a Kāvya. It seems the author really wanted to make his definition both comprehensive and easily comprehensible.

While he includes Sabdārtha and their Saguṇatva, Adoṣatva and Sālaṅkāratva which are recognized as analysable constituents of a poem, he avoids any explicit reference to the highly abstract and technical concept of Rasa which is difficult to grasp. For it is relatively easy to understand what Doṣa, Guṇa or Alaṁkāra is, but it is not that easy for beginners to comprehend fully the inscrutable element of Rasa.

It seems the next three Sūtras (12, 13, 14) **are intended by the author to supplement the definition of poetry as** stated in the previous Sūtra, because, Hemachandra realises that unless the different adjectives, viz., Adoṣau, Saguṇau and Sālaṅkārau are organically shown to be connected with the body of poetry, viz., Śabdārthau and its soul-Rasa-in a poem, the definition will suffer from deficiency and inaccuracy. He, therefore, hastens to define Guṇa and Doṣa in the Sūtrā (I.12) immediately following the definition and takes up the question of the definition of the Alaṁkāras and their relation with the body and the soul of a poem in two succeding Sūtrās (I. 13-14).

Hemachandra's Doctrine of Guṇa and Doṣa

In order to provide a general definition of poetic excellence as well as poetic defects or blemishes, the author states in Sūtra No. 12 that Guṇa and Doṣa are the causes of heightening and retarding respectively the impact of a sentiment. Though these two are the attributes of the sentiment, yet they are secondarily considered to be the attributes of words and senses. It is, therefore, clear that Adoṣau and Saguṇau in the definition, though they grammatically qualify Śabdārtha, do in fact qualify Rasa since the relation of Rasa with Guṇas and Doṣas is that of a thing and its attributes. The fact that excellence and blemishes belong to Rasa can be proved beyond cavil by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. Anvaya means Yadbhāve bhāvaḥ and Vyatireka means Yadabhāve yadabhāveḥ. This means that when the Hetu and

the Sādhya are joined by a constant and invariable concommitance, it is a case of Anvaya or invariable association. If oneis present, the other is always present. But when a Sādhya and its Hetu are joined by a concommitance of absence, it is a case of Vyatireka. **Guṇa and Doṣa both inhere in the same place. Now faults reside in a particular sentiment only; neither in a word not in a sense; for, faults are impermanent. A fault is not a fault always but, in fact, it is considered an excellence sometimes.** The truth of the matter is that what is a blemish in one sentiment becomes an excellence in another sentiment. Thus Doṣas like Kaṣṭatva (cumbersomeness) and the like are supposed to be the Guṇas in Bībhatsarasa and Doṣas like Aślīlatva etc. become Guṇas in sentiments like Hāsyarasa and the like. All this clearly proves that poetic blemishes or Doṣas are not associated with words and senses, and they have no permanent character. Where Rasa is, the Doṣas pertaining to that Rasa are discerned there only. Consequently when that particular Rasa is absent, the blemishes too vanish. It is in this way that, by a logical method of invariable concomitance between a sentiment and Doṣa and therefore between Rasa and Guṇa, we can show that Doṣas and Guṇas always are attributes of Rasa and not those of Śabda and Artha. **In short a Guṇa enhances the charm of a Rasa while a Doṣa is a Doṣa because it mars the Rasa and thus the whole poem. This is due to the fact that Rasa is said to be the soul of poetry.** As Hemachandra is a follower of the Rasa-dhvani School of Poetics, he follows Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa in the organisation of the different poetic elements like Guṇa, Doṣa, Alaṁkāra, Rīti, Vṛtti etc. around the central concept of Rasa, the best type of Dhvani or Vyaṅgya Artha.

Thus those attributes which inhere in the principal element called Rasa are regarded as Guṇas or qualities. These qualities are like the human qualities like valour and so forth. The expression Saguṇau Śabdārthau is quite appropriate,

since it is the words and sense that reveal the sentiment of a poem, so the qualities (Guṇas) which, in fact, are the properties of Rasa may be secondarily regarded as belonging to Śabda and Artha which manifest the sentiment, just as valour, cruelty etc. are associated with the man in our common parlance, but in point of fact they belong to the soul or heart of that man. Thus Guṇas are permanent attributes of the Rasa, since excellence, being the properties of Rasa follow the presence or absence of Rasa with the result that if Rasa is present, Guṇa is present, if Rasa is absent, then Guṇa too is absent. Thus the expression Saguṇau Śabdārthau means that while it is true that, since excellences are the properties of Rasa, the words Saguṇau can not be directly applied to Śabdārthau. But it is by an indirect or metaphorical process that the term Guṇa conveys the concept of Rasa to which it actually belongs. It is therefore no wonder that Saguṇau Śabdārthau indirectly means Rasavaṇtau Śabdārthau. But these Śabda and Artha are such that help reveal the excellences. It is such Guṇas that heighten the sentiment.

In the gloss that follows this Sūtra (I.12), Hemachandra takes up the three important terms in the Sūtra viz., Rasaḥ, Guṇāh and Dosāḥ and explains that while the nature of Rasa is to be defined, Guṇas or excellences are those attributes of a sentiment which are the direct causes of heightening the effect of a Rasa and Doṣas or blemishes are directly responsible for hindering and marring the effect of a sentiment. They, i.e. Guṇas and Doṣas are the attributes, Dharmāḥ, of the Rasa alone, but it is only indirectly or metaphorically that they are juxtaposed with words and senses as these latter help reveal them. The inherence of the Guṇas as well as the Doṣas in the sentiment can be determined by reference to ,the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. Thus wherever there are blemishes, there are Guṇas as well, for Doṣas appertain to a specific Rasas and not to either a Śabda or Artha. In other words Doṣas and Guṇas reside in the Same place and exist in referene to the same thing.

If, however, Doṣas belonged to the word and the sense, then blemishes such as Kaṣṭatva etc. would not become Guṇas in Rasas like Bībhatsa etc. and in a like manner, the faults such as Aślīlatva etc. would not deserve the appellation of Guṇas in Rasas like Hāsya etc. Obviously these Doṣas are variable, impermanent. Since they, viz., Doṣas, are Doṣas when the Rasa or the principal element whose Doṣas they are, is present but when Rasa is not there, they cease to be Doṣas. Thus by the method of Anvaya (invariable association) and Vyatireka (invariable dissociation) it can be proved that Rasa is the locus in which Guṇas and Doṣas inhere.

Hemachandra has made the above points with reference to Doṣas and Guṇas only by way of **a short, general introduction** to these important poetic concepts, **since he proposes to deal exhaustively with the concept of Doṣa in Chapter III, and with that of Guṇa in Chapter IV of this work**. In fact at the outset of these Chapters (III and IV), he again uses a paraphrase of the present Sūtra to explain Doṣa and Guṇa (see pages 159 and 274 of the text). In these places, he also repeats the expression Sāmānyalakṣaṇam to indicate that the definition of Doṣa and Guṇa is a sort of general definition.

The Viveka Commentary supplements the gloss by explaining the word Upachāreṇa occuring in the gloss in connection with the use of Guṇas and Doṣas with Śabda and Artha, and not with Rasa. The gloss has already clarified that it is by virtue of the metaphorical or indirect way of saying things that Guṇas and Doṣas are said to qualify word and sense in the definition of poet. To further explain this notion of **Upacāra or metaphorical usage,** the Tīkā says that just as when we speak of the appearance of a person as being brave (e.g. 'He looks brave'), we are applying the **inner** quality of valour to the **outward** body which reveals it, in the same way as qualities such as sweetness and the like are spoken of with reference to word and Sense. Though Hemachandra discusses here the concepts of Doṣas and Guṇas rather briefly and only

incidentally (incidental to the definition of Poetry), **yet he has made his theory of Guṇa and Doṣa pratty clear by correlating it with the central concept of Rasa as being the Soul of Poetry.** From the above discussion, we know that in **Hemachandra's theory of poetic beauty, Rasa reigns supreme in a poem and the other concepts of Guṇa and Doṣa, though they dwell in Rasa, only and depend on the Rasa.** We find echoes of not only the Dhavanyāloka (II. 6 & 9 etc.) but also of the Kāvyaprakāśa (VII and VIII) in this view. Thus in the opinion of Hemachandra, the importance of Guṇa, Doṣa and Alaṁkāra is to be evaluated not by their relation to the word or the sense to which they only indirectly and incidentally relate but only in terms of their relation to the realization of Rasa to which they directly relate.

Hemachandra's Conception of Poetic Embellishment

Hemachandra is logical, atleast he makes a conscious effort to be logical, in regard to the treatment of the different constituents of poetry. His definition of poetry commences by making a reference to the absence of blemishes and then states the excellences and finally the figures of speech in relation to words and senses. Quite consistently, therefore, he has defined blemishes and excellences in the very next Sūtra (No. 12). And now it is the turn of the third adjective used in the definition of poetry. This last adjective relates to Alaṁkāras, the figures of speech, which beautify both the word and the sense. Consequently, the next Sūtra (13) defines Alaṁkāras or the figures of speech. Now, one may really wonder how proper justice can be done to figures of speech in just one Sūtra when the subject boasts of a vast ancient literature grown around it. To a certain extent this fear is well-founded; for, since the earliest days of Sanskrit poetics-nay, since the beginning of Sanskrit poetry, the cancept of beauty in poetry has been closely connected with the idea of ornaments as a means to poetic beauty and the concept of the beauty of word and sense has exercised the minds

of the leading lights of ancient theories on poetics such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa and others. As all these theorists considered poetry to be a togetherness of word and sense, it followed for them that beauty of word and beauty of meaning should constitute the beauty of the whole poetic work. Hence, the figures of speech both pertaining to the word and the sense came to occupy a very important place in Poetics and consequently entire treatises came to be written on the subject of Alaṁkāra, and most of them were titled as works on Alaṁkāraśāstra. This state of affairs in that early period of Sanskrit poetics unmistakably points to the central place assigned to 'Alaṁkāra' in poetry. According to prominent authors like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and others, there can hardly be any poetry in the absence of figures. In fact, in their theories, 'Alaṁkāra' was considered to be the main source of poetic beauty and the most important element of the poetic expression. An even the Rīti School, which laid much store by Guṇa, gave equal importance to Alaṁkāra. Vāmana, for instance, declares that the term Kāvya properly applies to aword and a sense whose charm is enhanced by the Guṇas and the Alaṁkāras and considers them to be the sine qua non of poetry.

But with the advent of the Dhavani School, there arose a new kind of poetics which not only postulated Rasa or Dhvani to be the soul of poetry but relegated word, sense, excellences etc. to a subordinate position. Thus the new School of Poetics completely revolutionised the idea of poetry as well as the concept of poetic beauty. Keeping Rasa or Dhvani at the centre of the poetic process, it overturned the old theories of Alaṁkāra, Rīti etc. as the chief element in poetry, and reorganized the various elements in relation to Rasa or Dhvani which was termed the soul of poetry. The author of the Dhvanyāloka clearly says that Dhvani is the soul of a poem and Rasadhvani is the best type of Dhvani. This Rasadhvani occurs where Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa, Bhāvabhāsa etc. constitutes the principal element and where the words, the expressed

sense and the figures of speech are subordinated to Rasa, etc. This Rasadhvani is instanced in शून्यं वासगृहं विलोक्य etc., quoted by Hemachandra under Sūtra 11 (wherein he has defined poetry). It is clear, therefore, that in the new conception of Poetry, excellences, figures and styles are spoken of as the causes of the heightening of Rasa.

What are Poetic Embelishments ?

Hemachandra has used the adjective Sālaṁkāraiḥ to qualify word and sense in poetry. He now defines Alaṁkāras and determines their nature and scope in the realm of poetry (in Sūtra No. 13). Being a follower of the new School of Dhvani theory, which was responsible for subordinating all the traditional concepts of poetic expression to the principal element of Rasa, Hemachandra frames a very brief but significant definition of Alaṁkāra by way of giving a general idea of what Alaṁkāra means. He states that figures of speech are dependent upon word and sense which are the body of a Rasa (the soul). In other words, Alaṁkāras or figures of speech reside in the body of a poem and not in the soul, Ātmā, of it. This Sūtra along with its gloss is a clear literal echo of the text of the Dhvanyāloka (II. 6/2) : "Aṅgāśritāstvalaṁkārā mantavyā kaṭakādivat". Here the difference between a Guṇa and Alaṁkāra becomes clear. According to Ānandavardhaka, Mammaṭa, Hemachandra and others of the Dhvani School, while the Guṇas belong to and are the properties of Rasa, the principal element in the poem, the Alaṁkāras are related to the Śabda and Artha, Aṅgāśritāḥ. In the opinion of theorists of this school, the relation between the Alaṁkāra and the Rasa is such that the existence of Alaṁkāra is justified according to the role it plays towards the ultimate realisation of Rasa.

Concepts of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra Distinguished

The rather short definition of the Alaṁkāra (Sūtra 13) is elucidated in the Gloss. Alaṁkāras are dependent on the word and the sense which constitute the body of the soul called

Rasa. These Alaṁkāras, as a rule, add charm to the Rasa; but, sometimes they are not favourably disposed for the purpose of lending charm to the Rasa in a poem. However, when there is no Rasa worth mentioning in a composition, these Alaṁkāras merely end up rendering the words and sense picturesque and striking. The gloss, thus provides guidelines in regard to determining the role and worth of the Alaṁkāra in relation to the Rasa. In addition to this, the concept of Alaṁkāra is carefully distinguished from that of Guṇa. Thus, while excellences or Guṇas are the attributes of a Rasa, the figures are the embellishments of words and senses. In this way, the relations of Guṇa, Doṣa and Alaṁkāra with the body of a Kāvya as well as the soul thereof have been defined and determined following the Rasadhvani theory. In general, excellences, figures, styles of comosition etc. are described as the causes of the heightening of Rasa. Guṇas are said to be related to words and sense, only in a metaphorical sense, since the word Guṇa refers to words and meanings which develop excellence. Hence what is meant is that words and senses that reveal excellences, heighten Rasa. Even Mammaṭa defines the qualities or Guṇas as attributes of the Rasa like valour etc. which are attributes of the soul of a person. They are Nitya or permanent and always heighten the Rasa. Just as bravery etc. are attributes of the self, not of the figure or person of a man, so also sweetness etc. are the qualities of a Rasa and not that of the letters. Hemachandra, like Mammaṭa, clearly states that the excellences such as Mādhurya etc. are the properties of Rasa alone and not of anything else, like words and senses. As for Doṣas, we know that they are Anitya or impermanent in the Rasa-dhvani theory. Thus the position of the views of the Dhvani theorists and their followers including Hemachandra, can be briefly summarised as follows : शब्दार्थौ काव्यस्य शरीरम्, आत्मा रसः, गुणाः शौर्यादिवत्, दोषाः काणत्वादिवत्, अलंकाराः कुण्डलादिवत् ।[17]

Guṇa and Alaṁkāra vis-a-vis the Rasa-dhvani Doctrine

Interestingly, Hemachandra takes up for discussion the expression Aṅgāśritāḥ, figuring in the Sūtrā (13), in the Viveka commentary (p. 34). Excellences are the attributes of the Rasa, the Aṅgin, whereas embellishments belong to the word and the sense, the body of a poem. This is the nice difference between a Guṇa and an Alaṁkāra. Understanding poetry on the analogy of a human body, as shown above, we can very well appreciate the meanings of the poetic concepts of Guṇa, Alaṁkāra etc. as qualities of the mind, ornaments of the body and so on, keeping in mind that Rasadhvani is the soul of a Kāvya. Thus the followers of the Rasadhvani theory assing the Guṇas and Alaṁkāras their proper place in the context of the supremacy of Rasa-dhvani as a soul of poetry. No poet, therefore, is to waste his time in the creation of poetry that has no relation to Rasa. All elements must harmonise with this principle element (Aṅgin) of poetry. This is the final position reached by the remarkable work on Dhvani called the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhan so far as the different component parts of Poetry and Poetics are concerned; and this position is faithfully followed by all later writers, including Hemachandra. Naturally, Hemachandra regards Śabda, Artha, Guṇa, Doṣa and Alaṁkāra as subordinate in importance since they appertain to the external appearance of poetry and hence they cannot be equated with the inner sense of poetry. In fact, they only serve to heighten the inner or implicit beauty that underlies a good poem.

Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa's View Criticised

In the context of making a fine distinction between the Guṇas and Alaṁkāras, Hemachandra observes that, in regard to this distinction Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa, in his Commentary on Bhāmaha's work on Poetics, called Bhāmahavivaraṇa,[18] holds a mistaken view. For, Udbhaṭa believes that whereas in real life virtues or qualities are like valour etc. and ornaments are like necklece etc. and therefore, Guṇas and Alaṁkāras are

distinct because Guṇas are related to the human-being by Samavāyasambandha but Alaṁkāras are related to the same by Saṁyogasambandha, in Literature, however, both the Guṇas and the Alaṁkāras stand associated with Poetry by Samavāya-sambandha. This is an unrealistic distinction made by one (Udbhaṭa) who is blindly following a wrong tradition which is unable to discern the real difference between the nature of Guṇas and that of Alaṁkāras in Poetry. What Hemachandra means by criticising Udbhata is that while he knows fully well from real life that Guṇa is a permanent qualify inherent in the soul of a man and Alaṁkāra is an appendage attached to the body by a mere **external** contact still he refuses to recognize the distinction between the two types of relations, viz., Samavāya and Saṁyoga, i. e. inherence and association which marks off Guṇas from Alaṁkāras. This is nothing but blind faith in the tradition which militates against our own experience. From our experience of the world, it is quite clear that ornaments rest on the body only extetnally by Saṁyoga, and they have nothing to do with the soul of the person who wears them. Whereas Guṇas are internal qullities of the soul which are inherent, Samavāya, in the nature of the person and cannot be discarded. Thus, the difference between the Guṇas and the Alaṁkāras arises from the difference between their dwelling places (Āśraya). While the Guṇas reside in the Ātmā which is permanent and they inherently and permanently belong to it, the Alaṁkāras pertain to the Śarīra which is impermanent and they non intimately and externally belong to it, the Alaṁkāras pertain to the शरीर which is impermanent and they non-intimately and externally belong to the body from which they can be removed or to which they can be added. The upshot of the above discussion, then, is that poets freely employ or discard Alaṁkāras in their compositions, but they cannot dispense with Guṇas which belong to the Rasātmā. No doubt, Alaṁkāras serve the inner-soul of a peom indirectly by enhancing the charm and indicating the beauty of the inner virtues of a poem;.

nevertheless, they are found to be useful in a composition only when they heighten the effect of the Rasa. But when they do not contribute to the heightening of the emotional atmosphere or when they hinder the process of Rasa realisation, they need not be employed. In fact, such figures of speech can be taken out of a poetic composition without in anyway detracting from the beauty of the poem. In other words, Guṇas, being intimately connected with Rasa, the soul of poetry, can never be removed or rejected, but Alaṁkāras being the external appendages of the body of a poem consisting of word and sense, can be used or discarded without affecting the charm of the sentence or its Rasa. In order to make this exposition clear, Hemachandra quotes verses to provide concrete illustrations, demonstrating the truth of his observation that figures either of word or sense, even if removed or altered, do not at all mar the charm of a poem. He first gives an example of the alteration of a Śabdālaṁkāra or figure of word in the verse Alaṁkṛtajaṭācakram etc. Here the expression Cārucandramarīcibhiḥ containing the Anuprāsa figure of word (alliteration) in the second hemistich, is changed to Taruṇendumarīcibhiḥ without altering the meaning of the verse which consists in intense love and deep reverence for Lord Śiva. In another instance, the removal of a figure of meaning is attempted by retaining the Arthāntaranyāsa figure of sense, though discarding the figure simile (Upamā) in Bālamṛṇālakalpaiḥ by substituting Kelicakora-lehyaiḥ. Here, in spite of the fact that a good simile is removed from the verse, no change in the principle sentiment of love occurs – it neither increases nor decreases the charm of this sentiment. In the next verse (129), we have an example of adding a figure of speech pertaining to the sense, without, however, adding to or detracting from the sentimental value of the expression. The verse in question is the same as appeared under Sūtra 10 to illustrate the poetic convention that allows the statement of a non-existent thing. The idea expressed herein is that the female-peacocks mistake the web of the rays emanating from

blue emeralds made more effulgent by the spray of water thrown out through their trunks by the elephants resorting to the other slope for the clouds full of water and watch them longingly. Now, the word Taṭāntareṣu in the second line is replaced by the two words Mṛgākṣi sanau (Oh lady with eyes charming like those of a female-deer, on top of that mountain) so as to give rise to an additional simile or Samāsagā upamā which is a well known figure of sense. But so far as the charm of the original verse is concerned, the addition of this simile does not add much to that charm.

Criteria of Samavāya and Saṁyoga

The above examples show unmistakably that while the removal or addition of the figures of speech depends on the poets' sweet will, the Guṇas are unalterable. Moreover, it is also clear that while the figures of speech are not intimately and invariably connected with the essential beauty of the verse, the excellences are the attributes of that beauty and are, therefore, intimately and invariably connected with the soul of a poem. This difference between an Alaṁkāra and a Guṇa is not due to any blind faith in the tradition, Gaḍḍarikāpravāhaḥ, signifying lack of discrimination, but it is based rather on logical and sound reasoning of the theorists who believe in Rasa-dhvani to be the soul of a poem which has the sound and the sense for its body.

Hemachandra objects to Vāmana's View on Guṇa

After a scathing criticism of Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa's traditional as well as out-moded and illogical views on the Guṇas and the Ālaṁkāras, Hemachandra objects to Vāman's views on the variability of the Guṇas. He introduces the arguments of Vāmana (KASV. 3-1-1 & 2) by stating categorically that the removal or addition of the Guṇas in a poem is not at all possible. Vāmana, the advocate of the Rīti School, was the earliest theorist to define the terma 'Guṇa' and 'Rīti'. His well known work on Poetics called the Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti

treats the Guṇas as "those elements of poetry that serve to embellishment it". And these Guṇas, unlike the figures of speech or Alaṁāras in the narrower sense, are the inseparable attributes of poetry because they constitute the Rīti described as the soul of poetry. Thus Vāmana considers Rīti to be the soul of poetry and Guṇa to be the constituent of Rīti. This Rīti is Viśiṣṭā Padaracanā i.e. a special type of word-arrangement.

Vāmana's Significant Distinction

While Vāmana attempts to analyse the different elements of poetry, he not only defines them but also distinguishes them. Thus, for instance, while dealing with the concept of Guṇa in the first chapter of the third section of his work, the Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti, which consists of terse aphorisms as well as a gloss by the same author, Vāmana begins by saying in the first Sūtra that the Guṇas are those attributes or properties, Dharmāḥ, which impart beauty or charm to a poem, but states in the next Sūtra (Sū. 2) that the Alaṁkāras or figures of speech (like the simile, alliteration etc.) are the causes of heightening the beauty or charm thus produced. Thus, in Vāmana's theory of poetry, the Guṇas are described as inseparable attributes of poetry, while the Alaṁkāras, since they are not absolutely indispensable in the production of poetic beauty or charm, only serve to enhance the poetic charm when it is produced, enjoy a subordinate status as a poetic element. This significant distinction between the Guṇas and Alaṁkaras has been clearly brought out by Vāmana by quoting two verses Yuvateriva rūpam etc. and Yadi bhavati vucaścyutam etc. wherein the Guṇas are explained on the analogy of human virtues which reside inseparably in the human soul and the Alaṁkāras on the analogy of ornaments on a human body. Thus the Guṇas are the direct attributes that cause poetic beauty but the Alaṁkāras embellish poetry indirectly through the sound and sense and that too not invariably. Nevertheless, Vāmana's theory regards both the Guṇa and the Alaṁkāra as the properties of word and meaning, albeit

in different degrees. Thus, in Vāmana's scheme of poetry, the Guṇas and the Alaṁkāras are not different in kind but only different in the degree of their involvement in the production of poetic beauty.

The Real Difference between Guṇa and Alaṁkāra

Hemachandra, therefore, attacks Vāmana's distinction between the Guṇa and the Alaṁkāra as represented in the first two Sūtras quoted in the Viveka Commentary. According to Hemachandra, Vāmana's conception of the Guṇas as well as the Alaṁkāras is not universally found to be valid, as for example, in expressions like "Gato'stamarko...etc." though excellences such as Drasāda, Śleṣa, Samatā, Mādhurya, Saukumārya; Arthavyakti (all defined and explained by Vāmana) are present but that does not entitle the expression to be styled a poem, similarly in the following verse (161) "Api Kācicchrutā Vārtā etc." by the mere presence of the figure Utprekṣā (Poetic Fancy) as well as due to the presence of three or four unintended Guṇas, the title of poetry is used with reference to it. Hence it is settled that Guṇas become Guṇas only when there is Rasa in a poem and never otherwise. That is the rule. Similarly, the Alaṁkāras can be independent of the Rasa. That is the difference between a Guṇa and an Alaṁkāra. This, according to Hemachandra, is the proper distinction in the opinion of the Rasa-Dhvani theorists. As he winds up the discussion on the doctrine of Guṇas and Alaṁkāras, Hemachandra assures us in passing that the Guṇas are only three and it will be clear when the Guṇas are dealt with in Chapter IV of the Kāvyānuśāsana.

The True Function of Alaṁkāra

The poetic embellishments which embellish the constituent words and senses of a poem have been difined and explained. It has been pointed out that these figures or embellishments are employed to subserve the principal element in a poem. The figure thus enjoys a subordinates position in a poem

whose chief source of beauty is the sentiment. It has to function as a promoter of the sentiment. And it is precisely this function of the figure that makes it an integral part of the poetic expression. Hence, it is the poet's function to utilize the numerous figures so that they become not external appendages but rather true and real ornaments of the principal sense. This calls for imagination and discrimination. Since a figure of speech is regarded as beautifier of the principal element of the poem in the same way as an ornament is considered a cause of beauty in our personality. If used with proper care and discrimination, the alaṁkāras will unfailingly perform their function of promoting the beauty of the sentiment.

General Guide-lines for the Employment of Alaṁkāras

Hemachandra, therefore, lays down general guide-lines for the employment of the figures of speech so as to aid the process of Rasa-realisation. In Sūtra No. 14, Hemachandra states that those figures of speech are considered as favourable to a sentiment which are positively agreeable to a sentiment and are employed only at a proper time and only at the proper place and which do not deter the course of a sentiment nor occur in a poem without any definite purpose.

In the Sūtra (I. 14), Hemachandra points out the nature of the discrimination that a poet should exercise while employing the figures. Thus, according to him (a) if a figure of speech is **intent on helping** the development of the Rasa, (b) if it is employed only **at proper time** and **place,** (c) if it is **not pressed too far** due to indifference, (d) and even when it is employed it is kept **subordinate** at all costs, then it is said to be **agreeable** to the Rasa or considered favourably employed. In the gloss, he adds that the word 'alaṁkāra' follows. He says that Tatparatvaṃ in the Sūtra means that a figure of speech is employed only in such a manner that it becomes agreeable or favourable to the principal element, and does not become **detrimental**, not does it come in without

any **poetic purpose.** It is interesting to note that Hemachandra here follows the 18th and the 19th Kārikas of the Dhvanyāloka, Udyota II, with some of the illustrations given there. Ānandavardhana introduces the two Kārikas under reference by saying that the caution to be observed while bringing in the figures of speech is this, and then he lays down that the rule here is that (1) figures of speech are there only to help the Rasa and not there for their own sake, (2) it is necessary to employ them at the right time and drop them at the right moment, (3) the poet should not desire to press them too far, and, lastly (4) the poet should keep it subordinate to the principle element only. This is the way in which figures like metaphor become auxiliary elements in a poem. Thus, we have **five** aspects of this rule :

(1) We have to make sure that the figure comes in only as an accessory of the Rasa

(2) It should come in at the appropriate time

(3) It should be abandoned at the right moment

(4) It should not be pressed too far in undue zest, and

(5) It should be kept as a subordinate element

(Dhv.Āl.Ud.II.18,19 etc.)

To illustrate the five aspects of his caution, Hemachandra begins by quoting a beautiful verse from the Śākuntala (I.20), Calāpāṅgām etc., to show how an Alaṁkāra can be employed to heighten the Rasa (Tatparatvena). In this verse we have the Svabhāvokti figure, a pen-portrait of a bee, which consists in the description of the romantic behaviour of a bee expressing the mode of love for Śakuntalā in King Duṣyanta's heart. As the bee touches, the beautiful eyes, hovers humming sweetly around the ears and sits on the charming lips of Śakuntalā, the King stands observing the very lovely form of Śakuntalā as the bee behaves as a lover, as it were, and utters these words. Hemachandra remarks that this verse provides an illustration of the employment of a figure of speech

so as to heighten the sentiment. This shows that the poet is intent on the delineation of the sentiment only.

It may be noted that Tatparatvena means Rasaparatvena and it means that **the Alaṁkāra is never an end in itself**, that is to say, it is never permanent but is an accessory to the sentiment. The Dhvanyāloka quotes a verse with the figure Paryāyokta in a dominating position.

The next rule regarding the obstructive nature (Bādhakatva) of an Alaṁkāra is illustrated in the well known verse from Śrīharṣa's play "The Ratnavalī" (I. 16). This verse describes the boisterous dance of a damsel during the love festival and the poet intends to suggest the sentiment of love, but the figure Utprekṣā with its auxiliary figure Arthaśleṣa completely hinders the progress of the sentiment; for, the poet uses the word Pīḍayeva to produce Utprekṣā. This Utprekṣā is supported by a second figure called Arthaśleṣa (double enténdré) operating in the words Ākulai, Krandataḥ, Vyastaḥ and Madhyabhangāḥ so as first to convey the violent nature of the dance and then to convey the second sense of bewilderment, crying, distortion, merciless striking and breaking of the waist. Thus the poet has ingeniously worked out these two figures to describe the dance-scene vividly and picturesquely as also to suggest the predominant sentiment of Śṛngāra but the two figures mentioned just now create an atmosphere of pathos which is detrimental to the sentiment of love. Commenting on the verse, Hemachandra states that the figure Utprekṣā in Pīḍayeva becomes predominant here and together with its auxiliary figure Arthaśleṣa gives rise to the determinants and ensuants of the pathetic sentiment and consequently becomes detrimental to the main Rasa.

As for the third caution of Hemachandra, contained in the Sūtra (14) under reference, it states that the figure should not be employed without the poetic purpose. Here, we should remember that these **three** rules or conditions of the employment of an alamkāra, flow, from the expression Tatparatvena Rasopakāriṇaḥ (Alaṁkārāḥ) explained in the gloss, this

means that an Alaṁkāra is to act as an accessory to the dominant Rasa; hence it should not be detrimental to the Rasa and lastly it should not be neutral towards the Rasa, i.e., **it should positively serve the purpose of suggesting the Rasa.** Hemachandra illustrates the last aspect of the Tatparatva of an Alaṁkāra in a verse from the same play, Ratnāvali (2.8). The verse describes the feeling of love generated by seeing the lovely portrait of Sāgarikā. The King's expression only gives a description of Sāgarikā by employing the two figures Upamā and Śleṣa but does not distinctly reveal his love for Sāgarikā. Hemachandra remarks in the gloss that this expression of love in the verse being subordinated to the dominant simile with the double enténdré looks like the utterance of a neutral person i.e., looks like a statement of description. Hence the love-sentiment is not heightened by the figures at all. On the other hand, the sentiment is rendered weak. The result is that here the Alaṁkāra cannot be considered as Rasaparatva or Rasopakārin i.e., favourable and agreeable to the Rasa. And this is true, notwithstanding the apt comparison between Sāgarika and the female-swan.

Now, it is not enough that the figure of speech should subserve the cause of the sentiment; but it is absolutely necessary that the figure comes in only at the right time; Kāle gṛhitiḥ or Avasare gṛhitiḥ. We have noted above that Hemachandra has almost completely taken over this section on the definition and employment of Alaṁkāra from the Dhvanyāloka (II. 18, 19 ff), with illustrations and explanations, although with slight changes in the statements of the rules. Thus we have the same verse Uddāmotkalikā from the Ratnāvalī (2.4) in Hemachandra as well as in the Dhvanyāloka (II. 19 ff) as an illustration of a figure employed, having regard to proper time and circumstance. In the verse, the figure becomes an accessory to the Rasa and also comes in at an opportune moment. This is a very significant verse, having two figures, Upamā and Śleṣa and it brings out the king Vatsaraja's burning desire to snub his queen by creating a love-longing in Sāgarikā

for himself. Now the king had planted the Mādhavī creeper in his garden and his queen Vāsavadattā too had planted another creeper, the Navamālikā in the same garden. As time went by, a spirit of competition grew between the king and the queen, and the king challenged the queen that his creeper would flower earlier than her creeper. And, luck really favoured the king; for, his creeper put forth flowers first. The king, elated with joy at this favourable turn of good fortune, believes that this victory of his over the queen augurs very well for his desire to win Sāgarika's love, though the queen Vāsavdattā may not like it. The poet Śrīharṣa has composed a memorable verse suggesting the sentiment of Īrṣyāvipralambhaśṛṅgāra, separation in love, on account of jealousy – by means of a comparison (simile) between the garden creeper appearing like a love-lorn lady and causing heart-burn to the queen frustrated in her hold of love over the king. Incidentally the simile that makes the Mādhavī creeper look like a love-lorn lady is rendered charming and perfect by means of several double entendre which make the simile possible. These two figures, viz., Upamā and Śleṣa act as powerful accessories to the sentiment and come in at the right moment and in the most appropriate circumstance. It is interesting to note that this incident turns out to be an actual fact in the play, since Sāgarika **does** win the King's love and cause heart-burning to the queen. Thus this verse is an important verse, dramatically speaking. Hemachandra has attempted a good critical appreciation of the verse from the Śākuntala, previously cited, as well as of this particular verse. In the gloss, it is pointed out that in the present verse, the figure simile which is based on a double entendre brings out prominently for our enjoyment the sentiment called Īrṣyāvipralambha, a variety of the Śṛṅgārarasa which consists in separation in love due to jealousy, though it is yet to take place, and thus, comes in when the Rasa is dominant, that is to say, they come in at the appropriate moment, so that they are both favourable to the development of Rasa. Hence the verse is an illustration of Kāle grahaṇam.

However, the next verse Vātāharatayā etc. cited from the Bhallaṭa Śataka (87) contains an Atiśayokti, hyperbole, which is employed to heighten the feeling of disgust (Nirveda) on the part of the poet who has observed hypocracy masquerading as piety. But the poet has failed to describe instances of hypocracy (that of the serpents, the peacocks and the hunters) in an ascending order of the austerity of their vows. In other words, among the three vows, viz., of subsistence on wind, subsistence on the drops of rain water alone and being clad in the rough (sacred) skin of camūru deer, the first is the most difficult of all, hence it should have been described last. This would have ensured a proper ascending order of the vows of austerity, resulting in the proper development of the sentiment of quietude, i.e., Śāntarasa. Thus the figure Atiśayokti fails to agree with the principal sentiment; nay, it actually mars the effect by not maintaining the atmosphere of the Śāntarasa, though it exhibits the three types of hypocrites causing disgust to grow. Hemachandra, criticises the poet in the gloss by remarking that in this verse, since 'subsistence on air' (Vātāhāratva), which should have been mentioned last, has been mentioned first, the hyperbole is employed at an inopportune moment. To wit, from the beginning itself, the hyperbole which is brought in by means of the figures Hetūtprekṣā in the first line of the stanza, fails to serve to intensify or maintain the emotion of disgust which lies in the feeling of regret for the series of merits that are repressed by the power of rank hypocracy and which is relevant here. Indeed subsisting on drops of rainy water is not a greater hypocracy than subsistence on air, nor is being clad in a deer-skin a greater hypocracy than the second vow.

If timely acceptance of a figure is important for the heightening of a Rasa, the timely dropping of an Alaṁkāra is equally important. As the Dhvanyāloka says, even the abandoning half-way of a figure already taken up for treatment in favour of some other figure more favourably disposed to reveal the principal element, viz., Rasa, is perfectly justified. An

illustration of this rule is cited here from the Hanumannāṭaka (V. 4). Here, Rāma, filled with sorrow at separation from Sītā, addresses the Aśoka tree by pointing out several common attributes that both he and the tree share except that while Rāma is Saśoka i.e., full of grief, the tree is by name Aśoka, i.e., without grief. By way of a comment on this verse, Hemachandra adapts a single line from the Dhvanyāloka, where this verse is cited to illustrate the same point but with a detailed discussion following it in the Vṛtti. Thus, it is pointed out by Ānandavardhana that the double enténdré employed in the above verse is abandoned half-way in the third line with a view to making place for the figure Vyatireka. Hence it is helpful to the sentiment of love-in-separation. Hemachandra adopts only this much by substituting Vipralambhopakārī for Visesaṁ puṣṇāti. It is to be noted here that Ānandavardhana mentions mixed figures by compounding the two names, e.g. Upamā Śleṣa, Śleṣavyatireka etc. Such seperable figures usually go by the name of Sansṛṣṭi, whereas inseperable figures are designated by the name of Saṅkara. Incidentally, Rudrata and Namisādhu approve of the method of compounding the names of the figures. Ānandavardhana seems to follow this lead.

But, in the next verse, cited from Rājaśekhara's Bālarāmayaṇa, King Janaka denounces Rāvaṇa who had offered himself as a suitor. In the first three lines, Janaka ponders over the excellent qualities of Rāvaṇa which may surely make him a Dharmavira, if taken without the fourth line. But all his qualities which make him a good bridegroom are abruptly spurned because he is Rāvaṇa and the quality of being a Rāvaṇa, harasser of the world, cancells out all the other qualities at once and makes him fit to be condemned once and for all. In the first half of the fourth line, Janaka wishes that he were not Rāvaṇa and implies that he is utterly unworthy of any regard., for, the name Rāvaṇa is contemptible. But still he wonders in the last half-line : "Could all merits be found in one place ?" This last half-line is ill-suited and out of place

here. This statement can either give rise to a doubt (Sandeha) or deny what is said before (Ākṣepa) or laydown a universal proposition, Arthāntaranyāsa, but none of these ways or figures can agree with the principal sense of the verse. Whether the figure in the last half-verse is Sandeha or Ākṣepa or Arthāntaranyāsa, it in no way can establish Rāvaṇa to be a hero in religion, i.e. Dharmavīra. Hemachandra's remark in the gloss clearly shows that the speech of Janaka should have ended with the words न रावणः, for, Rāvaṇa harasses and tortures the world and so he is unfit to be a Dharmavīra for whom Janaka has great regard. Indeed Janaka takes into account all the good qualities of Rāvaṇa as these show him to be a Dharmavīra, but unfortunately he is Rāvaṇa, a dispicable torturer of mankind and so all his virtues come to nought. His prowess, his deep learning, his devotion to Lord Śiva, his divine and resplendent abode, Laṅkā, his birth in an exalted family – if all these qualities are found in an impious and anti-social man, they are worthless. The verse is well-sustained upto this point. But the last half-line beginning with Kva nu punaḥ does not agree with the tone and the tenor of the verse, even if that line is interpreted to yield either the figure Sasandeha or Ākṣepa or to consider the sentence Nedṛgvaro labhyate as containing a general proposition. The idea of Dharmavīra, which is the principal sense of the verse is not at all heightened or intensified by these figures. The verse Kopatkomala etc. (KAS. gloss : verse-9) illustrates "not pressing the figure too far", Nātyantanirvāhaḥ. A poet intent only on the delineation of a sentiment will always cut short a slightly introduced figure to maintain the effect of the sentiment. This verse from Amaru describes a lover being taken to task by his beloved in a soft and tender manner for his flirtations with another woman, and declares that such a lover is really fortunate. In this verse, we have a metaphor in 'the noose of her creeper-like arms' (Bāhulatikāpāśa) which is appropriately cut short. Otherwise, as explained in the Viveka Commentary, which brings out the hidden sense of

the verse, had the metaphor of the Bāhupāśa been worked out fully by depicting the lady as a female hunter and the bed-chamber as a prison, the result would have been a complete destruction of the Śṛṅgāra Rasa in the verse. Therefore, the gloss briefly approves of this method of not pressing or developing the figure too far, if the charm of the Rasa is to be predominantly maintained. It is because of the strong sense of propriety on the part of the poet of this verse that the figure Rūpaka is cut short so as to allow full play to the sentiment of love. The next verse from Bhāsa, on the other hand, suffers in respect of the charm of the sentiment of love, because the poet did not stop at the partial metaphor of Nayanadvāra. Here, against the rule of propriety, the author has tried to fully expand the metaphor, that is, he has tried to extend or prolong the metaphor to cover not only the eyes, but also the body (Dehagṛha), the beauty (Svarūpatāḍa), etc., and has consequently spoiled the charm of the Rasa.

Now, Hemachandra deals with the last condition regarding the use of figures only to heighten the sentiment. This last caution means that the accessory nature of the Alaṃkāra is not overlooked even while the figure is developed in full so as to heighten the sentiment in a verse. In other words, the general rule is that even when a figure is fully developed, it should remain subservient to the sentiment. It is such a figure of speech which is best suited to the delineation of the sentiment. This ideal, harmonious relation between a fully developed Rasa and a fully developed but subservient Alaṃkāra is instanced in the famous verse cited here, from the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa (2.41). In this verse, Hemachandra remarks, the figure Utprekṣā, poetic fancy, consisting in fancying the limbs, glances, cheeks, etc., of his beloved in the creepers etc. on the strength of resemblance, is not merely introduced but very ably and artistically sustained throughout the verse, and still it is made wholly agreeable to the principal sentiment of Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra. The Viveka Commentary very minutely explains the various words so as to bring out their subtle

suggested shades of meaning which yield charm for the responsive readers. Hemachandra's method of unfolding the deeper and finer shades of meanings in poetically excellent verses is quite impressive. He says that the reading Bhīru retained in the last line, used for addressing the beloved of the Yakṣa is quite appropriate and it is better than the reading Caṇḍi (Vide Locana pp. 232-33). But the same thing cannot be said with reference to the next verse (12) Nyañcat etc. The verse, quoted from the Bālarāmāyaṇa (II. 19) describes graphically the **different** workings of the **twenty** eyes of Rāvaṇa. Thus one is bent, another contracted, a third eager, a fourth is smiling, the fifth is full of significance, the sixth is partially closed, the seventh is turned back... the fifteenth dilated... and the last three eyes are full of tears, owing to specific feelings each eye is exhibiting a different expression. Now, obviously the figure of speech employed here is the Svabhāvokti, with which the author Rājaśekhara presents a marvellous spectacle. But this striking pen-picture of the behaviour of all the eyes of Rāvaṇa does not add up to much by way of helping the sentiment of love in separation, intended to be depicted here, as Hemachandra points out in the gloss. He remarks that though the Svabhāvokti is very well extended from the first line to the last line of the verse, still it fails to act as a handmaid to the sentiment of love in separation. Though Rāvaṇa who was upset at not being able to win over Sītā describes his own condition with the words: 'Hanta! Hanta! Naikaprakāro madanavyāparaḥ, yato mama Vaidehidarśanataḥ prabhṛti' and goes on to state that owing to different feelings in his mind each one of his twenty eyes displayed a different activity, thus still the description, no doubt marvellous in itself, does not serve the purpose of the sentiment of love in separation, or the Poet's intention. Now, the Viveka Commentary intervenes, though it is customary for poets to describe eyes as reflecting different feelings in conformity with the different sentiments intended to be portrayed, as for example in the well-known verse - "Ekaṁ dhyānanimilanānmukulitaprāyaṁ dvitiyaṁ punaḥ....

netratrayaṁ pātu vaḥ" we have Śānta Śṛṅgāra and Krodha with their attendant determinants, consequents, etc., very well portrayed., hence there can be no opposition of Rāvaṇa's different eyes as reflecting different feelings. But here when we are told that these different feelings displayed by the twenty different eyes are due to the impact of the sentiment, we would expect a proper delineation of the sentiment, through the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas peculiar to it. But here, in the verse on Rāvaṇa's eyes, the delineation of the generation of the fleeting emotions appropriate to the sentiment by means of the determinants and consequents of the Rasa is conspicuous by its absence. Hence it is remarked that the figure Svabhāvokti is pointless so far as the main sentiment is concerned. To provide a concrete illustration of a verse which contains a proper development of the Rasa through the artistic representation of the apparatus (the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas), Hemachandra quotes the verse Sabhāyāṁ tādṛśyām etc. The verse describes the sense of pity and pathos which overpowers the whole assembly that was witnessing the scene where the beastly Duḥśāsana drags Draupadī by hair, and moves it to indignation and tears. Herein the poet has admirably suggested anger by twisted eyebrows and grief or pathos by the overflow of tears and the simultaneity as well as the immediacy of anger and pathos by means of the proper determinants, ensuants and accessories. Here the helpless and hapless Draupadī is the determinant of the sentiment of pathos and the evil-doer Duḥśāsana that of anger. This two-fold Vibhāva instantaneously generates appropriate ensuants. Thus this is an appropriate instance of a proper blending of the opposite fierce as well as tendermost mental states. But the verse Nyañcatkuñcitam etc. does not display such poetic ability at all.

This sums up the topic of the relation of Alaṁkāra with the Rasa. Hemachandra has defined and illustrated **five** different uses of the Alaṁkāra favourable to the Rasa in question. He has also demonstrated how violation of these norms runs

counter to aesthetic principles. As indicated above, Hemachandra has closely followed Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka (II. 18-19) and has in fact adopted his views in toto with several illustrations. While Hemachandra has finished with this topic here, Ānandavardhana adds that if a poet violates this aesthetic discipline, it results invariably in the destruction of the Rasa. Such aesthetic lapses are evident in the poetry of even great poets. But it is improper to pick holes in luminous works. He emphasises that Rasa is the whole and sole essence of poetry and figures like metaphor must be harmoniously employed. The poet should imagine what is hinted at here.[19]

THE POETIC MEANING 2

The next few Sūtras of the first Chapter (15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21), seven Sūtras to be precise, with the gloss and the supplementary material collected in the Viveka Commentary exhaustively discuss the problem of the aesthetic meaning. Since Hemachandra has defined poetry as constituted by word and sense, devoid of blemishes, possessed of excellences and, as a rule, possessed of figures of speech and since he has already briefly explained Doṣas, Guṇas and Alaṁkāras in their relation to the principal element in a poem, viz., Rasa, he now takes up the question of words and meanings in poetry. In fact Mammaṭa has treated of Word and Sense immediately after the definition and division of poetry since Word and Sense are the most important elements of a poem. However, as will be clear, Hemachandra's method of treatment is somewhat different.

Types of Meaning : Hemachandra's Fourfold Classification

Words are of four kinds–Expressive, Metaphorical, Indicative and Suggestive, corresponding to the four kinds of Senses of these words – Expressed, Metaphorical, Indicated and Suggested. The gloss explains that the Expressive or the Denotative word conveys the primary or direct meaning, the Metaphorical word conveys the metaphorical or figurative meaning which is based

on common qualities or Guṇas, the Indicative word conveys the indicated or indirect sense and the Suggestive word conveys the suggested sense. Hemachandra observes that the division of words is based on the different senses conveyed by the word-the same word; it is, therefore, not real (but theoretical). In other words, the senses are different, i.e., four-fold and therefore we have to conceive of four-fold words, eventhough the same word may convey several different senses, depending on circumstances. Thus Śabdabheda is due to Arthabheda. Unlike such well known authors as Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, Hemachandra gives four types of words corresponding to four types of senses. He has thus stated Mukhya, Gauṇa, Lakṣaka and Vyañjaka Śabdas, and Mukhyā, Gauṇa, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya Arthas correspond to them. This division of words is based on the four-fold classification of Senses that these words yield. It may be noted here that this classification is peculiar to poetry only, because suggestive (and even metaphorical) words occur in poetry only, and not in sciences such as Logic, Metaphysics, etc. Mammaṭa has significantly used the word Atra to mean "here, in poetry".[20] The Vaiśeṣikas and others admit only a two-fold Śabda, i.e., Vācaka and Lākaṣanika but the Dhvani theorists like Ānandavardhana and others of his pursuation believe that the Suggestive word and the Suggested Sense are important in poetry and that the Suggested Sense is possible in poetry only. As Hemachandra, like Mammaṭa, is a protagonist of Dhvani theory, he has mentioned the Vyañjakaśabda which is the basis of suggestion. The processes or powers by which the four types of Words lead to the four corresponding Senses are called Abhidhā (Denotation), Gauṇī (Metaphorical), Lakṣaṇā (Indication) and Vyañjanā (Suggestion). These will be defined and a detailed discussion of the powers or functions called Vṛtti, Śakti or Vyāparā follows.

The Expressed Sense : Different Views

First and foremost, the denotative or Expressive power is defined and explained. To start with, the definition of the

direct or expressed meaning is given. The expressed sense is conveyed by virtue of a direct convention. In defining the term Mukhya which stands in the Sūtra (I. 16) for Mukhyārtha, the words Sākṣāt Saṅketa are used to convey the idea of a direct convention known from worldly dealings (Lokavyavahāra) whereby a particular word conveys a particular sense. The gloss clarifies that just as the word Mukhya conveys the idea of a face directly and without any obstruction as different from the sense of hands, feet, etc., similarly, the primary or direct sense is comprehended at once by virtue of a certain direct convention. Thus the words Sākṣāt Saṅketa serve to demarcate the province of Abhidhā from that of Lakṣaṇā which is brought about by Vyavahita Saṅketa or indirect convention. In other words, the above definition of the Mukhyārtha differentiates it from Amukhyārtha or Lakṣyārtha. This Mukhyārtha is accepted with reference to Generality (Jāti), Quality (Guṇa), Things (Dravya) and Actions (Kriyā), and a word expressive of such a Sense is called Mukhya or Vācaka word. Thus, for instance, Gauḥ is Jāti, Śuklaḥ is a Guṇa (Quality), Calati is a Kriyā (Action) and Devadatta is a proper name or a Dravya (thing). Thus a Vācaka word conveys the Mukhya or Vācya Sense, i.e., the primary sense, due to a direct convention. And there are four different functions of this significatory process. In support of his statement, Hemachandra quotes a well-known rule from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, a commentator of the Aṣṭādhyāyi of Pāṇini. This quotation states that words function in a four-fold manner (so as to yield senses). This four-fold conventional meaning is expressed by Vācaka words. This is according to the Grammarian's view of convention or Saṅketa. There is another school of thinkers, i.e., the Mīmāṁsā School, which views the notion of Saṅketa differently. According to the Mīmāṁsā School, a word has Saṅketa for Jāti only. Yet another school, that of the Logicians, considers that Saṅketa can only be for Jātiviśiṣṭavyakti. And finally, the Buddhist School holds that a word has Saṅketa for the exclusion of everything else. **Hemachandra has made a**

passing reference to these four views. viz., the Jātyādi, the Jātireva, the Jātiviśiṣṭavyakti and Taditaravyāvṛtti or Apoha views and clearly expressed his reluctance to attempt a detailed discussion of the Jātyādi view regarding the Saṅketa or the other three views for that matter.[21] He justifies his stand by stating that since any further explanation of these views is not relevant to the subject in hand, it is not attempted. However, he elucidates the above four views in the Viveka Commentary by reference to the quotation Catuṣṭayī etc. and then to the concepts of Jātireva, Tadvān and Apoha. He explains Catuṣṭayī etc. by stating that under this theory there are four kinds of words: Jātiśabdas, Guṇaśabdas, Kriyāśabdas and Yadṛcchāśabdas. Now when these words convey their meanings, they depend on Saṅketa by virtue of which the denotative power (Abhidhāvṛtti) operates. But the difficulty is as to how this Saṅketa is to be understood. In other words, the question is as to where the convention is understood. Mammaṭa has mentioned that the conventional denotation is four-fold consisting of Jātyādi or Jāti alone or Tadvān or Apoha. The grammarians, whom the Ālaṁkārikas follow, hold the first view. The Mīmāṁsakas are the Jātivādins. The Naiyāyikas are the holders of the Tadvān view, i.e., they are the Jātiviśiṣṭavyaktivādins and the Buddhists are the Apohavādins. The first two of these (Jātyādivādins and Jātirevavadins) are mentioned in the well-known Sūtra of Mammaṭa (II. 8): Saṅketitaścaturbhedo Jātyādirjātireva vā. These two views differ as regards the scope of Saṅketa, but they agree in holding that Saṅketa cannot reside in an individual and it is always with regard to the attribute or Upādhi. Because, if Saṅketa is assumed with regard to an individual, there would arise the contingencies of endlessness (Ānantyadoṣa), violation (Vyabhicāradoṣa) and lack of distinction (Viṣayavibhāgāpraptiḥ), because the word Go, having Saṅketa only for the Vyakti would fail to cover all the individuals which are Ananta or infinite, or it would only refer to one bull or a limited number or bulls,

which would constitute the fault of violation of the rule called Vyabhicāra, because the word Go meant for a single bull is extended to cover other bulls also. Now in the sentence given in the Mahābhāṣya, 'Gauḥ Śuklaḥ calaḥ ditthah' (and adopted by Hemachandra), 'Gauḥ' denotes a class, Śuklaḥ, a quality, Calaḥ, an action, and Ditthaḥ, a proper noun or individual. Thus, here we have a distinct sense attached to each of the four words which come to be described as Jātiśabdas, Guṇaśabdas, etc. The grammarians, who give this four-fold classification of words, hold that convention is always with regard to the four Upādhis or attributes and not individuals. By this explanation of the convention, they obviate the three logical faults mentioned above.

Thus to obviate the above three faults of **Infiniteness, Violation** or **Infringement** and the **Negation** of **Distinctiveness of Scope**, the grammarians as also the Mīmaṁsakas agree in holding that Saṅketa cannot be admitted as relating to the individual but only as relating to the attributes of the individual since it is the same upādhi that persists in the different individuals, the same word can denote all the individuals characterised by the particular Upādhi. Now, though the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṁsakas agree on Upādhi being the ground of convention, yet the former believe that Upādhi is four-fold, i. e., it persists in Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya, while the latter hold that Upādhi is found in the Jāti only. Thus it is that the Vaiyākaraṇas are known as Jātyādivādins and the mīmāṁsakas as Jātivādins. The Naiyāyikas, however, hold that the Saṅketa is in regard to both Upādhi as well as Vyakti and for the Buddhists, the Saṅketa neither refers to the Upādhi nor Vyakti but to the exclusion of everything else. But the main two schools subscribe to the dictum : Upādhāveva Saṅketaḥ i.e., the convention pertains only to the attribute.[22]

Saṅketa And Upādhi

Now the question is: what is this Upādhi? The author of the Mahābhāṣya, an exponent of the grammar school, whom the Ālaṁkārikas follow, has already pointed out in the stock example (above) the four-fold attributes or Upādhis with regard to Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya. And Bhartṛhari has clearly said that Saṅketa is for either of the four Upādhis Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya.[23] The passage 'Upādhiśca dvividhaḥ . . .' quoted in the Viveka Commentary embodies the Vaiyākaraṇa view which is held by the Ālaṁkārikas as well. This whole passage (adapted from Mammṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, Flash II) can be summarised as under: An attribute is two-fold: Vastudharma (Innate property) or Vaktṛyadṛcchāsanniveśita-dharma (an attribute imposed on the thing by the sweet will of the speaker). This is the proper name or Saṁjñā. Now Vastudharma is again two-fold: Siddha (accomplished) or Sādhya (being accomplished). This latter Sādhyavastudharma means Kriyā or action or process having prior and posterior action in continuum. Siddhavastudharma is again two-fold: Prāṇapradavastudharma (that which gives life to an entity) and Viśeṣādhānahetu (that which is the cause of endowing it with its speciality). This last Viśeṣādhānahetuḥ prāṇapradaḥ siddhavastudharma is Jāti or generality or class-characteristic. It is this Jāti that makes a bull a bull. Hemachandra, or rather Mammaṭa, supports this classification by citing Bhartṛhari's dictum: Gauḥ svarūpena etc. which means that we cannot call an entity a bull nor a non-bull on account of its form, but it is the Jāti, Gotva that gives a bull its life or its essence. In terms of the above classification, Guṇa is Viśeṣādhānahetuḥ prāṇapradaḥ siddhavastudharmaḥ. That is to say the Guṇa, whiteness, serves to distinguish an existing object from other objects of the same class, e.g., a white bull from a red bull. Thus Jāti gives existence to an object (Vastu) and it becomes Labdhasattāka, but Guṇa is not Prāṇaprada to an entity because it can be dissociated from that entity. A thing

can exist without a Guṇa but not without Jāti. Guṇas such as Śukla etc. do not constitute the nature of an entity, it is the Jāti that gives existence to the thing. So far as Kriyā is concerned, the word Pacati illustrates it. It is a Sādhyavastudharma which is described as Sādhyaḥ pūrvāparibhūtāvayavaḥ kriyārūpaḥ i.e. the property which is in the process of accomplishment is of the form of an action, parts of which have become prior and posterior, i.e., they occupy successive periods of time. The last category, Dravya is of the form of a Sañjñā given by the sweet will of the speaker so it is called Vaktṛsannivesitaḥ vastudharmaḥ. Now the problem here is as to what attribute or Upādhi is imposed on an individual to name it. In the case of Jāti, Guṇa and Kriyā words, this question did not arise since they have generality, quality and action as specific attributes, but in the case of a Sāñjña. an arbitrary proper name such as Tom, Dick or Hary or Dittha here, we cannot think of any attribute residing in these names which we can impose on the individual by naming him. Here the grammarians explain that when we name a bull as Dittha, we only attribute the eternal form, i.e., Sphoṭarūpa, of the word to specify that individual. This Sphoṭa, in words like Dittha is completely grasped when the last syllable in the word Dittha is comprehended. This Sphoṭa is described as Saṁhṛtakrama because it is eternal and because the order of the syllables in Dittha has nothing to do with the Sphoṭarūpa. Thus Saṁhṛtakrma means devoid of sequence. This means that names such as Dittha etc. are arbitrarily applied to objects such as a bull etc. without any intention to imply any attribute of that entity. However, it is clear that Sañjñā implies a Vyakti not an Upādhi; but it is only as a matter of convenience that it is said to refer to Upādhi. In any case, when a bull is called Dittha, we look upon the name Dittha as an attribute of a bull. The words, Sañjñā, Yadṛcchā and Dravya – all mean the same thing. Thus, the explanation of the attribute that forms the essence of a Sañjñā, Yadṛcchā or Dravya term shows that the Upādhi in

this case is the ideal form or Sphoṭa of that Sañjñā term – 'Ditthādiśabdānāṁ svarūpaṁ sphoṭamityarthaḥ.'

The Conception of Sphota : Hemachandra Stands by the Grammarian's View of Saṅketa

That Sphoṭa is the Svarūpa of Dittha etc. is made clear by the adjectives Antyabuddhinirgrāhya and Saṁhṛtakrama. Thus Sphoṭa is understood when the last syllable, helped by the impression left by the preceding syllables, is uttered. Sphoṭa has no sequence because it is Niravayava and Akhaṇḍa and it has no parts and so it cannot have a Krama or order of constituent parts like ghaṭa, paṭa, kamala, etc. have. This is the exposition of the passage cited under Catuṣṭayī etc. in the Viveka, so far as the Upādhi of a Sañjñā goes. But, there are those who believe that there is no Sphoṭa since in the word Dittha we can perceive only the Varṇas or letters D,I,T, TH and A, and therefore there is no Saṁhṛtakramasvarūpa of the word Dittha which we can impose on an individual. Even these people admit that Dittha is an arbitrary collocation of letters applied to a bull by the speaker's sweet will and so it is an Yadṛcchāśabda or an imposed name that serves to distinguish Dittha from another bull. Thus these theorists who follow Varṇavāda also concede that any variation in the utterance of the word Dittha carries the same reference to the bull called Dittha. So the यदृच्छा element in Dittha etc. is agreed upon. And thus the four-fold division of Saṅketa, advocated by the Mahābhāṣyakāra stands vindicated; and Hemachandra stands by this theory.

The second view of Saṅketa is explained in the Viveka under Jātireva. We know that the Mīmāṁsakas hold with the Vaiyākaraṇas that even though an individual alone is capable of being the object of our activity and passivity owing to its capacity to carry out an action for achieving a specific purpose, yet it is not proper to establish a convention with regard to it for fear of the faults of Endlessness and Violation or

infringement and because no distinction of scope obtains for each of the words; therefore, it is with regard to the attribute of the individual that a convention is made. **Thus the Jātyādivādins as also the Jātivādins agree in holding that Saṅketa must be made with reference to the Upādhi and not the Vyakti.** Since it is the same Upādhi that persists in the different individuals, the same word can denote all the individuals characterized by the particular Upādhi. Thus, Gauḥ can denote one and all the individuals characterized by the Upādhi, viz., Gotva Jāti. So, here, there will not be any Ānantyadoṣa or Vyabhicāradoṣa. **So far both the Grammarians and the Mīmāṁsākas agree. But they differ also.**

The Jātireva View Of Saṅketa In Viveka

So far as Mīmāṁsakas (both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) are concerned, a word denotes Jāti only. And the four-fold classification of word, posited by the Grammarians is subsumed by the Mīmāṁsakas under Jāti itself. The Mīmāṁsaka holds that it is the Jāti, Śuklatva, Calatva and Ditthatva in words such as Śukla, Cala and Dittha representing Guṇas, Kriyā and Dravya respectively that signify Śukla, Cala and Dittha. Thus without generality (Jāti) no word exists. And, as for the difference that obtains between the opinions of the grammarians and the Mīmāṁsakas on the other three aspects of primary signification, viz., Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya (for both agree on Jāti), the grammarians hold that denotation is four-fold because there is a clear-cut विषयविभाग i.e., distinction of convention among Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Dravya. Just as a Jātivācaka word like Go has convention with regard to Gotva or Cowness, so also a Guṇavācaka word like Śukla (white) has convention with regard to Śuklatva which is of one form in all white objects. Though it appears to be different, as it were, owing to the difference of substrata even as the same face appears different when reflected in a mirror, a polished sword or oil. The same is true of Kriyāvācaka as well as Dravyavācaka words. The action of cooking varies

according to the dishes prepared but it is the same action, all the same, in every type of cooking. Finally, in the case of proper names like Devadatta, though they appear different when applied to different individuals, **yet their sphoṭa is the same everywhere.** This is the position of the Jātyādivādins i.e., the grammarians. The views of the Jātivādins, referred to by 'Jātireva' in the Viveka Commentary, on the other hand, are stated in the last line of the paragraph (pp. 43–44). The Mīmāṁsakas, called Jātivādins, declare that convention is always with regard to the genus or generality (Jāti) only. Hence, Just as in words like Go, Gotva, being the genus or Jāti under which every bull (Go) is subsumed, the convention is with regard to the Jāti, so also in Guṇavācaka words like Śukla; in Kriyāvācaka words like Pacati and in Dravyavācaka or Sañjñāvācaka words or Yadṛcchātmaka words like Dittha; there is a notion of generality or Jāti like Śuklatva (whiteness), Pākatva (cookingness) and Ditthatva and here it is with reference to this notion of generality or Jāti that the convention operates. Thus the Jātivādins conclude : सर्वेषां शब्दानां जातिरेव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्. Simply put, Jāti is the "cause of currency" and Jāti is the primary or direct or expressed sense based on convention or consent. This is the background against which we have to read the passage under **Jātireva in the Viveka Commentary** The passage points out that the quality of whiteness found in milk, conch-shell and cranes, etc. is not the same because the same word Śukla cannot express all the whiteness in the world due to endlessness; nor can it express a few Śuklas in the world due to infringement of the rule; so, it can only express one common property running in all white things. Similarly the Kriyāvācaka word Pāka cannot cover Gūḍapāka as well as Tilapāka or Taṇḍulapāka, because they are different Pākas. Hence Pāka cannot express Kriyā, but the Jāti of Pākatva, a common property found in all Pākas is certainly denoted by it. As regards the proper names or Yadṛcchā words like Dittha etc., though the word Dittha as uttered in

different ways and pitches by different speakers like parrots etc., or when it is applied to an individual in the different stages of its life (it is sometimes a child, sometimes an adolescent and sometimes aged), varies, yet in the different uses of the word Dittha there is a common property Ditthatva which is the Jāti of Dittha. It is, therefore, with reference to this Ditthatvajāti that a Saṅketa is established. Hemachandra, who follows Mammaṭa here, as in several other places, paraphrases the statements from the Kāvyaprakāśa (flash II). So he goes on, in the passage under explanation, to meet a possible objection to the assumption of Jāti of Sañjñā-words. Because the stand-point of the Jātivādins with reference to Jātis of Guṇas and Kriyās is comparatively more scientific than their view regarding the Jāti of Sañjñā. For, one can say with justification that the Sañjñā of Dittha as an infant has as little to do with the attributes of the bull as when it grows old. So, it is difficult to say that the word Dittha used in relation to an infant is different from that used regarding an old bull. And, if they are not different, how can there be any Jāti of the word Dittha? As for the different utterances of Dittha by adults, children and birds, the utterance has nothing to do with the Abhidhā or primary sense of the word, because the denotation is unaffected by the pitch of the utterance. Hence, when the denotation of the word Dittha is the same, there cannot be a Jāti of Dittha and other proper names. To this exposition of the opposite view, the Mīmāṁsaka replies that the main criterion of this view-point is the idea of sameness or Abhinnapratyaya. Though utterance of the word Dittha may be different and the application of the word Dittha may pertain to various stages of growth and decay of the bearer of that name, yet, it is due to the sameness of the idea in these utterances of Dittha and sameness of meaning in their applications that we can assert the generality or Jāti of Ditthatva as being present in all utterances and all objects. So in the case of Sañjñā-words like Dittha etc., the existence of Jāti is proved by the criteria of Abhinnapratyaya and

Abhinnābhidhāna. Thus the Mīmāṁsaka view succeeds in establishing the existence of Jāti in Dravya (a) where the Sañjñā is considered as a Śabda and also (b) where it is regarded as an object or Artha. However, this conclusion is true if the same name, say Dittha, is given to one thing only. Because, if Dittha is applied to two different things like a bull and a horse, then there is no Sāmānya ditthatva or a common generic connection. The Sampradāyaprakāśinī Ṭīkā of the Kāvyaprakāśa draws our attention to the words 'Pratikṣaṇaṁ (or Pratikalam as here) bhidyamāneṣu' which smack of the Buddhist view of Kṣaṇikavāda, i.e., things are Kṣaṇika. We may note here that Mammaṭa has answered[24] the Jātivādins by saying that there is only one Guṇa, one Kriyā and one Sañjñā. The one Śuklaguṇa resides in different things and as such appears as though diverse, so with Kriyā and Sañjñā.

Hemachandra's brief Exposition of the other two Views on Saṅketa

As regards the other two views on Saṅketa, Hemachandra gives a brief exposition of these under Tadvāniti and Apoha iti on page 44 of the Viveka Commentary. The quotation under Tadvān refers to the view of the older Naiyāyikas who hold that a word has Saṅketa only for Jātiviśiṣṭavyakti (Tadvān = Jātimān). The Pradīpa commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa explains that, in the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, it is not possible to denote only an individual nor the class alone; for, in the first case, there is the fault of endlessness as well as the fault of violation of the rule; while in the second case, there will be the fault of excluding the individual. Hence the Saṅketa is placed on the individual characterized by the class. As interpreted by Hemachandra, this view of the logicians implies that the Saṅketa placed on Jāti is futile since Jāti as a whole cannot perform any function. In support of this interpretation, Hemachandra quotes a passage to the effect that "since the generality or class cannot perform the function of burning or cooking, it is always an individual that can perform a useful

function; still it is not possible to place the Saṅketa on the individual as it involves the fault of 'endlessness' and 'violation'. Hence a word conveys the sense of an individual implied by the class." It may be noted here that in the view of the Naiyāyikas the generic concept is already grasped and hence the question of the faults of endlessness as also of violation does not arise when fixing the Saṅketa on a Jātiviśiṣṭavyakti. Thus the Naiyāyikas are the advocates of the Jātiviśiṣṭavyaktivāda in regard to Saṅketa.

The Apoha Theory

Hemachandra also takes up the Apoha theory of the Buddhists. Apoha means 'excluding everything else from the object and excluding the object from all other objects.' The Buddhists believe that everything is momentary or Kṣaṇika. This is why the Buddhist doctrine is called Vaināśikadarśana. It is quite natural for those who hold this doctrine of Kṣaṇikavāda to find it difficult to fix the convention in Jāti since it is Ekanitya and Anekānugata. Nor is it possible to fix it in Guṇa or Kriyā or Sañjñā because they are Nitya. This means no positive idea can be got from words so far as things are concerned. Therefore, it is only the distinction or difference of things from all other things that words signify. Thus the word Gauḥ, when uttered, conveys the sense that the thing is not Aśva nor Hasti. To put it in other words, the word Gauḥ or any other word for that matter conveys no positive idea about the nature of the thing but it only marks it off from everything else. Thus, according to the Apohavāda, neither the Vyakti is Saṅketita nor an Upādhi. What is Saṅketita is the negative idea that a thing is neither this nor that (Atadvyāvṛtti).

In the light of the position adopted by the Buddhists with regard to Saṅketa, we find that the paragraph in **the Viveka Commentary on Apoha sums up the Buddhist doctrine neatly**. It states that "the class, the individual and the individual characterised by the class-all these are **notional**

and **unreal**, and, as such, no meaning of a word is possible with reference to them. Hence words like Go and others negatively convey the sense of exclusion from everything else (Agovyāvṛtti). Also, since anything characterised by such a negative sense is devoid of any contact with real objects, being merely a reflection of a mental notion, it can be expressed by the exclusion of all other things, which they are not." Thus, in the Buddhist view, nothing positive can be learnt about things. Again, Saṅketa for Vyakti is prevented by Ānantyadoṣa and Vyabhicāradoṣa. And, since everything is Kṣaṇika, a positive Upādhi, which will have to last for longer than a Kṣaṇa, cannot be admitted. So all that a word like Go denotes is that it is not A-Go, i.e., not an elephant or a horse etc.

This marks the end of the somewhat detailed discussion of the four views on the convention of words, viz., Jātyādivāda (to which Hemachandra subscribes), Jātirevavāda, Jātiviśiṣṭ-avyaktivāda and Apohavāda. The modern Naiyāyikas postulate a fifth view, viz., Vyaktivāda or Kevalavyaktivāda. The protagonists of this view [1] rely on Vyavahāra for fixing the Saṅketa and since Vyavahāra has to do with Vyaktis, it is the Vyakti alone which is Pravṛttinivṛttiyogya, as Mammaṭa clearly states. No wonder, then, that these neo-logicians assign Saṅketa to Vyakti only.

Hemachandra's Conclusion

From Hemachandra's words in the gloss on this Sūtra (I. 16), it is clear that (a) he favours the first view of Saṅketa viz., the Jātyādivāda of the grammarians, and (b) he believes that so far as theories of poetry are concerned, it is the first view that matters, since stalwarts like Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa clearly show their allegiance to the views of the grammarians on several major and minor matters connected with poetics. **Hemachandra, unlike Mammaṭa, is so businesslike here that he does not even elaborate on the Jātyādivāda or Jātivāda at all in the body of the text. But it is only in the**

sub-commentary Viveka that we get passages, either fully reproduced or abridged from well-known predecessors. Nevertheless, all in all, we get a fairly detailed account of the various theories of denotation based on Saṅketa.

The Indirect Meaning : Metaphor[25]

Abhidhā having been dealt with, now Hemachandra turns to the definition of the indirect sense or Amukhyā Vṛtti. The seventeenth Sūtra (Chap. 1) defines the Gauṇa Artha and the next Sūtra (I. 18) deals with the Lākṣaṇika Artha. Generally Gauṇārtha is not treated as a separate Artha, but included in the Lākṣaṇika Artha since both these senses are Amukhya or indirect. Moreover, two out of the three conditions laid down for the operation of the secondary or indicative power which yields the indirect sense are common to both the Gauṇa and the Lākṣaṇika senses. **The differentia that marks off the Gauṇa from the Lākṣaṇika sense is the Nimitta.**

Thus Gauṇārtha is a super-imposed sense based on similarity or identification and it arises when (a) the direct sense is incompatible, (b) when a Nimitta such as Sādṛśya exists, and (c) when it satisfies a purpose of the poet. In other words, when the primary sense of a word is found incompatible and another sense is got at on the basis of similarity with a view to conveying the sense of identification of the original and the super-imposed senses, the super-imposed sense is called Gauṇa Artha. Thus, a boy is called an ass or Mānavaka, a man, 'a lion.' Here, (a) the primary sense of ass or Siṁha (or Agni) is incompatible and hence it is set aside completely. Then it is realised that there are attributes in the ass or the lion or fire which characterize the boy, and bring about similarity. The poet who wants to stress the peculiar attributes of the boy, indentifies the boy with the ass or lion or fire by super-imposing the sense of lion or ass or fire on the boy. Thus, **though the boy is different from the lion or ass or fire in reality (Bheda), still to show similarity of the two, i.e., to call the boy an idiot, the poet conceives the boy**

to be identical (Abheda) with the lion or the ass or fire. Thus we have a metaphorical use of language. These examples fulfil the four conditions that Hemachandra has set forth in the definition. Hemachandra states that a Gauṇa sense arises when (1) there is Mukhyārthabādha, (2) there is a similar sense available, (3) there is a purpose for which the Gauṇa sense is used, and, (4) when Abheda in the midst of Bheda is resorted to.

Basis of Mataphor : How it Functions

It is clear that in the conveyance of the Gauṇa sense, likeness or similarity of qualities (Guṇas) plays a prominent part. In fact, similarity (Sādṛśya) as a basis of identification or super-imposition is the sine qua non of this variety of the indirect sense which is known as the metaphorical sense. As it is founded on similarity on account of Guṇas, it is called Gauṇa.[26] The well-known example of the Gauṇa process arising from a motive is Gaurvāhīkaḥ or Gaurevāyam i.e., 'Vahīka is a bull". Here the primary sense of the word Gauḥ, a bull, when applied to Vāhīka (a man) makes no sense as it is imappropriate or incompatible on grounds of direct perception. Consequently, we have to set aside the primary sense. Thereafter, it is seen that the bull possesses qualities (Guṇas) such as stupidity and slowness (Jāḍya and Māndya) which Vāhīka, the man, shares. This makes them similar in respect of Guṇas such as Jāḍya and Mandya. And on the strength of this similarity, which it is our purpose to show, between the bull and Vāhīka, we conceive **a second sense of the word Gauḥ** and identify Vāhīka with it. This identification takes the form of super-imposition (Āropaṇa) of the two senses. And the sense which is super-imposed (Āropitaḥ arthaḥ) is called Gauṇārthaḥ.

We, of course, know that the identification is not real, but imaginarily made or super-imposed by Upacāra or metaphorical usage.[27] This identification naturally takes two forms :

(1) either both Gauḥ and Vāhīka are present in the metaphor, or (2) it is so complete that only Gauḥ is mentioned, wiping out every trace of separateness or two-ness. The first type of identification is the basis of the figure Rūpaka or metaphor in which the Viṣaya (Vāhīka) or the object of identification as well as the Viṣayin (Gauḥ) or the object with which the identification is effected are both stated whereas the second type of identification gives rise to Atiśayokti of the first sort i. e., Rūpakātiśayokti. Explaining the Sūtra in the gloss, Hemachandra says that in examples like the above two, (a) when the primary meaning of Gauḥ as a bull having a hump etc. is found incompatible by direct perception, and (b) when a relation of similarity due to common qualities is present (in both the Viṣaya and the Viṣayin) and (c) when the purpose or motive of identification exists, the Gauṇa or metaphorical sense arises by the super-imposition of the sense of the bull (Āropya or Viṣayin) on Vāhīka, the man (Āropaviṣaya), either retaining their separateness or through complete identification (Bhedābhedena), assumed to be one, though not identical, so called because it arises from the Guṇas or qualities. And the word conveying this sense is called Gauṇa or metaphorical. Thus in Gaurvāhīkaḥ, the Gauṇārtha is super-imposed (i.e. identified) partially (Bhedena) due to the relation of similarity. This is the basis (or seed) of the figure of speech pertaining to sense called Metaphor which will be explained in the sequel. As for an instance of complete identification (Abhedena), we have Gaurevāyaṁ. 'This is the bull itself (eva).' This is (nothing but) the first variety of the figure of speech called Atiśayokti or Hyperbole. **Upacāra means secondary use of a word based on similarity between the primary meaning and the indicated meaning. In a general sense, Upacāra is a figurative or metaphorical or secondary use of a word. But in the case of Gauṇārtha, it specifically signifies a secondary use of a word based on similarity of the direct sense and the indirect sense.** Mammaṭa and others use it in both these senses. As a matter of fact, Upacāra routinely occurs in the sense

of Gauṇārtha or Lakṣaṇā since Lakṣaṇā involves a secondary or figurative use of a word.[28]

On how Transfereuce occurs in Metaphor

So far we are furnished with a general elucidation of the Sūtra itself. But, since it is not clear from the Sūtra, how the qualities of Gauḥ, the bull, come to be applied or transferred to Vāhika, the man. Now in examples like 'Gaurvāhīkaḥ', 'Siṁho baṭuḥ', 'Mukhacandraḥ udeti' or 'Candraḥ udeti', 'Agnirmāṇavakaḥ', we are told, the indicative or primary sense and the indicated or metaphorical (secondary sense) are comprehended as being identical. This is the hall-mark of the Gauṇa sense in which Āropaṇa is essential, since, unless identify is comprehended, no Āropa or super-imposition can take place. We must remember that the Viṣaya (Vāhika) corressponds to Upameya and the Viṣayin (Gauḥ) corresponds to Upamāna since both are used in the same grammatical case and are identified in respect of 'sense'. When the super-imposition takes place, the word Gauḥ loses its Vācyārtha or Mukhyārtha and **the Gauṇārtha comes to be super-imposed on Vāhika. Thus Gauḥ is the Gauṇa or Upacarita word here.** When the Mukhyārtha of Gauḥ (Sāsnādimattvādi in the Sūtra) is set aside (Bādhita) by direct perception (Pratyakṣādi-pramāṇena), Gauḥ, **almost like a symbol,** assumes the role of the vehicle of the metaphor, since the secondary sense is super-imposed on it. It should be noted that Gaurvāhīkaḥ and Gaurevāyaṁ (respectively) illustrate the Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā sub-types of Lakṣaṇā as explained by Mammaṭa (K. P. II) and interestingly, Āropa or super-imposition takes place only in case of Sāropā where the consciousness of Bheda is conspicuous because both Viṣayin (Āropyamāṇa) and Viṣaya (Āropaviṣaya) are mentioned by specific and separate words. Thus in Gaurvāhīkaḥ, Gauḥ is super-imposed (actually, its quaiities) on Vāhika and both these are expressed by saparate words. **It is this variety – Sāropā (Gauṇīlakṣaṇā) that gives rise to Rūpaka.** This is called **superimponent secondary usage.** Sādhyavasānikā or Introsusceptive secondary usage, on the

other hand, involves a swallowing by Viṣayin (Āropyamānena) of the Viṣaya (Āropaviṣaya) so that total Abheda (unlike Bheda in Rūpaka) prevails and only Viṣayin is verbally expressed. Thus, Gauḥ swallows up Vāhīka with the result that only Gauḥ is expressed by means of a word. This variety (Sādhyavasānikā which involves Adhvayasāna, Antaḥkṛti or Nigiraṇa) gives rise to **Hyperbole** or **Atiśayokti** of the first type (called Rūpakātiśayokti). These two together constitute Gauṇī, as Pradīpa, a commentory on the Kāvyaprakāśa, puts it : "... Gauṇī āropādhyavasānābhyāṁ bhidyate...." In āropa there is **attribution,** in Adhyavasāna there is Niścaya or **determinaton.** These are the two varieties of Gauṇī as explained by Mammaṭa (K.P.II. 7). However, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas headed by Kumārilabhaṭṭa himself recognize Gauṇī as a separate Vṛtti.[29] Among the Ālaṁkārikas, Bhoja followed by Hemachandra treats Gauṇīvṛtti as an independent process, i.e., different from Lakṣaṇā. This explains why Hemachandra mentions four types of word and sense.[30] Despite this difference of classification and treatment, it is difficult to find any vital difference in regard to the power of Gauṇa and Lakṣaka words. Briefly stated, the difference between Gauṇī and (Śuddhā) Lakṣaṇā is that while the former is Guṇayogādgauṇī and Upacāramiśrā, the latter is Upacāramiśrā and Śuddhā.[31]

Now the question that needs to be answered is as to how Gauṇārtha comes about. Indeed, if properly stated, the question would be : What is the Gauṇa Artha here ?

How Gauṇa Artha Comes About ?

Mammaṭa has stated **three** different views which we find re-stated here. The views can be stated as under :

(1) The First View : (a) The word Gauḥ in Vāhīka yields Gotva by Abhidhā; (b) and by means of Gauṇī, the qualities of Jāḍya and Māndya in Gauḥ are indicated, in virtue of Tadyoga (connection of these Guṇas with the Vācyārtha of Gauḥ) or Nimitta (Sambandha) or Sāhacaryasambandha as both Gotva (Vācya) and Jāḍyādi (Avācya) reside in Go itself;

(c) the Prayojana **may be assumed to be to suggest stupidity of the bull,** as like Gotva, Jāḍyādi is its nature. Thus in the second stage, Jāḍyādi are **indicated** by Gauḥ, as its own qualities. (d) Now, in the third stage, the above qualities (indicated) become the Pravṛttinimitta or cause of the expression of Vāhīka through Gauḥ. This last stage refers to Sādṛśyatādrūpya due to Sāmānādhikaraṇya of Gauḥ and Vāhīka. Thus Jāḍyādi become the basis of expressing Vāhīka. Thus we have Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and once again Lakṣaṇā functioning to make Gauḥ convey the sense of Vāhīka in Vāhīkaḥ gauḥ. The first view suffers from several defects of violation of rules of logic and tradition. It makes Abhidhā function twice and makes Lakṣaṇā (Gogatajāḍyādi) cause an **expression** – a contradiction in terms, it makes Gauḥ **express** Vāhīka (absurd, since no Saṅketa is possible) and so forth. It is clear that Gogataguṇas cannot activate Gauḥ to express Vāhīka. The argument involves cumbrousness and inconsistencies.

(2) **The second view** maintains that (a) the word Gauḥ yields Gotva by Abhidhā; (b) then indicates Jāḍyamāndyādi of Vāhīka due to Guṇābhedasambandha; and (c) by implication or inference or invariable association **expresses** Vāhīka. Here, Abhidhā Stage is the same as in view one. But in the second stage, Gauḥ, unlike in view one, indicates Vāhīka's Guṇas. Therefore, Vāhīkaguṇas are indicated by Gauḥ. And Vāhīka is not expressed but inferred from Vāhīkaguṇas which represent the Lakṣyārtha of Gauḥ in the Lakṣaṇā stage; since Guṇas imply a Guṇin i.e. Vāhīka (by Ākṣepa). Here we have Abhidhā and then Lakṣaṇā and Anumāna, to cap it all. Lakṣaṇā is inefficient both in view one and view two. No purpose can be served by these 'involved', yet 'faulty' procedures.

(3) **The third view** hits the nail on the head when it finally and correctly determines the nature of Lakṣaṇā involved in the instance Gaurvāhīkaḥ. Here Gauḥ **expresses** Gotva which is inappropriate to Vāhika (Mukhyārthabādha). So we resort to Lakṣaṇā to get the indication of Vāhīkaḥ (Parārthaḥ). As both

Gauḥ and Vāhīka share the Jāḍyādiguṇas (Gauḥ, the Mukhyārtha and Vāhīka, the Lakṣyārtha), the Nimitta or Sambandha or Tadyoga factor is present in the Lakṣaṇā. And the Prayojana of showing similarity of the Guṇas is easily satisfied. Thus, we find that this **third and final view** regarding the operation of Gauṇī (Lakṣaṇā) in Gaurvāhīkaḥ is accepted by Mammaṭa and Hemachandra : "Sādhāraṇaguṇāśrayeṇa parārtha eva (i.e. Vāhīka) lakṣyate ityapare". The first view is held by Kecit, the second by Anye and the third view by Apare (i.e. Mammaṭa and others). Incidentally, it may be seen that in all the three views, Gauḥ is the Gauṇa word; and they are superior in an ascending order both from the view point of the effectiveness of their Lakṣaṇā as well as from that of the adoptability of these views as represented by Kecit, Anye and Apare (which last means 'not others'–A–pare i.e. we ourselves).[32]

Four-Fold Power Of A Word

Since Hemachandra prefers to deal with Senses and Words first and postpones the explanation of the three powers of the Word, it is a bit inconvenient to give a thorough exposition of this topic. Indeed one really wonders if one can speak of the different kinds of the senses and the word without reference to the three-fold power of a word to convey the different senses. It is, therefore, in order that we understand once and for all that according to Sūtra 20 of Chapter one and the gloss thereon, there are four powers (Śaktis) of the four different types of words such as Mukhya, Gauṇa, Lakṣaka and Vyañjaka. Thus the four Senses Vācya, Gauṇa, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya arise due to this four-fold power of a word, viz. Abhidhā or Mukhyā Vṛtti, Gauṇī Vṛtti or Upacāra, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā. While Mammaṭa calls them Vṛttis or Śaktis, Hemachandra uses the term Vyāpāra or 'function.'

These four powers or functions of a word are explained in terms of the definition of these concepts as given by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhvanyāloka (I. 3 ff) where he states that in poetry there are three processes (Vyāpāras)

and Hemachandra takes over the passage after omitting the sentence on Tātparyaśakti. In fact while Hemachandra uses the word Vyāpāra in the first line of the gloss, he retains the word Śaktiḥ in the definitions of Abhidhā etc. Agajn, he adds the word Gauṇī in the definition of Lakṣaṇā that he takes over from the Locana, and rewrites the sentence by saying 'Śaktirgauṇī lakṣaṇā ca', while in the definition of Vyānjanāvṛtti, he has verbatim reproduced Abhinava's definition, except the word Tritaya in Tacchaktitritaya and writes Taccaktyupajanita instead of Tacchaktitritayopajanita and joins this with the portion beginning with Pavitrita etc. upto Śaktiḥ, and replaces Abhinavagupta's term Dhvananavyāpāra by Vyañjakatvam. And he totally drops Tātparyaśakti which is the basis of the inter-connection of the expressed senses in a sentence and there is also a corresponding import-sense called Tātparyārtha. Yet, since both of these pertain to the sentence, they are not detailed here.[33]

Abhidhā. Gauṇī, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā

Now, as for the difinitions of Abhidhā, Gauṇī as well as Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā borrowed from the Locana Commentary of Abhinavagupta, Abhidhā is the process of direct expression which depends on Saṅketa or convention. So far as Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā are concerned, both of them constitute **one** power or process and that is the process of indicating a sense which is indirect or secondary. This power of indication or Lakṣaṇāvṛtti arises when factors such as incompatibility of the primary meaning and a usage or a poetic purpose are present. And Vyañjnāśakti is the power of yielding on the basis of the primary and the secondary senses (Vācyārtha and Gauṇārtha and Lakṣyārtha) **a (suggested inner) sense aided by the imaginative responses (Pratibhāsahāya) of the connoisseur. In other words, the Vyañjanā function of Word is the only function which requires the help of a responsive reader[34] or spectator who is smart enough to comprehend both the primary and the secondary senses of a word.** This aesthetically profound power of the suggested

sense is defined and discussed by both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in great detail in the Dhvanyāloka and Locana respectively. When we view the Vācyārtha in the light of the extraordinary, suggestive senses of a word, we realize that Vācyārtha or Abhidheya is Laukika in nature, whereas the Vyaṅgya sense, particularly the Rasadhvani, has an Alaukika nature. This is clear from the use of the word Prasiddha by Ānandavardhana (Dhv. I. 3) and also Kuntaka (Vakrokti. I. 8).[35]

Reverting to the discussion of some other types of the Gauṇa function of a word, we notice that Hemachandra here deals with instances of relations other than Sādṛśya or resemblance. To put it in the words of Mammaṭa : "Sādṛśyādanyakāryakāraṇabhāvādisambandhāntaram" i.e., the relation between the expressed and the indicated sense is something different from similarity, like the relation of effect and cause, etc. The examples of this Kāryakāraṇa are expressions or metaphors like "Ghee is life", "This is life", etc. Hemachandra actually uses Mammaṭa's words when he says : "Atra anyavailakṣyanyenāvyabhicāreṇa ca kāryakāritvādi prayojanam"[36]. He also cites the same examples.

Mammaṭa's Views on Other Types of Metaphors

In this connection, it would be wise to take Mammaṭa's clarification of Kāryakāraṇādi sambandhāntaram. He states that in such instances, the super-imposition and Introsusception (Āropa and Adhyavasāna) are caused (not by Sādṛśyasambandha) but by relations like that between the effect and cause and the like. And in the two divisions of Qualitative (Gauṇa) or Metaphorical indication, the Prayojana (purpose) respectively is an apprehension of identity between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin, though we know there is a distinction between them, and the apprehension of complete identity. Thus the metaphor based on Kāryakāraṇabhāva is also a variety of the Gauṇavyāpāra, except that here the relation is not of Sādṛśya but of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect in Āyurghṛtam means that Ghee alone and

nothing else is conducive to a long life. Thus in this example, the identification is partial (Sāropa) but in Āyurevedam it is complete (Sādhyavasāna) and shows that Ghee, invariably, brings about longevity. The point to be noted here is that in Āyurghṛtam, as in Gaurvāhīkaḥ, we have Sāropā with the consciousness that the two objects are different (Bheda), in Āyurevedam or Gaurevāyaṁ, the consciousness of difference is lost (Abheda). **Thus, the one is Bhedāropa, the other, Abhedāropa.** These two are, therefore, called Sāropā Gauṇī and Sādhyavasāna Gauṇī. Mammaṭa regards this Gauṇī as a variety of Lakṣaṇā and writes the words "Lakṣyamānaguṇayogād vṛttiriṣṭā tu gauṇatā" to define it and adds by way of comments the words 'Atra gauṇabhedayorbhedépi tādrūpyapratītiḥ etc.' But the words Anyavailakṣaṇyena etc., taken over by Hemachandra, refer to the two divisions of Pure Indication called Súddhalakṣaṇā. The comment here means "The purpose is the accomplishment of the objective in a way distinct from all else and without fail". That is to say, here (in Kāryakāraṇādi sambandha) the Prayojana is Sarvathābhedāvagama, i.e., absolute identity. This is the sense that Mammaṭa's remarks, in reference to the two varieties of Sāropā Súddhā and Sādhyavasānā Súddhā, have. But Hemachandra appliest he remark to Gauṇabhedas of Bhede'pitādrūpyapratītiḥ and Sarvathaivābhedāgamaśca prayojanam. The idea seems to be to point out that in examples like 'Ghee is life' and 'Here is Life' and others, there is a different connection between Life and Ghee, viz., the relation of cause and effect, which is other than that of similarity (Sādṛśya). In other words, these two expressions, the Āropa and Adhyavasāna i.e., super-imposition and identification, have some such relation as that of cause and effect for their basis. Now, in the two types of Gauṇī, the motive (Prayojana) in Gaurvāhīkaḥ (Sāropā Gauṇī) is the apprehension of identity, even when distinctness of the Vācyārtha and the Gauṇārtha is consciously felt, and the motive (in Sādhyavasānā Gauṇī i.e., in Gaurevāyam) is the apprehension of a total identity. But in the two divisions of Súddhā, on the other hand, the motive is the consciousness

of the ability of a thing to bring about the desired effect, differently from others (in Āyurghṛtam) and invariably (in Āyurevedam).

Apart from the relation of cause and effect, Hemachandra, following Mammaṭa, mentions other relations with examples which come under Sādṛśyetara–sambandhas and are therefore classified under Súddhā Lakṣaṇā by Mammaṭa, **but here Hemachandra has followed Mammaṭa's tretament quite mechanically;** for Mammaṭa treats of Lakṣaṇā first and then its two divisions, Súddhā and Gauṇī, and then he deals with the Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā sub-divisions of both Súddhā and Gauṇī, where this question of Sādṛśya and Sādṛśyetara relations arises. Here Mammaṭa naturally treats of these two kinds of relations in one place but first he deals with Gauṇī Sāropā and sādhyavasānā and next with Súddhā Sāropā and Sādhyavasāna varieties in Āyurghṛtam and Āyurvedam, where he uses Anyavailakṣaṇyena etc. where it really applies squarely. But since Hemachandra has used it here with Kāryakāraṇasambandha it means the same thing as in Mammaṭa when he says Súddhābhedayostvanyavailakṣanyena etc.

Now, this Sādṛśyetara relation can include, (1) Kāryakāraṇabhāva (2) Tādarthya, (3) Svasvāmibhāva (4) Avayavāyavibhāva and (5) Tātkarmya. Māṇikyachandra, the commentator of Mammaṭa's Kāvyaparakāśa, adds some more relations : Māna or measure, Dhāraṇa (holding) and Ādhipatya (leadership) and Sthāna. In fact, these relations can be many. The Nyāyasūtra of Gotama gives a list of ten relations such as Sahacaraṇa, Sthāna, Tādarthya etc. Hemachandra explains Mammaṭa's relations and gives **three additional ones,** viz. Mānameya (Āḍhavo vrīhiḥ), Saṁyoga (Raktaḥ paṭaḥ) and Vaiparītya (Abhadramukhe bhadramukhaḥ). This last variety of Vaiparītyasambandha called 'irony' or dramatic irony in literature or ironical sense, is interesting from a literary point of view.[37]

Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā Distinguished

The next Sūtra (I.18) defines Lakṣyārtha as a separate sense-separate from Gauṇa. The Sūtra states that the indicated

sense (Laksyaḥ arthaḥ) is conveyed when the relation of the indicated sense with the primary sense of the word is entirely united (or identified). Thus in Indication (see Sūtra I.20) (a) the secondary meaning is connected with the primary sense, (b) there is an identity between the two senses. We must remember, however, that, we have to take over the words "Mukhyārthabādhe nimitte prayojane ca" from the definition of Gauṇārtha (barring the expression Bhedābhedābhyāmāropitaḥ as the gloss expressly states). **Thus the only point of difference between Gauṇārtha and Lakṣyārtha is as regards Āropa and Tattva (Abheda) respectively**. To explain, while in Gauṇārtha, we have Āropa, Bheda and Abheda, in Lakṣyārtha only Abheda or Tattva is required. A word which conveys the Lakṣyārtha is called a Lakṣakaśabda.

Omission of Rūḍhi Significant

Since Hemachandra defines Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā Vṛttis or Śaktis in the same words, we may be sure that he follows the traditional views on Lakṣaṇā as held by Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. In fact, in several places, it can be seen, nay, it has been demonstrated, that he reproduces verbatim the views of Mammaṭa and Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana and others like Bhoja etc. It is, therefore, clear that he accepts Mammaṭa's three pre-requisites of an indication. Mammaṭa prescribes (1) Mukhyārthabādha (2) Tadyoga and (3) Rūḍhi or Prayojana – three conditions for an indicated sense to arise. And, when we read Hemachandra's two definitions of Gauṇa and Lakṣya senses together, we find that in his view, Lakṣyārtha arises when (1) Mukhyārthabādha (2) Nimitta or Sambandha and (3) Prayojana are present. Thus here Lakṣaṇā presupposes the three conditions mentioned by Mammaṭa except that the third condition contains Rūḍhi or Prayojana in Mammaṭa's scheme, **while Hemachandra significantly drops Rūḍhi altogether and recognises only Prayojana – a definite advance over Mammaṭa. And this affects the number of divisions of Lakṣaṇā ultimately.** But apart from the minor

variation and apart from the separation of Gauṇī from Lakṣaṇā, what Hemachandra states here is apparently a paraphrase of (Mukhyó'rtho...prayojanam) and partly (Gauranubandhya.... ākṣipyata iti) reproduction of Mammaṭa's relevant statements. The last two sentences are added to make the above-mentioned variation explicit.

It must be noted that Mammaṭa treats of Lakṣaka, Lakṣya and Lakṣaṇā in the same section and explains this hotly debated topic with a lengthy exposition (Vide, K. P. II. 12-18).

Nature and Conditions of Indirect Process

We know that words are used in a sense other than the direct or primary sense. This is known as the indirect or secondary sense, and is known by the name of Lakṣyārtha. It is sometimes referred to as Bhākta or Gauṇa or Upacarita sense as well. But all these words refer to the same idea, viz., the indicated sense or the indicative usage.

Unlike the Vācya sense which is directly conveyed by a word by convention, the secondary sense is never directly conveyed. In this sense, it is an indirect sense and is conveyed by the Vācaka Śabda when the primary sense does not suit the context or the purpose in a given sentence. Mammaṭa says that "Indication is that process or power which is superimposed on a word by which a second sense is conveyed (or apprehended) when the primary meaning of the word is found inapplicable, and when there is a connection between the primary sense and the secondary sense either due to usage or through some motive or purpose." Thus in arriving at an indicated sense, the observance of three stipulations is presupposed : Mukhyārthabādha, Tadyoga and Rūḍhi or Prayojana. No Lakṣyārtha can arise if all these three conditions are not fulfilled. Thus in the stock example, Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, the primary sense of the word Gaṅgā is "the stream of the Ganges". But then the sentence would mean : There is a hamlet on the stream of the Gaṅgā. But the meaning does not fit in with the context since it is absurd to

say that a Ghoṣa or a village is situated on the Stream of Gaṅgā. We, therefore, look for some other meaning of the word Gaṅgā – a more reasonable meaning. On a second thought, we realize that Gaṅgā yields a secondary sense of Gaṅgātaṭa. This is the Lakṣyārtha of Gaṅgā which is apprehended after the Vācyārtha of Gaṅgā (viz. Gaṅgāpravāha) was obstructed. This Mukhyārthabādha is the pre-condition of Lakṣaṇā. **If the direct meaning is not found incompatible, there can be no indirect or Lakṣya sense.**

Now the question is as to how the word Gaṅgā yields the sense of Gaṅgātaṭa when Gaṅgāpravāha is found inapplicable. To this, it can be said that since Gaṅgātaṭa is connected with Gaṅgāpravāha by Sāmīpyasambandha, i.e., the relation of proximity, Gaṅgā can yield the sense of Gaṅgātaṭa which can be the Adhikaraṇa or location of a village. This reasonable sense is apprehended due to the relation of nearness between the primary sense and the secondary sense of Gaṅgā. When this round about way of getting the sense of 'Gaṅgātate Ghoṣaḥ' is adopted, one may wonder, why a more simple way of saying that expression directly cannot be adopted here. This doubt is cleared by the third stipulation about the Lakṣyārtha. The primary sense is given up and the secondary sense is understood in an indirect way because the speaker of the expression 'Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' has a **motive** or **purpose** to employ the word Gaṅgā to convey the holiness and coolness of the place. Hemachandra, while he explains the concept of Lakṣaṇā by means of the example Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, points out in the gloss that the primary sense of the word Gaṅgā etc. is the stream etc., and the bank etc. is connected with it, and the indicated sense is apprehended by the identity of the senses of the stream and the bank. He adds that the expression "Tattvena lakṣyamāṇa" is intended to replace "Bhedābhedābhyāmāropitaḥ" in the previous Sūtra on Gauṇārtha; for the remaining terms of that definition follow here.

The Process of Indication

Explaining the process of Indication in Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ and Kuntāḥ praviśanti, both stock examples used in the Kāvyaprakāśa, in terms of Mukhyārthabādha, Nimitta and Prayojana, Hemachandra goes on to state in the gloss that since a village cannot be situated on Gaṅgā (Pravāha) and since spears cannot enter, the primary sense is found incompatible and set aside. Then due to nearness of the bank to the stream and the association of spears with the holders or bearers of spears (soldiers) which is the Nimitta or Sambandha, the sense of Gaṅgātaṭa and Kuntavantaḥ arises which is apprehended in such a way as to suggest (the purpose of) the attributes of sacredness and fierceness of the place and the person (in question) respectively, which is the purpose of resorting to this secondary process.

Not every Sense can be Termed 'Lakṣyārtha'

It will be seen that in Hemachandra's definition of Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā the term Nimitta is used in connection with the second condition which requires that the two meanings must be connected, in the sense of Mukhyārtha or Tadyoga which means Abhidheyasambandha. The compliance with this condition is important because if there is no connection between the two (Vācya and Lakṣya) senses, every sense could become Lakṣyārtha. These connections are five : Abhidheya-sambandha (Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ), Sādṛśya-Sambandha (Gaurvāhīkaḥ), Samavāyasambandha or Sāhacarya (Kuntāḥ praviśanti), Vaiparītya-sambandha (Bhadramukha means Abhadramukha) and Kriyāyoga (Śatrughnastvam).

Lakṣaṇā not to be Confused with Implication Etc.

After illustrating the Sūtra on Lakṣyartha, Hemachandra reproduces verbatim from Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (II. 11 ff) an argument to justify that Lakṣaṇā is an independent power of word and is not to be confused with implication or any other logical method of cognition. The argument here concerns Mammaṭa's attack on the views of Mukulabhaṭṭa, the author of

Abhidhāvṛttimātṛakā. Mukulabhaṭṭa, while discussing the powers of a word, gives "Gauranubandhyaḥ" and "Pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte" as instances of Upādānalakṣaṇā, a variety of the Śuddhā-lakṣaṇā according to Mammaṭa's scheme. Now since Mammaṭa is engaged in explaining this same Upādānalakṣaṇā (called Ajahallakṣaṇā or Ajahatsvārthā more appropriately), he thinks it fit to refute Mukula's views and expose his fallacies in giving these two instances. **Hemachandra abridges this statement somewhat to suit the context of Lakṣaṇā here.** But the sense of the arguments is identical. The who e passage means : "Expressions like" 'A bull should be immolated' and so on should not be cited as examples (of Upādānalakṣaṇā) to argue that since here the sense of generality (the primary sense) is not possible because the immolation enjoined by the Veda cannot apply to a class; hence the individual (bull) is implied by the class-word bull; by virtue of the dictum that an individual is invariably associated with the class; and though it is not mentioned in so many words."

To state it otherwise, what Mammaṭa means is that the expression Gauranubandhyaḥ should not be cited to prove that there is Upādānalakṣaṇā in it because an individual (bull) is indicated by the class on account of the incompatibility of the immolation enjoined by the Śruti applying to the whole class of bulls and is not expressed as per the dictum that the expressive power cannot reach the thing qualified owing to the exhaustion of its power in expressing the attribute. For, here, there is no purpose. And if indication of the sense of an individual (bull) is intended as implication due to invariable association (with the class), then you will have to admit indication also in understanding the subject of Kriyatāṁ, the object in Kuru and the words Gṛham and Bhakṣaya respectively in Praviśa and Pindim. Thus far it is one single view or contention attributed to Mukulabhaṭṭa by Māṇikyachandra. However, it is also ascribed to Maṇḍanamiśra by Udyota, a commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa. According to this view, the Jāti conveys

the Vyakti by Lakṣaṇā, since Abhidhā cannot express Gotva (Jāti) no more as per the dictum "Viśeṣyaṁ nābhidhā gacchet. . . .viśeṣaṇe" (Quote-7). So the meaning of an individual bull (Govyakti) is indicated by the word Gauḥ, as Gotva (Vācyārtha) includes Govyakti, it is a proper case of Upādānalakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa refutes the view by saying that Govyakti is known by Ākṣepa or inferenco due to Avinābhāva between Gojāti and Govyakti and not by Lakṣaṇā. Consequently, the question of Upādānalakṣaṇā being present in Gauranubandhyaḥ cannot arise. Again there is no Prayojana (or Rūḍhi) in such a usage. So it is a case of misapplication of Lakṣaṇā, though the argument is presented in an intelligent way by quoting the famous maxim (Nyāya) : Visėṣyaṁ nābhidhā gacchet etc. which means the Viśeṣya cannot be grasped until the Viśeṣaṇa is grasped. The same idea is expressed in "Śabdabuddhikarmaṇāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvāt."

Mammaṭa wants to reduce the above argument to absurdity. He, therefore, says that if Lakṣaṇā is resorted to in Gauranubandhyaḥ by Avināhbūtamūla Ākṣepa, then we will have to assume the same process of indication in Kriyatām to get a Kartā, in Kuru to get a Karma and to get Gṛham in Praviśa, Bhakṣaya in Pindim etc. But, as we all know, we get this idea completed by the process of implication known as Arthāpatti or Śrutārthāpatti. Kumārila has said : "Śābdī hi ākaṅkṣā śabdenaiva pūryate".

After controverting the view of Mukula regarding the alleged operation in Gauranubandhyaḥ and establishing that it is an instance of implication, Mammaṭa, not Hemachandra, turns to dispose of another view – that of the Mīmāṁsaka – which regards Pino devadatto divā etc. as an example of Lakṣaṇā. This statement, which means 'The fat Devadatta does not eat by day', conveys the sense that he must be eating by night, not by Lakṣaṇā, but on the strength of implication or verbal presumption. So to urge that 'nightly feeding' is **indicated** in the above sentence is unwarranted, since it is the province of

Śrutārthāpatti or Arthāpatti. Now Arthāpatti is a Pramāṇa according to the Mīmāṁsakas, and it consists in presuming something to account for what goes against experience. In the present example, we suppose on the strength of Arthāpatti that Devadatta must be eating by night. This may be factual (Dṛṣṭārthāpatti) or verbal (Śrutārthāpatti). The followers of the Gurumata accept Dṛṣṭārthāpatti while Kumārila admits Śrutārthāpatti. Indeed Kumārila has said : "Śābdī hi ākāṅkṣā śabdenaiva pūryate" i.e., A verbal expectancy requires a verbal presumption only.[38]

The portion reproduced here from Mammaṭa to explain Lakṣaṇā comes to an end with Mammaṭa's refutation of Mukulabhaṭṭa's views on Lakṣaṇā.

Hemachandra's Significant Innovations. . . .

We can be sure from the way Hemachandra almost literally takes over ideas and expressions from Mammaṭa, Ānandavardhana, and others that **he fully accepts the views of these authorities on vital poetical concepts.** However, he has the good fortune of being a worthy follower of stalwarts in the field of poetics. He cannot start a new Prasthāna, but sometimes we find that **he effects innovations and improvements in a small but significant way.** The truth of this observation is brought out in the case of Hemachandra's separate treatment of Gauṇārtha and in his independent stand on the question of admitting Rūḍhālakṣaṇā. As we know, Mammaṭa divides Lakṣaṇā into Rūḍhā and Prayojanavatī. Thus an example like Kuśala is regarded by him as an example of Lakṣaṇā based on Rūḍhi. Similarly words like Dvirefa – a bee (Lit. having two 'r's), a crow (Lit. having two 'k's) also come under this Rūḍhā Lakṣaṇā as they have a primary or literal sense which is lost and now they convey a different sense which they did not originally possess. This is their Lakṣyārtha.

. . . .And His Independent Stand

Hemachandra, However, refuses to toe the line of Mammaṭa and frankly declares that these words express these (secondary)

senses because they possess these meanings by convention. He, thus considers all cases of Rūḍhilakṣaṇā as instances of Vācchyārtha. Consequently he did not regard Rūḍhi to be the basis of an indicated sense (p. 46). While stating his position on this question, Hemachandra is conscious that other authorities like Mukulabhaṭṭa actually admitted Rūḍhi on a par with Prayojana because of Lakṣaṇā and treated it as such (vide Viveka, p. 46). To substantiate this, he quotes a line from Mukulabhaṭṭa's Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā (10 a) which states that (the indicative sense) is due to Rūḍhi or Prayojana. This is all Hemachandra says about Lakṣaṇā. But he once again clarifies the distinction between the metaphorical sense and the indicated sense by saying that in this matter, where one thing metaphorically becomes another thing due to common qualities, it is a case of Gauṇārtha and where this Upacāra is not present, it is a case of Lakṣaṇā. The words actually mean that Gauṇārtha occurs when one thing is super-imposed upon another. In this context, **Upacaryate means** 'concealing the apprehension of difference between two things that are altogether distinct, on the strength of some relation between them'. In other cases, it is Lakṣyārtha. This view corresponds to Mammaṭa's statement Upacāreṇāmiśratvāt i.e as it is not mixed with the secondary or metaphorical use of a word based on similarity, it is Lakṣaṇā, otherwise Gauṇī. This distinction is mentioned here and the way it is mentioned, makes us think that **Hemachandra wants to emphasize not the separateness of the two functions, but probably the sameness of the process.**

Limited Varieties of Lakṣaṇā in Hemachandra's Classification

When we compare Hemachandra's treatment of the concepts of Gauṇī and Lakṣanā – and for purposes of comparison they are one, since Hemachandra mentions Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā together (in his gloss on Sūtra 20) – in the Kāvyānuśāsana with Mammaṭa's treatment of Lakṣaṇā in all its varieties, we cannot fail to notice the limited scope of discussion in Hemachandra.

Moreover, Hemachandra does not sub-divide the concept of Lakṣaṇā and disregards the Rūḍhā Lakṣaṇā altogether. He does not try to **establish** Lakṣaṇā as a separate power but takes this aspect for granted and mechanically reproduces passages from Mammaṭa. Indeed Hemachandra's two Vṛttis viz. Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā are two divisions of the same Indirect sense. Gauṇī is two-fold : Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā but Lakṣyārtha has no sub-division. Thus he gives **three** kinds of Lakṣyārtha. No further classification or its basis is discussed.

The Suggested Meaning or the Poetic Meaning

The first three senses – Vācya, Gauṇa and Lakṣya or the expressed, the metaphorical and the indicated senses have been explained. Now the definition and exposition of the fourth sense is in order. Hence, Hemachandra takes up this last or fourth sense, i.e., the Vyaṅgyārtha or Dhvani in the next Sūtra (I. 19). Thus the sense called "Dhvani" is that (a) which is suggested and (b) apprehended distinctly and (c) it is other than the primary sense. The gloss clarifies this statement by saying that this is the suggested sense which is an object of apprehension and **it is quite distinct from the primary sense (Mukhyārtha), the metaphorical sense (Gauṇārtha), and the indicated sense (Lakṣyārtha).** This is called Dhvani by the ancient authorities since it means that which is 'suggested', 'Dhvanyate (vyajyate) dyotyate arthaḥ aneneti'. Hemachandra, and Māṇikyachandra too, explains Dhvani as 'Dhvanyate dyotyate iti dhvanir vyaṅgyam'. According to the first explanation 'Dhvanyate vyajyate'arthaḥ aneneti dhvaniḥ' means Vyañjaka; according to the second explanation, that of Hemachandra and Māṇikyachandra, Dhvani means Vyaṅgya. Mammaṭa, while explaining the meaning of Dhvani states that the Grammarians called a word as Dhvani because it is the words that we use that suggest their eternal forms called Sphoṭa. Thus a word is a Dhvani of the Sphoṭa. Thus when I use the term Gauḥ, Gauḥ is a Dhvani of the Sphoṭarūpa 'Go'. Dhvani, therefore, is the Vyañjaka of the Sphoṭa which is Vyaṅgya. This term

Dhvani was later taken over by the aestheticians who follow the grammarians' views in vital matters and styled it as the pair of word and sense, which is capable of suggesting a sense that outshines the expressed meaning. It is clear that Mammaṭa uses Dhvani for both the Śabda and the Artha, i.e., the Kāvya. It is also clear that **Dhvani is a sense found only in literature.** As indicated in the definition of Vyañjanāvṛtti in Sū. 20 of chapter one, **this suggested sense presupposes the sympathetic and imaginative response of the reader or the Sahṛdaya.** Mammaṭa's explanation of **Dhvani as a term and a concept** carries considerable weight since he is regarded as the staunchest supporter and the most authorised spokesmen of the Dhvani theory which was securely established in the Dhvanyāloka by Ānandavardhana and which was ably explained by Abhinavagupta in his Locana Commentary.

The Theory of Dhvani or Poetic Suggestion

According to the Dhvani-theorists, Dhvani is the soul of poetry and it is revealed by an entirely distinct power of a word called Suggestion or Vyañjanā. This Dhvani, as a sense, is always Vyaṅgya and is absolutely distinct from the Vācya sense, as well as the metaphorical or the indicated sense. The Dhvanyāloka refers to **three** different schools of ancient Ālaṁkārikas who were reluctant to admit that Dhvani or Vyaṅgyārtha is the soul of poetry. These are (1) the Abhāvavādins who are ignorant of the true nature of Dhvani being believers in the expressive capacity of words only; (2) the Lakṣaṇāvādins or Bhāktavādins who are troubled constantly by doubts concerning the existence of Dhvani as the most important element in (or the soul of) poetry; and lastly (3) the Anirdeśyavādins who suffer from an inability to define Dhvani in a logical way, though they accept that there is such a thing as Dhvani. But despite the opposition of these antidhvani theorists, slowly more and more theorists veered round the concept of Dhvani and it was finally raised to the status of the Ātmā or soul of Poetry by the Dhvani-theorists.

The Nature and Types of Dhvani

The Dhvanyāloka and the Locan Commentary, both, explain the genesis of (a) the word Dhvani, (b) the sense of Dhvani and (c) the power called Dhvani. As there was divergence of views regarding the nature of suggestion, Abhinavagupta has dealt with five such views and according to Vimarśinī, a commentary by Jayaratha on Ruyyaka's Alaṁkārasarvasva, there were twelve rival schools that opposed the theory of Dhvani. But most of these rival theorists' views centred round the expressed sense or at best around Vācyārtha and Lakṣyārtha; so they are bracketed together and called Vācyārthavādins. Indeed, in the second Kārikā of the Dhvanyāloka, we have a two-fold division of Word – Vācya and Pratīyamāna, and this Vācya is called Prasiddha, meaning Laukika or ordinary, and the Vyaṅgya or Pratīyamāna as Alaukika or extraordinary. This Alaukika sense, called, Pratīyamāna or 'Suggested Sense', is entirely different from the expressed (Vācya) sense, and it is the quintessence of poetry. As for the true beauty of this Suggested Sense, we are told that it is like the supple grace that pervades the entire being of a lovely damsel which is over and above the ornaments and make up as well as the symmetry of form of that damsel. **The captivating charm of a work of art is not equal to the adornments of word and sense or excellences but is in fact much more than these beautifying elements and is different from the beauty of the external elements. It is the beauty of the entire work and not of parts or external ornaments thereof**. So, suggestion, the soul of a poem, is independent of and Supreme among the other elements such as Alaṁkāra, Guṇa, Rīti, Vṛtti, and Saṅghaṭanā. The point to be noted here is that the mere absence of Doṣa or presence of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra does not constitute the essential appeal of a poem. It is the Pratīyamāna Sense, distinct from all other senses, that gives life to a poem, exactly like Lāvaṇya in a damsel. It is this Pratīyamāna sense which pervades the immortal creative works of great masters like Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa and others. This Pratīyamāna or

Vyaṅgya Sense can be of three different types : Vastudhvani, Alaṁkāradhvani and Rasadhvani, and these have their sub-types. In all of these cases, the Dhvani sense is quite distinct from the Expressed sense. Of these three varieties of Dhvani, the Vastudhvani and the Alaṁkāradhvani can be conveyed through the expressive power of a word, but the last and the most important third variety, viz., Rasadhvani can never be expressed as it is always and invariably auggested. Abhinavagupta divides Dhvani into Laukika and Alaukika and subsumes Vastudhvani and Alaṁkāradhvani under the Laukika-dhvani, but regards the Rasadhvani, the best type of Dhvani, to be a class by itself and calls it Alaukika. This last is only possible in a poetical expression – Kāvyāvyāpāraikagocara and is never expressed but always enjoyed aesthetically through a proper representation of the aesthetic stimulii. This is the extraordinary type of Dhvani, indeed the real Dhvani or **Dhvani par excellence.** This is the considered opinion of Abhinava-gupta, one of the greatest aestheticians and critics. Here he lays down the divisions of Dhvani and shows their mutual difference in a nutshell.

The Term 'Dhvani' Explained

As for the term Dhvani, Abhinava explains that it is applicable to Śabda, Artha and Vyāpāra, both, severally and collectively. When it is applied to a Kāvya it is collectively used. Thus the term Dhvani can mean (1) the Suggestive word, (2) the Suggestive primary sense (Vācyārtha), (3) the Suggested Sense (Vyaṅgya), and (4) the process (Vṛtti) of Suggestion, and (5) the Dhvanikāvya – a whole poem. We can see here that this concept of Dhvani is a highly developed aesthetic concept and a far cry from the grammarians' Dhvani. According to these grammarians, Sphoṭa is Dhvani as also the sounds (Dhvanati iti dhvaniḥ) which suggest that Sphoṭa which is an eternal and indivisible but significant word.

Following the grammarians but developing fully their conception of Dhvani, the literary critics, chiefly of the Dhvani

school, apply the term Dhvani to Vācakaśabdas (the words) and the Vācyārtha (the expressed meaning) that jointly and severally suggest the implied meaning (Pratīyamānārtha). Abhinavagupta very ingenuously comprehends all the four elements – Sabda, Artha, Vyāpāra and Vyaṅgya – within the connotation of the term Dhvani. This is what Mammaṭa means when he notes in the Kāvyaprakāśa (I. 4 ff) "Budhaiḥ . . . śabdārthayugalasya". In fact, Mammaṭa's words in K. P. I. 4 ff. restate in a somewhat compact and technical way the words of the Dhvanyāloka (I. 13 ff); and under "Bhaktyā bibharti naikatvaṁ rūpabhedādayaṁ dhvaniḥ" Ānandavardhana explicitly states that "Suggestion is the unindirectional communication of a sense other than the expressed by both the expressed sense and the expression when Vyaṅgya is pre-eminent."

It should be noted that according to the Dhvani-theorists, a word can be merely Vācaka or merely Lākṣaṇika, but it can never be merely Vyañjaka. In other words, the Vyaṅgyārtha can never be revealed by a word without at the same time expressing a Vācya sense or conveying a Lakṣya sense, i.e., Vyañjanā must be accompained by either Lakṣaṇā or Abhidhā To put it in different words, **the Śābdī Vyañjanā is either Lakṣaṇāmūlā or Abhidhāmūlā.** The Vyaṅgya sense or the Pratīyamāna sense of a word happens to be in addition to and not in lieu of the Vācyārtha or Lakṣyārtha. In the case of a suggested sense, we have to assume two powers to be possessed by a word simultaneously, i.e., Vyañjanā and Lakṣaṇā or Vyañjanā and Abhidhā. The Pradīpa commentary calls Śābdī Vyañjanā as Śabdaniṣṭhā and says it is Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā. Now in Lakṣaṇāmūlāvyañjanā we should not suppose that Lakṣaṇā is the cause of Vyañjanā, but it is only a Sahakārin of it. Thus the motive or Prayojana in instances of Lakṣaṇā such as Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ or Kuntāḥ praviśanti is apprehended by Vyañjanā from the word Gaṅgā and not by Abhidhā (as there is no Saṅketa in Gaṅgā for the Prayojana) or Lakṣaṇā which only conveys the Taṭa. Thus coolness etc. is revealed by

Vyañjanā. Mammaṭa has ably demonstrated all this in the second flash of his Kāvyaprakāśa. The word Gaṅgā is able to yield the sense of Taṭa by (Lakṣaṇā) as well as that of Śaityapāvanatva by Vyañjanā.

Śābdī and Ārthī Vyañjanā

It may be noted that the Lakṣaṇāmūlā Śābdī Vyañjanā arises only in Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā. While the Abhidhāmūlā relates to Nānārtha words or homonyms, where the Abhidhā is restricted to one sense, but the other sense is obtained by it. And the cases which do not come under Śābdī Vyañjanā, naturally belong to the Ārthī Vyañjanā, e.g. Niḥśesacyuta etc. where the word Adhama exemplifies the latter.

The above digression is intended to serve as a general background to the theory of Dhvani or Suggestion. **We must now revert to Hemachandra's gloss on Sūtra-19**, which follows both Mammaṭa and the Dhvanikāra as also Abhinavagupta in the main.

Hemachandra's Treatment of Dhvani

Hemachandra explains Dhvani, as expounded by the previous stalwart critics, by using the words Dhvanyate Dyotyate which, as we have seen are the same words that Māṇikyachandra uses in his Kāvyaprakāśa Saṁketa. According to Abhinavagupta, Dhvanyate means Vyaṅgya sense (lit. that which is suggested). Similarly Dyotyate also refers to the sense which is suggested. Since Hemachandra is here concerned with the Vaṅgya sense, he only quotes two of the well-known explanations of Dhvani as a **sense.** This Dhvani or Vyaṅgyārtha is three-fold; Vastudhvanī, Alaṁkāradhvani and Rasadhvani. Of these three, the first variety of Dhvani viz., Vastudhvani is entirely different from the Mukhyārtha, Gauṇārtha and Lakṣyārtha. In short, it is different from all the other senses. This is a variety of the Pratīyamāna sense which represents the fourth stage of language, as Abhinavagupta


explains it. **This is neither expressed nor indicated but experienced or felt by or revealed to the appreciative, sympathetic and responsive reader.** In other words, the word Pratītiviṣaya in the gloss, as explained in the Viveka commentary, refers to the Svasaṁvedanasiddhatā of the Pratīyamāna sense. This **felt nature** of the suggested sense is brought out very well in the Dhvanyāloka (I.4) which Hemachandra quotes (p.47, Viveka). The Kārikā is intended to show that the suggested sense is quite distinct from the expressed sense and can in no way be equated with the Vācyārtha as it is Sahṛdayaślāghya, Kāvyātmā, Kavyasārarūpatayā-sthitaḥ i.e., the very essence or all-in-all of the poetic expression. To drive this point home, Ānandavardhana employs the analogy of the supple grace of the excellent beauty of a lovely mainden. This is the irrestible and capativating appeal of the Dhvani sense. Abhinavagupta explains that this Lāvaṇya is **suggested** by the form of the person but **it is distinct from the form** and is a different sort of attribute which appeals to us. So it is not merely a defectless or decorated body that makes for Lāvaṇya; for a woman with an appearance that is devoid of any observeable physical defect such as squintedness etc. and with a body decked with ornaments, still comes to be described as a woman without charm or appeal; on the other hand, a woman not possessed of the above assets is quite often referred to as a moonlight of the nectar of grace by the connoisseurs. Hence it is clear that Lāvaṇya does not stand in the relation of Anvaya or Vyatireka, i.e., agreement and difference. Naturally, therefore, it is independent of Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, and is a special charm or grace – altogether different from the other, worldly features. Like Lāvaṇya, the aesthetic meaning or Pratīyamānārtha is equally distinct from mere absence of Doṣas and mere presence of Alaṁkāras like Upamā, Rūpaka, etc., and is comparable to Lāvaṇya in the Kāvyaśarīra. Again since this Lāvaṇya is always apprehended by the true connoisseurs of art, its existence is an irrefutable fact. This is the felt meaning

experienced to be pervading and overflowing from the works of great poets. Thus there is no doubt that like Lāvaṇya, the Pratīyamāna sense is an acknowledged source of charm and beauty in great poetry. It will be remembered that in his Vṛtti (gloss) on Dhvanyāloka I.4, Ānandavardhana calls this Lāvaṇya as "Kimapi anyadeva sahṛdayalocanāmṛtaṁ tattvāntaram" and remarks that this Pratīyamāna sense is exactly like that, i.e., like 'nectar of joy'.

Hemachandra very closely follows here the Dhvanyāloka and defines, divides and illustrates Dhvani, by and large, in the manner and words of the Dhvanyāloka. A careful look at the related topics in the Dhvanyāloka and their relation with this Sūtra, its gloss and the Viveka commentary will easily bear this observation out.

As we know, Abhinavagupta in his Locana Commentary on Dhvanyāloka (I. 4 ff) gives us a brief chart of the main divisions of the suggested senses as also of their mutual difference. Thus he states that Pratīyamānārtha is two-fold : Laukika and Kāvyavyāpāraikagocara and elaborates on it to show his priority for the Rasadhvani. Thus we can show the classification of the suggested sense or Pratīyamānārtha as under :

The Suggested Sense



The Threefold Dhvani

Following the Dhvanikāra and Abhinavagupta, Hemachandra gives three divisions of Dhvani, viz. Vastudhvani, etc., but he explains these divisions in the Viveka Commentary (p. 47) under the words Vastvalaṁkāreti. He states that Artha i.e., Pratīyamāna in poetry (Iha) is two-fold : Laukika and Alaukika. Laukika again is two-fold : Śabdābhidhānayogyaḥ avicitritātmā and Alaṁkaradhvani. The word Vicitrita means decorated or striking. So, Vastudhvani is the suggestion of a plain idea, while Alaṁkāradhvani is the suggestion of a striking or ornamented idea. Here both the varieties represent ideas or senses. The mutual difference between Vastudhvani and Alaṁkāradhvani, we are told further in the Viveka, is that, while in Alaṁkāradhvani where the suggested sense is pre-dominant, it is obvious that the Alaṁkāra is the Alaṁkārya i.e., the thing to be ornamented. A question may arise as to how this Alaṁkarya, which is bound to be an idea that is beautified, can be called an Alaṁkāra. To this, it is replied that since the figure of speech, which has assumed the position of an Alaṁkārya or suggested sense, at one time in the past passed under the name of an Alaṁkāra in the sense of a Vācyārtha; now, even though it is not a Vācya Alaṁkāra, still retains its previous appellation and only comes to be described as an Alaṁkāradhvani. In other words, in a suggested state, the name Alamkara, which smacks of Vācyārtha and a decorator, cannot be justified in relation to the principal soul of a Kāvya, but on the analogy of Brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāya it is called an Alaṁkāradhvani. The maxim of the Brahmanic-āscetic means that though a man is now a monk, he was formerly a Brahmin. This maxim is used by Mammaṭa, Viśvanāth and Hemachandra. Thus, the appellation of Alaṁkāradhvani of an Alaṁkārya suggested sense is only formal and not real. For, of both Vastu and Alaṁkāra in a suggested state, there cannot be any **expressedness,** still they have a connection with the primary sense when in the forms of Vidhi etc., so they are called Laukika. But, the

variety which is Kāvyavyāpāraikagocara is called Rasādi which is never capable of being expressed.

Hemachandra's Exposition of the Threefold Dhvani

Now Hemachandra takes up each of the varieties of Dhvani (Sense), viz., Vastudhvani, Alaṁkāradhvani and Rasadhvani for a detailed treatment. Believing as he does that first things should come first, he explains the three different types of the suggested sense in the order in which they have been stated. Here it should be noted that, in the body of the Sūtra (19), he is merely defining Dhvani as a sense as distinct from the expressed sense as is shown by the expression : "Mukhyādvyatirikto pratīyamāno vyaṅgyo dhvaniḥ". This would imply that Hemachandra is alive to the ancient tradition of the Mīmāṁsakas as well as of the old rhetoricians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa, that included the metaphorical and indicated senses under the Mukhyārtha.

Dhvani is an Elastic Term

"The concept of Dhvani has towered over all other ancient poetic concepts and surpassed and supplanted several other theories of poetry of the day, because it made the break with referential speech or expressed sense complete, and represented the emotive or literary aspect of language at its best. Moreover, the term Dhvani comprehended within its elastic concept, the ideas of emotion, structure, texture, unified character of the aesthetic experience, organic form as well as the imaginative beauty of the literary medium consisting in 'ambiguity', 'ambivalence', 'implication', complexity and richness, many-sidedness, irony, paradox, tension, conflict, contrariety, and even gestures. And what is most important, the Dhvani of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta absorbed and assimilated the concept of Rasa so marvellously conceived and established by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra. This meaning which is unique and exclusive to poetry is alone characterised as the essence of poetry. And it has its parallels in fine arts like music. The theory was so formulated that it could assimilate the essence

of all the traditional aesthetic categories while emphasising the claim of Rasa".[39]

The argument for the pre-eminent role of Dhvani in poetry assumes the realization of the fact that there is a unique aesthetic formation of poetical or artistic expression called Suggestion, which is totally different from the two well known process known as direct and indirect expression. This is the high water mark of the Dhvani theory which is summed up in the words of Ānandavardhana: "Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā....." (Dhv. Āl. I.13) and "Tatparāveva śabdārthau..." (Dhv. Āl. I.13 ff).

Once we accept the position that the suggested meaning is the poetic meaning, it becomes clear that in all instances of Dhvani or Suggestion, the Vyaṅgyārtha is always more important and beautiful than the Vācyārtha. This in its turn implies that, even in the case of Vastudhvani, where a bare idea is suggested, the beauty of the Vācyārtha is outshone by the beauty of the Vyaṅgyārtha. For, it is the central aim of poetry to delight the reader by the all-surpassing beauty of the suggested sense. This sense is mentioned to be of three types by Hemachandra: Vastu or Idea, Alaṁkāra or suggestive figurative shades and Rasādi or sentiments. This threefold sense or Dhvani is the soul of poetry.

The first type of Vyaṅgya or Dhvani called Vastudhvani, we are told, entirely different from the expressed sense and the others, suggests a bare idea or a matter-of-fact subject. In the words of आनन्दवर्धनाचार्य, it differs from the explicit meaning, and this is the chief characteristic, not only of the Vastudhvani but also of the remaining two types of Dhvani viz., the Alaṁkāra type and the Rasādi type. Thus, Vastudhvani completely differs from the explicit or expressed **sense. Hemachandra employes the term Ādi to hint the other senses such as Gauṇa and Lakṣya as well. In order to** illustrate how a Vastudhvani or suggestion of the idea takes place, he points out that sometimes the expressed sense is of the nature of a

positive proposal but the suggested sense is of the nature of a prohibition. In his gloss on Dhv. Āl. I.4, Ānandavardhana points out that though the Vastu is **suggested** by the inner power of the explicit statement or the expressed sense – and not only the Vastu but all types of Dhvani – still the expressed sense is never intended and it is always distinct from the suggested sense. Thus he establishes the distinct nature of the Vācya and the Vyaṅgya senses once and for all. Thus in all cases of Dhvani, the suggested sense, be it Vastu or Alaṁkāra or Rasa, is quite different from the expressed sense. However, though Vastu, Alaṁkāra and Rasa are always conveyed by the Vyaṅgya sense, with this difference that whereas the Vastu and Alaṁkāra can be conveyed by Abhidhā or denotation as well, the Rasādi is always and invariably **suggested** and never expressed. This idea is brought out very clearly by Abhinavagupta who also pointed out the difference between the Vastu and Alaṁkāra types of Dhvani, both Laukika.

Why Resort to Dhvani ?

A point that needs to be explained in connection with what Abhinava says is that if Vastu or Alaṁkāra can be Śabdavācya or conveyed through Abhidhā or Denotation, then why resort to Vyañjanā ? The answer is that an idea conveyed through suggestion is more charming than the idea expressed through Abhidhā. This is the opinion of renowned critics. The Dhvanikāra himself testifies to this fact : "Vācyórtho na tathā svadate pratiyamānaḥ sa eva yathā". This makes one point clear that Vastudhvani and Alaṁkāradhvani have a semblance of Vācyārtha (Vācyasāmarthyākṣiptatva) though the meaning suggested by it will be entirely different.

The Distinction between Vācya and Vyaṅgya

To prove this, i.e., the distinction of Vyaṅgya from Vācya, Hemachandra takes over several illustrations with comments

from the Dhvanyāloka and adds a few more of his own. His treatment of this topic is thus fairly comprehensive.

The first verse quoted here is from Hāla's anthology of Prakrit lyrics (no. 175) called the Gāthāsaptaśatī. Introducing the verse in Prakrit, the author of the Dhvanyāloka observes that "Even the first variety itself (i.e. Vastu) differs widely from the expressed sense. In fact, very often the suggested sense will be prohibitive in sense while the expressed is of the nature of a positive proposal". The verse is Bhama Dhammia etc. in Prakrit (Bhrama Dhārmika etc. in Sanskrit) and is well-known to students of Sanskrit Poetics. In this verse, the suggested sense is quite the opposite of the expressed sense since an injunctive idea is diametrically opposed to a prohibitive advice. The verse purports to be an exhortation expressed with reference to a recluse who used to roam in the thickets on the bank of Godāvarī to pluck flowers for his daily worship. Now, this exhortation is uttered by a wanton woman who secretly meets her lover under a bougher in the same woods, As the frequent visits of the recluse disturbed the lovers, the woman wanted to scare away the recluse who, she knew, was a timid fellow. So, she thought of stopping the man from coming permanently and thinks of an idea, concocts a tale or story. Thus, she very innocently tells the man to keep moving about freely in the place since the dog which used to frighten him daily has recently been killed by the lion who frequented the thick forests on the bank of the Godāvarī.

Hemachandra comments on this verse by saying that the woman who was very clever pretended to be innocent and addressed the pious man who disturbed her rendezvous by telling the recluse that the advent of a lion can be dangerous for him, and hence he should not move out.

This verse is so cleverly addressed as to show the innocence of the lady who is asking the man to "move freely". As we can see, the verse "Bhrama Dhārmika, etc." directly exhorts the man to **move freely** but suggests unmistakably that the

advent of a lion can mean sure death for the man and so he should **never move** about in the forest. Thus the **method** in the kind exhortation is to express a **positive proposal** and suggest a **prohibition.** This illustration is cited in Dhavnyāloka (I.4 ff) to demonstrate how Vastudhvani is totally distinct from the expressed sense. Here the expressed sense is Vidhirūpa (injunctive in force) but the suggested sense is Pratiṣedharūpa (prohibitive in nature). This is the peculiar nature of Dhvani; for no man in his right senses would ever think that Vidhi and Niṣedha, diametrically opposed, can be identical. Thus affirmation and negation reside at the same time in the same word - that is the unique discovery of the Dhvani school.

Hemachandra's explanation in the Viveka Commentary lays bare the motive behind the verse, with reference to the context, and observes significantly : "एवमादौ च विषये यद्यपि रसादिरर्थो व्यङ्ग्योऽस्ति तथापि महाराजशब्दव्यपदेश्यविवाहकरणप्रवृत्तसचिवानुयायिराजवदप्रधानतामेव गृह्णाति ।" (Viveka p. 47). This means that while in Vastudhvani, sometimes a Rasa may be also suggested, still it is never predominant. It is rather like a great king or emperor who is attending the marriage function at a minister's house where (naturally) the Minister (and not the king emperor) stands out prominently. This remark provides a significant side-light on the theory and the division of Dhvani. Dr. K. Krishnamurthy brings out the importance of this observation of Hemachandra, when he states : "....But if the Vyaṅgya vastu or alaṁkāra or rasa is not subsidiary to the vāchya, but is surpassing it in beauty, then these come to be raised to the highest state of dhvani. This is the functional philosophy underlying the three divisions of Vyaṅgyārtha into Vastudhvani, Alaṁkāradhvani and Rasadhvani. Unless something is exclusively and relatively all-important, it won't be classed as dhvani. However, of the three, the province of Rasa-dhvani is not only the largest but also the sweetest. Its nature is such that it cannot but colour every minute ingradient or aspect of poetry on the one hand and every class of dhvani

on the other. In poetry, language is used uniquely because the poet endeavours to convey emotions, moods and feelings in addition to mere facts and actions. Even such hard and dry things like stones and bones associated with some mental feeling like anguish; and, therefore, even in seemingly rasa-less passages of poetry, a perceptive and sensitive reader will experience some shade or the other of rasādi. So the logically distinct categories of vastudhvani and alaṁkāradhvani cannot be deemed to be totally exclusive of rasa any time. Once we theoretically admit that dhvani is the essence of best poetry, to do full justice to the claims of rasa, we cannot rule out logically the application of that definition to vastu-dhvani and alaṁkāradhvani also. These latter too are definitely more aesthetic than their vācya counter-parts and they also in some measure atleast, partake of the healing touch of rasa which is not however prominent enough to be classed as rasadhvani."[40]

Hemachandra Tackles the Various Theories of Meaning

Incidentally Hemachandra takes up (Viveka, p. 48) the discussion of the various theories of meaning which have been or can be applied to 'Bhrama dhārmika etc.'

We have seen the general explanation of this verse attempted by Hemachandra with his comment that even in cases of Laukikadhvani like Vastu and Alaṁkāra, there is always a relieving touch of Rasa. Now, "if this verse is interpreted as the utterance of a lady who is inside the thicket or bougher, the second meaning 'Mā bhrama' will be an indicated sense, and with its purpose (removal of the Dhārmika from the rendezvous) will be suggested, then the interpretation will not be appropriate. Here Vāsinā (stalking the thickets) may perhaps (ca) be the Abhidheya (expressed sense). But it is not possible to say that the prohibition is expressed. To explain : Since no comprehension of a Sense is possible without a Saṅketa being there, a word can only convey a sense if a Seṅketa exists

with reference to that word." This reminds us of Mammaṭa's definition of a Vācaka śabda (K. P. II. 7 - Vrtti). And Saṅketa is of one type only because it cannot be placed on a word to yield a special meaning for fear of the fault of endlessness and infringement of the rule; just as it cannot be made with reference to a sentence to yield the sentence – meaning. For, the connection of general word-meanings (in a sentence) comes about owing to expectancy (Ākāṅkṣā), compatibility (Yogyatā) and proximity (Sannidhi). This is the view of the Abhihitānvayavādins. Mammaṭa deals with this view in his Kāvyaprakāśa (V. 47 ff).

The Tātparya Theory

We can see that here Hemachandrāchārya introduces a discussion of the Tātparya theory of the Mīmāṁsakas. The first of the Tātparyavādins are the Abhihitānvayavādins who hold that the purport-sense also belongs to the word when the senses of words are combined together owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity. The purport sense, which possesses a special form, and which, though not the sense of the different words, represents the sense of the sentence, springs up – this is the view of those who maintain that connection arises between senses after they are expressed by the different words. 'Vācya eva vākyārthaḥ' – the expressed sense is the sentence sense – thus hold those who maintain that words express a connected meaning. These are the Anvitābhidhānavādins. This is the **fourth Vṛtti** i.e., over and above Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā, though Hemachandra does not explain it. Abhinavagupta enumerates the different powers in this order : Abhidhā, Tātparya, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā. Thus according to him, Vyañjanā is the fourth Vṛtti.

Mammaṭa defines and explains the Tātparyavṛtti and Hemachandra depends mainly on him and the Dhvanikāra as well as Abhinavagupta. We can pinpoint words, quotations, examples and ideas in both the body of the text of the

Kāvyānuśāsana and the Viveka to substantiate this. Now Mammaṭa defines "Tātparyārtha as 'Tātparyārthópi keṣucit" (K. P. II. 6). This then is the additional (fourth) Vṛtti, called Tātparyavṛtti or purport. **This function belongs not to individual words as Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā do, but to the sentence as a whole.** Its purpose is to convey the connection (Anvaya) between the meanings of the different words in a sentence. This connected meaning is styled as Tātparyārtha (Vide S. D. II. 20).

The theorists who admit this Tātparyavṛtti are called the Abhihitānvayavādins as they hold that, in a sentence, the different words first convey their respective individual senses and then a connection between them arises giving rise to a sentence-meaning or import of the sentence as a whole. According to them, every word has a generic (Sāmānya) meaning which it expresses independently. This may be called the Vākyārtha and it is learnt from Vṛddhavyavahāra and Kośa. When several words are combined to make a sentence, the senses are modified in some way to accommodate others. These together give rise to a sense which is the sense of the sentence as a whole. This is accomplished by the Tātparyavṛtti which operates owing to the force of Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā and Sannidhi. This Abhihitānvaya view-point is held by the followers of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, a great Mīmāṁsaka, as also by the adherents of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy. However, another school of the Mīmāṁsakas, led by Prabhākara or 'Guru', hold a different view called Anvitābhidhānavāda and this view is opposed to the Abhihitānvayavāda. Anvitābhidhānavāda means that a word expresses a **connected** meaning and hence no need arises for postulating a Sāmānya or generic sense for every word. It should be noted here that according to the Anvitābhidhānavāda, the meanings of words are known from Vṛddhavyavahāra, as, for example, in sentences such as Gāmānaya, Aśvamānaya etc. the word Ānaya used with Gāṁ and Aśvaṁ explained by the act of bringing, Anayanakriyā,

drives home the meaning of Ānayana as 'bringing' to a child. Thus here the meanings of words are understood as connected (Anvita); no separate Tātparyavṛtti is called for.

Hemachandra's Refutation of Antidhvani Views Reviewed and Summarized

By now we are familiar with Hemachandra's method of treatment. While treating of the Vṛttis or sense-functions in chapter one, he provides the main theoretical argument on the four-fold power of Word and the four senses in the body of the main text but presents additional views and examples (mostly based on or cited from Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa) by way of supplementary material in the Viveka Vyākhyā (Vide K.A.S. pp. 42-44, 46-52 etc). Thus the exposition of the theories of Denotation and Indication has already been duly supplemented with additional citations above.

Now, under the verse Bhrama dhārmika etc. (V.13) he again presents (in the Viveka, p. 47 ff) the well known theoretical refutation of the Anti-dhvani views and strives to establish the Vyañjanā function in a convincing and logical manner by following Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya pinpoints this (and Dr. S. K. De, HSP-II p. 244, endorses it) when he states : "In chapter-I....there are unmistakable traces of the K. P.'s influence in the expression and in the ultimate dominance of the Vyañjanā view, the author's guides are the Dhv. āl. and the Locana... He has occasionally utilized the K. P., especially in the treatment of the Vṛttis, though Hemachandra chooses to differ from Mammaṭa here and there.... His efforts for being exhaustive in his treatment are evidenced in his taking the cue from Ānandavardhana's **specifications of four varieties of Vastudhvani** (K. A. S. pp. 53-56 etc.) followed in **toto** by almost all the later writers **and amplifying them to thrice their number with apt illustrations in Prakrit. The age-old practice of giving** stock-examples, which has much in its favour, is scrupulously followed, but the author is never oblivious of the practical

nature of poetics and adds here and there examples which serve to increase the range of the students in their studies of Kāvyas. His discretion, however, never leads him to unnecessary and irrelevant elaboration or **dissuades** him from picking up **supplementary** matter in his gloss which is much thought of by **the advanced student.** A paragraph in the Viveka by way of explaining the Prakrit verse Bhama dhammia (Viveka pp. 47–48, not found in Locana or V.V.)...hints at his zeal for clarification, even at the cost of throwing overboard his trusted guides" (Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists, pp. 119-20, also vide p. 118, p. 126 etc. See Bibliography).

Dr. V. M. Kulkarni traces the **sources** of Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana (vide ch. 13, "Studies in Sanskrit in Sāhityaśāstra", pp. 149-54) and indicates the K. P. (V), the Dhv. Āl. and Locana pp. 74, 78, 137–139, 167-169, 255–257, 271–276, 351-356 and Bhoja's S. P. VII (pp. 245-50) as the principal sources on Śabdārthasvarūpa. He also invites reference to Rucaka's Saṅketa as a source (Ibid, p. 152). However, the question of **the mutual relation between Hemachandra and Somes'vara is left out of consideration** in view of uncertainty. Dr. Kulkarni holds that we need not find fault with Hemachandra if he **preferred** to present his predecessors' theories and doctrines in their original form, instead of briefly summarising them in his own language. (Ibid, p. 153). Hemachandra presents a fairly complete review of the various views which go counter to the Dhvani doctrine and we can see that here Hemachandra has marshalled numerous arguments, taken over mostly from the fifth flash of the Kāvyaprakāśa wherein Mammaṭa has very ably refuted the anti-Dhvani theories of the Abhidhāvādins, the Tātparyavādins-Abhihitānvayavādins, the Anvitābhidhānavādins, the Lakṣaṇāvādins, the Vedāntins and the Anumitivādins, to establish that Vyañjanā is an independent power entirely different from the expressed, purported and indicated senses.

In the different passages quoted here by Hemachandra (17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23), an attempt is made to (a) disprove the contention that Dhvani can be expressed, (b) refute that either Abhihitānvayavāda or Anvitābhidhānavāda can account for the Vyañjanāvṛtti, (c) reject the Dīrghavyāpāravādin's claim that his extended Abhidhā can cover Vyañjanā, (d) and to establish that the same word can suggest a variety of meanings. **Thus, a wide gulf divides the Vyaṅgyārtha from the Vācyārtha.** Examples also are cited to show that (1) the suggested sense is affirmative when the expressed sense is negative, e.g. 'Niḥśeṣacyuta....etc.' (2) the Vyaṅgyārtha is decisive when the Vācyārtha is doubtful, e.g. 'Mātsaryamutsārya...' (3) the suggested sense is Praśaṁsā while the primary sense shows Nindā, e. g. 'Kathamavanipadarpo etc.' (4) the Vācyārtha is Praśaṁsā but the Vyaṅgya is Nindā e.g. 'He Helājita Bodhisattva etc.' and (5) the suggested sense varies with the context, speaker, hearer, etc. e.g. 'Kasya vā na bhavedroṣaḥ etc.' The concerned person alone apprehends the suggested meaning whereas the lay reader merely comprehends the primary sense. This in itself unmistakably proves that **the two senses** – the Vācya and the Vyaṅgya – **are totally distinct from** each other.

Statement and Suggestion : How are They Related ?

The above lengthy disquisition (Viveka pp. 48-52) was intended to establish that in the verse (no. 13) "Bhrama dhārmika....etc." **in the positive statement** 'Visrabdho bhrama' move about freely, which is the expressed meaning, **the suggested sense** 'Tatra nikuñje siṁhastiṣṭhati tvaṁ ca śūnópi bibheṣi, tasmāt tvayā tasmin na gantvyam iti' **which is prohibitive in nature** is revealed. Now the author produces – or rather reproduces (Dhvanyāloka I.IV ff) another verse (no.14) in which **the primary sense is prohibitive but the suggested sense is positive or affirmative**. The verse is a gāthā quoted from VII. 67 of Hāla's anthology. It is addressed by a Proṣitabhartṛkā lady to a traveller who is lodged in her

house, and is enamoured of her. But **the presence of the lady's mother-in-law comes in the way of their meeting. So, the lady cleverly tells the man that they could meet at night and requests him to note the place where she sleeps. Here,** "do not stumble into our beds" – is the prohibitive expressed sense but 'mark our beds in day light, so that you can come here (to me)' is the affirmative suggested sense. We can see that this prohibition is only outward, and is in fact a clever way of agreeing to meet the man at night under cover of darkness, while at the same time making him aware of the mother-in-law's presence. Thus, by veiled hints or suggestion, the woman reveals her desire to welcome the man's amorous advances.

Very often, **the expressed meaning is affirmative and the suggested meaning reveals another affirmative proposal.** This is illustrated in the verse (15) 'Bahalatama etc.' In this verse, the expression "please keep awake, so that we are not robbed" is Vidhi in the expressed sense, but "the night is pitch dark; my husband is away; I am alone in the house, so you come to me without fear" is the suggested meaning which is also of the nature of Vidhi. The expressed Vidhi, here, results in suggested Vidhi : क्वचिद् विधौ विध्यन्तरम्

The next verse (16) illustrates how one prohibitive expressed meaning results in another prohibitory suggested meaning : क्वचिन्निषेधे निषेधान्तरम्.

Sometimes the expressed meaning is neither affirmative nor prohibitive but the suggested meaning is affirmative, as, e.g. the verse (17) Mahuehin etc. ("O traveller ! If you remove my under-garment, whom can I call for help ? I am alone in the forest and the village is far away from this place !"). Here in the absence of the expression of either a Vidhi or a Niṣedha, the words "I am alone, the village is far away" imply that the place is secluded and so the idea "you may remove my under-garment" is suggested.

It may happen that a charming, simple verse (such as Jivitāśā etc., No. 18) may convey an expressed sense which involves neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha, but the suggested sense involves Niṣedha. Here, the expressed sense in Gaccha vā tiṣṭha vā is neither affirmative nor negative, but in the words "Jivitāśā balavatī dhanāśā durbalā mama" the lady **suggests** that "It is impossible for me to live without you (her husband), you, please, **don't** go."

Another illustration (verse 19) conveys both Vidhi and Niṣedha by the expressed sense, but the suggested sense reveals another Vidhi. This becomes clear when we scrutinize the literal sense : "O traveller, proud of the beauty of your wife, go by another path. In this wretched village, the headman's daughter is caught in a net from which she cannot free herself" (i.e., her parents restrict her movement). Hemachandra remarks on this verse that 'Anyena pathā vraja' shows both Vidhi and Niṣedha, but in 'the headman's daughter is worthy of looking at even by you who are proud of your wife's charms' there is another Vidhi that is suggested ultimately.

Sometimes the expressed Vidhi and Niṣedha result only in another Vidhi in the suggested sense. Verse 20 suggestively tells the farmer's daughter-in-law **not** to (Niṣedha) carry on with her secret love-game as her father-in-law can hear the sound of her bangles. But the outward meaning is "collect the flowers etc." which is the expressed Vidhi and 'do not shake the शेफालिका tree' is the expressed Niṣedha.

Often, outwardly Vidhi is meant but in the suggested sense neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha is there. So, in the verse (21) 'Saniyaṁ vacca, etc.' quoted in the Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa (VII p. 248), "Śanaiḥ vraja" is Vidhi, but "You are extremely delicate" which is the suggested sense is neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha.

Similarly, **very often the expressed sense is Niṣedha, but the suggested meaning is neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha.**

For instance, in verse 22, (cited in the Dhvanyāloka under I. 4 with the caption : प्रतिषेधरूपेऽनुभयरूपो) "De a pasia etc. (O you who have reduced the thickness of darkness with the light of your moon-like face, kindly go back; for, you are throwing obstacles in the path of other women going to see their lovers, you cursed one !), we have the words निवर्तस्व, go back, which **express** Niṣedha, but the suggested meaning, the excellent beauty of the lady's face, is neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha. According to one interpretation, in this verse, a lover shrewdly praises the beauty of his beloved; but Abhinavagupta disapproves it because if that is the sense, then the verse will not become a fit instance of Dhvani, but will be a case of Guṇibhūtavyaṅgya. So Abhinavagupta explains it to yield the Dhvani-sense. He says that this is said to a woman hurriedly going to meet her lover by the lover who was proceeding to her house, and says it under the pretext of not being recognised by him. That is why the expression हतासे is ironically used. "How do you expect to achieve your desired purpose when you obstruct the path of other ladies desirous of meeting their paramours ? So you come to my house, or we proceed to your house." Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, in both ways, the intention of the speaker (i.e. the paramour's) is suggested. So those who say that it is a lover's shrewd praise of his beloved's beauty are not on the right lines.

Another verse (23), Vacca maham etc., quoted in the Dhvanyāloka (I. 4 ff) to illustrate Anubhayarūpavyaṅgya when Vācya is Vidhi, is here cited by Hemachandra to illustrate Anubhayarūpavyaṅgya when the expressed sense involves Vidhi and Niṣedha both. Here we find expressed the intense dejection on the part of a wife whose husband is setting out on a journey against her wish. Here, 'go, let me alone suffer and weep' is Vidhi, and 'let there be no suffering on your part' is Niṣedha in the expressed sense but the suggested meaning involves neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha; only the rebuking of the offending lover by his beloved is suggested. The Dhvanyāloka

explains it as Anubhayarūpavyaṅgya in a Vācyavidhi. Thus the suggested sense Vrajyābhāva is not the opposite of Vraja (Vācyavidhi). The suggested sense has no definite relation with the Vācyārtha and can neither be classed as Vidhi nor as Niṣedha. Hence it is called Anubhayarūpa.[41] Hemachandra's remark is also tantamount to this: here 'Mamaiva niḥśvāsaroditavyāni bhavantú, is Vidhi; 'Mā' tavāpi (tāṁ vinā) tāni jāyantāṁ, is Niṣedha; but the suggested sense is neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha, but only the reproach of the lover for pretending to love her.

The next verse (24) illustrates neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha in the expressed sense and lack of both (Anubhaya) in the suggested sense. "Eventhough your body is adorned by the tips of her nails, your eyes are unsteady with sleeplessness, yet O You with dark limbs, you do not torment my heart so much as you do with your lips free from scratches made by her lips." The primary sense here is that the angry woman says that she is not jealous of the rival woman; so the marks of dalliance with her do not offend her; but she is pained that the dalliance was incomplete as his lips are not bitten by the other woman. Now, this, outwardly soft, expression suggests through the force of the context that what the woman means is that, owing to his excessive love for the other woman, he went on kissing her without a break so that the lady had no chance to return the kisses resulting in scratches on his lips. This proves that their fondness for eachother is extreme. This pains the lady and hurts her. This is suggested. This suggested sense shows neither Vidhi nor Niṣedha.

Now, quite often the expressed sense is meant for one person and the suggested sense for another. The next verse (25) 'Kassa va na hoi roso etc.' quoted in the Dhvanyāloka, and taken over here literally with the introductory remark itself, means "who will not be offended to witness the lips of his beloved sorely hurt? Though you were warned, yet you obstinately smelt the lotus with bees inside it. Do you, now, suffer the consequence of your perversity!"

It may be noted that in all the previous verses, the expressed and the suggested senses were apprehended by the same person, but in this verse, the two senses are apprehended by two different persons – i.e., the substrata of both apprehensions are विभिन्नविषय (distinct) here. If the Vācya and the Vyaṅgya were not distinct, this distinction of the substrata of cognition would not have been possible. Thus, this last example in support of distinction of the suggested sense, proves conclusively the futility of the numerous arguments advanced against Dhvani by the Mīmāṁsaka, the Naiyāyika, the Vedāntin, the Vaiyākaraṇa and others.

The Range of the Suggested Sense Demonstrated

The above verse (Kasya vā...) is addressed to a woman by her confidants in the presence of her husband. The husband does not know the wife's infidelity and so believes the maid. But the suggested meaning, viz., the dalliance with her lover which is the cause of the lips being bitten, is understood by the woman who, if found out, may be rebuked or divorced by the lover. **Abhinavagupta admirably brings out several different senses from this verse, each meant for a different person.** Thus, it can be with reference to her (a) husband, (b) to the neighbours who suspected her waywardness, (c) to the rival woman (Sapatnī), (d) to the lady herself, (e) to the paramour and (f) to the third party who is watching all this (Viveka, pp. 57-58; Locana, p. 77).

This is the range of the suggested senses that can be had from a single verse – Abhinava seems to say; and this is the power of the poetic meaning we marvel at. Hemachandra has reproduced the Locana text on this verse in toto.

Finally, Hemachandra states that we should realise that like Vastudhvani, Alaṁkāradhvani and Rasadhvani are also quite distinct from the Mukhyārtha, Gauṇārtha and Lakṣyārtha. The word which suggests is the Vyañjaka or suggestor.

Recapitulation of the Four Powers of Word

The next Sūtra (I. 20) is about the various processes of the four different senses. This we have already seen in connection with the previous discussion of the Sabdārthas. We may recapitulate by stating that Abhidhā is a process of direct sense which depends on convention or Saṅketa. It deals with the primary sense. But Gauṇi and Lakṣaṇā processes are nothing but the power to indicate a sense. And both of them rely on the three prerequisites, viz. Mukhyārthabādha, Nimitta or Sambandha and Prayojana. But Vyañjakatvam or Vyañjanā is the power by which some suggested inner sense is yielded with the adeptness of the person in understanding both the Vācya and the Laksya senses.

Hemachandra Ignores the Drift-Power

It is to be noted that Hemachandra totally ignores in the main text of his work the Tātparyavṛtti which is treated of by Mammaṭa and others. This Vṛtti is important as it determines the inter-connection between words in a sentence. In other words, Tātparyavṛtti and Tātparyārtha or Vākyārtha should have found scope here. But Hemachandra clarifies that since Tātparyārtha etc. are connected with a sentence in the direct sense and as such form part and parcel of the Abhidhā, hence no separate treatment of the purport-power or the purport-sense is given. However, we know that he has quoted passages from the Kāvyaprakāśa to supplement the body of the Kāvyānuśāsan text wherein this topic has incidentally figured. We have covered it in detail.

The concepts of Abhidhā, Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā as well as of Vyañjanā are explained in our text wholly in terms of the definitions provided by Abhinavagupta in Locana under Dhvanyāloka, Udyota I, Kārikā 4. So far as Tātparyaśakti is concerned, Hemachandra clearly states that, normally, Tātparyaśakti, the cause of Anvayapratipatti or understanding the connection of words, should follow the treatment of Abhidhā and there is also the Tātparyārtha or Vākyārtha which is related to the

Tātparyaśakti, but since both of these are related to the sentence (sense), they have not been stated.

Thus Hemachandra has dropped out Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhidhānavāda, as they do not deal with the power of a word, strictly speaking.

Hemachandra's Exposition of Vyañjanā Process

Vyañjakatvam or the process of Suggestion has been defined as that power of conveying a sense which is aided by the sensitive reader's refined sensibility, rendered pure by the apprehension of meaning, born of those powers, viz., Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā. In Sūtra 21 of Chapter I, Hemachandra states that any one or all of these **three** senses, Vācya, Lakṣya or Vyaṅgya, in their turn, suggest some inner sense, when either the speaker (Vaktā) is some peculiar person (Vaktṛvaiśiṣṭya) or the subject on hand has some speciality (Boddhṛvaiśiṣṭya) or the intonation of the sentence uttered is peculiar (Kākuvaiśiṣṭya) or the expressed sense (Vācya - artha) is peculiar (Vākyavaiśiṣṭya) or the person associated with the Speaker is peculiar (Anyāsatii) or the context, place, time, gestures and others have some peculiarity about them. In all such cases, there is definitely a suggested sense. The suggested sense in its turn proceeds sometimes from Vācyārtha, at other times from Lakṣyārtha and sometimes from Vyaṅgyārtha. All these specialities or peculiarities (Vaiśiṣṭyas) have been illustrated by Hemachandra by following Mammaṭa's treatment of these aspects in most cases.

Mammaṭa's View of Suggestiveness

Mammaṭa, in the beginning of the second flash of his Kāvyaprakāśa, states the nature of Word and Sense, and then declares in Kārikā 2 : सर्वेषां प्रायशोऽर्थानां व्यञ्जकत्वमपीष्यते, i.e., Suggestiveness is admitted as belonging to all senses. This means that not only the word is suggestive, but the three-fold sense - the expressed, the indicated and the suggested - also is suggestive. This can also be taken to mean that senses,

in addition to being expressed, indicated and suggested, are further Vyañjaka i.e., 'when they further suggest something else.' In three verses (6, 7 & 8), the three senses Vācya, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya are made to suggest other senses. Mammaṭa uses the word Prāyaśaḥ in the Kārikā to show that senses are not always further suggestive. When the Vyaṅgya is a Rasa principally developed, it is not Vyañjaka. Mammaṭa's Prāyaśaḥ also restricts the examples to three only. His first verse illustrates 'Vācyasya vyañjakatvam'. In the second verse he explains the suggestiveness of the Lakṣya and in the third verse he demonstrates the Vyañjakatva of Vyaṅgyārtha.

Mammaṭa uses the terms Vyañjanam, Dhvananam and Dyotanam to denote Vyañjanā, though usually he refers to Vyañjanā as Vyañjanam.

The Ārthī Vyañjanā

In Sūtra 21 of Chapter I, Hemachandra first takes up Ārthī Vyañjanā or the suggestion which depends upon sense by reason of the speciality of the speaker or that of the person addressed etc., as illustrated above by three examples from Mammaṭa. This variety, different from Śābdī Vyañjanā (which depends on Anekārtha Śabdas or Homonyms when their Vācakatva is restricted to one sense only, but another Avācyārtha shines out), called Ārthīvyañjanā, is suggestion based on sense. This is the same Vyañjanā to which Mammaṭa's words "Sarveṣāṁ prāyaśaḥ arthānāṁ vyañjakatvamapiṣyate" apply. Accordingly, all senses, Vācya, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya are generally suggestive. The Ārthīvyañjanā occurs in those cases of suggestion where the special conditions, which give rise to Śābdīvyañjanā of Lakṣaṇāmūla and Abhidhāmūlā types, exist. It may be mentioned that Lakṣaṇāmūlā Śābdīvyañjanā requires Prayojanavatīlakṣaṇā, while the Abhidhāmūlā Śābdīvyañjanā presupposes an Anekārtha word. In other words, Ārthīvyañjanā occurs, when there is Suggestion but devoid of Prayojanavatīlakṣaṇā or Anekārtha śabda. For instance, in the well-known example Niḥśeṣacyuta etc., we have Ārthīvyañjanā but not

Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā or Anekārtha words in it, though the word (Śabda) Adhama suggests it.

In order that these senses become suggestive, the presence of certain circumstances is required. These circumstances are, as Mammaṭa mentions them (K. P. III. 1 & 2) : "That operation of the threefold sense, which, owing to the peculiarity of the speaker, the person addressed, the modulation or intonation of voice (Kāku), the sentence, the expressed meaning, the proximity of another person, the occasion, the place, the time, etc., become the cause of the apprehension of another sense in the case of persons gifted with creative imagination, is suggestion itself." And "Here the person addressed means the person spoken to. Kāku means a modification of the voice. Prastāva means context (Prakaraṇa). Arthasya means, 'of the (three) senses' : the expressed, the indicated and the suggested." The main point of this quotation is that, while Vācyārtha is understood by all, the Vyaṅgyārtha requires Pratibhā or imaginative ability. Again, as Ārthīvyañjanā is based on Vācya, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya senses, we may note that Ārthīvyañjanā creates the apprehension of another sense, viz., a Vyaṅgyārtha which is different from the original Vācyārtha, Lakṣyārtha and Vyaṅgyārtha as well. Thus a Vyañjaka Vyaṅgyārtha may enable us to apprehend even a third Vyaṅgyārtha. This helps prove that Vyañjanā is a separate Vṛtti.

Peculiar Factors Analysed

Hemachandra's list of peculiar circumstances contains ten factors, while Mammaṭa gives nine factors only. The additional factor in the Kāvyānuśāsana is Ceṣṭā which is understood in Mammaṭa's Ādi. Thus, according to Hemachandra, when the speaker is a special person (Vaktṛviśeṣa), or the subject is peculiar (Pratipādyaviśeṣa), or when there is a peculiar Kāku, or a typical sentence (Vākyaviśeṣa) or a Vācyaviśeṣa or the person nearby is peculiarly connected with the subject, or the context, or place or time or gestures, etc. – all these circumstances give rise to a suggested sense (Vyaṅgyārtha) which is distinct

from the expressed or the indicated or the suggested sense. It may be noted that the second factor according to Mammaṭa is Boddhavya i.e, the person spoken to, but Hemachandra puts Pratipādya or Viṣaya in its place. However, Mammaṭa's gloss mentions Pratipādya for Boddhavya or Bodhaitavyaḥ.

The above ten circumstances or factors, when closely analysed, reveal that, while Vaktṛvaiśistya and Pratipādya-vaiśiṣṭya belong to the things themselves, Kāku or Anyasannidhi are themselves peculiar.

Under Sūtra 21 of Chapter one, Hemachandra illustrates Vaktrādivaiśiṣṭya. He next illustrates the combination of Vaktṛ-vaiśiṣṭya and Boddyavaiśiṣṭya in Attā etha i.e., Śvaśrūratra śete etc., and remarks that the knowledge of Vaktā and Śrotā in the verses reveals Vidhirupavyaṅgyārtha by the word Śeṣva, 'you sleep.'

In this manner, we can have combinations of two or three factors, such as, in Kasya vā na bhavati...etc. (p. 62, gloss). However, this statement is rather loose, as we know that only some of the factors can combine, not all. At the end of these examples, Hemachandra notes that in the above examples, we have the Vācyārtha as Suggestor, i.e., the suggested meaning proceeds from Abhidhā. Consequently he gives one illustration (Verse 30) of Amukhyasya Vyañjakatvam: Kathayanti sakhī subhagaṁ kṣaṇe kṣaṇe etc. (cited by Mammaṭa), where, due to Viparītalakṣaṇā, the lover's fault is suggested. In another instance (37), Vaṇijaka hastidantāḥ kutóasmākaṁ vyāghrakṛttayaḥ etc. (cited in the Dhvyanyāloka p. 299). The Vyaṅgyasya Vyañjakatvam is illustrated. "O you merchant, how do you expect us to have tiger-skin or tusks of elephants in our house (for sale) when our daughter-in-law with her face covered with dishevelled hair is moving about in the house?" Here the adjective Lulitālakamukhi i.e., with untidy hair on her face, suggests that the son of the speaker is ever and anon in dalliance with his wife and it is further suggested that the son,

owing to his excessive sexual indulgance, is very much emaciated. So he is no longer able to kill tigers or elephants in hunting and thus collect tusks or hides.

Hemachandra has taken over the verses 'Tathābhūtaṁ dṛṣtvā', 'Niḥśeṣacyuta', etc. to illustrate Vaktrādivaiśiṣṭya and even 'Vaktrādināṁ mithaḥ saṁyoge' also. But he has supplied examples of Lakṣyavyañjakatā and Vyaṅgyavyañjakatā in addition, which Mammaṭa has only hinted at. Thus, the different circumstances of the Ārthīvyañjanā as also of the Lakṣyavyaṅgyatva and Vyaṅgyavyañjakatva have been fully illustrated. However, under Tathābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭvā Mammaṭa clarifies that the verse explains only Kākorvaiśiṣṭya under vācyārthasya vyañjakatā and is not to be considered as an example of Kakvākṣipta - a sub-type of Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya; though he uses the term Vācyasiddhyaṅgam, another type of Guṇībhūtavyaṅgyam.

We must note that all the above verses illustrate Ārthīvyañjanā and represent Dhvanikāvya or Uttamakāvya according to Mammaṭa. This marks the end of the consideration of Vyañjakatā of Vācyārtha, Lakṣyārtha and Vyaṅgyārtha called Ārthīvyañjanā in our text. Hemachandra has thus given us a detailed exposition of the Ārthīvyañjanā in all its aspects. It is, however, noteworthy that while Mammaṭa has given the Śābdīvyañjanā towards the end of Chapter II and Ārthī in Chapter III of the Kāvyaprakāśa, Hemachandra has first taken up the topic of Ārthī vyañjanā for discussion.

Divisions of the Suggested Sense

Hemachandra takes up the divisions of the suggested meaning in the next Sūtra (I. 22). He states that the suggested sense can be based on the power of the word as well. So, we have a twofold suggested sense : the Śabdaśaktimūla or that which depends on the power of words and the other is Arthaśaktimūla or that which proceeds from the expressed sense (illustrated fully in the previous section). **The third variety called Ubhayaśaktimūla** (by Mammaṭa for instance)

which depends both on the word and the sense simultaneously, is, in Hemachandra's view, not different from the Śabdaśaktimūla type of Vyaṅgya since as between a word and a sense, the word (in poetry) is more important than its sense, so far as Suggestiveness is concerned.

It is pertinent to note here that in the second Ullāsa of the Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammaṭa has treated of Lakṣaṇāmūlaṁ Vyañjakatvam in connection with Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā first, and then in Kārikā 19 he defines only Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā. **But he does not give the** name Śābdīvyañjanā anywhere. Similarly while Kārikās 1 and 2 (i.e., 21–22 of K. P. IV) define Ārthīvyañjanā, Mammaṭa does not call it by the name of Ārthīvyañjanā. In actual fact in Kārikā 19 of K. P. II, Mammaṭa defines Śābdīvyañjanā by mens of Anekārthasya śabdasya etc. and gives Saṁyogo viprayogāśca etc. with examples of each of these factors but he does not care to title it as Śābdīvyañjanā, although it is Śābdī only. Again in the last Kārikā of the same Ullāsa (K. P. II. 20), while dealing with Vyañjaka Śabda – the basis of Śābdīvyañjanā, Mammaṭa states that the Artha also collaborates with the Śabda; but he makes no mention of the Śābdīvyañjanā either.

It is only when we come to the example (K. P. II,v.12) 'Bhadrātmano duradhiroha etc.' that we have a concrete and precise instance of Śābdīvyañjanā otherwise called - Hemachandra in fact calls it – Śābdī Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā or Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvaniḥ. The verse contains Anekārtha śabdas but, on account of the context (Prakaraṇa), their Abhidhā is restricted to the sense of the Rājā as it is addressed to him. But the words – all double-meaning words – also suggest by means of Abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā other direct senses, which apply to an elephant as well. The ultimate suggested sense of the verse turns out to be that the king resembles an elephant (a case of a Vyaṅgya or suggested Upamā). Thus we gather the following definition of Śābdīvyañjanā – two types of it – from Kārikā 4 cd : (Yasya pratītimādhātuṁ lakṣaṇā samupāsyate) "Phale śabdaikagamyettra

vyañjanānnāparā kriyā" i.e., "With reference to this fruit (for the apprehension of which Lakṣaṇā is resorted to), it is only understood from the (indicative) word alone. And here, i.e., with reference to the motive, there is no other process except suggestion."

Śabdaśaktimūlā Vyañjanā Defined

Hemachandra therefore defines Śabdaśaktimūlā by saying that "When in a sentence, a word in its primary sense yields various meanings but on the strength of different factors such as association (संसर्ग, not संयोग, which means conjunction) etc., other senses are restricted (or rejected), and only two sense remain; the first is the primary sense and the other is called the Suggested sense." The word that has thus two senses and suggests some figure of speech or some inner sense, gives rise to Śabdaśaktimūlavyaṅgya. Similarly, when a word, by its power of indication (Lakṣaṇā) giving rise to an indicated sense (Lakṣyārtha) suggests some figures of speech or some subtle idea after its Lakṣyārtha, that sense is also called Śabdaśaktimūlavyaṅgya.

Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā Vyañjanā

This Śabdaśaktimūla is twofold : one, based on Abhidhā, is called Abhidhāmūla, and the other based on Lakṣaṇā is called Lakṣaṇamūla. Thus Vyañjanā is first divided into Śabdaniṣṭhā and Arthaniṣṭhā and then Sabdaniṣṭhā or Śābdi is sub-divided into Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇamūlā. As Pradīpakāra puts it : "Sā (Vyañjanā) ca dvedhā : śabdaniṣṭhā arthaniṣṭhā ca. Ādyā tu dvedhā : abhidhāmūlā lakṣaṇāmulā ca" (NSP. Ed. pp. 45-46). Here, clearly, Mammaṭa is followed both by Hemachandra and Viśvanātha. Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā both are included under Śābdī or Śabdaśaktimūlāvyañjanā since Lakṣaṇā and Abhidhā are both powers of a word.

Why Divide Vyañjanā into Śābdī and Ārthī ?

Now, one may wonder why Śabda and Artha are conceived of as a distinct when for all practical purposes they are

inseparably connected, i.e., वागर्थाविव संपृक्तौ (Ragu. 1.1.). So, in a sense, it is unreasonable to make Śabda and Artha the basis of two divisions of Vyañjanā. Mammaṭa has quoted the stanza Bhadrātmano etc. to illustrate Ābhidhāmūlāvyañjanā i.e., Dhvanikāvya. A kāvya consists of शब्दार्थौ. If the words in Bhadrātmano are regarded as Vyañjaka, then are the senses not Vyañjaka? If both Śabda and Artha are Vyañjaka then what is the point of dividing Vyañjanā into Śābdī and Ārthī? In 'Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ', the word Gaṅgā is suggestive, but it has a Lakṣyārtha too. Is not that Lakṣyārtha suggestive? Thus here also, one may ask: Why divide Vyañjanā into Śābdī and Ārthī?

Suggestiveness of Word as well as Sense

Mammaṭa replies to this criticism in K. P. II. 20: "Since the word is suggestive when accompanied by the other sense, the other sense also is there considered to be suggestive due to its cooperation with that word in conveying the suggested sense." In other words, a word is said to be suggestive where it is अर्थान्तरयुक्. Arthāntarayuk means Vācyārthayuk in Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā (i.e., Vācyārthaḥ, tena yuk) e.g., Kara in Bhadrātmano is suggestive of Hastiśuṇḍā, but it is so when joined with Vācyārtha, Hasta (Kara). That means Kara suggests the trunk only after it has expressed the sense of Hasta. Thus, here the Vācyārtha (कर) is also suggestive. In the same way, in Lakṣaṇāmūlā Vyañjanā a word is suggestive when it is Arthāntarayuk in the sense of Lakṣyārthayuk; e.g. in Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ, Gaṅgā suggests Śaityapāvanatvādi. But this suggested sense comes about only after the Lakṣyārtha (i.e., Gaṅgātaṭa) is indicated. So the Lakṣyārtha (i.e. Gaṅgātaṭa) is also suggestive. Thus, in Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā, Arthāntara implies Vācyārtha and in Lakṣaṇāmūlā Vyañjanā it signifies Lakṣyārtha. So we can conclude that when a word is Vyañjaka, its Artha – Vācyārtha in Abhidhāmūla and Lakṣyārtha in Lakṣaṇāmūlā-Vyañjanā – is also Vyañjaka. But the point to be noted here is that the Vyañjakatā of Artha is Sahakāritayā (by way of collaboration),

since it is the Śabda that is chiefly suggestive. Hence these two varieties of Vyañjanā are called Śābdī on the dictum: "Prādhānyena vyapadeśā bhavanti". This view of Mammaṭa figures again in K. P. III. 23 where he tells us[42] that when Artha is principally suggestive as in Ārthīvyañjanā, Śabda is also suggestive as a help-mate since Artha, only when conveyed by Śabda, becomes so suggestive.

Vyañjanā Belongs to both Śabda and Artha

It is important to note that, while Abhidha and Lakṣaṇā belong to a word, Vyañjanā belongs both to a word and a sense.

Hemachandra uses Anekārthasya mukhyasya etc., like Mammaṭa, except that while the latter uses Sañyogādyaiḥ, the former uses Sañsargādibhiḥ (perhaps Sañsarga etc., is more correct and faithful to Bhartṛhari's couplet).[43]

What is Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā ?

As we know, in the example Bhadrātmano....etc., double-meaning words like Kara, Vaṁśa, Saindhava etc., possess more than one expressed meaning. When such words occur in literature, circumstances like (Saṁsarga or Saṁyoga) association or conjunction, etc., restrict it to only one sense, rejecting the other senses which it can convey. And this is the only one sense that the word conveys by Abhidhā. But it is very often found that later on we comprehended another of its several direct senses. This other sense, though ordinarily a Vācyārtha of the word in question, cannot at this place be regarded as primary since the word is confined to express one sense, i.e., Vācyārtha, already, and yet it cannot be denied that we apprehend another sense. Now, this sense cannot be due to Abhidhā, because it is restricted to a different sense. Nor can it arise from Lakṣaṇā, since the three pre-requisites of Lakṣaṇā are absent. Hence the conclusion is irresistible that the other sense, a Vācyārtha in reality, is Avācyārtha in the present context, and is no other than Vyañgyārtha; and the process by which it is apprehended is

none other than Suggestion or Vyañjanā. This suggestion is called Abhidhāmūlāvyañjanā – a sub-division of the Śabdaśaktimūlāvyañjanā.

The Problem of Homonyms

Now, two views prevail in connection with double-meaning or multi-meaning words (Anekārtha – Śabdas). The first view holds that an Anekārthaśabda possesses as many expressive powers as its senses and it is due to these multifarious expressive powers that the same word expresses many senses. The second view maintains that there are as many words as there are senses – Yāvantaḥ arthāstāvantaḥ śabdāḥ. Thus the word Kara, meaning 'hand', is a different word from the word Kara which means the trunk or tax. The implication of the second view is that an Anekārtha śabda is impossible, for no word can have more than one sense.

The Restrictive Circumstances

The two couplets (Saṁsargo . . . hetavaḥ) quoted in the Gloss (l. 23 ff). enumerate the circumstances or factors that restrict the expressive power of Anekārthaśabdas and are attributed to Bhartṛhari not only here but everywhere. But the commentator Puṇyarāja says that they contain the views of 'others'. He mentions that Bhartṛhari's view is embodied in the previous couplet, viz., Vākyapadyīya, Kāṇḍa 2, V. 316.

Since a word has many senses and we are at a loss to know which to understand, these 'factors' or circumstances serve to help us cognize one sense from the multifarious senses of the word.

We may note that Hemachandra has defined and explained Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūla Śabdaśaktimūla vyaṅgyārthas in one place. **He, thus, takes Sū. 22 and Sū. 23 together as one topic.** Having defined Śābbī and Ārthī vyañjanā in Sū. 22, he takes up the Śābdī first for discussion in Sū. 23. According to him, there are two kinds of Śabdaśaktimūlavyaṅgya : one is Abhidhāmūla another Lakṣaṇāmūla. These two again

are twofold each: Abhidhāmūla-padadhvani and Abhidhāmūla-vākyadhvani on the one hand, and Lakṣaṇāmūla-padadhvani and Lakṣaṇāmūla-vākyadhvani on the other.

Hemachandra states 'Saṁsargādayaśceme Bhartṛhariṇā proktāḥ' meaning that Bhartṛhari had laid down factors like संसर्ग etc. Actually the 14 circumstances or factors mentioned by name, as also the other factors such as Abhinaya, Apadeśa, Nirdeśa, Sañjñā, Iṅgita, etc., serve as clues that help in deciding the sense of the words. These are Saṁsarga (Saṁyoga), Viprayoga, Sāhacarya, Virodhitā, Artha, Prakaraṇa, Liṅga, Anya-śabdasannidhi, Sāmarthya, Aucitya, Deśa, Kāla, Vyakti (Viśeṣa) and Svara. It will be noticed that Hemachandra gives a more detailed explanation than Mammaṭa of these main (14) and additional 6 (14 + 6 = 20) factors.

Interestingly, Hemachandra refers to Aucitya[44] and notes that Arthaviśeṣapratīti is brought about by Svara in the form of Kāku[45] which is a Svara of a sort as it involves modulation of voice; Kāku in "Mathnāmi Kaurava-śatam samare na kopāt" consists in a change in the voice of Bhīmasena under the influence of an emotion. For, the angry Bhīma poses a question here: "Shall I not kill the hundred Kauravas?" The apparent meaning is that he will not kill the Kauravas; but this sense is to be rejected; for Bhīma is the speaker, and he is possessed by anger which he expresses with the help of the Kāku or intonation and then the sense of the words changes suddenly: "I will definitely and unfailingly destroy all the Kauravas in the battle."

Hemachandra interprets the Ādi in Svarādayaḥ to include six more factors, viz., Abhinaya (gesticulation), Apadeśa or pointing to some person and Nirdeśa is a veiled reference to a person or thing – both involve signs or gestures such as Itaḥ etc. Sañjñā is a sign – shaking the head or nodding approval. Ingitam is also a gesture or movement of a limb to indicate internal feelings. And Ākāra is the facial expression displaying inner feelings. Incidentally, Dr. Raghavan (S. P. p. 708) has

shown that Hemachandra's six additional conditions (Svarādi) like Abhinaya, Apadeśa, etc. with illustrations are reproduced from the Śr. Pr. of Bhoja (Also see 'Studies in Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra' by Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, p. 149).

Thus one or more of these clues definitely restrict the direct meaning (Vācyārtha) of a verse. But even after the expressed sense is grasped by the reader, a deep subtle sense remains hidden behind that direct sense. This is called the Suggested Sense – Kāvyātmā – which is apprehended through the function of Vyañjanā alone and this function is positively different from the expressed sense (Abhidhā) and the indicated sense (Lakṣaṇā). Hemachandra establishes this point by following in the foot-steps of Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa which becomes clear in his discussion of Lakṣaṇāmūlā Śabdaśaktimūlā Vyañjanā.

The Motive Factor in Lakṣanā is Always Suggested

Hemachandra begins by saying that even in a word whose Mukhyārtha is restrained by the incompatibility of the primary sense, the apprehension of the Prayojana (e.g. Śaityapāvanatva in 'Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ') is through the power of Vyañjanā alone. For there is no Saṅketa or convention with reference to the Prayojana viz., Śaityapāvanatva-pratīti, so there is no Abhidhā process involved in it, nor Gauṇī, nor Lakṣaṇā, since the three pre-requisites of the latter do not obtain therein. This is so, because the Gaṅgātaṭa which is the Lakṣya, is not the primary sense of the word nor is it Bādhita or inappropriate as the location of a hamlet, nor is there any connection between the Mukhyārtha (Gaṅgātaṭa) and Lakṣyārtha (Śaityādi), nor, to be sure, is the word Gaṅgātaṭa faltering in yielding its own sense, nor is there a further Prayojana for the existing Śaityapāvanatvādi Prayojana.

Now, granting for the sake of argument that the Prayojana is indicated, but then it will need another Prayojana, and this other Prayojana will require a further Prayojana and it will go

on ad infinitum. This will create a chaotic situation. Thus, while trying to gain a point, you will loose the ground or root and destroy the basis of Lakṣaṇā. As for stating that the indicated sense together with the Prayojana is the subject of Indication, it is untenable. Why ? Because Viṣaya and Prayojana (Mammaṭa's Jñāna and Phala) are poles apart. That is to say, the province of Lakṣaṇā is altogether different from the Prayojana or purpose of a Lakṣaṇā. For example, in direct perception, the Ghaṭa, a pot, is the subject of perception, and its knowledge is its Prayojana : 'Jñānasya viṣayo hyanyat phalamanyad udāhṛtam.' This Prayojana is Arthāvagamana or Prākaṭyam or Saṁvittiḥ– consciousness of the Ghaṭa. It, therefore, stands to reason that another Vyāpāra (Vyañjanā) must be posited and accepted to make up for the incapacity of either Gauṇīvṛtti or Lakṣaṇāvṛtti to yield a Lakṣyārtha (Gaṅgātīra) together with Prayojana (Viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā naiva) and that power is Vyañjana or Vyañjanam.

We may do well to remember that Hemachandra has practically paraphrased and abridged a long disquisition on Vyañjana afforded by the Kāvyaprakāśa (II. 14-18).

Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā : Both Śābdī

It will be seen that the above argument convincingly establishes that the Lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā is as much Śābdī as the Abhidhāmūlā is, and so Hemachandra's definition and explanation of the twofold Śabdaśaktimūla is fully justified.

The Function of Perception

Hemachandra has mentioned the words Arthādhigatiḥ, Prākaṭyam and Saṁvittiḥ in connection with the explication of the Prayojana of the Pratyakṣādipramāṇa. In the Viveka Commentary (p. 66) our author states that, **according to the Naiyāyikas, Arthādhigati or understanding the meaning of an object is the purpose of direct perception. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, it is the revelation of the object and according**

to Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas it is the consciousness or self-consciousness that is the result of a perception. The above remark of Hemachandra occurs in the context of his exposition of the passage which conclusively establishes that in Lakṣaṇā also the Prayojana is Vyaṅgya and that Viśiṣṭalakṣaṇā is not possible; for, Viṣaya and Prayojana or Jñānaviṣaya and its Phala are poles apart : 'Na ca prayojanasahitameva lakṣyaṁ lakṣaṇāyā viṣaya iti vaktuṁ śakyam; viṣayaprayojanayoratyanta-bhedāt." (K. A. S. I. 23, Gloss. p. 66).

Neither Abhidhā Nor Lakṣaṇā can Convey the Prayojana

As we know, Lakṣaṇā is resorted to, to convey a certain Prayojana, viz., Śaityapāvanatvādi in Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ. Now, this prayojana is not known by Lakṣaṇā but by Vyañjanā. More specifically, that Purpose is known from that **word alone** by means of Suggestion. This suggestion is Lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā. We must note that function is Śabdaikagamya or Lākṣaṇikaśabdamātragamya i.e., the Prayojana cannot be understood by another Pramāṇa, i.e., Śabdetarapramāṇa, such as Anumāna and Pratyakṣa. Thus it is clear that neither Abhidhā nor Lakṣaṇā can convey the Prayojana for which Lakṣaṇā is resorted to. In the example गङ्गायां घोषः, the properties of coolness, holiness, etc., cannot be expressed by Abhibhā, since there is no Saṅketa; Lakṣaṇa connot convey the Prayojana, since Lakṣaṇā stops after indicating Gaṅgātaṭa.

Refutation of Dvitīyalakṣaṇāvāda and Viśiṣṭalakṣaṇāvāda

If another Lakṣaṇā is resorted to for **indicating** the Prayojana, then it is unjustified; for, the three causes of Lakṣaṇā are absent here. Thus in the example गङ्गायां घोषः, the properties like coolness, holiness, etc. cannot be indicated even by another Lakṣaṇā; for, we will have to assume a new Prayojana for the existing Prayojana, and this process will go on endlessly. But if we admit Vyañjanā, the Prayojana (coolness, etc.) can be easily apprehended. Besides, disregarding Vyañjanā for a second Lakṣaṇā will lead to disastrous

consequences – Anavasthā. The Dvitīyalakṣaṇāvādin is, therefore, wrong in his persistence. However, there is another view – point, that of the Viśiṣṭalakṣaṇāvādin, who argues that no second Lakṣaṇā is necessary for apprehending the Prayojana in 'Gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ' because the first Lakṣaṇā indicates the Taṭa as **qualified (Tataviśiṣṭa)** by the properties of coolness, holiness etc. Vyañjanā is, therefore, not necessary. In other words, the Viśiṣṭalakṣaṇāvādin holds that the Lakṣyārtha in 'Gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ' is Pāvanatvādidharmayuktatatā. To this it is said that a Lakṣyārtha or an indicated sense (Lakṣaṇīyam) such as Taṭa, qualified (Viśiṣṭa) by (Śaityādi) Prayojana cannot be justified. For, to believe that a Lakṣaṇā indicates a sense qualified by the purpose is improper, i.e., Pāvanatvādiviśiṣṭataṭa cannot be regarded as the Lakṣyārtha. Hence Viś'ṣṭalakṣaṇā is untenable. For the Prayojana, i.e., Pāvanatvādipratipattiḥ is produced by the knowledge of the indicated sense (Lakṣyārthajñāna) i.e., Dharmaviśiṣṭataṭa. Here, it is only when we know the Lakṣyārtha (Pāvanatvādiviśiṣṭataṭa) that we get the cognition of Pāvanatvādi. Thus, the Prayojana, Pāvanatvādipratipatti is Lakṣyārthajñānajanya, which, in short, means Jñānajanya or Janya.

On the other hand, the Prayojana, Pāvanatvādi is Lakṣyārthajñānajanyapratītiviṣayaḥ i.e., the object of the cognition (Pāvanatvapratītiḥ) which is produced by the knowledge of the indicated sense (Lakṣyārthasya pāvanatvādiviśiṣṭataṭasya jñānena janyaḥ). When we know the Lakṣyārtha (Dharmaviśiṣṭataṭa), we get the cognition of those properties. And the object of this cognition is naturally those properties only. So the Prayojana, Pāvanatvādi is Jñāpya. To this, we say : ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्यन्यः, फलमन्यदुदाहृतम् । प्रत्यक्षादेर्नीलादिर्विषयः, फलं तु प्रकटता संवित्तिर्वा ॥ In this statement, Jñāna means Pramāṇa. So, when Jñānasya is paraphrased as Pratyakṣādeḥ, Ādi refers to Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. (Hemachandra uses Viṣaya and Prayojana for jñāna and phala). But we are only concerned with Śabda and not Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Upamāna. Mammaṭa

and Hemachandra, however, deal with the general principle which applies to all four Pramānas, by adducing an example of Pratyakṣa. Now, when we take a word like Ghaṭa we get Ghaṭajñāna. The fruit of this cognition can be understood from two angles, viz., objective and subjective. Objectively, the fruit of the cognition is that the Ghaṭa that we have cognized has Jñātatā or knownness or Prakaṭatā or manifestness. It now differs from other Ghaṭas; for, while this घट is known, the other घट s are not known. Jñātatā or Prakaṭatā, which is thus produced in a thing, when it is known, is a Vastudharma. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas or the followers of Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Subjectively, the fruit of the above cognition is the consciousness in the form of 'Ahaṁ ghaṭam jānāmi' that arises in us when we recognize the Ghaṭa. It is this consciousness in us that distinguishes the known Ghaṭa from others that are not known. This is designated as Saṁvitti or self-consciousness. Saṁvitti is Ātmadharma. This is the view of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas as well as the Naiyāyikas.

In 'Ahaṁ ghaṭaṁ Jānāmi', Jñānaviṣaya is Ghaṭa and Jñanaphala or Prayojana is either Arthādhigatiḥ or Prakaṭatā or Saṁvittih. Here clearly the 'Jñānaviṣaya is different from the Jñānaphala or Prayojana or result. It can also be said that here Viṣaya and Phala are both different from Jñāna. This is the sense that we get from Viṣayaprayojanabheda. This Viśiṣte Lakṣaṇā violates the principle : 'Jñānaviṣayāt Jñānaphala-manyat', so it cannot be admitted. In the sense of Prakaṭatā or Saṁvitti also, Jñānaviṣaya and Jñānaprayojana are not one, and hence Viśiṣṭalakṣaṇā does not stand a chance. Thus Prayojana is apprehended by Vyañjanā only. **This is Lakṣaṇāmūlā Śabdaśaktimūlāvyañjanā - Suggestion based on Indication. This Lakṣaṇā is always Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā.** It is only such a Lakṣaṇā that has a Prayojana to understand which the Lakṣaṇā is resorted to. Wherever Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā is present, Lakṣaṇāmūlāvyañjanā is also present. Wherever it is absent, Lakṣaṇāmūlāvyañjanā is also absent. However,

the Anvyayavyatireka sense is not present in Abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā. For it is common knowledge that Abhidhāmūlāvyañjanā is not present wherever there is Abhidhā. Abhidhā is present in every Vācaka word. But every Vācaka word is not Vyañjaka. We have already seen the special circumstances that give rise to it. This Vyañjanā is called Abhidhāmūlā for two reasons : (a) It comes into operation after Abhidhā has expressed the sense restricted by Saṁsargādi circumstances. (b) It suggests a meaning which is really the Abhidheyārtha or Vācyārtha of the word, but which the word cannot express by means of Abhidhā on account of that Abhidhā having been restricted. It is also noteworthy that of the three functions of a word, Abhidhā is the only independent and self-sufficient function. This means that while Abhidhā can express a sense independently of any other power, we cannot say the same thing about the other two powers, viz., Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā. In fact, Mammaṭa states that even Tātparyavṛtti is a dependent power and that it is different from Vyañjanā (Vide K. P. V. 69 ff.)

The Śābdīvyañjanā is both Abhidhāmūlā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā and in Lakṣaṇāmūlā, the suggestion of the Prayojana take place, when a **word** is employed in a Lākṣaṇika sense; thus it is based upon Lakṣaṇā. In Śābdīvyañjanā, the particular words used are most important, the circumstances constituting the Ārthīvyañjanā may or may not be present; but, it is not stipulated that they must never be present.

Factors that Affect the Ārthīvyañjanā

As for Ārthīvyañjanā, we know that herein the suggestion arises from the **sense** of the words, which causes one to think of something else through the particular character of the speaker, or the person addressed, or the sentence, or the proximity of another person, or the expressed sense, or the occasion (context) or the place or the time, or the modulation of voice or gestures, etc. These words of Mammaṭa are used even by Viśvanātha. As for Kāku, different opinions have been expressed

ınd as Viśvanātha points out, the varieties of Kāku can be gathered from the original Ākara works or Śāstras.[46]

From the point of view of Ānandavardhana's classification of the concept of Dhvani (Dhv. Āl. I. 13 ff; II. 1-3 etc.), it is clear hat the Śabdaśaktimūlā and Arthaśaktimūlā varieties (of which ve have attempted a detailed critical and comparative analysis ıbove – both on the basis of Mammaṭa's and Hemachandra's lefinitions) are the two varieties of the Vivakṣitānyaparavācya – saṁlakṣyakrama variety of Dhvani. This Saṁlakṣyakrama is sometimes divided into Śabdaśaktimūlā, Arthaśaktimūlā and Ubhayaśaktimūlā. For example, Mammaṭa in Kāvyaprakāśa V. 37–38 does so. We know that, whether in a certain instance he suggestion proceeds from the word or from its expressed sense can be checked against the possibility or otherwise of he sense being got at even by changing or substituting the word (Śabdaparivṛttisahatva or Asahatva); if it be found that he suggestion remains unaffected even when we substitute a synonymous word, then it is regarded as based upon the Artha Arthaśaktimūlā), whereas, if the slightest change in the word ılters or affects the Vyaṅgyārtha, then, it is said to be based on Śabda.

The Śabdaśaktimūladhvani is twofold: of Alaṁkāra or of Vastu. If Alaṁkāra is **principally** represented by the word, it is Alaṁkāragataśabdaśaktimūladhvani, and if Vastu is **principally** suggested by the word, it is Vastugataśabdaśaktimūladhvani. Mammaṭa remarks that, though in Alaṁkāragataśabdaśaktyudbhavavyaṅgya, the Alaṁkāra is Vyaṅgya and therefore Pradhāna and so it cannot be an adornment but is the Alaṁkārya – the **thing** to be adorned, but it continues to be called by the name of Alaṁkāra, since formerly it functioned as an Alaṁkāra. Thus, on the basis of the maxim 'Brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāya', we have to understand the term Alaṁkāradhvani.

The Śabdaśaktimūladhvani and Śleṣa: Their Provinces

Incidentally, the Śabdaśaktimūlā variety, which is based on the restriction by several circumstances of the sense of

Anekārthaśabdas (homonyms) needs to be precisely differentiated from the paranomastic expression. i.e., Śleṣa or **double entendre**; for, in both cases, we have homonymous (Anekārtha) words, and the apprehension of more than one sense from these words. So it may be asked, what is the difference ? For, an indiscriminate use of Śabdaśaktimūlā will remove the scope of Śleṣa altogether from poetry. The Dhvanikāra replies to this in Kārikā 21 (Udyota II) : "It is true that in Śabdaśaktimūlā, as in Śleṣa, we have the apprehension of more than one sense. But, in Śabdaśaktimūlā we have also the apprehension of an unexpressed poetic figure or Alaṁkāra as some definite relation like Sādṛśya etc., obtains between the Vācya and the Vyaṅgya senses, in Śleṣa no such relation is noticed. This is the essential difference between the two. In Śleṣa, two or more senses are apprehended but the unexpressed relation that connects the two distinct meanings is not present. Thus, in a verse where Śleṣa is present, the facts will be apprehended only as unrelated to each other, e.g., in the verse – Yena dhvastamanobhavena etc., which applies to Śiva and Viṣṇu at the same time. Hence, Mammaṭa has observed in K. P. IV. 38 that mere Vastu might also be suggested in an example of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani. Again, Ruyyaka or Ruchaka, in his commentary called Kāvyaprakāśasaṁketa criticises Mammaṭa for regarding Vastudhvani as a variety of Śabdaśaktimūla, though the Alaṁkārasarvasva admits Śabdaśkatimūlā vastudhvani.[47] Jagannātha also supports Mammaṭa's two-fold classification of Śabdaśaktimūlā, e.g., Śabdaśaktimūlā-vastudhvani with Śabdaśaktimūlālaṁkāradhvani. Thus, where two senses are understood fron Anekārthaśabdas, one is intended to be hinted at covertly, being not stated, and the other serves as a cover; it is a case of Vastudhvani, the former sense is apprehended through Vyaṅgya and the latter sense through Abhidhā. It is interesting to note that Jagannātha differentiates Śleṣa and Samāsokti, on the one hand, and Śabdaśaktimūlā on the other, quite logically.

In brief, a case of Śabdaśkatimūladhvani occurs where the relation between Prakṛta and Aprakṛta ideas is not expressly

stated. So, if the poet uses words which are Vācaka of that Sambandha, it is not a case of Śabdaśaktimūla. In other words, in Śabdaśaktimūla, the relation must be suggested, and not expressed. Otherwise, it would be an instance of mere Alaṁkāra or witty and striking expressions. This holds true for Rasas also; for, if a certain emotion be properly developed and suggested through Vibhāvādi, and then again **denoted** by words like Śṛṅgāra, Karuṇa, etc., it will detract from the Rasa of the poem.

Hemachandra Illustrates Types of Dhvani

Now Hemachandra illustrates the different types of Dhvani or Vyaṅgya resulting from the different types of Vyañjanāvṛtti. For example, in the verse (58), he explains śabdaśaktimūlavyaṅgya in a Pada (śabda) – 'Sadāgamaḥ'. In the next verse (59), 'Pathia etc.' which means : "O Pathika, the village is full of stones and there is no bed to sleep on; if you wish to stay here, owing to the rainy season, do so" the inner sense is that "the traveller will enjoy the company of the lady throughout the night, since the people there are all dull as stones; he may stay if he wants to stay looking to the buxom breasts of the lady". This inner meaning consists of a Vastu – a bare idea. As the Vyaṅgya arises due to the Bādha (obstruction) of the Vācyārtha, there is no Upameya – Upamānabhāva between the Vācyārtha and Vyaṅgyārtha, hence no Upamā results. The next verse Śaniraśaniśca etc. contains the words Śani and Aśani yielding two senses, so also Udāra and Anudāra have a double-sense; but the suggested sense 'even contraries serve you' is a bare statement – Vastu.

The next verse (61) contains the word Bhīma which means terrible but **suggests** the comparison of Bhīma, the son of Pāṇḍu. This Vyañjanā is based on one word (Pada) 'Bhīma.' Here the king is called 'Bhīma' i.e., Bhīṣaṇa due to his fierce looks. However, in (62) Unnataḥ etc. (quoted in the Dhv. Āl. II), the Vyaṅgya is found in the whole Vākya. The words

Unnataḥ, Prollasaddhāraḥ payodharaḥ, etc. are Śliṣta and yield double senses. Payodharaḥ means Stana and Megha. Prollasaddhāra means Prollasan hāraḥ and Prollasantyaḥ dhārāḥ. The direct sense of this verse is : whom do the breasts of this lady not entice ? But "whom does the rainy season not make uneasy ? is the Vyaṅgyārtha. So, the Upamā (similarity between Stana and Megha) is suggested here, as Hemachandra points out : "Here to make the sentence plausible, the Prakṛta and Aprakṛta are conceived of as Upameya – upamāna and the simile is suggested." It can be seen that here the resemblance is verbal but the Alaṁkāra (Upamā) is to be accepted; otherwise the suggested sense (Vakyārthasyāsambaddhārthatvaṃ mā prasāṅkṣīḥ) will be irrelevent. In a similar instance (63), cited by Mammaṭa to illustrate Ubhayaśaktīmūlāvyaṅgya, Atandra etc., Śyāmā, with its adjective, is **first** understood as a beautiful woman and then as a moonlit night. The suggested figure in this verse is Upamā through Śabdaśakti. However, as Hemachandra observes, by 'Samuddīpita', 'Sānandam', etc., the Artha is also Vyañjaka, yet, since Arthaśakti cannot function without Śabdasakti, only Śabdaśakti is suggestive here. Again, the passage from Bāṇabhaṭṭa's Harṣacarita examplifies Virodhālaṁkāra (as it is cited and explained in the Dhv. Āl. II). Here, Hemachandra calls it by the same name (but Prof. R. B. Athavale prefers 'Virodhābhāsa'). The next verse (65), illustrates Vyatirekālaṁkāradhvani. The word Padaḥ is paranomastic and means (1) the rays of the Sun, and (2) the king's feet, and the whole verse is paranomastic, thus, giving rise to the suggestion that the King's feet are superior to the rays of the Sun. This Vyatireka-vyaṅgya is based on Śleṣa or double entendré, as e.g., in Nakhodbhāsinaḥ. Here Nakha means nails but 'Kha' in 'Nakha' means 'the sky'. This verse is cited in the Dhv. Āl. II also. It may be noted that Ānandavardhana does not at all mention Śabdaśaktimūlavastudvani as a separate category. This is taken by some writers on Poetics to mean the non-existence of Vastu-type of Śabdaśaktimūla.

Verse 60 is intended to illustrate a suggested statement based on Gauṇīlakṣaṇā by means of a wellknown Rāmāyana Verse (2. 16. 13) : Ravisaṁkrāntasaubhāgya etc. The moon is as lack-lustre as a mirror rendered dim by the breath exhaled, i.e., the vapour put out by a breath. Here Andha is not literally taken to mean 'blind', but means 'dim'. This is Gauṇīlakṣaṇā by Mukhyārthabādha and the Prayojana of this function is to suggest extreme pallor, uselessness and other things. Here the Vyaṅgyārtha in based on the word Andha. This verse in also cited in the Dhvanyāloka as an instance of Atyantatiraskṛtavācyadhvani (Dhv. Āl. II. 1 ff).

The next verse (67), the well-known verse from the Bhagavadgītā (2.69) is cited to illustrate how Gauṇīlakṣaṇāmūlāvyañjanā covers the whole Vākya or Śloka. The statement "The Muni wakes throughout the night and sleeps when others are awake etc." is meaningless on the face of it. Therefore, we have to resort to Gauṇīlakṣaṇā to get the sense that "the sages are alive to the universal truths to which the ordinary people are blind". Thus the extraordinary, exceptional nature of a Yogin is suggested here by Gauṇīvṛtti.

The next verse (68) – a well-known example of Dhvani – illustrates Lakṣakaśabdaśaktivyaṅgyaṁ vastu pade or Śabdaśaktimūlāvastu in a Pada based on Lakṣaṇā. Here the speaker of the verse is Rāma himself. So, Rama (the proper noun) in the expression 'Rāmósmi sarvaṁ sahe' does not merely convey the vācya sense of Rāma, i.e., the son of Daśaratha, but Rāma as characterised by such Dharmas as सकलदुःखभाजनत्व, राज्यनिर्वासितत्व, etc.

Now, Hemachandra argues that Rāma will not use the word Rāma for himself. Therefore, with the help of the process of Lakṣaṇā i.e., Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā (Jahatsvārthā), the word Rāma is to be understood as a 'hard-hearted man'; and the suggested प्रयोजन of the Lakṣaṇā is to bring out the agony of his mind, the sense of self-condemnation and similar other attributes

of Rāma. However, this verse is given as an instance of Arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya by Ānandavardhana (Dhv. Āl. II. 1 ff). According to Ānandavardhana, the Vācyārtha of Rāma is **transformed** from a mere Sañjñin to some other sense which includes within its scope the Vācyārtha – 'Rāma' itself as well. But the Dharmas mentioned above are comprehended through व्यञ्जना (suggestion). Hemachandra reproduces a long note on this in his Viveka which is the explanation of this verse as given by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on page 167 in connection with the same verse cited in the Dhvanyāloka (Dhv. Āl. II).

Hemachandra concludes by saying that as the context as well as the words 'रामोऽस्मि सर्वं सहे' render the word राम as merely राम inapplicable and because of राम's connection with कठोरहृदयत्व etc., **indicate** his sufferings and **suggest** his extraordinary anguish, dejection, delusion, etc. (K. A. S Gloss, p. 71, V. 68 ff).

In the next verse (69), we have an instance of Arthaśaktimūlā, suggested sense based on Lakṣaṇā in a sentence. This verse, 'Suvarṇapuṣpāṁ etc.', is cited in the Dhvanyāloka (I. 13 gloss) to illustrate Avivakṣitavācyadhvani or Lakṣaṇāmūladhvani. After refuting the objection of the Abhāvavādins and stating that Dhvani is a fact, not fiction, Ānandavardhana classifies Dhvani into Avivakṣitavācya and Vivakṣitānyaparavācya (I. 13 ff). And the first Avivakṣita is based on Lakṣaṇā or Indication. To illustrate this Avivakṣitavācya Lakṣaṇāmūla-dhvani, Ānandavardhana cites the present verse Suvarṇapuṣpāṁ etc., which means that "only those three – a brave man, a learned man and the parasite, pluck the golden flowers of this earth". Here, the primary sense is incompatible; so the Lakṣaṇāvṛtti is resorted to. As the earth does not have the flowers of gold, so the Mukhyartha of Suvarṇapuṣpāṁ cannot go with Pṛthivīṁ and as such it has to be abandoned in favour of the secondary sense. So also the sense of Cinvanti (to pluck) is inapplicable here. So, realizing the प्रयोजन of the verse, that it wants to

stress that only the brave, the learned and the parasites achieve success in this world, we feel that Lakṣaṇā can very well convey this purpose if Suvarṇapuṣpā is taken to mean 'prosperity' and Cinvanti to mean 'achieving' or 'obtaining' – both of which senses can be connected with the primary sense. Thus the excellence of these three types of men can be suggested. This suggestion is very poetic in that the praiseworthy qualities of the brave etc., are, like the pair of the fully grown breast of a lovely and cultured heroine, precious and only suggested. Here the word is important, and the sense is a help-mate. So here there are all the four Vyāpāras-Abhidhā, Tātparya, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā according to Abhinavagupta and Vyañjanā pervades **this short but fully suggestive verse** (Read Viveka, p. 71).

In order to explain the verse Suvarṇapuṣpām etc., Hemachandra provides a note in the Viveka Commentary, wherein he cites a verse Sihipiccha to explain the principle that words are not enough to sustain a Śābdī Vyañjanā. This verse outwardly means that the wife of a hunter moves about proudly with the peacock's feathers as ear-ornaments in the midst of her cowives who have cosmetics for make-up, made from pearls. This verse is quoted in the Dhvanyāloka (II. 24 ff). **Hemachandra has reproduced Ānandavardhana's gloss on Dhv. Āl. II. 24 in the Viveka** (pages 71–72), by reversing the order and varying it a little.[49] On this verse Abhinava remarks : "The wife has only peacock's feathers for ornament, nothing more to beautify her, and her cowives have pearls to decorate their body. Still she is proudly moving about in their midst ! The suggestion–real–is that the hunter is so engrossed in her love that he finds no time or has no energy left in him to kill elephants etc.; so he kills nearby peacocks and gets their feathers to decorate her. But she is content through love. But when the hunter was in love with the cowives, he did not lose himself and so had time to kill elephants etc. This shows the great good fortune of the heroine" (Locana on Dhv. Āl. II. 24 ff).

Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya Defined

The next Sūtra (I. 24) is devoted to the definition and the exposition of the Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya. This variety of suggestion depends on the force of sense (Arthaśakti), and so it is known as the suggested meaning based on sense. This Arthaśaktimūla lies at the root of the suggestion of Vastu and Alaṁkāra by Vastu and Alaṁkāra, and is present in a Pada or word, a Vākya or sentence and a whole poem or Prabandha. The gloss gives the divisions of the Arthaśaktimūla as follows :

(1) Vastudhvani i.e., the sense consisting of an idea or bare statement suggested by Vastu;
(2) Vastudhvani suggested by an Alaṁkāra;
(3) Alaṁkāradhvani suggested by Vastu;
(4) Alaṁkāradhvani suggested by an Alaṁkara.

Again, each of these four varieties is possible in a Pada or a Vākya or a Prabandha (composition or a whole poem).

Incidentally, we may note that Mammaṭa's classification of Arthaśaktimūla is twelvefold (Kāvyaprakāśa IV 39 bc, 40 & 41 ab). First he divides Arthaśaktimūla into three principal categories : (1) Svataḥsambhavi i.e., one in which the whole sense is natural (2) Kavipraudhoktisiddha i.e., one that is created or established by virtue of the poets' words full of lofty imagination, and (3) Kavinibaddhavaktṛpraudhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīraḥ i.e., one that is created by the words full of lofty imagination of the speaker or character conceived by the poet (Kavinibaddhena vaktrā).

Hemachandra's Criticism of Mammaṭa's Threefold Arthaśaktimūladhvani

In his Vṛtti on I. 24, Hemachandra criticises those who offer a threefold classification of the Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya, by saying that this approach to literary classification is ill-conceived and unreasonable. Hence, this threefold classification should be rejected. For, even a natural idea does not appear

to be charming without the grand utterances of a poet. Therefore, Kavipraudhokti or the grand imagination of a poet is enough to produce a charming suggestion whether in an idea or in a figure of speech. In fact, Kavipraudhokti is an essential prerequisite for any beautiful piece of literature. (K. A. S. I. 24-gloss).

Hemachandra's Treatment of Arthaśaktimūladhvani Compared with Ānandavardhana's and Mammaṭa's

It is also interesting to compare Hemachandra's treatment of Arthaśaktimūladhvani with its exposition as given by Ānandavardhana. In his Dhvanyāloka (II. 22), Ānandavardhana takes up this variety based on material significance (a variety of Saṁlakṣyakrama). Here, the matter (Artha), and not the form (Śabda) is more important than the words expressive of it. Again, in Śabdaśaktimūla Dhvani the change of the double-meaning (Śliṣta) word would be accompanied by the absence of the suggested sense. But in the case of the Arthaśaktimūla-dhvani, a knowledge of Prakaraṇa, Vaktṛ, Boddhavya etc., that is, of the Artha itself, is very essential so as to apprehend the suggested meaning. This is the sense that Mammaṭa conveys in his definition or Ārthīvyañjanā (K. P. III, 21-22).[50] In fact, Mammaṭa earlier had made a clear reference to Ārthī in 'Sarveṣāṁ prāyaśo'rthānāṁ vyañjakatvamapiṣyate'. Thus all the three Arths-Vācya, Lakṣya and Vyaṅgya – can be suggestive. But these three by **themselves** cannot suggest anything. A set of circumstances (वक्तृवैशिष्ट्य, etc.) is laid down to accompany these three to enable them to be suggestive. Hemachandra has enumerated, defined and illustrated these factors (K. A. S. I. 22 ff). This Arthavyāpāra or Ārthīvyañjanā is responsible for arousing a consciousness of a different sense in those who are endowed with poetic susceptibilities or with connoisseurship.[51]

Classification of Arthaśaktimūla Unjustified

In Kārikā 24, Dhvanikāra classifies Arthaśaktimūla – a suggestion based on material significance into three sub-types

according as the Artha (matter) concerned is objectively or realistically or naturally possible : (1) Svataḥsambhavı or invented by the poets' own imaginative faculty, (2) Kavipraudhoktiniṣpanna or again brought into being not by the poets' fancy but by the imagination of a character created by the poet – the poet's creation or (3) Kavinibadhavaktṛpraudhoktiniṣpanna. Mammaṭa, following in the foot-steps of Ānandavardhana, takes for granted the plausibility of this classification (K. P. IV). But Hemachandra contends that this classification is unnecessary and incongruous inasmuch as the three above mentioned varieties have the essential property of being the outcome of poetic fancy common to all of them. Even matters that are objectively real per se cannot find place in a true poetic art if they are not transfigured by the poet's imagination. Māṇikyachandra in his (Kāvyaprakāśa) Saṅketa follows Hemachandra. Jagannāth in his Rasagaṅgādhara criticises the threefold classification, though he recognises the first variety – viz. Svataḥsambhavı. According to him, the two varieties should be really classed under a single head.[52]

Hemachandra's Independent Stand on Division of Arthaśaktimūladhvani

We have seen above that Hemachandra takes an independent stand on the division of Arthaśaktimūla and insists on every sense being full of Praudhokti and hence rejects Mammaṭa's classification. For instance, in the verse Śikhariṇi. . . . . . etc., a lover says, " What kind of penance and austerity this parrot practiced and how long he gets to enjoy the Bimba fruit as red as your lower-lip ?" Here, the idea of austerity and penance on the part of a parrot itself is Praudhokti – a piece of the poet's powerful imagination. For, we cannot find a mountain which can yield such a fruit and there is no penance which can produce such a fruit; hence, it is a matter purely conceived by the imaginative faculty of the poet and it is, therefore, a Praudhokti. The poet does not convey this sense directly, but he makes one of his characters to say this. Thus it is an instance of कविनिबद्धवक्तृप्रौढोक्ति.

This above view of Hemachandra is in the Viveka. This verse is quoted in the Dhv. Āl. too to illustrate the Vivakṣitānyaparavācya – the second main type of Dhvani. The Vivakṣitānyaparavācya is Saṁlakṣyakrama as well as Asaṁlakṣyakrama. And Saṁlakṣyakrama includes Vastu and Alaṁkāra. In this verse, as we know, a lover covertly expresses his intense desire to his beloved. Thus the primary sense here is not incompatible and so it is Abhidhāmūla. Hemachandra quotes from Abhinavagupta's Locana on this from 'Nahi....to vyaṅgyam' (Viveka, p. 73). But in conclusion says : here in the three illustrations – three includes Sihipicchi, Sajjai and Śikharini – it is Prauḍhokti, suggested in the form of an idea, is what is enjoyed. That is how even Svabhāva – objective beauty gives charm when mixed with imagination. This beauty of Svabhāva constitutes the charm in the poetic figure called जाति or स्वभावोक्ति. The poet himself is the creator and speaker of the poem. Hence, what is composed by the poet is of the poet only; the senses and objects of this type (imaginative type) come to be portrayed by the poet; so the Artha should not be described as Svataḥsambhavī or Kavinibaddhavaktṛprauḍhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīra.

Kavipraudhokti Explained

These forthright and immensely significant observations of Hemachandra arise from his review of the threefold classification of Arthaśaktimūla – by such stalwarts such as Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa and others. Just as he has quoted Śikharini etc. and commented on it in connection with Kavinibaddha etc.; he has also explained the concept of Kavipraudhokti in the Viveka (page 72). He says that the expression Kavipraudhokti means the sense which is embodied in a richly imaginative expression of a poet. To illustrate this he cites Sajjei etc. (Verse 141). Now, Ānandavardhana has cited the same verse in Udyota II. 24 ff to illustrate Kavipraudhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīra variety of Arthaśaktimūla and Hemachandra has adopted verbatim the Locana commentary

on it. The verse means : "The season of love, Spring, is preparing arrows of Cupid in the form of new mango trees with feathers of fresh leaves and tips of the blossoms to hit the young damsels, but he has not handed over the same to Cupid." Here, the mere idea is that the Mango tree puts forth blossoms in Spring, but by means of the extremely creative and powerful imagination of the poet, the same idea is put as "The Spring, a sentient being, and a friend of Cupid is sharpening the arrows, but not giving over to him", very ingeniously and suggestively so as to give rise to an increasing feeling of deep and intense love. It is clear that Hemachandra has given the three illustrations – Śikhipiccha, Sajjayati and Śikharini – to demonstrate that poetic genius is the cause of poetry and it is the single most powerful element in the poetic process and literary beauty. Hemachandra clearly bases this view on Dhv. Āl. II. 24-25 as a true follower of आनन्दवर्धन.[53]

The Poet's Imagination is All-Informing

The above exposition of the conception of Arthaśakti as a Vyaṅgya helps us to appreciate and even admire Hemachandra's words in the gloss on the Sūtra (I. 24). He says that the division of Arthaśakti is ill-conceived, for the poets' imagination abides in or informs this all. It is inconceivable that there can be any charm-more especially poetic and suggestive charm in a poem even if a real object is described without a tinge of imagination. Similarly, the suggestion through a character is nothing but the poet's talent which gifts him with imaginatively rich ideas or expressions. So, what is the use of further elaboration ?

Thus Hemachandra does not divide and further sub-divide Arthaśakti as Mammaṭa does to a greater extent and even Ānandavardhana also holds forth on the topic. He, however, gives illustrations of Vastu and Alaṁkāra types of Arthaśaktimūla. Thus in verses 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76 and 77, he illustrates Arthaśaktimūla in its Vastu and Alaṁkāra varieties. Thus verse 70 explains Vastunā Vastudhvani or a mere statement suggesting

another statement. The verse (v. 70) describes how Kāmadeva subjugated the demons. Before the charms of their wives, the demons forgot everything else. Here the **word** Kusumabāna (a delicate weapon) suggests the Charming idea that Kāmadeva can attack people with delicate or subtle weapons. The next verse (71) contains a Vākya in the expressed sense which suggests another statement (Vākya) : "A thing loved alone gives charm to the thing; if one does not love a thing, one does not find any charm in it" or in Bhāravi's words "Vasanti hi premṇi guṇā na vastuni." "The river is the same (Tāpī), the same Tīra is there, I am the same person as before, but I cannot enjoy the place since there is the absence of love in may heart." This verse illustrates Vastunā Vastudhvaniḥ in a Vākya. Verse (72) illustrates Vastunā alaṁkāradhvaniḥ in a Pada; for, here a mere Vastu suggests a figure of speech and the Dhvani is based on the word Dhīrāṇām. The verse means : "Brave men's glances do not find so much charm in the breasts of their beloved as they find in the temples of the elephants of the enemies." Hemachandra says that, here the word Dhīrāṇām suggests a comparison between the breasts of the beloved and the temples of the elephants.[54] The next verse (73) (Putrakṣayendhana etc.) contains Vyatirékālaṁkāra-dhvani suggested by a mere Vastu in Vācyārtha (in a sentence). "Vasiṣṭha, tormented by the fire of grief at the death of his son threw himself into a river." Here, it is suggested that Vasiṣṭha's grief was **more** terrible than the fire; hence the Poetic figure Vyatireka is suggested here. The first is a bare sentence (Vastu in a Vākya) and it suggests the figure Vyatireka. In the next verse (74), God Cupid kisses the face of Madhumāsa-lakṣmī i.e., the beauty of Spring of vernal beauty. Hence Asamarpitampi contains Virodhālaṁkāra in a Vācya sense, and it suggests the idea that if the season of Spring is so intoxicating right now, how, much more intoxicating it will be in future ? So we have Alaṁkāreṇa Vastudhvani in a Pada here. Now Alaṁkāreṇa Vastudhvani in a Vākya is explained in the next verse (75) : "The pride of a damsel vanishes for fear

of being crushed in a close embrace of the lovers." Here the expressed sense of Utprekṣā suggests the Vastu or idea that she cooperated with the lover in embracing closely. Now we have a verse (76) Tava vallabhasya. . . . etc. i.e., "the lower lip of your lover was pale like the petal of a lotus", which conveys the expressed Rūpaka or metaphor, and "you have, it seems, repeatedly kissed him" – this is the suggested sense by way of an Alaṁkāra called Anumāna or Kāvyaliṅga. It is an instance of Pade alaṁkāreṇālaṁkāraḥ. Now Vākye alaṁkāreṇālaṁkāraḥ is illustrated in verse (77) (Sa vaktum etc.) "He only can describe the entire range of virtues of Hayagrīva who can measure with pots the water of an ocean." (Why try to describe Hayagrīva's qualities ? It is impossible to describe them.) Here, the figure Nidarśanā is expressed, and it suggests Ākṣepālaṁkāra. Some of the above verses are also cited in the Dhv. Āl. under similar circumstances, and Hemachandra cites them here with the Locana.

Now the author explicates Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgyavastudhvani in a Prabandha. The example is the same Gṛdhragomāyusaṁvāda cited by Mammaṭa. The speeches given (verses 78, 79 & 80) constitute the Vācyārtha here. Here we have a Prabandha or group of verses on one subject. This passage is from the Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan ch. 152, vv. 11a, 12a, vv. 19 & 65). Here a vulture and a jackal try to outsmart eachother in order that they may get to eat the dead body of a boy. They want to create a situation where no one is present. So the suggested sense is the desire of these two animals to eat the dead body of the boy. It is well to remember that Ānandavardhana gives the example of the whole of the Mahābhārata as an illustration of a suggested sense in a Prabandha.

Hemachandra's Concern with True Aesthetics

In the course of illustrating the different varieties of Arthaśaktimūla sub-type of Dhvani, Hemachandra has made comments of considerable aesthetic significance. We have noted his remarks about the rich poetic imagination lying at the

base of all creation. In this connection on page 74 of the Viveka Vyākhyā he explains the words "Kiṁ prapañcena" used in the gloss by saying that a mere compounding of types and sub-types and multiplication of varieties and examples does not serve the purpose of poetics or literature, but it actually results in delusion and dejection for the student. It may initially dazzle the young pupil but will not equip him to read and enjoy poetry.[55]

In connection with Vastu suggesting Alaṁkāra, Hemachandra gives additional references and illustrations in the Viveka (Page 75). He explains that figures like Upamā etc., are suggested by Vastu or a mere fact. The suggestion of Upamādhvani is illustrated in verse 72 (Dhīrāṇām etc. – see above). He cites Hiayaṭṭhiya etc. in the Viveka (V. 143). This verse is quoted in the Dhv. Āl. (II) as an illustration of Arthāntaranyāsadhvani of the Arthaśaktimūla variety. Hemachandra has adopted the verse as well as Abhinavagupta's comments thereon. The verse means : "You are audacious enough to try to please me, who am not showing the anger hidden deep in the heart, so, O you very intelligent man, I cannot get angry with you, though you are the offender.' Here, the lady says, "I conceal my anger in my heart and show no sign of wrath on the face; yet, O clever one, as you cajole me, I cannot be angry with you, though you have really done harm to me (i.e., offended me)." Here, the general statement that it is impossible to be angry with clever men though they might have caused harm, is got at by the exclusive suggestiveness of the expressed. This verse illustrates the Arthāntaranyāsadhvani. The next verse (144) in the Viveka also is from the Dhv. Āl. with Locana, and illustrates Utprekṣādhvani. Kuntaka cites Candanāsakta etc. as an instance of Pratīyamānotprekṣā (V. J. III, V. 113). Since the particle Iva is not present in this verse, someone may say it is not Utprekṣādhvani but merely Pratīyamānotprekṣā. Ānandvardhana demurs and say that the non-mention of Iva is not a defect here. Because, in cases of Pratīyamānotprekṣā also, Utprekṣā is grasped without Iva. And

he cites two verses to prove this point (see Dhv. Āl. II. 25 ff). Hemachandra has, however, quoted the whole long passage on this point with Locana. The verses 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148 and 149 illustrate – Arthāntaranyāsadhvani (143), Utprekṣā (144), Arthāntara (145) and Utprekṣā (146). The verse Isākalusasya etc.' is cited to show that we get instances of Utprekṣā where words like Iva are not there. The idea is : The full-orbed moon is overjoyed to be similar to the lady's face. The verse Trāsākulaḥ is also meant to drive home the same point. The idea is : The deer is running away, not due to fear of getting hit by the arrows of hunters as usual, but due to the hitting of its eyes (surpassing) by the arrows of the side-long glances of ladies. At this point, Ānandavardhana remarks that "Convention alone is the authority for all such usages of words and senses : शब्दार्थव्यवहारे च प्रसिद्धिरेव प्रमाणम्." Upto this point (Verse 146) Hemachandra follows Ānandavardhana who winds up by saying "In the same way, readers should find out examples of other suggestive figures". Now **Hemachandra looks elsewhere for help** – and he does not need to go far, for, he gets and cites verses and explanations from the Locana of Abhinavagupta for Dīpakadhvani (Verse 147) : 'Mā bhavantam', which means : The tree is blessed to live in the company of the Latā – without hinderance from Anala, Anila, Varuṇa, the axe, Vajra etc. Here Bādhiṣṭa (with Mā) is hidden and so Dīpaka is suggested which makes for a charming and tender meaning. By the by, at this point Abhinavagupta says : "Sarveṣāmevārthālaṁkārāṇāṁ dhvanyamānatā dṛśyate." Then he gives Dīpakadhvani. Next is Aprastutapraśaṁsā in Ḍhunḍhullanto etc.[56] (Viveka V. 517) – another Anyokti. The sense is : "O, bee, you will spend your whole life roaming in the (thorny) Ketakī groves, but you will never find anything like the Mālatī flowers." Here the bee is Prastuta in Vācya. After the Vācya is comprehended, the suggested Aprastuta comes out. Next, Apahnutidhvani is explained in the Locana (Verse 148 in the Vīveka). This is said to be Bhaṭṭendurāja Upādhyāya's verse (in the Locana). The verse is Yatkālāguru etc., and the

idea is that the spot in the moon is Kāmadeva who was rendered dark by staying in the burning hearts of ladies suffering from the pangs of separation from their lovers. Kāmadeva is lying in the moon to make its burning limbs cool. By saying that this is not the spot in the moon but it is Kāmadeva etc., the figure Apahnuti is suggested. This is so because Niṣedha is not Vācya here. So Apahnuti is Vyaṅgya.[57] This verse also contains Sandehadhvani, for, the spot in the orb of the moon is not named but hinted at in Gaurāṅgistanābhogasthānīye candramasi etc., suggesting Sasaṁdeha. There is also Prativastūpamā as Abhinavagupta points out. There is also Hetu and also Sahokti. Also Upameyopamā in Tvatkūcasadṛśaścandraḥ etc. And Abhinava finally observes : "The words of the great poets are indeed inexhaustible sources of poetic wealth." The quotation (23) Helāpi etc., eulogises the mightily gifted and outstanding personalities. It says : "A mere sport on the part of a (mighty) genius produces such a result as is undreamt of or unheard of; whereas a great effort by another fails to produce even an iota of a fruit. Indeed the mere flutter of the hair of the quarter-elephant is sufficient to cause an earthquake; while the poor bee (may shatter itself to pieces) by falling from great height (the sky) but succeeds not in shaking a creeper !" How true !

After adducing verses to prove the various kinds of Alaṁkāradhvani and after reproducing the concluding remarks of Abhinavagupta, strangely, Hemachandra brings up the topic of Vyatirekadhvani and cites a verse (149 in Viveka) from the Dhv. Āl. (II. 27 ff) to illustrate it. Now Vyatirekadhvani is explained in verses Khaṁ yetyujjvalayanti and Raktastvam under Śabdaśaktimūla by Ānandavardhana, but since Vyatireka is Ubhayarūpa – Śabdamūla as well as Arthamūla, the Arthaśaktimūladhvani (Vyatirekālaṁkāra variety) is illustrated under Dhv. Ā. II. 27 ff. Ānandavardhana states that the contrast in Vyatireka between a tree, gnarled and devoid of foliage and a generous as well as kind-hearted man in strained

circumstances is cognised in the wake of the similarity (Sādṛśya) which is first cognized, since, Vyatireka is based on Aupamya. Here the expressed idea is censure of the life of a generous but poor man and the praise of the life of a bare and stunted tree. But it is arrived at by suggesting that a comparison is intended between the tree and the man – both so described and stated, and the latter deserves far more sympathy than the former. Thus, here the contrast is exclusively and finally suggested. Hemachandra winds up by saying (Viveka p. 79) that the other figures may be explained in this manner.[58]

Now on the same page (79) of the Viveka, the topic of Alaṁkārasya vastuvyañjakatvam is brought up. It means that Vastu is suggested by Alaṁkāras like Upamā etc. that are expressed. Here the suggestion of an idea by Virodhālaṁkāra is instanced in Cūtāṅkura etc. which is the verse (74) in the gloss. Suggestion of Vastu by Upamā is illustrated in Śikhariṇi (page 73 – Viveka). Here in the words Tavādharapāṭalaṁ, the word Tava with Upamāsamāsa suggests the Vastu – "I wish I would peck at your nether lip" – this is the desire that is suggested as an idea (Vastu).

The example of Rūpakavācya, giving rise to a Vastuvyaṅgya is presented in verse No. 150 (Viveka). The verse means : "The mighty elephants are like his arm-bolts : laden with the scent of golden lotuses squeezed by them in the Mānasalake (also, laden with the glory of smashing the fond dreams of his enemies) and strong with unimpared abundance of ichor (also gifts)". Here the double 'entendre' (Śleṣa) which assists (Chāyānugrāhī) in the use of the Rūpaka is expressed only and these Alaṁkāras, Śleṣa and Rūpaka – suggest a Vastu, a bare statement. The other instances of the variety called 'Alaṁkārasya vastuvyañjakatvam' should be supplied. Hemachandra explains the above verse (150) by saying : "Here by the Rūpakālaṁkāra in the bolt-form of the arms, the Vastu in the form of Gajāśvādisāmagrī other than Bhujadvaya is suggested".

Other instances of suggestion of Vastu by Alaṁkāra can be adduced, he adds. He also explains Kṣaṇa (Chaṇeti, Viveka p. 79) in verse (74) 'Cūtāṅkura etc.,' by following Abhinavagupta. He says : 'Kṣaṇa means Utsava, festival' and states that the blossoming of the mango tree means 'the spreading of the power of love or intoxication.' So Kāmadeva kissed the face of Vernal beauty without her being given over to him.

After illustrating the Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya in a Prabandha from the Mahābhārata, he states that the suggestiveness of the sense (Ārthīvyañjanā) can be illustrated with verses from the Madhumathanavijaya (Pāñcajanyokti) and with verses regarding the accessories of Cupid in the Viṣamabāṇalīlā of Ānandavardhana. In the Viveka, in connection with the verse 'Līlādaḍha etc.' (151) (i.e., Līlādanṣṭrāgrodvyuḍha etc. cited by Abhinavagupta in the Locana also i.e., "you who lifted the entire earth by the playful gesture of your jaws, how, now, even an ornament of a lotus-stalk weighs you down-causes burden to you?" Hemachandra verbatim reproduces the Dhvanikāra's words (p. 81. Viveka). Here the words of Pāñcajanya (a conch-shell) suggest the desire of Vāsudeva separated from Rukmiṇī.

The above suggested sense develops into the Rasa (Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra). And Humi etc. occurs in the context of the convergence of the accessories of Kāmadeva. The verse means, "I have crossed the limits; I am beyond control or correction; I am indiscriminate; still I cannot really ever forget devotion even in a dream." These words of the youthful ones reveal their respectful or reverential nature. But that develops into the Rasa in hand.

Rasādi Belongs to Arthaśaktimūladhvani

In the last sūtra (I. 25) we have a discussion of the Rasādi type of the अर्थशक्तिमूलव्यङ्ग्य or simply रसादिध्वनि. To begin with, Hemachandra states that poetry which portraits Rasas and Bhāvas; Rasābhāsa and Bhāvābhāsa; Bhāvaśānti, Bhāvodaya,

Bhāvasthiti, Bhāvasandhi and Bhāvaśabalatā – nine in all – provides very good examples of Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya. While the Sūtra (25) mentions Rasādiśca, i.e., Rasādi also (constitute) the Arthaśaktimūladhvani (as pointed out above, this explicitly acknowledges Rasādi as a poetic principle – a central and cardinal principle at that.). He separately enumerates Rasa, Bhāva etc., so as to make it clear that these are always suggested (Vyaṅgya); for they can never condescend to the level of Vācyārtha. In other words, whereas in Vastudhvani and Alaṁkāradhvani the Vācya sense or the Lakṣya sense plays its part, in Rasadhvani, the Vācya sense is totally discarded, that is to say, Rasadhvani is always suggested. The word 'Ca' in the Sūtra, explained in the gloss, is intended to indicate that Rasādi are suggested in a Pada, Vākya and a Prabandha, i.e., in a word, a sentence as well as in a whole poem or poetic composition. We have seen that Rasa etc., are all separately mentioned so as to hint that these are all suggested at all times, and they never even so much as approach direct expression. They can never be explicit. This in its turn shows the supremacy of Rasa, Bhāvas, etc., in poetry. However, as Hemachandra points out in the gloss, Vastu and Alaṁkāra may parttake of an expressed character or can be explicit.

Rasādi is Always Suggested; Never Expressed

Hemachandra lays great emphasis on the fact that Rasadhvani or suggestion of an emotion or mood always surpasses everything that is explicit or matter of fact. It is in this variety alone that the supreme importance of suggestion can be truly realized. There is no emotion that can become delectable without the sole means of suggestion; for Rasa is never denoted by words, but is always developed or prortrayed by means of a proper presentation of Vibhāvas or determinants, Anubhāvas or ensuants and Vyabhicārīs or the accessories or fleeting emotions of that particular Rasa. In a poem, we have a poetic description and in a drama an aesthetic representation of the

Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, leading up to the Rasa. This Rasa is a matter of experience, not of statement. It is impossible, in fact, to experience Rasas like Vīra, Śṛṅgāra etc., in a composition which is totally devoid of the delineation of their respective Vibhāvas etc., though there is only a mention of Vīra, Śṛṅgāra etc. Thus by both Anvaya and Vyatireka – positive and negative concomittance, the conclusion is inescapable that Rasa is portrayed not by its proper name, but by development (Upacaya) through the representation of the appropriate Vibhāvasāmagri i.e., aesthetic situation. Even here, a word of caution is necessary. It should not be supposed, as is done very often, that these Vibhāvas and the other accessories generate or produce Rasa like so many worldly causes, for they only **suggest** Rasa. Thus, Hemachandra emphasises at this point that Rasādi are always suggested and never expressed.

This Rasadhvani is a class by itself because it outshines what is expressed and it occupies the most dominant position in high class poetry. Indeed, this Rasadhvani, as Abhinavagupta repeatedly stresses, is the soul of poetry.[59] Here it may be noted that it is not the personal grief or pain of the poet (Dhv. Ā. I. 5) that develops into a poem which is full of Rasa. For, personal bereavement in life produces tears, not in poems, as we know. Abhinavagupta, therefore, explains that the poet is a sympathetic spectator whose heart is touched and he imaginatively experiences that sorrow in an ideal, impersonal kind of way which results in expansion of his consciousness which is indescribable bliss, pure as well as unique. Thus, "The sorrow of the bird gets transfigured in the vision of the imaginative poet, and the result is a poem. The sentiment of compassion (Karuṇa) has pity for its immediate primary impulse, and the essence of Vālmiki's verse has of course to be sought in the Karuṇarasa that is suggested therein. Of the three varieties of Dhvani mentioned, Rasadhvani alone happens to be the most important."[60] Thus Rasadhvani

is suggestion par excellence, since Rasa, Bhāva, etc., do not admit of direct expression at all; and, in fact, ordinary ideas and figures of speech look much more delectable when they are suggested than when they are merely stated or expressed. Because, Suggestion, by its very nature, almost always outshines and outreaches the primary denotation or explicitness. Again, no good poetry can be devoid of Rasa. Ānandavardhana repeatedly stresses that Rasa is the single most important element in poetry and all the other elements deserve consideration only in so far as they tend to make the process of Rasa-development or delectation of Rasa smooth and easy. It is for this reason that Rasadhvani cannot be conveyed by any other manner except through suggestion. Hemachandra, as a faithful follower of the Rasa-Dhvani theory of Poetry, treats of all the topics of poetics keeping always in view the aesthetic principle of Rasa which is the peak or zenith of the theory of Dhvani.

This Rasa-Dhvani is called a variety of the Asaṁlakṣya-kramadhvani, since Rasa is suggested almost simultaneously with the Vācyārth, though some imperceptible sequence occurs between the two. Thus Rasa can be easily distinguished from other types of Dhvani.

This Rasadhvani or Asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya proceeds not only from words and sentences (like other types of Dhvani, e.g., Vastudhvani, Alaṁkāradhvani etc. of Abhidhāmūla or Lakṣaṇāmūla varieties) but also from letters, modes of arrangement - Saṅghaṭanā, and whole works of poetry - Prabandha (Dhv. Āl. III. 2). Hemachandra cites the verse (81), quoted in Dhv. Āl. (Under III. 4) which here, too, serves the same purpose :

"Tatra arthaśaktimūlo vyaṅgyo rasaḥ pade yathā utkampinī...." etc.

The idea in this verse (उत्कम्पिनी etc.) is that a lovely damsel, trembling with fear, was burnt down by the fire, who was

himself blind-folded by his own smoke. Here the first two lines give an effective word-picture of the frightened heroine Ratnāvali (Act IV) caught in the midst of that fire. In this verse, we are told, the word 'Te' suggests that the eyes of Ratnāvalī, full of charming graces are vividly remembered by the King. This suggests the intense pathos in the poem. Ānandavardhana remarks that the word 'Te' in this verse illustrates how a word may be endowed with a lot of Rasa.

The next verse (82) illustrates how even a Tyādyanta or termination or a padaṁśa can suggest subtle senses. The verse – Mā patham etc. (Mā panthānaṁ rundhi mama apehi etc.) means : "Don't block my way, get away you childish and shameless fellow; we have to guard this vacant house." Here Apehi (a Tyādyanta) suggests 'you are immature since you are betraying our secret (relationship) in the midst of people; (for) you should come to the vacant house'.

The next verse (83) Tālaiḥ etc. illustrates how a Bahuvacana (a part of a word – Padaikadeśa) can be suggestive. The verse is from the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa (2. 16), and shows that the wife of the Yakṣa was adept in various Tālas (timing beats); this word Tālaiḥ, therefore, intensifies the love in separation. Similarly, in the following verse (84) in Likhannāste... the present participle (Likhat) which terminates in (At) and the locative case in Bhūmau are both highly suggestive – Likhan suggests that the repentant hero is still sitting and is bent upon sitting till he is pardoned and Bhūmau suggests that he is totally at a loss. In the same way, in Anyatra vraja bālaka (Annattha vacca V. 85) "Go away, do not see me when I am bathing; this place is not for those who are terrified of their wives." Here Etat sthānam is suggestive of the romantic nature of the place. Again, the taddhita termination 'Ka' (in Jāyābhiru-ka) suggests that the woman utterly condemns the man who is terrified of his own wife and thus for losing the fun of secret love. Similarly in verse 86, Ayamekapade etc. from the Vikramorvaśīya (Act IV. 3) the two 'Ca's

(connetions) show the simultaneity of the two actions of separation of Pururavas from Urvaśī and the on-set of the season of rains. For, even **one** of these two is enough to torment a lover, what to say when both take effect on him! The two 'Ca's here are deeply suggestive. Besides, the word Ramya in Nirātapatraramyaiḥ also intensifies the Uddīpana-vibhāva in the verse. In the next verse Prasnigdhaḥ....(87), cited from the Abhijñānaśākuntala of Kālidāsa (I. 13) the preposition 'Pra' (in Prasnigdhah) suggests the freshness of the Iṅgudī fruits and thus shows the refreshing beauty of the hermitage.

In the next few illustrations, Hemachandra shows (a) how a number of Nipātas and Upasargas come to be employed together so as to suggest a subtle sense (of great admiration (V.88), (b) how several Upasargas together become highly suggestive (V.89), (c) how a verb in the past tense suggests the strength of a character (V. 90), (d) how a crude form of a word (Prakṛtyaṅśa) can suggest rich meaning (V.91) and (e) how a single word like जयति can sggestively convey a charming idea or sentiment.

Interestingly, Hemachandra winds up this topic by observing that he does not consider the suggestiveness of words etc. in the case of Bhāva etc. as very poetic and as such no instances are provided here. As for the suggestiveness of the sentence (Rasātmaka vākya), Hemachandra proposes to illustrate it with charming as well as concrete instances in the next chapter on the Theory of Rasa. For, the suggestion of Rasa, founded on meaning, is clearly evidenced in Literary Works such as Dramas and others. As for letters and styles of compositions, they directly **suggest** poetic excellences like Mādhurya etc. and thus, through them, they become relevant to Rasa. These elements, therefore, will be dealt with in the fourth chapter on Guṇas.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 3

While Rasa has already been introduced as a principal poetic element in the first Chapter, the complete theory and practice of Rasa, in consorance with the unbroken aesthetic tradition which regarded Rasa as the most important aspect of Poetry is now taken up by Hemachandra for a fuller treatment in Chapter Two of the Kāvyānuśāsana.

The Starting Point of the Rasa Theory

The starting point of the theoretical discussion on Rasa in Indian Poetics is the famous Rasa-Sutra of the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni :

" Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ."

In general terms, this Sūtra states that Rasa or aesthetic emotion is enjoyed as a result of the proper blending together and operation of the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Sañcāribhāvas or the Vyabhicāribhāvas.

Analysis of the Keywords in the Rasasūtra

The key words in this Sūtra are Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva, Saṁyoga, Rasa and Niṣpattiḥ. In order to

understand the whole concept of Rasa, it is necessary to have a precise idea of the above words or concepts.

The word Vibhāva represents the twofold objective condition necessary to arouse any emotion and involving the Alambana-vibhāva which means the **person or persons** with reference to whom the emotion is manifested and the Uddīpana-vibhāya which refers to the circumstances that excite the emotion. To take an example from Kālidāsa's Abhijñānaśākuntala, the King Duṣyanta feels attracted towards Śakuntalā because the setting and the situation of the hermitage of Kaṇva in which he meets her are favourable. Here Śakuntalā is the Ālambana-vibhāva of the feeling of love arising in the mind of the King Duṣyanta, and the cooperative circumstances of their meeting accompanied by the beautiful surroundings of the hermitage which excite that feeling constitute the Uddīpanavibhāva.

The term Anubhāva means the bodily expression of the emotion. Thus the side-long glances of Śakuntalā as also her peculiar behaviour under the influence of the feeling of love, etc. are regarded as Anubhāva.

Finally, the Vyabhicāribhāvas are a series of diverse, fleeting emotions or feelings such as anxiety, doubt, disappointment, elation, etc., that affect the mind of the person in love and feed the dominant emotion. These emotions are fleeting and unsteady by nature as they pass in quick succession, and may all at the same time aid the development of that same emotion.

The Psychology of Rasa

'Saṁyoga' and 'Rasaniṣpatti' are the other two 'keywords' appearing in the Rasa-Sūtra and it may be noted that it is in the interpretation of these two terms that a divergence of views has prevailed. Thus opions of aestheticians have been sharply divided and heated debates have taken place with reference to the precise aesthetic significance of the two terms:

'Saṁyoga' and 'Niṣpatti'.[61] Roughly stated, the word Saṁyoga means 'Conjunction' and the expression Rasa-niṣpatti means 'manifestation of Rasa or completion of Rasa'. But, with a view to realizing the precise aesthetic significance of these two terms, it is absolutely necessary to understand the basic assumption of the theory of aesthetic emotion or Rása. Even a cursory glance at the Rasa theory shows that a notion regarding permanent and dormant primary emotions residing in us lies at the base of the theory of Rasa. In terms of modern, western psychology, the human personality, both from the point of view of motivation as well as cognition, is made up of some basic emotions, often termed as permanent, dormant moods which lie deep in our being. These basic emotions or moods are the amorous, the ludicrous, the pathetic, the heroic, the passionate, the fearful, the nauseating and the wondrous. These emtions are found to be present in all human beings in a permanent manner and are, therefore, referred to as dominant moods or Sthāyibhāvas. It is these Sthāyibhāvas that determine the particular internal moods or temperaments and hence they are considered to be the dominant characteristics of the different emotional states. These emotional states of the amorous, the heroic, the pathetic and the others, exhibit in their expressions the composition of diverse, fleeting sentiments constantly passing and changing and thereby producing the appearance of the permanent and single whole of a Rasa; the diverse fleeting emotions that keep passing and changing give expression to the permanent emotion or sentiment of love or hatred, heroism or anger. This psychological explanation serves the limited purpose of clarifying the basic conception of the permanent moods which develop into Rasa. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that an emotion must be properly and aesthetically developed to be called a Rasa. Mere emotions are not Rasa, but the aesthetically stimulated and developed mental state or emotion is Rasa, or Sentiment. Thus, falling in love or getting angry with someone in our day-to-day life is not **Rasa,** but an

ordinary (Laukika) emotion. Thus Rasa is to be distinguished from the common, worldly emotions, as it is an emotion developed by a set of artistic stimulii or circumstances or situations.

The Interpretation of the Rasasūtra : Major Theories

Reverting to the Rasa-Sūtra, we find that the Sūtra deals with Rasa, which is a dominant mood roused and developed by means of artistic stimulii. But the question that arises now is how or in what manner do the artistic stimulii operate in arousing the dominant emotions or Sthāyibhāvas ?

In regard to this question, several different theories of Rasa have been put forward; chief among these being the theories of eminent aesthetic thinkers like Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and finally of Abhinavagupta. These different theories are nothing but commentaries on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata in general and on the Rasasūtra in particular. Thus, Lollaṭa interprets the Rasasūtra and comes to the conclusion that Rasa is 'produced', and Śaṅkuka holds that Rasa is 'inferred', while Bhaṭṭanāyaka regards Rasa 'as enjoyed by a process of universalization' and finally Abhinavagupta elaborates on them and declares that **'Rasa is suggested'**.

Bharata's Conception of Rasa

As the idea or concept of Rasa is defined and explained in the sixth Chapter of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, it is necessary that we first try to understand Bharata's exposition of this complex idea and then try to understand what the theorists have said about Rasa and its realization in Literature.

Rasa and Bhāva

Now, as we open the sixth chapter, we have the vital questions : (1) So far as Rasa in a play is concerned, tell us wherein lies the essence (Rasatvam) of these Rasas ? (2) What are the Bhāvas (emotions) and what do they create (Bhāvayanti) ?[62]

In the words of Abhinavagupta, the first question is : 'रसानां केन रसत्वमित्येकः प्रश्नः ।'

And the second question regarding Bhāvas is : 'रससहभावेन भावाः केचन प्रोक्ताः...ते च केन प्रकारेणोक्ताः...तत्रापि भवन्तीति व्युत्पत्तिर्भावयन्तीति किमेत्, किमुत्पादयन्ति ।'

Abhinava does not, however, regard these questions as something novel. He opines that the enquiry assumes importance because of the great importance of Rasas as well as Bhāvas. He says that as the Rasa is most desirable, the enquiry is made. But the next four questions relate to Bhāvas as they were not mentioned heretofore. The etymology of the word Bhāvaḥ can be given as Bhavantiti bhāvaḥ or Bhāvayantiti bhāvaḥ – which, then, is meant here ? Do they 'make' or 'pervade' ? In short, what is their function? These constitute the five questions in Abhinavagupta's view based on the words ca, vā and api used in the text. Abhinavagupta takes both the etymologies of the word Bhāva as acceptable.

No Rasa, No Drama

And when Bharata takes up the question of Rasa, he declares that without Rasa, no topic of drama can ever appeal to the mind of the spectator. In terms of Poetics, it means, there can be no true or real poetry totally devoid of Rasa. This Rasa comes from a combination of the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas. To illustrate the nature or concept of Rasa, Bharata takes the analogy or example of Rasa in real life. Just as flavour (रस) comes from a combination of many spices, herbs and other substances (द्रव्यs), so Rasa (in a drama) comes from the combination of many Bhāvas. For example, just as beverages or soups such as षाड्व (six-substance drinks or six-flavoured drinks) are created (Nivartante) from substances like molasses, spices (Vyañjanas) and herbs (Oṣadhi), the permanent or dominant emotions attain the status of Rasa when they are accompained (Upagata) by the various bhāvas. Now as to the question : Why is it

called Rasa? The reply is: It is called Rasa because it can be savoured (Āsvādyatvāt). How does one savour a Rasa? As gourmets (men of taste) are able to savour the flavour of food prepared with many spices, and attain pleasure etc., so sensitive spectators (Sumanasaḥ), savour the primary emotions, suggested (Abhivyañjita) by the presentation or enactment of the Bhāvas and presented with the appropriate modulations of the voice, movements of the body and display of involuntary reactions, and attain pleasure and so forth. Therefore, they are called Nāṭyarasāḥ (dramatic flavours). Then he quotes the two Ānuvaṁśya verses (N. S. VI. 35-36) which mean: "As gourmets savour food prepared with many tasty ingradients (Dravyas) and many spices, so sensitive people enjoy in their minds the permanent emotions presented with different kinds of the acting or representation of (transient) emotions (and the presentation of their causes). This is why they all (i.e., the Bhāvas) are known as Nāṭyarasāḥ."

Mutual Relation between Rasa and Bhāva

In relation to the question as to whether Bhāvas come from Rasas or Rasas emanate from Bhāvas, Bharata states: "Some people hold that they arise from their relation of mutual dependence, but this is not true. The reason is that we actually find that Rasas proceed from the Bhāvas and not the other way around." Bharata's verses bearing on this point state that (1) those who stage dramas should know that the Bhāvas are so called because they give rise to (Bhāvayanti) Rasas that are related to the different kinds of acting. As a spicy flavour is created from many **dravyas,** so the Bhāvas alongwith various types of acting create Rasas. (In literature) there is no Rasa without Bhāva, nor any Bhāva without Rasa. Their realization in gesture is dependent upon their relation of mutural dependence. As a combination of herbs and species will bring (Nayet) food to tastiness (Svādutām), in the same way Bhāvas and Rasas create (Bhāvayanti) each other. As a tree arises from a seed, and from the tree a flower and fruit,

so all the Rasas are the roots, and on them are founded the Bhāvas.

"Evamete sthāyibhāvāḥ rasasamjñāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ" (N. S. VI. 42 ff).

Bharata's Idea of Rasa-Development

Then Bharata explains how **Rasa** is developed : "We will bring the dominant emotions to the status of Rasas". To achieve this objective of showing how a dominant emotion attains to the position of Rasa, Bharata first assigns the eight permanent primary emotions to the respective Rasas, and then explains in detail the nature and the apparatus of the eight different Rasas in a very subtle, psychological way.[63]

Hemachandra's High Sense of Priority

When we read the second chapter of the Kāvyānuśāsana, we find that Hemachandra has accorded a very important position to Rasa by devoting a whole chapter to the thread-bare as well as an in-depth discussion of the all-important concept of Rasa. Indeed it speaks volumes about Hemachandra's high sense of priority that he should not only elaborate on what Bharata has said in the sixth and the seventh chapters (as also elsewhere) on Rasa, Bhāva, etc., – in short, on the question of the Aesthetic Experience, but that he should also try to present the entire discussion of the Rasa-problem by reproducing long passages from the Abhinavabhāratī relating to the four main theories of Rasa, thus enabling the student to know the pros and cons of the entire theory of Rasa. Besides, the second chapter in which this Rasa-theory is comprehensively treated, contains the largest number of Sūtras (fifty nine) in the Kāvyānuśāsana.

The Process of Rasa-realization in a Nutshell

Hemachandra presents the idea of Rasa in a nutshell (II. 26) by saying that Rasa is a dominant mood (Sthāyibhāva) developed fully and suggested (Abhivyaktaḥ) by means of

Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas. We have already seen in the last Sūtra of the first chapter (Sūtra No. 25 : Rasādis' ca) that Rasa, Bhāva etc. are always suggested, they are never directly expressed. The Sthāyibhāvas are eight and there are eight Rasas corresponding to them. These Sthāyibhāvas are in-born primary emotions, lying in a dormant state in every human being, but when they finds determinants such as women etc., and garden etc., to enhance and intensify them they becomes fully developed and attain to the position of Rasa.

The Vibhāvas as Excitants

Thus the Vibhāvas help the development of the Sthāyibhāva. Between the two Vibhāvas, the Ālambanavibhāva prompts the emotion to action or activates it, and forms a field of that emotion; a beautiful young woman, thus, becomes an Ālambana (support) Vibhāva of the emotion of love (Rati) born in the mind of a young man. This emotion of Rati is surely intensified by the favourableness of circumstances such as a lovely, secluded place, a proper time and things like that. This is the Uddīpanavibhāva which inflammates the emotion of love. Now, in the course of the development of this love, several (33 in all) momentary or transitory fleeting emotions such as anxiety, yearning, disappointment appear and disppear, ultimately helping the progress of the development of the Sthāyibhāva of love until it becomes a full-fledged Rasa, exactly as small flickering flames go to produce a big, whole flame. Since these thirty three emotions or feelings are momentary or short-lived, they are called unsteady i.e., Vyabhicārins or fleeting or momentary states i.e. the Sañcāribhāvas. These Bhāvas are, by and large, fixed for a definite Rasa, although sometimes they are common to many Rasas.

How Rasas become Known : Anubhāvas or Consequents

Now the question is how these Rasas become known, because Rasa being internal emotions cannot be directly known. So, we are told that when these Rasas are fully developed,

they are expressed by certain gestures, or they are acted out. These are called Anubhāvas. A man in love exhibits certain characteristic gestures such as languid gait, vacant gaze, etc. These Anubhāvas are found described in poetry. For instance, the words Gamanamalasaṁ śūnyā dṛṣṭih śarīramasauṣṭhavaṁ etc. in the verse of Bhavabhūti appearing in his Mālatīmādhava play. It is in this way that a Sthāyibhāva fully developed by means of Vibhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, and indicated by Anubhāvas or acting, is styled a Rasa. This Rasa is enjoyed or experienced by a man of taste, a connoisseur of art.[64]

The Character of the Aesthetic Experience

In the gloss (II. 26 ff), Hemachandra explains (1) how a Rasa is developed, and (2) What the character of an aesthetic experience is or how the Rasa is enjoyed and by whom. It may be mentioned here that Hemachandra's explanation of Rasa-experience given in the gloss is nothing but **a faithful** abridgement of the view of Abhinavagupta on Rasa as presented in the fourth Chapter[65] of Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (IV 28 ff). The paragraph means : "Rasa is the permanent mood or primary emotion such as love etc. developed by means of Vibhāvas. Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas. This Rasa is of the nature of an experience consisting of enjoyment of it both by the poet and the connoissour with eyes closed since it resembles the experience of the bliss of realizing the highest principle due to the fact of its power of causing an extraordinary, supreme joy. The aesthetic experience or Rasānubhava lasts only so long as the exciting, ensuing and the fleeting emotions last and consists chiefly of relishing by the responsive mind alone being made fit for enjoyment by the process of Universalization. The Sthāyibhāva is a specific emotion which is always present in a primary or instinctive form in the mind of such spectators (Sāmājikas) as are proficient in the art of experiencing poetic relish or emotion and it becomes distinctly manifested by such agencies as those of women etc., and garden etc., well-known in Literature and Drama – which agencies are Bhāvas by means of which

the internal workings of minds such as Sthāyin, Vyabhicārin accompained by the fourfold acting, can be specifically known – and by means of ensuants or effects or acting such as side-long glances, throwing up of the hands, which enable the spectator to cognize and realise in a concrete way the special emotional states having the characteristics of permanent and transient emotions and by means of the transitory emotions such as patience, memory, etc., called causes, effects and auxiliaries in the real world (but called by these names in poetry and drama by reason of their being endowed with the faculty of exciting and so forth; on this account called Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas) – these Vibhāvas are recognized in their universalized form, not showing any restriction due to either the affirmation or negation of any of those specific relations that are involved in such conceptions as 'this is mine' or 'this is my enemy's' or 'this is not mine' or 'this is not my enemy's' – and, even though the said emotion actually subsists in the particular spectator himself, still by virtue of the generalized form in which it is presented, the spectator loses his separate individuality and has his consciousness merged in the Universal; and since the spectator represents the mental condition of all men of poetic sensibility, he apprehends the bliss of the emotion. Though this emotion is enjoyed in a highly universalized form, it has no existence apart from its apprehension."

Rasāsvāda : The Source of Transcendent Charm

This is Rasa, and thus is it realized. When the spectator enjoys it, Abhinavagupta adds that "It is relished in the same manner as a mixed beverage; and whed it is enjoyed, it appears as if it is vibrating before our eyes, as if it is entering the innermost recesses of the heart, embracing and pervading our whole body and eclipsing everything else." Obviously, "this is the rapturous bliss of Brahman and the emotion thus manifested becomes the source of transcendant charm and is spoken of as Rasa."

The Extra-ordinary Nature of Rasa-Experience

Hemachandra explains (basing his argument on Mammaṭa's passage, reproduced here in part) that this Rasa is not an effect, i.e., something produced (Utpādita) by Vibhāva etc., for, if it were an effect, it would continue to exist even after these excitants and the rest cease to exist. For example, the Ghaṭa being Kārya, continues to exist even after the destruction of the Kulāladaṇḍa and other causes that operated to produce it. But this is not happening in the Rasa-experience, since Rasa lasts so long as the Vibhāvādi continue to exist. Again, Rasa is not something to be made known (ज्ञाप्य) by the Vibhāvādi, as it is never an accomplished entity like a Ghaṭa, Paṭa, etc., In actual fact, it is only manifested or suggested by the Vibhāvādi and is something to be relished. It may be asked : Is there anything that exists and is still neither produced nor made known ? The reply is : nothing is seen to exist like Rasa which is neither Kārya nor Jñāpya; but it is true that what occurs in the Rasa-experience is not seen anywhere else because it shows the transcendental or extraordinary nature of Rasa and it does not vitiate but confirms this nature of Rasa. It may be said to be an effect by reason of its being accomplished by relishing it; and it may be regarded as known or cognized in the sense that it forms the object of a super-physical consciousness (स्वसंवेदनगोचरः) which differs from perception etc. (ordinary forms of cognition) and from the cognition of the imperfect yogin, which is independent of the ordinary means of cognition and also from the cognition of the perfect yogin, which is self-centered and free from all touch of any other cognisable thing. The Pramāṇa that apprehends it is not of the Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) kind, since in Rasa-realization there is a due recognition of the Vibhāvādi as important elements of it, nor is it Savikalpaka or of the determinate type, since it is merely relished as an extraordinary bliss and depends wholly on its own realization (which is not true of Savikalpakajñāna). Here also the fact that

it is neither of the two – उभयाभावरूप (i.e., निर्विकल्पक or सविकल्पक)— and still it is उभयात्मक i.e., partakes the nature of both, confirms that its character is extraordinary or transcendental; it does not vitiate this nature of Rasa.

The Difficulty of Particular Assignment of Vibhāvādi

Now Hemachandra explains (on the basis of the Kāvyaprakāśa IV) the different Vibhāvas etc. We must note that the excitants (Vibhāvas), the ensuants (Anubhāvas) and the accessories (Vyabhicāribhāvas) are spoken of in the Rasasūtra in a general way because, as a rule, they are not related specifically to any other particular Rasa. Thus, for instance, the Tiger is the Vibhāva of the Bhayānakarasa as also of the Vīra, the Adbhuta and Raudra; the Aśrupāta etc., are the expressions or representation as well of the Karuṇa as of the Śṛṅgāra and Bhayānaka; similarly Cintā etc., are the Vyabhicārins of the Karuṇa, Śṛṅgāra, Vīra and Bhayānakarasa. So particular assignment is difficult. So Hemachandra sets forth concrete examples[66] of (1) the Vibhāvas only, (2) the Anubhāvas only, and (3) the Vyabhicārins only.

The Theories about the Rasa-Experience

It has been hinted at above that there are various theories regarding the enjoyment of Rasa. Of these theories, Abhinavagupta puts forward four theories, including his own. In connection with the interpretation of the Rasasūtra of Bharata, while commenting on it, Abhinavagupta, who was a champion of the theories of Rasa and Dhvani, first introduces the three different views of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śhrī Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka on **Rasaniṣpatti** or on how and where Rasa makes its appearance by way of preliminaries, which incidentally represent a gradual development of this Rasa-theory, finally culminating in the up-dated version of Abhinavagupta. In actual fact, Hemachandra has summarized the views of Abhinavagupta about Rasaniṣpatti in his gloss on the first Sūtra of Chapter II,

as given in the Kāvyaprakāśa. But, in order to present the Rasa-theory in full, he reproduces in the Viveka commentary the complete text of the Abhinavabhāratī, a commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra by Abhinavagupta, insofar as it relates to the Rasasūtra in Chapter Six of the Nāṭyaśāstra wherein the four Major views along with some other incidental opinions are fully presented. Thus due credit must be given to Hemachandra who very faithfully reproduces the relevant portion from the Abhinavabhāratī text, unlike Mammaṭa who recapitulates the well-known theories in the form of critical summaries.

The Abhinavabhāratī - A Great Work on Art

Hemachandra's reproduction of the relevant portion – relating to the Rasasūtra – involves the above mentioned four views in the main. This portion presented (in the viveka) on page numbers 89 to 103 is taken from the Abhinavabhāratī which, along with the Locana constitutes the two learned commentaries written by Abhinavagupta with a view to explain the texts of the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana and the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata respectively. These two works are "masterpieces of the Indian theory of aesthetics and are considered to be the best works on Art of all times and places, both for their erudition, depth, terseness and dignity of style as well as for the lasting value of the profound views expounded in them." These two works make Abhinavagupta (990–1015 AD) not only one of the greatest authorities on art but, according to J. L. Masson and M. V. Patawardhan, the greatest original writer on Aesthetics, since the works are astoundingly original. Abhinavagupta's Locana preceded the Abhinavabhāratī, and hence it forms the bed-rock of the theories of Rasa and Dhvani, and it furnishes us with truly profound insights into the many intricate problems of the theories of Rasa and Dhvani formulated by Ānandavardhana.[67]

Hemachandra Introduces Important Views on रसास्वाद

After explaining Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas on page 88 of Viveka in terms of Bharata's couplets (Nāṭyaśāstra VII. 4 &

VII. 5), which means that Vibhāvas are so-called because they help make concrete meanings consisting of acting in the form of speech and body and Anubhāvas are so-called because by means of them the meaning of a drama or work of art is rendered concrete with acting through speech and body, and it is possessed of Abhinaya of three types. Hemachandra mentions the Rasasūtra and reproduces the entire Rasa-portion from the Abhinavabhārati as set out and interpreted by Abhinavagupta.[68] We must remember that Abhinavagupta himself wants to thrash out the problem of Rasa and hence he records and explains the views of others first, not only by way of prima facie views (Pūrvapakṣa) so as to comply with the vogue of the Sanskrit theorists, but also because the views are important and representative of the chief schools of interpretation of Rasa in vogue before his attempts to unravel and finally settle the issue of Rasa-experience in his own masterly way.

So far as the divergent views on the interpretation of the Rasa-sūtra of Bharatamuni are concerned, we know that Jagannātha has recorded **twelve** such views while Abhinavagupta has **discussed** in his Locana commentary some of his predecessors' views in detail and **only recorded** some other views (Vide Locana on Dhv. Ā. II. 4). However, it is well-known that besides Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, Daṇḍin, too, has contributed to the discussion on Rasa and, in fact, Abhinavagupta has cited his views. Further, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the great master of Abhinavagupta and the renowned author of the lost masterpiece Kāvyakautuka, also helped improve the Rasa-theory by offering critical comments on Śaṅkuka's views.

The Rasa – Theories in the Abhinavabhāratī

It is interesting to attempt a faithful resumé of the different views presented on the aesthetic experience by way of the interpretation of the Rasasūtras by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta along with Hemachandra's illuminating comments.

Lollaṭa's Theory of Rasa

The Rasasūtra has been explained by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa like this : "The birth of Rasa arises out of the combination of the Sthāyin i.e., the permanent emotions (not mentioned in the Sūtra) with the Vibhāvas etc. Specifically, the विभावs or the determinants are the cause of the birth of the mental state which constitutes the Sthāyin. The consequents are not meant (in the Sūtra) to be those that arise from the Rasas; since they cannot be termed as the cause of Rasa; but, on the contrary, they are the consequents (Anubhāvāḥ) of the Bhāvas or emotions in the mind only. And, as for the transitory emotions or moods, although they cannot exist side by side with the Sthāyin, yet, the Sthāyin is not absent, for, it is in the form of a latent impression (Vāsanātmatā iha tasya vivakṣitā). So, Rasa is simply a permanent emotion (or Sthāyin only), intensified (Upacita or Puṣṭa or Paripoṣagata) by the विभावs, the अनुभावs, etc. But, in an unintensified state it is only a Sthāyin. This state is present both in the person represented (Anukārya, i.e., Rāma) and in the actor (Anukartā i.e., Naṭa) by reason of the power of realization (Anusandhānabalāt). Daṇḍin, for instance, in his verse Ratiḥ Śṛṅgāratāṁ etc. (K. Ā. II 281), while dealing with Alaṁkāras, says that, "In association with a number of other elements, the feeling of Rati or love is transformed into the Erotic Sentiment (Rasa)" and "on reaching its peak, the feeling of anger is transformed into the Furious Rasa."

Here Hemachandra remarks by way of a summary. He says : "The idea is : Rasa is the permanent mental state or emotion called Sthāyin, which when produced by the विभावs, rendered cognisable by the अनुभावs and intensified by the transitory moods or सञ्चारिभावs is apprehended (Pratīyamānaḥ) chiefly in Rāma, the original character reproduced or represented, and then in the actor (Anukartā) by virtue of the power of realization through acting (Tadrūpatā) or identification of the actor with the character."

Śaṅkuka Controverts Lollaṭa's and Daṇḍin's View

This view is not sound, says Śrī Śaṅkuka

1. For, without the Vibhāvādi, the Sthāyin i.e., the permanent mental state or emotion cannot be known. Way ? Because the characteristic signs (Avagamaka) or the logical reasons (Liṅgas) by which cognition is rendered possible, as the fire within a mountain, could not be known, were there no smoke.

2. Besides, Bharata would have explained the nature and scope of the Sthāyin first and the Rasas only afterwards, if he had believed that the Sthāyin becomes Rasa through a combination with Vibhāvas which produce them, the Anubhāvas which exhibit them or manifest them and the Vyabhicārins which intensify them. But he has not done so. On the contrary, he has laid down the nature and scope of Rasa at the outset ! Moreover, why has he mentioned the same Vibhāvādi with the Sthāyin after describing them about the Rasas already ? The sage indeed, at every step, is going to proclaim when dealing with the Rasa : 'Atha vīro nāma etc.'[69] And again, while describing the Sthāyin he says : Utsāho nāma etc. Dynamic energy means Noble Nature. This is given rise to by lack of grief, energy, endurance, bravery, selflessness, etc. It is acted out by Anubhāvas such as Dhairya, Tyāga, Ārambha, Vaiśāradya etc. Hence, Rasa and Sthāyin are not different in meaning or essence. However, the Vibhāvas[70] are extensively dealt with in the definition of Rasa, while in the context of Bhāva, they are only scantily treated of.

The point sought to be made here is : if it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa, why is it that Bharata first dealt with Rasa (Nāṭyaśāstra Chapter-VI) and afterwards (Chapter-VII) with the mental states ? Again, if, as Lollaṭa claims, Rasa is no more than an intensified permanent mental state, why should Bharata have explained the Vibhāvas of the mental state twice over, once in connection with it in its non-intensified state (Chapter-VII)

and once again in connection with it in its intensified state (Chapter-VI)?

Lollaṭa's Explanation is Illogical

Clearly, it is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its rising state and once when it has reached its full development (Na cotpattau etc., Viveka p. 90). This is futile. Thus, if, as Lollaṭa claims, Rasa is nothing but a feeling intensified, then, as intensity can be of many degrees, so there will be different grades in the Rasa realized. Again, if it is argued that only when the utmost intensity is reached, Rasa is then realized, in that event, the division of the Comic Rasa into six varieties, given by Bharata (Chapter-VI) would be wrong. The six-fold comic Rasa is: Smita-slight smile, Hasita-smile, Vihasita-gentle laughter, Upahasita-laughter of ridicule, Apahasita-vulgar laughter, and Atihasita-excessive laughter. Thus every feeling would become subdivided into an infinity of different gradations : weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc. Moreover, in the Erotic Rasa, there are ten stages as mentioned by Bharata (Nāṭyaśāstra XX. vv. 154-56) : Longing (Abhilāṣā), anxiety (Arthacintana), recollection (Anusmṛti), enumeration of the beloved's virtues (Guṇakīrtana), distress (Udvega), raving (Vilāpa), insanity (Unmāda), fever (Vyādhi), stupor (Jaḍatā) and death (Maraṇa).[71] Thus the ten stages of love would be replaced by an infinite number of mental states of Rasa. If each Rasa has different grades according to its intensity, then there will be endless varieties under that Rasa and feeling alone.[72] Again, in the Rasa-experience what happens is contrary to what is described by Lollaṭa, i.e., first Sthāyin exists, and when it is intensified, becomes Rasa. Thus the great sorrow which is most intense when it arises from the Vibhāva caused by separation from the beloved, gradually grows weaker and becomes quiet, and it does not intensify (Dārḍhyamupaiti). And, in the feelings of anger, heroism and delight, a diminution is observed when the indignation, firmness and sexual enjoyment is absent. So

Rasa is not preceded by Bhāva, i.e., the Sthāyin. But the contrary is the case. The Sage Bharata has said : रसपूर्वकत्वं भावानां भावपूर्वकत्वं रसस्य etc. (Viveka, P. 91, Quote-31.) So the first view arises (Prathamasya pakṣasyotthānam). In our real life, Rasa appears from Bhāva.

Śrī Śaṅkuka Submits his own Interpretation

So we submit another interpretation (says Śrī Śaṅkuka).

Rasa is simply a permanent state of mind, and more precisely, the reproduction of the permanent state of mind proper to the person reproduced – Rāma etc., and just because it is a reproduction, it is called by a different word, i.e., Rasa. This reproduced mental state is perceived by means of three kinds of elements, viz., causes, here called Vibhāvas, effects, i.e., the Anubhāvas and accompanying elements, i.e., the Vyabhicārins, and though these Vibhāvādis are unreal and artificial since they are brought into existence by means of conscious efforts of actors, yet they are not believed to be so. This permanent state is inferred by the characteristic signs. This is the sense of Saṁyogād in the Rasasūtra, i.e. Gamyagamakabhāvarūpād. The Vibhāvas can be enjoyed through the power of poetry (Vastusaundaryabalāt i.e. Anusandhānabalāt), the अनुभावs through the skill of the actor, and the Vyabhicārins through the actor's ability to present his own artificial consequents. In fact, the permanent state can be ascertained only indirectly, through an inferential process. But, the विभावादि, are realized directly. That is why the word Sthāyin is not mentioned in the Sūtra. Thus the Sthāyin cannot be realized even through Anusandhanābala or power of poetry, but only inferred. But since they have the capacity to be enjoyed through power of visualization, this inference is different from another inference. These Sthāyins are not at all present in the actor, still they are enjoyed through skillful imitation as in the verse Seyaṁ mamāṅgeṣu etc., and Daivādaham-adya etc. realistically. Herein the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and

Vyabhicārins are realized through the power of poetry, skill of acting and through the ability to represent the artificial consequents. But the Sthāyin cannot be realized even through power of poetry. The words 'delight', 'sorrow', etc., (as it is to be expected from expressive words) are only able to turn the feeling of delight etc. to which they refer into an expressed thing, but they are not able to communicate (Avagamayanti) it in its fullness, as if they were forms of verbal representation (Vācikābhinaya). For, verbal representation does not consist merely in words, but rather in what effect the words produce; in the same way, Āṅgikābhinaya does not consist merely in the movement of the limbs, but in the effect that this movement produces. In the verse Vivṛddhātmāpi etc. and in Śoke kṛtostambhastathā etc.[73] the feeling of sorrow is not represented but only verbally expressed. But the verse 'Bhāti patito... me vapuṣi' (158), represents its own sense side by side with expressing its own sense; and thus avoids mere verbal expression; the Sthāyibhāva of Rati present in Udayana causes pleasure. Representation indeed is nothing but a power of communication different from the power of verbal expression. It is for this reason that the Sage Bharata did not include the word Sthāyin in the Sūtra, not even in a different grammatical case, i.e., in the genitive case. Thus the Erotic Rasa is a mental state of love imitated. According to Bharata the erotic and the pathetic Rasas are born (prabhava) of the sentiments of love or sorrow respectively; while instead the other Rasas are made up of them (ātmaka). Thus what the Sage has said (that Rasas are made up of the Sthāyin and are born of them) is quite appropriate too.

Hemachandra Quotes Dharmakīrti's Verse

Further, it is found that even mistaken cognition is sometimes not without causal efficiency (Arthakriyā). To corroborate this dictum, **Hemachandra quotes** here a famous couplet of Dharmakīrti, P. V. II. 57.[74] Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, and the

14

other by a lamp (without knowing) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition. (Causal efficiency, the capacity to produce effects is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, therefore, of the real existence of a thing). Thus mirage provides an example of a mistaken cognition, but the present case is one of exception, for, here the mistaken perception allows the observing man to find a jewel which is real. Thus, here there is no delusion like in a mirage, and it is a source of right knowledge.

The point that Śaṅkuka drives at is that when a mistaken cognition is capable of causal efficiency, there is all the more possibility for a reproduced cognition, i.e., the Rasa-cognition, to be capable of causal efficiency. In other words, even though Rasa is Anukaraṇātmaka and Anumita, the spectator is not deluded by it, but finds in the spectacle a fulfilment of his desires.

Besides, here there is none of the following perceptions: (a) The actor is really happy; (b) Rāma is really that happy man; (c) That man is not happy; (d) Is this man Rāma or not? and (e) This is similar to Rāma – but rather the perception is "This is that Rama who was happy" or "This is Rama." Like the experience one has when observing a horse or a bull in a picture, the above mentioned perception is neither valid perception, nor error, nor doubt, nor similitude. As it is said :

"What kind of an argument could disprove an experience evident in and by itself – an experience in which, it being devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error ?"

Abhinavagupta, following his master Tota, criticises the theory of Reproduction or Imitation held by Śaṅkuka.

Bhaṭṭa Tota holds that this theory is without any intrinsic worth and is unable to withstand a close scrutiny. We ask : (1) Is it from the point of view of the spectator's perception or

(2) that of the actor or (3) that of the critics who analyse the real nature of the dramatic representation that you claim, Rasa has the nature of a reproduction or imitation ? (As it is said: It is the critics who analyse in this way), or (4) Finally according to Bharata's opinion ?

The first alternative cannot be maintained, for reproduction is only something perceived by means of cognition, as in the case of a person drinking some milk only, saying "In this manner, so-and-so drank wine". In this case, the action of milk-drinking reproduces the action of wine-drinking. But here, in the case of the actor what is it that is perceived in him that seems to be a reproduction of some feeling, say, of love ? This baffles us.

The actor's body, his headwear or turban, his horripilations, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, his frowns, his expressive glances and so on, surely cannot be regarded as the reproduction of the permanent emotion or mental state of love, which is a feeling. These being insentient, being perceived by different sense-organs and having different substrata are thus quite different from feelings. Consciousness of a reproduction requires perception of the original and the imitation thereof; but none has ever before perceived the love of Rāma, the original character. Hence the contention that the actor is reproducing Rama is dismissed as mere prattle.

If it is argued that the Erotic Rasa, the reproduction of Rati, is simply the feeling of the actor that, when perceived by the spectators appears to them in this very form, we do not agree with this argument; for when perceived, tell us, what does this feeling consist of ? It may be contended that the actor's feeling appears to the spectators to consist of just those characteristic signs – कारणs such as women, etc., कार्यs or effects such as side-long glances, etc., सहचारीs such as contentment, etc., which serve to render perceptible an ordinary

feeling. Good, if what you say is true; then the feeling of the actor would be perceived simply in the form of delight (i.e., there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic cognition). Thus your argument for a reproduction of delight falls flat. If you say that the विभावादि are real in the reproduced characters and here in the actor unreal, then let it be so but even if these विभावादि are not the real विभावs, अनुभावs and सञ्चारिभावs of the feeling of the actor, even if they are moulded solely by the power of the poem, the skill of the actor and so forth, and are thus artificial, are they perceived by the spectators as artificial or are they perceived as real ? If they are perceived as artificial, how can the feeling of love be perceived through them ? If you say that it is for this reason that what is perceived is not love, but a reproduction of love, this answer, we say, shows your dull-mindedness. For, it is proper to hold that a thing different from the usual one can be inferred from more apparently similar effects, only if the effect from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause and is recognized as such by a man of experience (Suśikṣitaiḥ). But an unexperienced man can infer from them the usual cause only. From some particular scorpions, for instance, it is reasonable to infer that their cause is cow-dung; and the inference from them of another scorpion as their cause is a false cognition.

Hemachandra Intervenes

Here Hemachandra intervenes (Viveka p. 94, ll. 14-19) to explain Bhaṭṭa Tota's argument. The upshot is that the well-known cause in the form of the feeling of love is not the same thing as the imitation of love. If the consequences are caused by this Rati, and are cognized by men of experience to be so, then the inference of the imitated Rati would stand scrutiny. But since it is clearly not the case, how then can the imitation of Rati stand ? And if an inexperienced man infers such an imitated Rati, then it is clearly a case of a false cognition.

And when the cognition of the logical reason – e.g. smoke – is erroneous, the inference based on that logical reason will be invalid itself. The inference from mist, taken as smoke, of a reproduction or imitation of fire, is surely unsound. For, a veil of mist, which is an imitation of smoke and is recognized as such, does not legitimize the inference of a heap of red roses, viz., something that reproduces fire.

The Theory of Imitation is Vain

It may be argued that eventhough the actor is not angry himself, yet he seems angry. True, he resembles a man who is angry. This is resemblance and it is due to a contraction of eye-brows etc., and is like the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like creature due to the shape of the muzzles etc. In this case, there is no imitation involved. Again, the spectators are not aware of this resemblance. (They are unaware of any resemblance between the actor and the original character, but are aware only of the fact that the actor is in a certain state of consciousness which is also shared by them). The spectators' perception of the actor is with his mental state. Therefore, the theory of imitation or reproduction is after all a vain theory.

To say that the audience has the perception – "That is Rāma", is not correct. For, if this perception, divested of every doubt during the play is not stultified later on by some subsequent cognition which invalidates it, why is it not a true cognition ? And, if it is stultified, why is it not a false cognition ? In fact, even when no invalidating cognition appears, it will be always a type of false cognition. (According to Śaṅkuka, the aesthetic experience consists of an imitation; thus he implicitly admits that it is unreal.) Thus Śaṅkuka's contention that this is an experience in which, since it is devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error, is untrue. Again, the same perception, 'This is Rāma', is had in other actors also and hence of Rāma, we have only his universal aspect. To say that the Vibhāvas can be

recognized through the power of poetry : it is difficult to explain it. In fact, the actor does not have the perception 'Sītā is mine' as in real life. That is to say, the causes in real life are not to be confused with the विभावs in a poem. For, the actor does not have the perception that the Vibhāvas from a part of his real life. It is argued that this is the meaning of the word 'realization', i.e., that this is how the विभावs are made perceptible to the spectators; then we say that there ought to be a realization of the permanent mood. The fact of the matter is that the perception of the actor is primarily and chiefly concerned with this and is presented in the form of : "This man is in this (emotional) state." (अस्मिन्नटेऽयं स्थायी—कल्पलताविवेक p. 305). So the thesis of Śaṅkuka that from the point of view of the spectator, the imitation of the permanent state is Rasa, is untenable.

The actor does not believe that he is reproducing Rāma or his feeling. For a reproduction, that is, a production of action similar (Saḍṛśakaraṇam) to those of someone whose nature we have never before perceived, is not possible (since every imitation presupposes a previous perception). Now, if it is maintained that the meaning of the term imitation is after-production (Paścātkaraṇam), such imitation, we say, would extend to ordinary life also (because such imitation is common in life). Perhaps it will be urged that the actor does not reproduce a specific person, but has only this notion : "I am reproducing the sorrow of some noble man". But, by what is this reproduction effected ? This is the problem. Not by sorrow which is absent in actor. Not by tears etc. for they are of another nature – i.e., they are not mental or spiritual. You may argue that the perception, "I am reproducing the अनुभावs of the sorrow of a noble person" occurs in the actor. But which noble person ? For, no person can be thought of without a clear-cut idea (विशिष्टतां विना). If you say that the actor is reproducing a person who should have wept like this, then his personality also intervenes, so that the relation of

Anukārya – Anukartā disappears. Besides the actor is not aware of carrying out any reproduction or imitation. The actor's performance, in fact, takes place only through three causes : his skill in acting, his memory of his own विभावs and the consent of his heart, aroused by the state of generality of the feelings; and in virtue of this, he displays the corresponding consequents and reads the poem with suitable accompanying intonations (Kāku) of voice. So, he is conscious of this only, and not of reproducing someone. Indeed, reproduction of the deeds of Rāma is different from the reproduction of the attire of the beloved person. (For, imitation of the gestures of the beloved by a person deeply in love is not the aesthetic act.)

Also, the theory of reproduction cannot be maintained from the point of the view of the nature of things (Vastuvṛtta); for, it is impossible that a thing of which one is not conscious, has a real nature.

Nor did the sage (भरतमुनि) ever say (in his text) that Rasa is the reproduction of a permanent mental state (Sthāyyanukaraṇam rasā iti).

Some other Theories (Viveka p. 95 : Yaccocyate –)

To say "The pigments – orpiment, etc. – surely compose a cow, etc." : now, if the word 'compose' (Saṁyujyamāna), is understood in the sense of 'manifest' (Abhivyajyamāna), then it is wrong. For, we cannot say that minium etc. manifest a real cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp etc. All they do is to produce (Nivartyate) a particular aggregate (Samūha) similar to it (cow). The only object of the image 'It is like a cow' is simply this minium, etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the विभावs etc., the situation is different : this cannot be perceived as similar to love. Hence the thesis that Rasa is the reproduction of the emotional state is untenable : "Tasmāt bhāvānukaraṇaṁ rasa ityasat."

The Sāṁkhya View of Rasa[75]

As for those, affiliated with the Sāṁkhya view-point, who maintain that Rasa, which is made up of pleasure and pain, is nothing but an external combination (Sāmagrī) of various elements – a combination possessing the power of generating pleasure and pain; and who hold that the determinants take the place of petals (external things or Upādānabhūta, i.e., they are not psychic states) and the consequents and the transitory mental states act to garnish it (i.e., these two are also external), while, the permanent mental states, made up of pleasure and pain, are born of that सामग्री and are internal (Āntarāḥ). Thus the thesis is put forward that expressions such as "We shall bring to the state of Rasa the permanent mental state" etc. must be understood metaphorically, but they know that these contradict Bharata's text and we are thus saved from looking for errors by their unsound statement. What to tell these people ? We had better state the other hypothesis arising out of this difficult problem, viz. the nature of aesthetic perception.

Rasa is Neither Perceived, Nor Produced, Nor Manifested : Bhaṭṭanāyaka's View

Bhaṭṭanāyaka says that Rasa is neither perceived nor produced, nor manifested : रसो न प्रतीयते, नोत्पद्यते, नाभिव्यज्यते. For, if it were perceived by the spectator as really present in himself, then in the Pathetic (करुण) Rasa, he would necessarily experience pain. Again, such a perception does not stand to reason, because Sītā etc., does not play the role of a विभाव (with reference to the spectator); because no memory of his own beloved person does arise in the spectator's mind (while he watches Sītā); because the representation of deities etc., cannot logically arouse in the spectator the state of generality (Sādhāraṇikaraṇa) required for the aesthetic experience; because Samudrollaṅghana etc. are extraordinary exploits and thus fall short of साधारण्य (generality).

Further, it is not possible to say that what occurs is simply the memory of Rama, as endowed with such-and-such quality, viz., heroism, etc., insofar as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Moreover, even if it be said that he is perceived through verabl testimony (शब्द), inference (अनुमान), etc., logically there cannot be any occurrence of Rasa in the audience just as it is not aroused by a thing perceived through direct knowledge. (To put it plainly, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, it should arise from a direct perception also.) For, on the appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present is subject to conflicting feelings (- shame, disgust, envy, etc.,) and we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa ! If it be supposed that Rasa is perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. So it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be perceived – either as direct experience or in the form of memory. The same drawback can be shown in the theory that maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is assumed that Rasa first exists in a potential form (शक्तिरूपत्वेन) and is later manifested, then the विभावs must necessarily illuminate it gradually. Besides, the difficulties already faced would recur : Is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self or as present in a third person ?

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Theory of Aesthetic Enjoyment

Therefore, we expound thus : Rasa is revealed (Bhāvyamāna) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (भावना), different from Denotation (अभिधा), consisting of the action of Generalizing the विभावादि. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (मोह) occupying our own consciousness; in poetry, it is characterized by the absence of blemishs (दोष) and the presence of qualities (गुण) and ornaments (अलङ्कार);[76] in drama by four kinds of representation. Rasa, revealed by this power, is then

enjoyed (भुज्यते) with a kind of enjoyment (भोग), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment (Bhoga) by virtue of the different forms of contact (Anuvedha) between Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas (which are mingled and obstruct the light of the self) is consisting of the states of fluidity (द्रुति), enlargement (विस्तार) and expansion (विकास), is characterized by a resting (विश्रान्ति) on one's own consciousness (संवित्), which due to the emergent state of Sattva, is pervaded by beautitude (आनन्द) and light (प्रकाश)[77] and is similar to the tasting (आस्वाद) of the Supreme Brahman.[78]

Abhinavagupta Reviews Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Theory

Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said : Abhidhā, Bhāvanā and Bhogikṛti are the three powers (in Rasa-experience) and word, sense and ornaments belong to Abhidhā; the group of Rasas such as Śṛṅgāra etc. is revealed by Bhāvanā and is enjoyed by an aesthete through the power of Bhogikṛti. (Viveka pp. 96-97, Quote–34).

We agree with Bhaṭṭanāyaka as far as the defect in the views of Lollaṭa and others are concerned. But so far as the power of Bhoga is concerned, we do not know what kind of enjoyment, distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world. If, as you contend, it is tasting (Rasanā), we say, that this too is a perception, and is only called by another name on account of the particular means (Upāya) by which it is called into existence. The same thing happens in the case of direct perception (Darśana), reasoning (Anumāna), the revealed word (Śruti), analogy (Upamiti), intuition (Pratibhāna), etc., each of which takes a different name. Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either eternal or non-existent, no third possibility exists. Again, the existence of an unperceived thing cannot be affirmed. The supporters of Bhaṭṭanāyaka may perhaps say that the perception of Rasa is just what they call the power of bringing about enjoyment (Bhogikaraṇa) – consisting

in the states of fluidity (Druti, Vistāra etc.). Very well, then – but it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three states. For, these exist just as many forms of perception – whose nature, in your view, lies in this very power of bringing about fruition consisting of a relish, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent elements, Sattva etc. can be seen set out in an infinite number of different ways : one may predominate at one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of relish to only three.

However, if the word revelation (भावना) in 'भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादिगणो हि यत्' (Viveka 97), Rasas like Śṛṅgāra etc., are revealed by the power of revelation, is used in the sense of the poem becoming the matter of perception, which consists of a tasting made up of gustation, and which is generated by the विभावादि, it may be accepted without any reservation.[79] This view is agreeable to Abhinavagupta.[80] And as to what is stated in the verse संसर्गादिर्यथा शास्त्रे etc. (Quotation-35), (Just as in scriptures संसर्ग etc., owing to identity and contact with the result or aim; so also Vākyārtha itself is termed as Śṛṅgāra and other Rasas.), your view is entirely our own.[81]

Abhinavagupta's View of Rasa

Let us now state the correct nature of Rasa, devoid of previous errors. It has already been stated by the Sage (Bharata) and we can add nothing new. For, the Sage has declared (in the Nāṭyaśāstra) काव्यार्थान् भावयन्तीति भावाः । (Viveka, p. 97, Quote-36) i.e., The mental states are called Bhāvas because they bring into existence (Bhāv) the ultimate aims of the poem, i.e., Rasa. Hemachandra[82] explains Kāvyārtha in the same way. He says, since Padārtha and Vākyārtha culminate in Rasas only, so due to extraordinariness and importance, the Artha of a Kāvya or the first aim of a poem is Rasa. And thus Kāvyārtha means Rasa, as Rasa is the principal aim of a poem, not the expressed sense. So Rasa is simply the aim of poetry. The nonmention of the Rasa, Bhāva, etc., by words expressing them is already explained.

Thus, Kāvyārtha is Rasa, and the Sthāyin and Vyabhicārin – permanent and transitory mental states that bring them into existence are called Bhāvas. It is really through the cluster of Sthāyin and Vyabhicārin that the supra-mundane Rasa, whose nature is to be enjoyed, is brought about or turned out or manifested. First of all, the Sthāyin, etc., are cognized, and then in a general way, Rasa is tasted. Therefore, being recognised or realized by cognition first, Sthāyin etc., are said to be producers or revealers of Rasa which is relished at a later stage. So it is settled that Rasa is the aim of the poem. To explain : In the verse आरोग्यमाप्तवान् शाम्ब: etc., (Śāmba regained his health when he praised the Sun God, etc.), there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense, and then, undoubtedly, arises in the mind of the perceiving subject, a perception which eliminates (न्यक्कारेण) the temporal data, etc., assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the form of : "Whoever praises the Sun regains his health; so I too will praise the Sun to be free from disease."[83] Similarly from the words of a poem the appreciative reader has an extra or additional perception.[84]

The Aesthetic Perception is Unique

In such a qualified person, on hearing the verse Grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam etc., (from the play, Sākuntalam I. 2), there appears immediately after the perception of their literal sense, a perception of a different order, an inner perception, consisting in a direct experience which completely eliminates the temporal distinction, etc., possessed by the sentences. Besides the young deer etc. which appears in the perception (प्रतिपत्ति) is without its particularity (विशेष) and at the same time, the actor, who (acting the deer) frightens the spectators, showing to be afraid, is unreal. Thus, what appears is simply fear – fear in itself uncircumscribed by time, space, etc. This perception of fear is of a different order from the ordinary perceptions : "I am afraid; he – my enemy, my friend, anybody is afraid"; for these are necessarily affected by the appearance

of fresh mental movements (of shunning etc.), consisting of pleasure, pain, etc., and just for these reasons are full of obstacles (विघ्न).

The sensation of the fear referred to above, on the contrary, is a matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obstacles (निर्विघ्न), and may be said to enter directly into our hearts, to dance before our eyes : this is the Terrible Rasa. In such a fear, one's own self is neither completely immersed, nor in a state of particular emergence, and the same thing happens with the other selves. As a result of this, the state of generality involved is not limited (परिमित), but extended (वितत) as happens at the moment in which is formed the idea of the invariable concomittance (Vyāpti) between smoke and fire or, in fact, between trembling and fear. Therefore this idea to be confronted with a real experience is nourished by the combination of नटादि. In this combination, indeed – in that the real limiting causes (Niyamahetu) – time, place, the particularized cognizing subject etc., on one side, and those afforded by the poem on the other, neutralize each other and then completely disappear – the above stated state of generality is readily nourished; so that by virtue of the very uniformity (Ekaghanatā)[85] of the spectators' perception, it being so nourished, readily nourishes the Rasa in all of them, and this occurs because the latent impressions of their minds harmonize with each other, the minds being varied by beginning-less, latent impressions.

The Conception of चमत्कार

This form of consciousness without obstacles is called 'Camatkāra' and the physical effects of it, i.e., trembling, horripilation, joyful motions of limbs etc., are also Camatkara, as in the Prakrit verse (Viveka – 159) अज्ज वि हरि चमक्कइ etc. i.e. – अद्यापि हरिश्चमत्कृतो भवति etc. which means : "Viṣṇu is still today in a state of camatkāra etc."[86] Indeed **camatkāra** may be likewise defined as an immersion in an enjoyment (Bhogāveśa) which can never satiate and is uninterrupted. The word

camatkāra, really speaking, properly means the action being done by a tasting or enjoying subject (Camataḥ karaṇam); in other words, by the enjoying subject, he who is immersed in the vibration (Spanda) of a marvellous enjoyment (Adbhutabhoga). It may be thought of either as a form of mental cognition (मानसाध्यवसाय) consisting of direct experience, or of imagination (सङ्कल्प), or of remembrance (स्मृति) which nevertheless is manifested in a direct manner to its ordinary nature. As Kālidāsa says in Ramyāṇi vīkṣya etc. (शाकु. V.2), there is a disquiet in the mind of a happy man on seeing beautiful objects etc., and he remembers in his inner soul, though vaguely, association of former births deeply implanted in him. In any case, it is a form of perception – in which what appears (is just a feeling, for example) love, consisting of a tasting. (In other words, a perception characterized by the presence of a generalized feeling, (love, anger, etc.). For this reason, i.e., because it is not conditioned by further specifications, this perception is apt to become the object of relish and, for that reason, it is neither a form of ordinary cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception (i.e., reproduction of it, in Śaṅkuka's language), nor does it consist of super-imposition (as when wrong knowledge follows after the right one is vitiated). We may call it a state of intensification to indicate that it is not limited by space etc.; call it a reproduction to mean that it is a production that repeats the feelings (an operation that temporally follows the feelings); and, call it a combination (विषयसामग्री) of different elements in the sense of the Vijñānavāda (or the idealistic Buddhism according to which everything that exists is pure consciousness or perception). Rasa is, in any case, simply and solely a mental state which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and consisting in relish.

The elements which eliminate the obstacles (Vighnas) are the determinants, etc. Also, in the day to day world, the

different terms चमत्कार, निर्वेश (Immersion), रसना (relish), आस्वादन (tasting), भोग (enjoyment), समापत्ति (accomplishment), लय (laysis), विश्रान्ति (rest), etc. mean only a (form of) consciousness completely free from any obstacles whatsoever.

There are seven obstacles to this perception. They are :

(1) the unsuitability, i.e., the lack of verisimilitude (सम्भावना-विरहरूपा प्रतिपत्तावयोग्यता);
(2) the immersion in temporal and spatial determinations perceived as exclusively one's own or exclusively those of another (स्वगतपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेशः);
(3) the fact of being at the mercy of our own sensations of pleasure, etc. (निजसुखादिविवशीभावः);
(4) the defective condition of the means of perception (प्रतीत्युपाय-वैकल्यम्);
(5) the lack of evidence (स्फुटत्वाभावः);
(6) the lack of some predominant factor (अप्रधानता); and
(7) the presence of doubt (संशययोगश्च).

The Seven Barrirers : How to Overcome Them ?

1. The first obstacle or barrier to the realization of Rasa consists in the lack of adequate realization of the probability or the reasonableness of things. In fact, if one is not convinced of the likelihood or verisimilitude of the things presented, he cannot obviously immerse his consciousness in them, so that no rest in them can take place, i.e., they cannot engage his all-absorbing attention. This is the first barrier to be crossed or eliminated, and the means by which it is achieved is the consent of the heart which takes place at the view of ordinary events; for, an event of ordinary character finds more ready response in the spectator's heart. When extraordinary incidents have to be portrayed, it is necessary to choose great heroes like Rāma, etc., who, by our deep-rooted belief in them, inspire our confidence in their superior capacity to undertake impossible

feats. That is way in dramatic compositions, whose aim is the learning and teaching of deeds transcending the ordinary life, and which have a lofty moral purpose, the plot and the characters are always drawn from the Epics and well-known tradition (प्रख्याततवस्तुविषय). This makes the works appealing. However, this requirement is absent in the case of farces (प्रहसनादि).

2. The second barrier (विघ्न) is the presence of certain individualistic or distinctive features of time and place which enable the spectator or connoisseur to sever himself from the objects described. When the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person, the second obstacle or barrier surely arises. This obstacle consists in the appearance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned by the sensation of pleasure, etc., to the worry about their preservation, to have a desire to procure other similar sensations, to think of getting rid of them, give them open expression, hide them, etc., Even when someone perceives pleasure, pain, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (pleasure, pain, stupor, indifference, etc.) which obviously constitute an obstacle.

The Nāṭyadharmī – Means of Eliminating the Obstacles

The means by which this obstacle can be eliminated are the Nāṭyadharmīs[87] or the theatrical conventions, which include a number of things not to be found in ordinary life, as for example, the zones (Kakṣyā) dividing the pavilion (Maṇḍapa), the stage (Raṅgapīṭha), the various types of costumes, the various dialects (Bhāṣās) used, etc.; and, what is more, the different dresses of the actors, the headwear, etc., by which they hide their true identity. The various theatrical devices such as the Pūrvaraṅga, the prologue etc. are employed for this reason only. The presence of the above devices and improvisations eliminates the perception : this particular

individual in the particular place at the particular moment feels pain, pleasure, etc. This elimination takes place insofar as in the theatrical performance there is, on the one hand, the negation of the real being of the actor, and on the other – since the spectator's consciousness does not rest entirely on the represented images – there is no rest on the real being of the super-imposed personage (i.e., the character of Rāma etc. who is super-imposed upon the real being of the actor); so that, ultimately, there is a negation both of the real being of the actor and that of the character he is playing. The Sage (Bharata) has dealt with all this in connection with Rasa-realization to ensure universalization of feelings. In other words, the devices help to promote the gustation of Rasa (रसचर्वणा) through the state of generality produced.

3. The third obstacle lies in the undue assertion of self-regarding emotions. How can anyone who is overpowered by his own happiness or sorrow concentrate on something else ? To overcome this barrier, various means such as music, vocal and instrumental, well-decorated halls, well-accomplished ladies, are employed so that, on account of a state of generality, these are aesthetic objects enjoyed by all the spectators and possess such a charming power (Uparañja) that even an unesthetic person (Ahṛdaya) reaches limpidity of heart and is forced to vibrate in response (becomes 'possessed of heart').

4. If the means of perception are absent, perception itself will also naturally be absent. We require eyes, ears, etc., for immediate and adequate realization of any data presented to us; if they are absent, how can we be sure of the correctness of our knowledge ? So, it is the fourth obstacle not to possess sound senses of perception : प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्य.

5. The fifth barrier also arises from अस्फुटत्व or absence of clarity or perspicuity. Even where there is clear and unmistakable verbal testimony and inference so as to evoke an evident perception, perception, however, does not rest

in them, because there is in it the expectancy of the certainty proper to direct experience which consists in an evident perception. For, as Vātsyāyana has said (Nyāyasūtra – Bhāṣya I, I. 3) सर्वा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरा – "All valid knowledge depends upon direct experience." It is quite well-known that a thing which has been directly perceived, cannot be proved to be otherwise by a number of inferences and verbal testimonies. In cases like the fire-brand, our knowledge is disproved by a more powerful perception. To remove this obstacle (as well as the third one) we use in dramatic representation something that is different from the inference and verbal testimony and that is almost equal to perception itself, viz., Abhinaya, Nāṭyadharmī, Vṛtti and Pravṛtti (the last two – Vṛtti and Pravṛtti are dealt with in the 20 th and 12 th chapters of the Nāṭyaśāstra). These forms are the traditionally consecrated modes of representation, viz., acting, the styles (Vṛtti), the local usages (Pravṛtti) and the realistic representation (Lokadharmī).[88] Representation is indeed a different operation from that of inference and verbal testimony; and, it is equal to direct perception. This helps overcome the obstacle of स्फुटत्वाभावः.

6. The sixth obstacle (अप्रधानता) arises from the absence of some element as the dominant factor. The human mind does not rest contented with the cognition of subordinate things, but it runs towards the predominant thing. In the same way, the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas, which help develop something else (Rasa), are certainly subordinate, and these are not realized with a sense of satisfaction, but only the Sthāyibhāvas which are dominant emotional moods and to develop which the Vibhāvādi strive. The Sthāyins are dominant (and not Vyabhicārins) because they are the emotional moods or impulses which alone are directly connected with the aims or ends or goals (Puruṣārthas) of the life and are dominant. Rati is associated with Kāma, and also with Dharma and Artha; Krodha is connected with Artha, Utsāha or fortitude; and energy with Kāma and all varieties of Dharma, etc.; and

Śama or quietism born of the knowledge of sacred lore with final liberation or Mokṣa, the highest goal of life. Thus these emotional moods are Pradhāna or more important.

Although these different Rasas display mutual dependence or subordinateness (in this that while one Rasa is dominant the others are subservient to it), yet, each of these Rasas is dominant in a play that principally portrays it. (Hence they all become principal Rasas in different types of plays (Rūpakas). And, as a matter of fact, they even hold away in varying measures in the same play. Indeed, in ordinary life also, women, even when they are immersed in the compact (एकघन) gustation (Carvaṇā) of the form of consciousness called sorrow, find rest in their own heart, for this very sorrow consists of, and is animated by, a rest without obstacles. (This refers to the experience of love by women, who find in the pain of biting, scratching, etc., by their lovers, the fulfilment or the realization of all their desire, and they enjoy this to the exclusion of everything else.) Pain, thus, is simply and solely an absence of rest. This is why the disciples of Kapila (The Sāṅkhya theorists) say, to explain the acting of Rajas, that the soul of pain is mobility (Cāñcalya) (चाञ्चल्य). All the Rasas, thus, consist of beautitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by which they are coloured (i.e., the Vibhāvādi), are not free from a certain touch of bitterness; this appears in the Heroic Rasa. For, it consists of, and is animated by, precisely the firm endurance of misfortunes.

Thus Rati etc. are pre-eminent (Pradhāna). Hāsa etc. on the other hand, also occupy a pre-eminent position owing to the fact that their determinants are easily accessible to all types of people and so they possess an extremely high power of winning the heart (उपरञ्जकत्व). However, laughter, etc., are mostly met with in people of inferior nature. All low-class people laugh, grieve, are afraid, despise others and are astonished at the slightest refined expression. Even these depend on

Rati etc., and as such serve the पुरुषार्थs i.e., the goals of life. The mental states of permanent nature are solely these (nine). A refutation of the subordinate elements has been made by Bharata, the Sage, also through the description of the permanent sentiments, by the words : स्थायिभावान्रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः। (Nāṭyaśāstra 6.50 ff) i.e., we shall now bring the permanent sentiments to the state of Rasas. (Here Bharata implies that only the Sthāyibhāvas and not the Vibhāvādi are brought to the state of Rasa.) This description is based on the definition of the general marks and concerns of the particular ones.

7. The last or seventh barrier or obstacle is doubt in general (संशययोगः). The Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas are not severally related to any specific Sthāyibhāva; for instance, अश्रुs or tears (Anubhāva) may arise out of joy, sorrow or even some disease in the eye; Vyāghra or tiger etc. (Vibhāva) may arouse anger or fear; Bhrama (perplexity) and Cintā (contemplation) etc. (Vyabhicāribhāvas) may be the accessories of Utsāha and Bhaya. However, their combination is fixed. Thus where the death of a close relation is the Vibhāva, bewailing, and shedding tears is the Anubhāva, and contemplation, weakness, etc., the Vyabhicāribhāva. There may arise a doubt about the particular Sthāyibhāva, say शोक, which is developed. To remove this doubt, the word Saṁyoga (संयोग) is used in the Rasasūtra. (It means, when there is a specific combination of such Vibhāva, Anubhāva, etc., we know that the Sthāyin developed is certainly Śoka and the Rasa is Karuṇa)

Rasa is a Personal Experience

Rasa is that reality (अर्थ) by which the विभावादि, after having reached a perfect combination (सम्यग् योग.), relation (सम्बन्ध), pointedness (Aikāgrya) – where they will be in turn in a leading or subordinate position – in the mind of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation (चर्वणा) consisting of

a form of consciousness free from obstacles and different from the ordinary ones. This Rasa differs from the permanent feelings, consists solely in this state of gustation (चर्वणा), and is not an objective thing (सिद्धस्वभाव) i.e., it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which can exist independently of tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form of perception called tasting which lasts exactly as long as the gustation (चर्वणा) and does not last at any time different from it. The Vibhāvādi which consist of उद्यान कटाक्ष, वीक्षा, धृति, etc., transcend the worldly states of causes, etc.(लौकिक कारणत्वादिभावमतिक्रान्तः) as they are understood in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour (the spectator's consciousness). This function is called Vibhāvanā, Anubhāvanā, etc. (i.e., germination, corroboration, consolidation, etc.). These causes, etc. take on a non-ordinary character of Vibhāvas etc. (as they are different from ordinary causes), and this nomenclature aims at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left by the corresponding preceding causes etc. (i.e., the विभावादि arouse the latent traces of the mental process of Rati etc., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, require the presence of these traces and depend on them). The operation of the Vibhāvādi presupposes that the spectator, in real life, has not neglected the habit of a close observation of the characteristic signs (causes effects and concomitant elements) of other peoples' mental processes. Like Śaṅkuka, it cannot be said that what is called Rasa is simply a permanent sentiment, brought to our knowledge by the Vibhāvādi (through inference), and that because this is the object of a relish, it assumes the name of Rasa. Why should Rasa not exist also in day to day life ? For, if an unreal thing (i.e., अनुमित-स्थायी) is capable of being the object of relish, a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus you may say that the perception of a permanent mental state consists in inference; not Rasa

(i.e., Rasa cannot rightly be said to be of this nature). This is the real reason why Bharata did not include the word Sthāyī in the Sūtra; on the contrary, it would have been a source of trouble. (For, then, Rasa would simply be a perception of someone else's permanent mental movement). It is only due to correspondence (औचित्य) that 'स्थायी रसीभूतः' is mentioned by Bharata. This correspondence consists in the fact that the same things which were previously called the causes, etc., related to a given permanent sentiment, now serve the purpose of the gustation (चर्वणा), and are thus presented in the form of Vibhāvādi.[89] What kind of a Rasa is there, indeed, in the inference of an ordinary sentiment ? Therefore, the tasting of Rasa (which consists in a camatkāra different from any other kind of ordinary cognition) differs both from memory, inference or any form of ordinary consciousness (i.e., pleasure, pain, etc.). Indeed, he who possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman etc. (Vibhāvādi), as if he were indifferent to her (impersonal – तटस्थ or मध्यस्थ, opposite of अनुप्रवेश – personal); but, by virtue of his sensibility which quality is consisting in a consent of heart – he rather apprehends her, without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation (चर्वणा), suitable to an indentification (with this young woman etc.) which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This gustation (चर्वणा) also is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is now a form of memory, nor is it the result of the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct perception etc.); but it is aroused solely by the combination (Saṁyoga) of the Vibhāvādi, which, as we said, are not of an ordinary nature.

Its Distinction from other Experiences

This gustation is distinguished (a) from perception of the ordinary sentiments (रति etc.) aroused by the ordinary

means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc.); (b) from cognition without active participation of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the perception of the yogins; and (c) from the compact (एकघन) experience of one's own beautitude, which is proper to yogins of higher orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impressions (Uparāga) deriving from external things). Indeed, these three forms of cognition, being in due order (यथायोगम्) subjected to the appearance of obstacles (practical desires etc.), lacking evidence and at the mercy of the adored object, are deprived of beauty (सौन्दर्य).

In the aesthetic experience, on the contrary, because of the absence of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., as inhering exclusively in our own person, of an active participation in our own self (स्वात्मानुप्रवेशात्), of the absence of the above mentioned sensations as inhering exclusively in other persons, and the immersion (आवेश) in the latent traces of our own sentiments of love etc., reawakened by the corresponding Vibhāvādi which are generalized, because of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles is impossible.

Hence, the विभावादि are not the causes of the Niṣpatti or production of Rasa; otherwise, Rasa should continue to exist even when they are no longer under cognition. Nor are they the cause of its cognition (Jñāpti); if they were, they would have to be included among the means of knowledge (प्रमाणs) bacause Rasa is not an objective thing (सिद्ध), which could function as a knowable object (प्रमेय). What is it then that is called by the expression विभावादि? They do not designate any ordinary thing, but what serves to realize the gustation (चर्वणोपयोगी). Does any such thing appear anywhere else? The fact that it does not occur elsewhere can only strengthen our view of their non-ordinary (अलौकिक) character. Does the taste of the Rasa of Panaka occur in molasses, pepper, etc. (of which it is made)? The case is perfectly analogous. But

(one might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (अप्रमेय) ! That is what it deserves to be. Rasa, in fact, consists solely of a tasting and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. But then why the expression 'रसनिष्पत्तिः' in Bharat's Sutra. This expression must be taken to mean the production not of Rasa, but of the tasting of the Rasa. If the expression 'रसनिष्पत्ति' is understood in the sense of a production of a Rasa whose subsistence is exclusively dependent on the said tasting, then our view is not affected by that. This tasting is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition nor of the means of action. In fact, in itself, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge (अप्रमाणिक), for its real existence is an irrefutable datum of our own consciousness (स्वसंवेदनसिद्ध). This tasting is undoubtedly a form of cognition, but different from any other ordinary perception. This is because the means of it, i.e., the Vibhāvādi, are of non-ordinary character. To conclude : What is produced by the संयोग or combination of the विभावादि, is the Rasana or tasting; and the Rasa is the non-ordinary reality, which is the matter of this tasting. This is the sense and purport of the Sūtra.

A Summary of Abhinava's Exposition

The summary is : in the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by tiaras, headwear, etc.; in the second place, the idea that he is Rama, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, nevertheless, does not succeed in imposing itself upon the idea of the actor, for the latent traces of the said idea are strongly impressed on the spectator's mind. For this very reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the space and time of Rama, etc., nor in the space and time of the actor as such. Horriplation, etc., which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course of everyday life as signs of love, etc., serve, in this case, to make known a love etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this love,

just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the self of the spectator also actively participates. So, this love is perceived neither with indifference from the outside, nor, as if, it were linked with a particular (ungeneralized) cause – for, in this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of gain, etc., would interfere – nor again, as if, it exclusively belonged to a defined third person – for, in this case, sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc., would occur in the spectator. Thus, the Erotic Rasa (शृङ्गार) is simply the feeling of love (रति) – which is both generalized and the object of a consciousness which may be either single or developed consecutively. The task of generalization is carried out by the विभावs etc.

The Philosophic Character of Aesthetic Bliss[90]

Thus Abhinavagupta expounds the views of the earlier commentators on Rasa and sets out his own views in exhaustive details regarding the aesthetic experience. He declares that the previous theories are the staircase on which climbing further or higher has been possible for him, and he has been able to understand the true nature of Rasa. He only claims credit for improving on the views of earlier authors and not unduly criticising their views. Thus, his method is both of analysis and synthesis. And, we can see that Abhinavagupta has given a masterly explanation and exposition of the Rasasūtra which has since dominated the field of not only dramaturgy but poetics also. Both in his Abhinavabhāratī as well as in the Locana Commentaries. Abhinavagupta repeatedly declares that poetic content is itself Rasa, when it is contemplated by the connoisseur (Kāvyārtho rasa it). He has explained Rasa-experience from the points of view of the dramatist, the actor and the spectator. He has explained the sevenfold barrier with a rare penetrating insight and shown how these can be removed successfully and conclusively established that the nature of Rasa-experience is different from the ordinary means of knowledge as also from the extraordinary perception of a Yuñjaña as well as a Yukta Yogin. The process of

Rrsa-realization is Unique and the joy resulting from it is supra-mundane bliss. This gives an extraordinary, philosophic character to the aesthetic experience. Hemachandra's adoption of the Abhinavabhāratī-text on Rasānut bhava in toto shows his unflinching adherence to the views of Abhinava. In fact, he says so in no uncertain terms : एतन्मतमेव चास्माभिरुपजीवितम् (Viveka, p. 103).

The Number and Types of Rasa : Nine Rasas

In Sūtra 27 (II. 2), Hemachandra deals with the different types of Rasas, by defining and illustrating them. According to Hemachandra, there are only nine Rasas. They are Śṛṅgāra or the sentiment of the Erotic, Hāsya or the Comic, Karuṇa or the Pathetic, Raudra or the Dreadful, Vīra or the Heroic, Bhayānaka or the Terrific, Bībhatsa or the Disgustful, Adbhuta or the Wonderful, and lastly Śānta or the Quietistic. The gloss explains the nature and importance of these Rasas. It says that Śṛṅgāra is mentioned first because it is common to all creatures and it is the most familiar and the most delightful of all the Rasas – in fact, it is the Rasarāja, the king among all Rasas, according to many authorities. Hāsya closely follows Śṛṅgāra, and often serves to help and heighten the latter. Karuṇa is just the opposite of Hāsya and is mentioned next. Raudra is often the cause of Karuṇa, and comes next. Raudra is based on Artha, one of the four – goals of life, and results from frustration in one's endeavour to get some desire fulfilled. Vīra is based on the religious spirit or a sense of piety, and is mentioned next since Kāma and Artha depend on Dharma. As Vīra removes fear, so Bhayānaka is mentioned after it. On account of the fact that the Vibhāvās of Bhayānaka are shared in common by Bībhatsa, this Rasa is mentioned immediately after Bhayānaka. Since Vīra finally culminates in marvellous exploits, Adbhuta naturally comes next. So far as these traditional eight Rasas are concerned, they are all based on the first three goals (त्रिवर्ग) of life, viz., Dharma, Artha

and Kāma which are characterized by activity (Pravṛtti). But the ninth Rasa, i,e., the Śāntarasa is characterized by passivity (Nivṛtti) and is opposed to the first three goals of life, directed as it is to the questistic tendency called Mokṣa or final beautitude. These **nine** Rasas are clearly distinguished from each other by virtue of their specific natures and are **only nine in number.** Hemachandra deliberately stress the number Nine, because he is aware that some writers on Poetics and Dramaturgy were busy additing to the list, thus inceasing the bulk or the number of Rasas. So, in the Viveka commentary (p. 106), he amplifies his statement regarding the number of Rasas, by saying नवैव. He explains that this number of nine is the only justifiable number of the Rasas because these nine Rasas are allied to the four goals of human life and also because these nine Rasas possess greater charm and beauty. Hence the question of abmitting स्नेह as Rasa based on the permanent mood of आर्द्रभाव (an emotion of pity or affection) is ruled out. For स्नेह is include in रति, as स्नेह or भक्ति or वात्सल्य i.e. affection and devotion, happen to be specific traits found in Rati. 'Sneha' is mutual love (रति) between two equal beings, and the Rati (love) showered by a lesser being on a higher being is Bhakti or Prasakti or devotion, dedication, while the Rati (affection) shown by a higher person towards a younger or lower creature is Vātsalya or affection. In all these matters, Bhāva or emotion is what is tasted or enjoyed. So the number of Rasas is settled to be **nine** in Hemachandra's opinion. In the same way, we can explain the affection one feels for his friend as Rati; the affection of Rāma for Laxmaṇa can be included under Dharmavīra, for Rāma loved Laxmaṇa almost religiously; again, the affection which a child feels for its parents can be subsumed under Bhayānakarasa as fear is the basis of filial love ! So also an old man's love for his grown-up son springs from fear and thus it is a part and parcel of Bhayānaka ! Here Hemachandra seems to explain various feelings rather psychologically. It will not sound funny if we

take a close loot at human nature and human instincts. Freudian insights also seem to support these explanations.

Additional Rasas Untenable

There are some authorities that consider लौल्य or Cupidity as a distinct Rasa with गर्ध or gluttony as its permanent mood. Hemachandra dismisses the claim of Laulya or Cupidity being a full-fledged Rasa, to, since it is nothing but the Comic sentiment in another form; for it contains ridicule, and at best this craving may be classed under love of possession or mere greed. The same reasoning applies to Bhakti too, says Hemachandra.

The Śṛṅgārarasa-Defined and Explained

The next Sūtra (II. 28) defines the Erotic Sentiment or Śṛṅgāra. Śṛṅgāra exists between a man and a woman. So the man and the woman are each other's Ālambanavibhāvas or existants of love. The objects such as garlands, music, fragrance, etc., that stimulate the feeling of love are the Uddīpanavibhāvas or stimulants of love. Then some prominent accessory feelings excepting Jugupsā – a sense of dislike, Ālasya – lassitude and Augrya – severity, help the process of love and consequently they are its Vyabhicāribhāvas or Sañcāribhāvas – transitory feelings. Thus, Śṛṅgāra is nothing but the feeling of love (Rati) excited, inflammated and helped by various Vibhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas. Hemachandra clarifies his statement in the gloss to the effect that Jugupsā, Ālasya and Augrya are barred from the list of the transitory feelings that help love to grow. In the Viveka (p. 106), he explains that Rati based on Jugupsā as a permanent emotion is also prohibited by this, and this permits the Vyabhicāritva or transitory nature of Jugupsā which is a Sthāyin of the Bībhatsa. And, so far as Ālasya or lethargy etc., are concerned, they belong to the excitants or विभावs of love, viz., women and others, and they are certainly ruled out in regard to them

only. By virtue of this, the verse 'वपुरलसलसद्वाहु लक्ष्म्या' (वे. सं. १.३) as also the verse 'कतिचिदहानि वपुरभूत केवलमलसेक्षणं तस्याः' (वि.क्र. ५. ८) should not be held as contrary to this rule. For, herein the body is said to be languid and not the mental state. The Śṛṅgāra is twofold : Saṁyoga or Sambhogaśṛṅgāra or Love in Union and Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra or love in separation. The sentiment of Śṛṅgāra is a longstanding one ranging from the process of its start to its fulfilment (प्रारम्भादिफलपर्यंतव्यापिनी...इति). This is a special trait of Rati which entirely consists of desire, which follows the different stages of love and assumes the form of a fleeting emotion (Viveka p. 107). It becomes more and more blissful as it advances. It is a tie or knot that binds two hearts together. Originally, it is the Sthāyibhāva styled Rati, but when fully developed, it is called Śṛṅgārarasa, and it is then that it is enjoyed by the spectator or reader. This Rati or love is possible between a man and a woman only. Thus it is that Rati or love between a man and a woman is exalted to a supreme position as the Śṛṅgārarasa in literature. The other kinds of Rati – the love of mother or for a mother, the devotion to God or a Sage, or loyalty for a king, are all known as Rati, but truly speaking they do not grow into a full fledged Rasa; they only attain to the position of a Bhāva. Mammaṭa declares in his Kāvyaprakāśa (IV. 35) : "रतिर्देवादिविषया व्यभिचारी तथाञ्जितः भावाः प्रोक्ताः". Thus it is that Hemachandra calls it Vyabhicārirūpāyāḥ in the Viveka. Obviously, here, Hemachandra implicitly follows the conventional opinion of Mammaṭa (K. P. IV. 35 ff) and others, and cites illustrations for Rati as a Bhāva after declaring that 'देवमुनिगुरुनृपपुत्रादिविषया तु भाव एव न पुनः रसः' and that real Śṛṅgāra is that which is developed with reference to Kāntā, a beloved wife. As an example of Rati or devotion with reference to God, he quotes a verse from the well-known Jain hymn, Bhaktāmarastotra (2. 12). Then the devotion or reverence to a Sage is illustrated by means of the verse – 'Gṛhāṇi nāma tānyeva....pāvanaiḥ padāṅśubhiḥ' (97), cited in the Kāvyādarśa (I.86).

It is already stated that the Erotic Sentiment is **twofold,** but Hemachandra comments on this Statement by saying that, strictly speaking, **this is not true.** He argues that as both the types of Śṛṅgāra belong to Rati (a Sthāyin) which is of the nature of a tie of affection; so, Sambhoga and Śṛṅgāra – these two concepts overlap, for, even in separation, the craving for union is very much there, and, again, in Sambhogaśṛṅgāra sometimes when there is a sense of security, owing to the course of unimpeded love, there is a sort of mental separation as Bharata has appropriately stated :

यद्वामाभिनिवेशित्वं यतश्च विनिवार्यते।
दुर्लभत्वं च यन्नार्याः कामिनः सा परां रतिः। (ना० शा० २२,२०७)

–which means : "It is because women are perverse in their love that they repulse the advance of men and are very difficult of attainment, that men are mad after them." Hence a combination of these two – Sambhoga and Vipralambha – is more delightful, as e.g. एकस्मिन् शयने etc., (अमरु० २३) which very delightfully paints a mixture of separation and union (दृशाद्वयमीलन) of two lovers in the same bed. Hemachandra aptly observes that the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas are found distinctly only in a full-fledged poem, while in stray verses (Mukatakas) we have to imagine (take for granted) the presence of all these constituents of Rasa.

The next Sūtra (II.4) contains a definition of Sambhogaśṛṅgāra. It consists of horripolation etc. as Anuhhāvas and endurance, delight, etc., as Vyabhicāribhāvas. It consists in the lovers being united, though it is characterized by bashfullness, etc. It is made attractive by accessories such as patience (Dhṛti) etc. In the Viveka, it is pointed out that although sleep etc., caused by fatigue due to love is present in the Sambhoga variety of (actul) love, yet it does not add charm to Rati; while in Vipralambha it arises from the conception of love, and so it is properly stated that there is Sukhamayatva, i.e., a happy frame of mind. It also consists of Anubhāvas such as horripolation, perspiration, trempling, tears, slipping off of the

girdle, hard breathing, fatigue, hurry, tying up the hair, collecting the clothes, re-arrangement of clothes, ornaments, garlands, etc., and activities – both verbal and physical – such as lovely glances, sweet words, etc. This Sambhogaśṛṅgāra is of unlimited varieties (अनन्तभेदः) consisting in mutual glancing, embracing, kissing, etc., Hemachandra only make a passing reference to the many possible varieties of love in union but illustrates the most important among them with one illustration only. The verse in the वृत्ति (९९) दृष्ट्वैकासनसंगते प्रियतमे etc. (अमरु० १९) describes how a rogue in love with two ladies enjoys observance (Avalokana-dṛṣṭvā), embraces, horripolation, kissing, etc., physically and one of the ladies reacts mentally. Here, obviously the first woman with closed eyes was not loved by him, but the other who was embraced, kissed etc., was his real beloved. So she beamed with joy.

The Vipralambha variety of Śṛṅgāra is threefold : (1) Abhilāṣavipralambha (one in which the lovers yearn for each other before their first union), (2) Mānavipralambha (separation through anger), and (3) Pravāsavipralambha (separation caused by staying away from each other). If this separation leads to grief, it transforms itself into pure pathos (करुणरस). While the Erotic sentiment in union (Sambhoga) is Sukhaprāya, and has Dhṛti etc., as Vyabhicārins, the Erotic sentiment in separation (Vipralambha) has painful accessories such as apprehension, suspicion and has mental tormenting etc., as consequents. Here, one's self pines away in a special way so as to attain a joy of union. Its Vyabhicāris are शङ्का, औत्सुक्य, मद, ग्लानि, निद्रा, सुप्तप्रबोध, चिन्ता, असूया, श्रम, निर्वेद, मरण, उन्माद, जडता, व्याधि, स्वप्न, अपस्मार, etc., and its Anubhāvas etc., संताप, जागर, कृशता, प्रलाप, क्षामनेत्र, वचोवक्रता, दीनसञ्चरण, अनुकारकृति, लेखलेखन, वाचन, स्वभावनिह्नव, वार्ता, प्रश्न, स्नेहनिवेदन, सात्त्विकानुभवन, शीतसेवन, मरणोद्यम, सन्देश, etc. However the करुणविप्रलम्भ type of this रस is extremely pathetic; as, for instance, in the Verse (100) – हृदये वसतीति etc., (कुमारसंभव, ४.९) – (What you say that you stay in my heart', is a fraud; it is not a formal word;

since you are bodiless, how can Rati remain unhurt ?), the lamentations of Rati are quite heart-rending.

Hemachandra adds by way of a comment in the Viveka (p. 110) that Vipralambha is **tinged by sorrow** – even in its Vyabhicāribhāvas. So he uses the word शङ्का in the Sūtra (II. 5). This hints at the possibility of even death in Vipralambha, but the word शोक is not mentioned as can be seen in the Verse – तीर्थे तोयव्यतिकर etc. (Raghu VIII. 95) which describes Mṛti as a Vyabhicāribhāva (K A S II. 52 ff. V. 157). Hence, a good writer does not describe मरण in a play (but only hints at it). In the above Verse, the third line helps imagine the Vibhāvas to avoid the obstacle of lack of clarity (प्रतीतिविश्रान्तिस्थानत्व-परिहाराय). By the use of the word 'पुनः' the same meaning comes out well. Or the act of immolation or suicide implies life, not death; it is easy to cite examples for it. So far as Unmāda, Apasmāra and Vyādhi are concerned, the not-too-wretched condition of these should be displayed in a Kāvya or a play; but the worst condition should never in reality be shown – this is the opinion of the ancients (Vṛddāḥ). We, however, say : "In such a situation when one despises one's life, the hope in the form of Rati through physical enjoyment is also shattered only; hence there is no seope for the wretched condition.

Types of Vipralambha Śṛṅgār

1. Abhilāṣavipralambha (II. 6) is due (a) either to the freak of fortune or (b) to the dependence on others. The variety due to दैव or freak of fortune is illustrated in the Verse (101) शैलात्मजापि etc., cited from the Kumārasambhava (IV. 75) wherein we witnees Pārvatī who saw that the desire of her father was frustrated and that her lovely form was useless, returned home overwhelmed by a sense of excessive shame.

2. The second variety of the Abhilāṣavipralambha, due to dependence on others (पारवश्य), is illustrated in the next

verse (102) from अमरु's शतक. The verse describes how two separated lovers pine for each other by looking at each other and drink love through eyes. Hemachandra notes that the fact that the union of Kādambarī with Candrāpīḍa did not result for fear of breaking a pledge, also typifies this variety of Abhilāṣavipralambha which arises from पारवश्य or dependence.

The next variety (II. 7) is called Mānavipralambha which is twofold; Praṇayamāna and Īrṣyāmāna. Praṇayamāna (प्रणयमान) means anger arising from the disregarding of one's love. It is possible in the case of both a man and a woman. Pārvatī is angry with Śiva, so he bends down to appease her; but in doing so, his matted hair reveals the Ganges (another woman concealed); so, Pārvatī kicks him. This verse (103) illustrates Praṇayamāna of a woman. The next verse (104) explains it in relation to a man's offended love. It is cited from the Uttararāmacarita (3.38) wherein Rāma is described as getting angry with Sītā who was late in coming home, being attracted and delayed by the sports of swans. Another verse (105) illustrates how both the lovers get angry with each other at the same time. It gives a very fine description of angry lovers : both pretend to be asleep (अलीकप्रसुप्त) but are intent on hearing each other's sighs controlled with great effort.

Īrṣyāmāna (anger due to jealousy) which is the second variety of Mānavipralambha is possible in women alone. In the next verse (106), which illustrates Īrṣyāmāna, an indignant Pārvatī rebukes Lord Śiva thus : "You are bowing down before Sandhyā (a lady); you are also carrying shamelessly on your head a Nadī (a female person); Laxmī is now churned out of the ocean – take her, why do you swallow poison ? Don't touch me, you voluptuous one !"

Sūtra II. 8 deals with Pravāsavipralambha (प्रवास विप्रलम्भ), the third variety of Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra. It is caused by important work, a curse or a flurry (सम्भ्रम) or excitement due to some panic such as an invasion or a hurrycane. Pravāsa (प्रवास)

always refers to another region or country. The verse (107) याते द्वारवतीं तदा etc., describes Rādhā's pathetic-tragic condition caused by Krishna's departure to Dwārikā. She embraced the Vañjula creeper bent down due to Kṛṣṇa's jumps into the Yamunā river, and kept singing such a pathetic song that even the creatures in the waters began to sob.

As for the variety of शापहेतुकप्रवासविप्रलम्भ, Hemachandra says that the whole of the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa is an instance in point since it describes the lovelorn condition of a certain Yakṣa who was separated from his beloved due to a curse of his master Kubera.

And the संभ्रमहेतुकप्रवासविप्रलम्भ, a variety of विप्रलम्भशृङ्गार, is instanced in (108) Mālatīmādhava (8. 13) wherein the condition of Mādhava, who had gone to help Makaranda, becomes truly pitiable.

The Comic Sentiment

The Rasa defined in the next Sūtra (II. 9) is Hāsya or the Comic sentiment. Ths essence of Hāsya lies in its being produced from something done which is incompatible with a particular place, time, age and rank. Its Vibhāvas (determinants) are unseemly dress or ornament, impudence, greediness, quarrel, a defective limb, the use of irrelevant words, mentioning of different faults etc. Its अनुभावs (consequents) are the throbbing of the lips, the nose, the cheek, opening the eyes wide or contracting them, perspiration, colour of the face and taking hold of the sides. Its सञ्चारिभावs (transitory feelings) are indolence, dissimulation or concealment of inner feelings, drowsiness, sleep, dreaming, insomnia, envy, etc. Hāsya is of two types : Self-centred or आत्मस्थ and Centred in others i.e., Parastha. When a person himself laughs, it is called the Ātmastha type, but when he makes others laugh, it is Parastha type.

The next Sūtra (10) defines and explains the three kinds of Ātmasthahāsya. The best kind of the हास is स्मित – slight smile, which involves heaving of the cheeks, which is attended by charming eye-glances and in which the teeth are not visible.

The second kind of हास is विहसित – the gentle laughter, which involves slight sound and sweetness, and is suitable to the occasion, and, in it, the eyes and the cheeks should be contracted and the face should appear joyful or red. अपहसित is the laughter not suitable to time, and during it, tears come and the shoulders and the head are violently shaken, and it comes at a wrong place. Here स्मित and हसित belong to persons of the superior type (उत्तम), विहसित to the middle type (मध्यम) and the vulgar smile (अपहसित) belongs to the inferior type (अधम). Thus, we have आत्मस्थ–हास of three types: स्मित (उत्तम), विहसित (मध्यम) and अपहसित (अधम.) To impart authenticity to his views, Hemachandra quotes three verses from the Nāṭyaśāstra (VI. 54, 56 & 58) of Bharata which describe the threefold laughter.

In the next Sūtra (II. 11) our author defines Parasthahāsa (परस्थ-हास) or laughter pertainingt o another.[91] When a man is made to laugh at the sight of another man laughing, it is called परहसित. This is also threefold, with slight variations in names: हसित, उपहसित and अपहसित, belong to High (उत्तम), Middling (मध्यम) and Lowly (अधम) persons respectively. Here too Bharata is quoted (Nāṭyaśāstra VI–55, 57, 59). Hasita is a smile characterized by blooming eyes, face and cheeks, only slightly displaying the cheeks. During Upahasita or the laughter of ridicule, the nose expands, the eyes squint and the shoulder and the head bend. अतिहसित is the excessive laughter in which the eyes are expanded through agitation and there is a copious flow of tears, the sound is shrill and the two sides are pressed with hands. Verse 109 is an example of Ātmastha hāsya. It describes the queer dress of lord Śiva who, as a bride-groom, wanted to invite the attention of Pārvatī. Parasthahāsya is described in the next verse (110). It illustrates a laughter excited by the laughter of others. Here the cloud-like dark form of Kṛṣṇa is reflected in Rādhā's breasts and mistaking his own form for the blue garment of Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa keeps pulling it. At this, Rādhā laughs

heartily and Kṛṣṇa, too, laughs heartily, realizing his own mistake.

The Pathetic Sentiment

The करुणरस or Pathos is deat with in II. 12. Karuṇa is the dominant state of Śoka developed through the combination of Vibhāvas like the death of a dear one, अनुभावs like rebuking the fate and व्यभिचारिभावs of pain. Thus the pathetic sentiment arises from determinants such as affliction under a curse, separation from the near ones and dear ones, loss of wealth, death, captivity, flight from one's place, accidents and other misfortunes. Its consequents are cursing the fate, shedding tears, lamentation, dryness of the mouth, change of colour, drooping limbs, loss of breath, loss of memory, etc. Its transitory feelings are indifference, languor, anxiety, yearning, excitement, delusion, fainting, sadness, dejection, illness, inactivity, insanity, epilepsy (अपस्मार), fear, indolence, death, paralysis, tremor, change of colour, weeping, loss of voice etc. When sorrow, characterized by anguish in heart, is developed fully, it becomes the Karuṇarasa; as, e.g., in the lamentation of Rati in the Kumārasambhava (4.3) : अयि जीवितनाथ जीवसि. . . . .

The Furious Sentiment

The next sentiment to be defined (in II. 13) is the Furious or रौद्ररस. The Furious has, as its basis, the dominant mental state of anger. It owes its origin to Rākṣas, Demons and haughty men, and is caused by (battles due to) the abduction of one's wife and such other offensive acts done by others. Its determinants (विभावs) are anger, rape, abuse, insult, untrue allegation, exorcizing, threatening, revengefulness, jealousy, etc. Its consequents (अनुभावs) are red eyes, knitting the brows, frowning, biting the lips, quivering of temples, clasping the palms, drawing blood, cutting, etc., and its transitory feelings are fierceness, daring, energy, indignation, restlessness, fury, trempling, etc. (Incidentally, it is clarified by Bharata that Raudra relates to all but specially to Rākṣasas as these are

naturally furious, having many arms, mouths, unkempt hair and looks, large bodies of black colour, etc. Their speech, appearance and action all are furious by nature. Even in their love-making, they are violent.)

The verse (112) 'चञ्चद्भुजभ्रमितचण्डगदाभिघात' etc. from Veṇīsaṁhāra (I. 21), which expresses the wrath of Bhīma who resolves before Draupadī to reveng her insult, illustrates the रौद्ररस.

The Heroic Sentiment

The next Rasa to be defined (in-II. 14) is the Heroic sentiment or वीररस. The Heroic sentiment relates to the superior types of persons and has energy (उत्साह) for its dominant mood. Its determinants (विभावs) are diplomacy, discipline, presence of mind, perseverance, military strength, aggressiveness, reputation of might, influence, etc. Its consequents (अनुभावs) are firmness, patience, heroism, charity, etc., and its transitory feelings (व्यभिचारिभावs) are contentment, judgement, pride, agitation, energy, ferocity, indignation, remembrance, horripilation, etc. It is threefold : (1) Dharmavīra or a hero in duty; (2) Dānavīra or a hero in charity; and (3) Yuddhavīra or a hero in battle.

The verse (133) below the Sūtra (II. 141), cited also in दण्डी's काव्यादर्श (2. 284), illustrates all the three kinds of heroes : "How can I become a king (worth the name) without conquering the whole earth (Yuddhavīra), without performing the various sacrifices (Dharmavīra) and without giving alms to the supplicants (Dānavīra) ?"

Hemachandra observes in the वृत्ति (II. 14 ff.) that the best instance of Dharmvīra is Jīmūtavāhana in the Nāgānandanāṭaka of Śrīharsa, Paraśurāma and Balirāja are types of Dānavīra and Rāma in the Mahāvīracarita is a type of Yuddhavīra.

Further on, in the same gloss, Hemachandra points out the main difference[92] between Raudra and Vīra so as to avoid confusion. We should remember that in the Vīrarasa there is no sense of being knee-deep in trouble or being stuck up

(Āpatpaṅkanimagnatā); the hero has loftier aims and is not satisfied with immediate hitting back, and he has no false cognition of his job, whereas in the Raudrarasa, the hero is full of egotism, infatuation and dismay; he may resort to crooked and horrible means to destroy his enemy and he is full of self-conceit.

In the Viveka, Hemachandra comments on the word[93] Nayādi in the Sūtra (II. 14) and explains नय as a proper employment of Samdhi etc. and Ṣāḍguṇya – six expedients of a king or a diplomat. Vinaya is selfcontrol or control of the senses; determination with presence of mind means ability to understand the essence of things, i.e., to say, the king's ability to hold consultations successfully. His forces are cavalry etc., and so on. वैशारद्य refers to his ability to employ one or two or three or four of the Upāyas viz., Śama, Dāna, Daṇḍa and Bheda. Explaining the threefold nature of Vīra, our author observes that Dharma, Dāna, and Yuddha pertain to behaviour or consequents (अनुभावs) but when belonging to each hero, it is of the nature of determinants (विभावs); so, due to this difference, वीररस is threefold as Bharata has put it (in ना. शा. ६. ७३).

The Terrible Sentiment

The next रस to be defined (II. 15) is the भयानकरस or the Terrible sentiment. The dominant mood (स्थायिभाव) of this sentiment is fear or भय. Its determinants (विभावs) are hideous noise, sight of ghosts, panic and anxiety due to cries of jackals and owls, sight of death or captivity of near ones or news of it, staying in an empty house, going into a forest, etc. Its consequents (अनुभावs) are trembling of the hands and the feet, unsteady glances, quaking of the heart, dryness of lips and throat, change of colour of face, change of voice, etc. And its transitory feelings (सञ्चारिभावs) are fear, stupefication, death, terror, restlessness, agitation,

helplessness, etc. Hemachandra, following Abhinavagupta, points out that Bhayānaka is natural in women and low characters and children; in high characters and middling characters, fear produced by some external reason is not genuine (for they are afraid of Guru, Rājā, etc., but there is loftiness about it; even a minister like यौगन्धरायण says 'भीत एवास्मि भर्तुः', which shows his high-mindedness and a lofty sense of duty.) Kālidāsa's celebrated verse (114) ग्रीवाभङ्गाभिरामम् etc., from the play Śākuntala, illustrates the भयानकरस in an excellent manner because it presents an excellent pen-portrait of a frightened deer which is closely followed by the King Duṣyanta.

Are Feelings Genuine Always?

Hemachandra has already touched upon the idea that in high characters fear is not genuine. To this, one may object by saying: 'Why, for instance, the kings show a mock fear towards their perceptors? Besides, why should they show mild tremblings? Why do you say that the sentiment of fear alone is not genuine? Can it not be equally said of other sentiments (like Śṛṅgāra) that they are often not genuine? A prostitute, for example, shows false love for the sake of money!'

No Genuine Fear in Superior Persons But only Modesty

Hemachandra replies: Sometimes one has to show mock fear, for instance, to create an impression that he is a modest man, as, for instance, a king shows himself frightened before his perceptors. By his mild gestures of fear, he shows that he is a polished, polite man; he is not a man of low type. But the example of a prostitute who displays false love and synthetic manners, serves no purpose or goals of life (–धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाः). However, kings or superior persons often show genuine anger or other sentiments in order to do good to others. In such cases, **it must be supposed that it is not a permanent sentiment but a transitory feeling** (व्यभिचारिभाव).

In this connection, Abhinavagupta says (in his Abhinavabhāratī under N.S.VI. 69) : Fear is natural in women, lowly persons and children. Genuine fear does not exist in the Superior and middling types of people; still, they display fear of Guru and Rājā. And this adds to their greatness. Ministers show their modesty or culture when they say that they are afraid of the master; as for example, the minister यौगन्धरायण, says : 'भीत एवास्मि भर्तुः', 'I am, indeed, afraid of the master' (Ratnāvalī I.7). To exhibit this fear, proper appearance and gesticulations are shown so that the perceptor etc. feel convinced that he is really afraid. But the fear is not genuine, and it is feigned, still, due to its practice over a long period of time, it is relished; hence it is called Rasa. Here, fear is not a transitory feeling. It would be so if it did not last even for a while naturally."

The Disgustful Sentiment

The Disgustful or Odious Sentiment (बीभत्सरस) is defined, in Sūtra 15 of Chapter-2, as having for its permanent mood the dominant state of disgust (Jugupsā). It is created by determinants (विभावs) like hearing of unpleasant, offensive, impure and harmful things, or seeking them, or descerning them – things such as words, worms, puss, etc. Its consequents (अनुभावs) are contracting the limbs or stopping the movement of all the limbs, narrowing down of the mouth, vomitting, spitting, shaking the limbs (in disgust) etc. Its transitory feelings (व्यभिचारिभावs) are epilepsy, fierceness, fainting, death, etc. The Verse (115) from the Mālatī-mādhava (V. 16) provides a typical illustration of the बीभत्सरस (Sentiment of loathing or disgust) in which a famished corpse is tearing away the skin from another corpse, and after eating the flesh from its different parts, with a horrible grinning, is, at last, trying to take slices of flesh from the uneven cavities of bones.

The Marvellous Sentiment

The next Rasa is the Marvellous Sentiment (II. 16). It basis

is the dominant emotion of विस्मय or astonishment. It is created by the विभावs or determinants such as sight of heavenly beings or events, attainment of desired objects, entrance into a superior mansion, a temple, audience hall, a seven-storied palace and seeing illusory and magical acts. It is represented by अनुभावs or consequents such as wide opening of eyes, looking with fixed gaze, horripilation, tears of joy, perspiration, joy, uttering words of approbation, making gifts, crying words like ha ha ha, waving the end of dhoti or sāri and movement of fingures etc. Its व्यभिचारिभावs or transitory feelings are joy, agitation, numbness, stupor, etc. The essence of the sense of wonder (विस्मय) is its capacity to expand the heart, and when it is realized or relished, it is the Marvellous Rasa. The verse (116) 'कृष्णेनाम्ब गतेन रन्तुमधुना etc.', provides an excellent illustration of the अद्भुतरस. In this verse, the mother is taking Kṛṣṇa to task for eating clay but then Kṛṣṇa opens his mouth to show that he did not do so, and then, in the open mouth of Kṛṣṇa, lo and behold, she saw, instead of a bit of clay, the whole world and so she was aghast with wonder.

Hemachandra's Treatment of the Śāntarasa

Unlike Mammaṭa who seems to consider शान्त as an additional Rasa and who is inclined to restrict its operation to poetry only (K. P. IV. 27-35), Hemachandra accords the status of a full-fledged Rasa to शान्त by recognizing nine Rasas (नव रसाः) straight away in Sūtra 2 of Chapter-2. Thus, like Abhinavagupta, our author categorically mentions **nine** Rasas at the outset and then in Sūtra 17 (II. 17) he defines शान्त as based on शम. Now, so far as the question of the स्थायिभाव of the शान्तरस is concerned, we know that there is a controversy and that Mammaṭa and others hold that निर्वेद is the स्थायिभाव of the शान्तरस. But Hemachandra is opposed to निर्वेद being regarded as the basis or permanent mood of शान्तरस. For, he

holds that निर्वेद is world-weariness or वैराग्य which consists in a dislike for mundane matters, and it proceeds from तत्त्वज्ञान as also ends in तत्त्वज्ञान. Thus निर्वेद becomes the effect as well as the cause of तत्त्वज्ञान and this makes no sense. For this reason, शम or तृष्णाक्षय (i.e., absence of desire and calmness or tranquility of mind) must be regarded as the स्थायिभाव of the शान्तरस.

As for the विभावs of the शान्तरस, they are detachment, dislike for संसार, knowledge of truth, absence of likes and dislikes, service to the sages, the grace of god, etc.; its अनुभावs are Yama, Niyama, scriptural study and reflection on religious matters, etc., and its accessory feelings are contentment, memory, world-weariness, intellectual thought, etc. The verse (117) from Bhartṛhari's Vairāgyaśataka (Gaṅgātīre - etc.) illustrates the Śāntarasa.

Can this Śāntarasa be regarded as an independent Rasa? Can it not be included under Bībhatsa - since Śama also means a sense of dislike? Again, Viṣayajugupsā is common both to Bībhatsa and Śānta. In this connection, Hemachandra's view is that whereas Jugupsā is the Sthāyibhāva in Bībhatsa, in Śānta it is only a Vyabhicāribhāva (transitory feeling), for the prominent feature of Śāntarasa is a quiet mind. In Jugupsā, there is some kind of excitement of mind due to the sense of repugnance. If this excitement persists, it will mar Śāntarasa. Again, if it is said that Śāntarasa could fall under Dharmavīra, the suggestion is untenable; since there is a marked difference between Dharmavīra and Śāntarasa. In Dharmavīra, due to the lofty nature of the character, a sense of just pride is present, while in Śāntarasa, there is a total absence of pride or egotism. If, despite this difference, Dharmavīra and Śānta are mixed together, then Vīra and Raudra also will have to be regarded as one.

However, if the hero of Dharmavīra is portrayed as possessing such a lofty character that he is totally devoid of

any kind of pride or egotism, and is full of quietude, we can say that he no longer remains a hero in Dharmavira, but becomes a type of Śāntarasa. Thus, it is absolutely necessary that we treat Śāntarasa as an independent Rasa.

In order to supply additional reference material on Śāntarasa, and to make the treatment of Śānta comprehensive, authoritative and authentic, Hemachandra has reproduced the relevant portion of Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhārati commentary on Śāntarasa (Viveka pp. 121–124).

Ānandavardhana's Conception of Śāntarasa

Hemachandra has used the expression तृष्णाक्षय (absence of desire) to characterize the concept of शम (tranquility or calmness of mind), which is the स्थायिभाव or permanent state of the शान्तरस (K. A. S. II. 17). But, the expression तृष्णाक्षय, which occurs in the Dhvanyāloka (III. 26 ff), itself needs explanation – and this explanation is met with in the comments of Abhinavagupta both in the Locana commentary on the Dhvanyāloka as well as the Abhinavabhārati commentary on the portion on शान्तरस in the sixth chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra.

So far as the portion on the शान्तरस[94] in the G.O.S. edition of the Nāṭyaśāstra is concerned, it must have found its way into the Nāṭyaśāstra some time before Udbhṭa's time; for Udbhaṭa is the first author who mentions the शान्तरस and includes it in his list of Rasas. In the Dhvanyāloka, while its author recognizes the शांतरस as based on तृष्णाक्षय, we can hear the echoes of a contraversy regarding the admissibility of the शान्त as a Rasa. For Ānandavardhana refers to a view which regards the शान्तरस as falling outside the pale of an ordinary persons' experience and disposes off this view by saying that the possibility of शान्तरस coming within the range of the experience of extraordinary persons should not prevent शान्तरस from being regarded as a full-fledged रस :

यदि नाम सर्वजनानुभवगोचरता तस्य नास्ति नैतावतासावलोकसामान्यमहानुभावचित्तवृत्तिविशेषः प्रतिक्षेप्तुं शक्यः । (Dhv. Āl. III. 26. ff.)

Thus Ānandavardhana categorically states that शान्त is one of the Rasas and that it is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the destruction of desires (तृष्णाक्षय). In this connection he cites a verse to the effect that the pleasure of love as also the great happiness of heaven, cannot equal even the sixth portion of the happiness which follows the destruction of desire :

यच्च काममुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।
तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशीं कलाम् ॥

Obviously, the total destruction of desire or selfish feelings, which characterizes the mental disposition called शम or tranquility of mind, is not possible in the case of ordinary persons; but the great-souled ones are capable of achieving this impossible mental state. So शान्त does exist : अस्ति शान्तो रसः. This शान्तरस connot be included within the Heroic sentiment (वीररस), as the Heroic sentiment depends on egoism. However, so far as दयावीर, a variety of वीररस, is concerned, as it depends on compassion and is devoid of egoism of any kind, it can be regarded as a variety of शान्तरस.

Ānandavardhana considers the Mahābhārata to be a highly philosophical work which stresses detachment to suggest the pre-eminence of the शान्तरस among the Rasas as also of मोक्ष, among the पुरुषार्थs or goals of life. For detachment is at the base of मोक्ष. Thus, the Mahābhārata, as a whole, promotes the highest goal of life, viz. मोक्ष and, as a work of art, it portrays the शान्तरस as the most important of all the Rasa.

Abhinavagupta's View of Śāntarasa

It is in connection with the explanation of the philosophical expression तृष्णाक्षय that Hemachandra reproduces in his Viveka

(pp. 121-124) Abhinavagupta's commentary on the portion concerning the शान्तरस in the sixth chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra (G.O.S.edition).

While discussing the sixth obstacle (विघ्न) to the Rasa-experience, Abhinavagupta mentions the four major mental states of रति, क्रोध, उत्साह and शम which are associated with the four goals of life, viz. धर्म, अर्थ, काम and मोक्ष, respectively. Thus the mental state of शम corresponds to मोक्ष and becomes its basis. This same mental state of शम again figures in Abhinavagupta's extensive discussion on the शान्तरस, for शान्त is there defined as based on the permanent mental state of शम, and it is connected with मोक्ष. Its विभावs are knowledge of the truth, detachment, purity of mind, etc. Its अनुभावs are यम and नियम as described by पतञ्जलि in his योगसूत्र, meditation on the self, devotion, compassion towards all creatures and possession of religious signs. Its व्यभिचारिभावs are निर्वेद or disgust with the world, remembrance, firmness of mind, purity in the different stages of life, स्तम्भ or rigidity (of the body), horipilations, etc.

Before we attempt a resume of the passage reproduced in the Viveka, we would do well to understand the context in which Abhinavagupta states his views on the Śānta Rasa. As is well-known, Abhinavagupta first discussed this question while commenting on Ānandavardhana's views (on the Śāntarasa) as presented in the Dhvanyāloka (III. 26 ff.). Thus, Abhinavagupta's views in the Locana commentary deal with the exact meaning of the expression तृष्णाक्षय in Ānandavardhana's definition of the शान्तरस. In this connection, he states that the complete extinction of desires, i.e., love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal of the mind from every object of sense, that alone, is happiness. The development of this, which arises from the, aesthetic enjoyment of the detachment, when

it turns into an abiding state of mind, constitutes the nature of Śāntarasa which is indeed apprehended. Others hold that the Sthāyibhāva of Śāntarasa is the calming down of all mental activities. But the absence of desires, i.e., तृष्णाक्षय, when it is taken to imply a complete negation of their existence, it means the absence of all mental activities and as such it cannot be regarded as Bhāva, i.e., a positive mental state. But, if it is understood in the sense of exclusion of all desires, then it agrees with our view. Because exclusion of something with the possibility of including its opposite is acceptable. Others base their view of Śānta on the following verse of the sage Bharata:

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद् भावः प्रवर्तते ।
पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

"Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from Śānta (a state of tranquility of mind). But, when these causes disappear, they merge back into Śānta)." According to these theorists, Śānta is common to all Rasas (सर्वरससामान्य स्वभाव) and its permanent dominant mood is that state of mind which has not been particularized into any other mood.

Abhinavagupta observes that this view is not very different from our own view. The difference is one of "non-existence of something" before its origination and 'non-existence of something' when it is destroyed. And it is correct to say that desires are destroyed. For it has been said : वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् i.e., we can never find a man who is without desires from his birth. In other words, desires, at a later stage in life, can be destroyed. Even Bharata refers to शम in 'क्वचिच्छमं' (Nāṭyaśāstra I. 106). So, barring the last stage of nirveda, in the earlier stages, described by Patañjali (Y. S. III. 10 & IV. 27), activities like Yama, Niyama, etc., as also several worldly activities are perceived even in really Śānta persons like Janaka and others. And so Śānta is apprehended because of outwardly visible

symptoms and many Vyabhicāribhāvas which are imaginable in the intervals of Yama, Niyama, etc. Śānta is perceived and its Vibhāvas such as acquaintance with people who are devoid of desire, fruition of one's former good deeds, grace of the परमेश्वर and acquaintance with the secret teaching relating to the Self must be presumed. And so, by all these, it can be shown that Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas, Vyabhicāribhāvas and a Sthāyin for Śānta, all exist. Further, there is a sympathetic response in Śānta, but that response is by a few qualified people only.

On the oneness of Vīra and Śānta, Abhinavagupta explains that while Vīra and Śānta are extremely opposed to each other because while the one (Vīra) is full of desire, the other (Śānta) is devoid of desire. Still Dayāvīra is Śānta. But Vīra and Raudra are not even very much opposed, because their similarity consists in this, that in attaining Dharma, Artha, or Kāma, both are equally helpful (उपयोगी). Dayāvīra is neither Dharmavīra nor Dānavīra, but it is another name for Śānta. And Dayāvīra is equally sanctioned by Bharata alongwith Dharmavīra and Dānavīra. It is also wrong to suppose that Bībhatsa includes Śānta since both arise from disgust (जुगुप्सा). Although Jugupsā can be a Vyabhicāribhāva of Śānta, it is not a sthāyibhāva of शान्त because in the last phases of Śānta, Jugupsā is completely ruled out. But because Śānta is grounded on Mokṣa the highest goal of life, it is the most important of all the Rasas.[95]

शान्तरस in the Abhinavabhārati

In his Abhinavabhārati commentary, Abhinavagupta disposes of the opposition to the admission of शान्त as a Rasa and silences the criticism of the aesthetics of शान्तरस by refuting all arguments against the tenability of शान्त as a Rasa.

While some theorists admit शान्त as a रस based on शम and arising out of विभावs such as ascetic practices, association with yogins, etc., अनुभावs such as the absence of lust, anger,

etc., and व्यभिचारिभावs such as firmness, wisdom, etc., other theorists do not accept this view, because, they hold that शम and शान्त are synonyms; that the admission of शम exceeds the list of the forty-nine व्यभिचारिन्s of भरतमुनि wherein शम is not mentioned; and that, while विभावs like ऋतुमाल्यादि can be appropriately connected with love, etc., which arise immediately after these विभावs, but तपस्, वेदाध्ययन, etc., do not immediately give rise to शान्त. If तपस् etc., are held to be the immediate causes of तत्त्वज्ञान, then, since तत्त्वज्ञान which precedes शान्त is their immediate effect. तपस् etc., causes to be the विभावs of शान्त. Again, the absence of lust, etc., cannot be the अनुभावs, of शान्त, because, firstly many other Rasas are also characterized by their absence and secondly such an absence of lust etc. (चेष्टाद्युपरम) is not stageable. Hence the absence of lust etc. is no conclusive evidence of शान्त. Further, firmness of mind etc., associated with attainment of an object, cannot be appropriate to शान्त. Therefore, शान्त does not exist.

Abhinavagupta's Reply to Critics of शान्तरस

Just as धर्म, अर्थ and काम are goals of life, so also मोक्ष is a goal of life and, in fact, मोक्ष dominates the other three goals in this that the scriptures uphold its importance as well as lay down the means of its attainment. So, if रति etc., which are the mental states appropriate to the first three goals, can become Rasas why cannot the mental state proper to मोक्ष, the highest goal of life, become Rasa ? Clearly, therefore, the mental state which is appropriate to the attainment of मोक्ष (परमपुरुषार्थोचिता चित्तवृत्तिः) is the स्थायिभाव of शान्त. What is the name of this चित्तवृत्ति ? निर्वेद or world-weariness born of तत्त्वज्ञान, according to some theorists. These theorists derive support from the mention (in the नाट्यशास्त्र) of निर्वेद mid-way between the list of स्थायिभावs and the सञ्चारिभावs, though tradition required a more

auspiscious word to start off the list of the सञ्चारिभावs. निर्वेद, which arises from तत्त्वज्ञान, overwhelms the other स्थायिभावs because it is more highlg stable than the others.

But an objection may be raised against निर्वेद. If निर्वेद, which arises from तत्त्वज्ञान, be the स्थायी of शान्त, thus making तत्त्वज्ञान the विभाव of निर्वेद, then, how could वैराग्य, समाधि, etc., be the विभावs of निर्वेद ? For, विभाव is the direct cause of a स्थायी, and nor a remote cause. Besides, the attitude of total dejection, which निर्वेद implies, helps the emergence of तत्त्वज्ञान from which मोक्ष comes. It is not possible for detachment to follow तत्त्वज्ञान as also for मोक्ष to follow detachment. वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलयः – detachment can lead to प्रकृतिलय, not मोक्ष. Thus निर्वेद is a remote cause of मोक्ष, not an immediate cause. In truth, तत्त्वज्ञान displays detachment and it gets stronger from stage to stage. So तत्त्वज्ञान, not निर्वेद, is the स्थायिभाव of शान्त.

A distinction can also be made between निर्वेद and वैराग्य. निर्वेद has traces of sadness, while वैराग्य is the complete destruction of attachment, hatred, grief, etc. Thus वैराग्य is a higher form of detachment than निर्वेद which often implies 'disgust,' etc. How can this निर्वेद be equated with शम, the स्थायी of शान्त ?

Others object to admitting an additional स्थायीfor शान्तरस on the ground that भरतमुनि has admitted only **eight** mental states such as रति, etc. and these same स्थायिभावs when aided by extra-worldly विभावs like श्रुत,etc., which are different from the विभावs enumerated, become enjoyable. So, one of these eight स्थायिभावs may serve the purpose of the स्थायिन् of the शान्तरस. Thus, any one of the eight स्थायिभावs – रति, हास, शोक, क्रोध, उत्साह, भय, जुगुप्सा and विस्मय – can be the स्थायी of शान्त, if properly handled.

And the sage (भरतमुनि) himself concurs with this view and admits their ability to lead to मोक्ष (N.S. VI. 17).

This view is faulty because the different स्थायिभावs would cancel each other out and so not even one स्थायी would remain to serve as the स्थायी of शान्त. As for the different approaches of developing different स्थायिन्s into शान्तरस, the proposition is impracticable because an infinity of शान्तरसs will result from the dependence of these स्थायिन्s of शान्त on the approaches of the persons concerned. To say that all स्थायिन् merge to become one स्थायिन् of शान्त is to assume the co-existence of the different states of mind at the same moment – but this view is untenable; for different states of mind cannot co-exist at the same time and some of them are even antagonistic.

Thus, तत्त्वज्ञान alone is the means of attaining मोक्ष. This तत्त्वज्ञान is another name of आत्मज्ञान and hence आत्मन is the स्थायिन् of शान्त. As this आत्मन् is possessed of several pure qualities such as knowledge, bliss, etc., and as it is devoid of the enjoyment of sense objects, it is the स्थायिन् of शान्त. As तत्त्वज्ञान, this स्थायिन् provides the back-drop to all emotions and,thus,is the most stable of all the स्थायिन्s. Thus being the most fundamental स्थायिभाव, which reduces the other स्थायिन्s into accessories, the permanent nature of तत्त्वज्ञान needs no separate mention and so the number (49) of the सञ्चारिभावs is not disturbed.

शम is the nature of the self (आत्मस्वरुप or आत्मस्वभाव). It is totally a different kind of state of mind. As such, the nature of the self is itself the knowledge of the truth (तत्त्वज्ञान) and it is also tranquility (शम).

The Passage on शान्तरस in the Viveka

Since Hemachandra considers शम to be the स्थायीभाव of शान्तरस

and since this शम is characterized by a total absence of desires, he provides supplementary material on this topic in his Viveka (pp. 121-124) by reproducing Abhinavagupta's views on this topic. The portion given under तृष्णाक्षय इति (K.A.S. II. 17 ff.) is, therefore, summarized herebelow :

शम is the nature of the self, after the desires have been totally destroyed. The point is : The nature of the self, devoid of the particular dark colourations of भय, रति etc., is like a very white thread that shines through the interstices of sparsely threaded jewels. It assumes the forms of all the various feeling like रति, etc., because all these tinge it. But it shines out through them according to the maxim : सकृद्विभातोऽयमात्मा (सदाभासमानः) i.e., once this self shines, (it shines forever).

It is devoid of the entire net-work of miseries which consist in turning away from the self. It is identical with the consciousness of the realization of the highest bliss. It makes the heart of the sensitive spectator in tune with that consciousness or bliss.

Thus, the argument that Nirveda, though not an anspiscious भाव, was mentioned by the sage at the head of the list of the सञ्चारिभावs, with a view to show its permanent nature, is rejected. To explain : Is this निर्वेद born of poverty, etc. or born of तत्त्वज्ञान ? If the former, it will be soon mentioned as a व्यभिचारी. If निर्वेद, born of तत्त्वज्ञान, is treated as a स्थायी (of शान्त), then तत्त्वज्ञान itself would become its विभाव ! But how can तत्त्वज्ञान which arises from वैराग्य etc. become a विभाव ? If you urge that because it is a cause of निर्वेद, then we will have the contingency of the cause of another cause becoming the cause (विभाव). But, in fact, निर्वेद, is characterized by वैराग्य (detachment) and is, on the contrary, a means of तत्त्वज्ञान; for a detached man so strives as to attain तत्त्वज्ञान. तत्त्वज्ञान leads to मोक्ष — not to निर्वेद. If you say, for a knower of truth, detachment always

grows from stage to stage. That is so. Such a detachment indicates the height of knowledge (ज्ञानस्यैव पराकाष्ठा). Hence निर्वेद cannot be the स्थायिन् of शान्त.

As for the सम्यग्ज्ञान which will be mentioned in connection with निर्वेद as a व्यभिचारिभाव (K.A.S. II. 48; Viveka, p. 139), it refers to the true knowledge which dispells the illusory nature of the experiences of the world, which is the cause of निर्वेद or word-weariness, a kind of dejection, disappointment. Hence शम or tranquility of the mind is the permanent mental state (स्थायी) of शान्तरस.

One should not suspect that शम and शान्त are synonyms like हास and हास्य (i.e., स्थायी and रस); for शम and शान्त are really different : शम is सिद्ध, शान्त is साध्य; शम is लौकिक, शान्त is अलौकिक; शम is साधारण, शान्त is असाधारण. Just as the mental states appropriate to पुरुषार्थेs of life such as काम etc. are called by the names of रति etc. and are brought to the state of Rasas such as शृङ्गार etc. in relation to sensitive spectators through the art of the poet and the acting of the actor, so also the mental state proper to the पुरुषार्थ called मोक्ष, which is the highest goal of life, is brought to the state of a Rasa.

Let us explain this : The entire group of mental states, both ordinary and extraordinary, can become the helper of the major emotion known as शम whose nature is the knowledge of the truth. Its अनुभावs are अनुभावs helped by यम, नियम, etc.; its विभावs are the grace of God, etc., and Rati etc., which are soon to be destroyed completely, can be aesthetically enjoyed in शान्त (as subsidiary, momentary elements). Just as औत्सुक्य in विप्रलम्भ शृङ्गार or in सम्भोग शृङ्गार (as per the adage : प्रेमासमाप्तोत्सवम्); औग्र्य in रौद्र; निर्वेद, धृति, त्रास and हर्ष in करुण, वीर, भयानक and अद्भुत respectively – although these are all व्यभीचारिन्s, yet they appear prominently; so also in शान्त, जुगुप्सा etc. appear

predominantly as they are completely opposed to love. The उत्साह of such people, who are contented in the knowledge of the self, is characterized by परोपकारेच्छा and दया and so this उत्साह takes the form of an effort calculated to help others. It is for this reason that शान्त is so often referred to by some people as दयावीर and as धर्मवीर by others.

If it be urged that उत्साह is animated by ego (अहङ्कार) but शान्त is characterized by a relaxation of the ego (अहङ्कार-शैथिल्य), we say, so what? There is nothing wrong in an opposing mood becoming a व्यभिचारिन् in शान्त, like निर्वेद in शृङ्गार. In verses like शय्या शाद्वलम् etc. (नागानन्द 4.2), उत्साह is very much a characteristic of परोपकारेच्छा. In fact, there is no state of the mind which is devoid of उत्साह, for in the absence of desire as well as effort, one would be like a stone (इच्छाप्रयत्नव्यतिरेकेण पाषाणतापत्तेः). Again, for a self-realized man, who has no selfish thoughts, nothing remains to be done. Hence, his heart (mind) is tranquil and he can give his all, including his body. This is in accordance with the scriptures. For, body is preserved for चतुर्वर्ग, as the धर्मशास्त्रs declare in words like आत्मानं गोपयेत्. But this is true in the case of unrealized persons; for, in the case of self-realized men, the goals of life (चतुर्वर्ग) are all achieved. To explain :

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां प्राणाः संस्थितिहेतवः ।
तान्निघ्नता किं न हतं, रक्षता किं न रक्षितम् ॥

Life is the main-stay of the four goals of life, viz. धर्म, अर्थ, काम and मोक्ष. If life is destroyed, what (indeed) is not destroyed? But if life is preserved, everything is preserved (achieved).

Thus the main purpose of preserving the body is to achieve the celebrated four goals of life. But, for self-realized souls, everything is achieved (in renunciation) as declared in these words : जलेऽग्नौ श्वभ्रे वा पतेत्.

Thus, if the body is to be, somehow, renounced, it is better that it is sacrificed for the good of others. If it is pointed out that persons like जीमूतवाहन (in the play नागानन्द) have not renounced everything, then, we say, that makes no difference. For, in the case of जीमूतवाहन, there is certainly the state of self-realization or knowledge of the truth. How, else, do you explain his self-sacrifice for the sake of others ?

In a war, a warrior (hero) does not discard his body, activated as he is by a desire to vanquish another warrior. In some cases, however, the desire for obtaining another, more auspicious body is predominant. So, whatever is done by the self-realized ones – from acts of charity to laying down the body, if all this is done by the householders or ordinary men, it is also termed तत्त्वज्ञान. For the scriptures hold that a man who has acquired the knowledge of the truth is freed in all stages of life :

ज्ञानिनां सर्वेष्वाश्रमेषु मुक्तिः ।

And an ordinary pious man who is devout and selfless, and is intent on knowledge of the self, though he may be a householder, is freed :

देवार्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञाननिष्ठोऽतिथिप्रियः ।
श्राद्धं कृत्वा ददद् द्रव्यं गृहस्थोऽपि हि मुच्यते ॥

As for बोधिसत्त्वs and तत्त्वज्ञानिन्s, who lay down their bodies to serve the cause of धर्म and with a view to do good to others, a body, appropriate to their good deeds, is, once again acquired by them.

This शान्तरस is fully enjoyed, despite the fact that it is not a chief Rasa but is only an अङ्ग of some other Rasa. Thus it is that शान्त can assume a subservient role, though by nature it is a principal Rasa. In the play called Nāgānanda, though शान्त is there, it is not the chief Rasa; for, in it, the achievement of त्रिवर्ग (धर्म, अर्थ and काम), with special emphasis

on helping others, is the final result in the case of जीमूतवाहन, the hero of the play. It is clear that उत्साह is principally intended here, and this उत्साह is characterized by दया; so the principal Rasa in the Nagananda is दयावीर. The other mental states, however, act as subsidiary emotions in relation to this dominant Rasa.

Thus, the efforts of some theorists (like the efforts of धनञ्जय in his दशरूपक II. 4-5) to establish जीमूतवाहन as a धीरोदात्त hero are shown to be untenable. Nevertheless, that शान्त which has reached the last stage, wherein all अनुभावs are absent, cannot be represented. In love and sorrow, too, the peak experience (फलभूमि) cannot be represented. But in the earlier stage, described by Patanjali in his Yogasūtra (III. 10 and IV. 27), activities like यम, नियम etc., or worldly activities are perceived even in really शान्त persons like Janaka and others. And so शान्त is, indeed, apprehended because of outwardly visible symptoms and many व्यभिचारिभावs which are imaginable in the intervals of यम, नियम, etc.

It may be urged that, though शान्त may exist, yet, since it cannot be appreciated by everyone, it is not tenable. On these grounds, we say, even a Rasa like शृङ्गार will cease to be a Rasa, just because it cannot be appreciated by the recluses. We must remember that everyone cannot experience everything. While शान्तरस may not be within the range of everyone's experience, it cannot, for that reason, be discounted as a Rasa; for शान्त is a special charecteristic of the mental disposition of the extraordinary, great persons.

Hemachandra's Treatment of Śanta : A Review

In strict critical terms, Hemachandra's treatment of the शान्तरस is wholly in keeping with Abhinavagupta's views on the subject. A close study of Hemachandra's gloss on Sūtra 17 of Chapter two of the Kavyanuśasana as well as of the

Viveka text (pp. 121-124) clearly reveals that Hemachandra completely follows Abhinavagupta's exposition of the Śāntarasa portion, both in the Locana commentary on Dhvanyāloka (III & IV) and in the Abhinavabhāratī commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra (VI) passage on the Śāntarasa. However, Hemachandra uses his discrimination in the matter of adopting Abhinavagupta's theoretical views as well as extracts from his works, inasmuch as he first decides on his own line of treatment and then draws upon the information or expression contained in the Locana or the Abhinavabhāratī in consonance with his requirement and purpose. Thus he adapts portions from both of Abhinavagupta's texts in his gloss as well as the Viveka commentary so as to make out a convincing case for the existance of शान्तरस as also for the tenability of शम as an additional (ninth) स्थायिभाव and to highlight the theoretical as well as the philosophical aspects of Abhinavagupta's philosophy of aesthetic pleasure with special reference to the शान्तरस.

In terms of the Locana commentary of Abhinavagupta, तृष्णाक्षय i.e., the total extinction of desires or love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal of the mind from every object of sense (i.e., detachment), an expression used by Ānandavardhana himself, is to be developed for aesthetic enjoyment, that is to say, तृष्णाक्षय should become an abiding state of mind. This is शम, a स्थायिभाव of शान्त. This तृष्णाक्षयरूप शम is the nature of शान्तरस and this is, indeed, apprehended : प्रतीयत एव. This is a positive mental state from which all desires are excluded. Such a state is necessary for मोक्ष, the highest goal of life and it comes through spiritual discipline and can be found in high-souled persons. Among the other Rasas, दयावीर, a variety of वीररस, meets the requirements of the शान्तरस to a great extent. Hence, Abhinava considers it to be another name of शान्त.

It may be added that Hemachandra has utilized the Locana commentary, too, to explain certain knotty problems connected

with the controversy regarding the tenability of शान्त as an aesthetic principle.

शान्तरस : The Views of Dhananjaya and Dhanika

Dhananjaya, the author of the Daśarūpaka, a well-known treatise on Dramatorgy, refers to शम or tranquility of mind (IV-35) while enumerating the eight traditional स्थायिभावs such as रति etc. He maintains that while some people have recognized शम as a स्थायिभाव, we think that it cannot be developed in plays : पुष्टिर्नाट्येषु नैतस्य.

Commenting on this, Dhanika, the author of the Avaloka commentary of the दशरूपक, states that a great difference of opinion prevails in regard to the शान्तरस. Notable among these differing views are three views. These are :

1. शान्तरस has not been defined by Bharata and he has not mentioned its विभावs;
2. शान्तरस cannot exist in actual practice because it is impossible to root out राग, द्वेष etc., and
3. शान्तरस can be included within वीररस, बीभत्सरस etc.

In view of this, शम cannot be accepted as a separate स्थायिभाव. Besides, शम consists in a total cessation of activity and as such it is impossible to act it out in any नाटक, wherein acting is essential.[96] But, according to Dhanika, though शान्त cannot be introduced in a play, as its acting is impossible, yet, since all things can be described in words, its presentation in poetry cannot be ruled out : शान्तरसस्य...काव्यविषयत्वं न निवार्यते.

Dhananjaya holds that शान्तरस, which consists in the heightening of शम, need not be (separately) mentioned because the mental attitudes like मुदित etc., out of which it is developed, are of the same nature (as विकास, विस्तार, क्षोभ and विक्षेप, which are at the root of the other eight स्थायिभावs).[97]

Further, शान्तरस, being devoid of sorrow, happiness, anxiety, love, hatred and desire, is based on शम. Such a sentiment is possible only in the state of मोक्ष which is of the form of the realization of the true nature of the self. But this state is indescribable and as such it is without any positive attributes. And there are no sensitive readers who are competent to enjoy such a रस. But मुदिता, मैत्री, करुणा and उपेक्षा which are the means leading to it, are of the nature of विकास, विस्तार, क्षोभ and विक्षेप, and as these four states of mind are known to be associated with the eight स्थायिभावs, the aesthetic relish of शान्तरस can be taken to have been already described.

Apart from the theoretical discussion on शान्तरस and its स्थायिभाव (शम), we also meet with comments of considerable critical significance in Dhanika's Avaloka commentary. Thus, while commenting on Dhananjaya's definition of the धीरोदात्त नायक (II.4), Dhanika deals with the question whether जीमूतवाहन, the विद्याधर hero of the नागानन्दनाटक is a धीरोदात्त नायक or a शान्त नायक.

Is जीमूतवाहन a शान्त नायक ?

Dhanika realizes that the definition of a शान्त नायक as given by Dhananjaya (II. 4), which states that such a शान्त hero should be twice-born etc. and that he should be endowed with general virtues, is very formal, is neither realistic nor exclusive. This is proved, firstly, by the fact that it excludes जीमूतवाहन, a विद्याधर, who is exceedingly peaceful and compassionate, like a sage who has subdued all his passions, from being considered a शान्त नायक and, secondly, by the impossibility of all the general qualities of a धीरशान्त being found in any and every धीरशान्त नायक. If we look to the behaviour of the Buddha, of जीमूतवाहन and युधिष्ठिर, we find that they are शान्त heroes. Yet, they all may not fit in with the fixed definition

of a शान्त hero. In the case of जीमूतवाहन, the main difficulty is that his love for मलयवती rules out his being considered a शान्त hero. So technically, जीमूतवाहन is a धीरोदात्त hero, and not a धीरशान्त hero. But in real terms, characters like जीमूतवाहन are शान्त heroes. As between the Buddha and जीमूतवाहन, the difference is that the Buddha is a कारुणिक in a निष्काम way but जीमूतवाहन is कारुणिक in a सकाम way. This makes जीमूतवाहन a धीरोदात्त hero. In all other ways he is an उदात्ततम – the most exalted – hero and can be classed with the Buddha, Yudhiṣṭhira and such other personages.

Only Eight Sthāyibhāvas, Says Dhanika

We have seen how Abhinavagupta rejects the suggestion that जीमूतवाहन is a धीरोदात्त hero (Viveka, p. 123, ll. 18-19). His contention is that if जनक and others, despite their wordly pre-occupations, are held to be शान्त heroes, why not जीमूतवाहन? Dhanika seems to agree with this contention and yet he cannot support the view that शम, which is the स्थायिभाव of शान्त, is the स्थायिभाव in the play नागानन्द; for the portrayal in this play of जीमूतवाहन's love for मलयवती, which runs through the whole play, is contrary to the mental state of शम and such contraries cannot be found to exist (i.e., love and detachment cannot co-exist) in the same character. Therefore, उत्साह or energy connected with दयावीर (as the principal Rasa) is the स्थायिभाव of the नागानन्द. Thus only eight Rasas are possible (and not nine, the ninth being शम). However, as we know, Dhanika has granted the possibility of the ninth Rasa in poetry, whose medium is only words.

Thus both Dhanañjaya and Dhanika seem to be set against the number of Rasas being nine or more as also against the admission of शम as a स्थायिभाव so far as the different types of Drama are concerned.

Mammaṭa's View About Śāntarasa

In the fourth chapter (IV. 29) of his Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammaṭa mentions the well-known eight Rasas and adds that these are the eight Rasas in dramatic art (अष्टौ नाट्यरसाः स्मृताः). Similarly, in Kārika 30 of chapter 4, he enumerates the **eight** basic mental states (स्थायिभावs) and observes that these (eight) are the basic, permanent states or emotions. Then, after stating the thirty three accessory feelings as per Bharata's Verses (N. S. VI. 19-22), Mammaṭa remarks in the gloss that the mention of निर्वेद or Despair, though inauspicious as a | भाव, is done (by भरतमुनि) at the beginning of the list of the accessory feelings in order to show its nature of a permanent mental state. And it is with this निर्वेद as its स्थायिभाव that शान्त is also the ninth Rasa : निर्वेदस्थायिभावोऽस्ति शान्तोऽपि नवमो रसः (K. P. IV. 35).

From the manner of Mammaṭa's presentation of the topic of शान्तरस, it is reasonable to infer that he regards शान्त as an additional Rasa and assigns it a role in poetry only, but not in a play (नाटक). In fact, the poetic illustration that Mammaṭa provides for the शान्तरस confirms our surmise that for him शान्त is an additional (नवमः, ninth) poetic sentiment (काव्यरस).

It may be noted that Mammaṭa does not dwell any further on the subject of शान्तरस or its स्थायिन् (निर्वेद) and thus, unlike अभिनवगुप्त or धनिक, he skirts the philosophical and theoretical issues connected with the शान्तरस by his sketchy treatment of शान्तरस.

The Nine Dominant Moods or Mental States

Hemachandra deals with the nine permanent, dominant mental states or moods of the foregoing nine Rasas in the next Sūtra (II. 18). He says that Rati (Love), Hāsa (Laughter), Śoka (Grief), Krodha (Anger), Utsāha (Energy), Bhaya (Fear), Jugupsā (Disgust), Vismaya (Wonder) and S'ama (Absence of

desire or tranquility of mind) are the (nine) permanent states or moods (स्थायिनः भावाः).

The term Bhāva, according to Hemachandra, means states of mind which in everyday life cannot be enjoyed with pleasure by others, but when delineated in the province of poetry, they become fit objects of extraordinary enjoyment through the poetic and dramatic apparatus such as acting, representation, etc. Or because they pervade the mind of the audience and, therefore, they are called Bhāvāḥ. Thus, the above explanation applies both to the Sthāyibhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas.

The Sthāyibhāvas are inborn, dominant and latent emotions present in every human heart. Every man has a desire for pleasure. Every human being, at some time or the other, considers himself superior to others and laughs at them. He has his moments of anger, sorrows, lofty thoughts, loathing and wonder. The only difference found is a difference of degree or a variation in the extent of the interaction of these feelings. The standard for judging these feelings as lower or higher depends on whether they help promote the goals of life (पुरुषार्थs) or not. These emotions or feelings deserve depiction only if they help one of the four goals of human life.

Vyabhicāribhāvas such as Dhṛti (contentment) etc., on the other hand, are fluctuating feelings. Some people tend to be devoid of some Vyabhicāribhāvas, for instance, a sound mind and a sound body can never be a prey to indolence (Ālasya) or exertion (Śrama) or langour (Glāni).

Some transitory feelings, again, appear in a man but disappear when their cause is removed. In other words, the transitory feelings, by definition, are fleeting, short-lived feelings which come and go. These feelings are not inborn and dominant or permanent as the Sthāyibhāvas are. Even when these latter (Sthāyibhāvas) seem to disappear when the cause of their development is removed, they do not entirely disappear, but lie dormant in the heart (प्रलीनकल्पा अपि संस्कारशेषतां

नातिवर्तन्ते), awaiting a favourable opportunity for their development. Thus the inherent power of the dominant emotions is never exhausted.

On the other hand, the Vyabhicaribhāvas spring from some outward cause. For example, when a man is tired (Glāna), we ask: 'What is the cause of his fatigue (Glāni)?' This shows that his feeling of fatigue is not inborn. But we never ask the question: 'Why is Rama or Bhimasen full of energy (Utsāha)?' For, we know that this feeling never arises from external causes. Vibhāvas merely develop them. It is, therefore, that these Sthāyibhāvas are described as Vāsanārūpa in our minds.

Sometimes, some Sthāyibhāvas, when not fully developed, are called Vyabhicāribhāvas; for instance, the Rati of Rāvaṇa towards Sītā, not being reciprocated, never attains the position of a Sthāyibhāva but remains a Vyabhicāribhāva only. So also the love we feel for our elders or servants which is only a Bhāva. Anger in Śṛṅgāra and Vīra is only a Bhāva. Thus Vyabhicārins are by nature dependent, transitory and non-permanent.

Hemachandra explains the Sthāyibhāvas by saying that Rati consists in mutual love, Hāsa in the dilation of the heart, Śoka in the agony of the heart, Krodha in the display of fierceness, tumultuous behaviour marks Utsāha, Bhaya implies feebleness, Jugupsā means contraction of the mind, Vismaya means expansion of the mind, and Śama is total destruction of desire (तृष्णाक्षय). While all the other Sthāyins assume the role of a Vyabhicārin on occasions, Śama, the Sthāyin of Śānta, never becomes a Vyabhicārin, though it may be Apradhāna sometimes, because it is the Sthāyin of Sthāyins. Being the very nature of the mind, it always remains permanent and dominant (शमस्य....सर्वत्र प्रकृतित्वेन स्थायितमत्वात्[98]).

The Accessory Emotions

In the next Sūtra (II. 19), our author enumerates the thirty three Vyabhicāribhāvas – beginning with Dhṛti, they are Dhṛti,

Smṛti, Mati, Vrīḍā, Jāḍya, Viṣāda, Mada, Vyādhi, Nidrā, Supta, Autsukya, Avahittha, Śaṅkā, Cāpala, Ālasya, Harṣa, Garva, Augrya, Prabodha, Glāni, Dainya, Śrama, Unmāda, Moha, Cintā, Amarṣa, Trāsa, Apasmāra, Nirveda,[99] Āvega, Vitarka, Asūyā, Mṛti, (Sthiti, Udaya, Praśama, Sandhi and Śabalatva). The list of the thirty three Vyabhicārins extends upto Mṛti (death). Thereafter it is mentioned that these Bhāvas sometimes seem to be steady – not as steady as the Sthāyibhavās, but comparatively steady – and so they are called Bhāvasthiti etc. For instance, the Vyabhicāribhāva, Vitarka (conjecture) in the verse (117) Tiṣṭhet kopavaśāt etc., from the fourth act of the Vikramorvaśīyam, remains steady throughout the verse, for, the verse contains a series of conjectures. Here, the main sentiment is Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra, but the Vitarkabhāvasthiti – a series of conjectures adds a lot of charm to this poem and helps strengthen the main sentiment.

Bhāvasthiti, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvapraśama, Bhāvasandhi and Bhāvaśabalatā

Sometimes a feeling appears very prominently in a poem. This is called Bhāvodaya which is explained in the verse (118) 'Yāte gotraviparyaye' etc. In this verse, a women offended by the mention of another lady's name (Gotraviparyaya or Gotraskhalana) by her lover through inadvertence, being on the same bed with her husband, made a semblance of amorous gestures, but did not embrace him with her breasts. This verse illustrates Mānodaya (appearance of anger). The next verse (119) 'दृष्टे लोचनवन्' etc.,' explains Bhāvapraśama or the disappearance of a feeling in a prominent way. "When the lover was seen, her anger began to contract like her eyes; when he stood next to her, her anger bent down like her face; when he touched her, her anger came out like her horripilation; when he began to talk to her, her anger began to slip off like the knot of her garment; and when he fell at her feet, her anger entirely vanished as though it were ashamed (to stay on any longer)."

Bhāvasandhi occurs when two feelings prominently come in conjunction with each other. The verse (120) 'उरिसरकस्य etc.', illustrates this. Rāma, who was in the company of Sītā was told about the arrival of Paraśurāma. At that moment, he felt a genuine pleasure at the arrival of Paraśurāma and an intense joy at the embrace of Sītā. Here two Bhāvas are combined.

When two feelings come side by side, they give rise to Bhāvasandhi. But when diverse feelings come and go in quick succession, thus rendering the poem very charming, these feelings are called Bhāvaśabalatā. This is illustrated in the verse (121) Kvākāryaṁ etc., where a king experiences Vitarka, Autsukya, Rati, Smaraṇa, Śankā, Dainya, Dhṛti and Cintā in quick succession, as he, on being attracted towards a charming lady, is assailed by an overpowering feeling of love.

Hemachandra explains (K.A.S., P. 128) the term Vyabhicārin by saying that they are so called because they help the development of the Sthāyibhāvas by their presence or their movements : विविधमाभिमुख्येन स्थायिधर्मोपजीवनेन स्वधर्मार्पणेन च चरन्तीति व्यभिचारिणः. The number of these is strictly thirty thiree. Hemachandra shows how the other feelings like Dambha, Udvega, Kṣudhā and Tṛṣṇā etc., can be brought under Avahittha, Nirveda and Glāni respectively. He also explains all the व्यभिचारिभावs with suitable illustrations (K.A.S. II. 20-52).

The Sāttvika·bhāvas : Hemachandra's Interpretation

Hemachandra deals with the eight Sāttvika-bhāvas called Stambha, Sveda, Romāñca, Savarabheda, Kampa, Vaivarṇya, Aśru and Pralaya in Sūtra 53 of chapter two.

These eight Sāttvika-bhāvas are indications of internal feelings and as such are Anubhāvas (outward indications, though they are called Bhāvas or feelings); but although to all appearances these Sāttvika-bhāvas seem to be nothing but Anubhāvas, yet they are significantly regarded by Hemachandra as Bhāvas or internal feelings. Mammaṭa and others do not treat of these Sāttvika-bhāvas separately but

consider them as belonging to the class of pure Anubhāvas or indications of Rasa.

सत्त्व is the internal quality that exhibits to view the Rasas and these Sāttvika-bhāvas proceed directly from that internal quality. Ordinary Anubhāvas are mere outward movements that may or may not indicate any sentiment, but these Sāttvika-bhāvas are invariably associated with the Rasas and appear only to indicate the Rasas. Thus it is evident that Sāttvika-bhāvas belong to a higher plane than that of the Anubhāvas.

Hemachandra further clarifies that these Sāttvika-bhāvas are in themselves feelings or bhāvas; for, Bharata does not call them bhāvas for nothing and they stand on a par with the thirty three Vyabhicāribhāvas. But they are not included in the list of the Accessories (Sañcārins) since the latter spring from outward causes such as Ālasya, Glāni, Śrama, etc., while the Sāttvika-bhāvas spring only from the internel quality of the heart. Thus Hemachandra is of the firm opinion that they stand superior even to the Vyabhicāribhāvas. These Sāttvika-bhāvas are so closely connected with the Rasas – especially with Śṛṅgārarasa – that their Vibhāvas are the same as those of the Rasas. Thus the Sāttvika-bhāvas themselves are indicated by Anubhāvas and as such they are totally different from the Anubhāvas.

Hemachandra gives an original and peculiar etymology of the term Sāttvika. 'Sattvaṁ' means 'Prāṇa' and the Sthāyibhāvas which awaken from their dormant state and try to manifest themselves, on their way, come to the province of Prāṇa and assume a totally different form. These Sthāyibhāvas, transformed owing to their contact with Prāṇa, are known as Sāttvika-bhāvas.[100]

These Sāttvika-bhāvas, although they are exactly similar to some of the ordinary Anubhāvas, yet they must be regarded as different from them. Aśru, a Sāttvika-bhāva is not the same as ordinary tears; for these tears may be caused by anything.

A set of feelings, coming in contact with Prāṇa with the element of Pṛthvī in it, is called Stambha. Another, coming in contact with Prāṇa of the Jala kind assumes the form of Bāṣpa. A third, coming in contact with Prāṇa of the Tejas type, gives rise to Sveda and Vaivarṇya. A fourth set of feelings, allied with Prāṇa of the Ākāśa type, gives birth to Pralaya and, finally, the fifth set of feelings, connected with Prāṇa of the Vāyu type, gives rise to three Sāttvika-bhāvas, viz., Romāñca, Vepathu and Svarabhaṅga, differing in degrees from one another.

Thus there are these eight Sāttvika-bhāvas. They are internal feelings. Outward Paralysis (Stambha) is a quality of the body, and thus differs from the internal Stambha – a Sāttvika-bhāva. Thus we have nine Sthāyibhāvas or dominant emotions, thirty three Vyabhicāribhāvas and eight Sāttvika-bhāvas making a total number of fifty Bhāvas.

In the Viveka commentary (pp. 144–145), Hemachandra elaborates on the concepts of Prāṇabhūmi,[101] Stambha, Pralaya, Romāñce, Vepathu, Svarabheda, etc., and notes that these Sāttvika-bhāvas are associated with each Rasa and never appear independently, like the Vyabhicāribhāvas which can come independently, on the analogy of the King attending the marriage ceremony at the house of an attendant. All these Sāttvikas are not illustrated in the gloss because their examples are easy to find.

As for Prāṇabhūmi, Hemachandra explains that, in short, the Sthāyins like Rati, etc., become Sāttvika-bhāvas in contact with Prāṇa and are called Sāttvika-bhāvas. He quotes a line from the Harṣacarita of Bāṇa to the effect that first penance melts and then it becomes perspiration. And a Bhāva brought to this state by the Vyabhicārins, Avahittha etc., but not exhibited, is to be seen in the world too. He quotes the verse (Viveka, V. 170) which applies to Sāgara also. The verse means that the heart of the beloved, the ocean of love, agitated by the sight of the moon in the shape of the lover's face, is not able to remain stable, though it spreads by means of perspiration

which is obstructed from great movement. When applied to the ocean, the verse means : The ocean which was agitated due to the rise of the moon, its lover, with its waves obstructed by the great bridge, still, a great surprise, it goes on producing waves. The first meaning is : On sighting the face of the lover, the heart of the beloved is agitated by love, lest it should run to elders, with this in view it is **checked** through control of sweat, etc., does not find rest and remains agitated by **mental disturbance in the form of internal sweat** etc.

Now, according to Hemachandra, this verse bears out his statement that it can be seen in the world also that a certain Bhāva – Sāttvika-bhāva, which is internally evident but does not find scope to manifest itself due to a check or break applied to stop it from appearing outwardly. Another point that Hemachandra makes in the Viveka is with regard to the words 'Ratyādigatena' in the gloss. He explains the gloss by saying that the dormant, dominant emotions like Rati, etc., are called up by Vibhāvas and manifested by Anubhāvas. These Bhāvas are different from tears, etc., which are physical but the same Bhāvas, when they come into contact with Prāṇa, become Sāttvikas. These are similar to Anubhāvas but are still regarded as distinct from them. Our author remarks in the Viveka that the Vibhāvas are not different, for they are independent of any association with any external object. And Glāni, Ālasya, Shrama, etc. (Vyabhicārins), though devoid of any exciting support (Ālambanaviṣayaśunyatā), still because they are born of external causes, are counted as Vyabhicārins. However, Stambha etc. are not produced by external physical causes. In other words, Aśru is a Sāttvika-bhāva, and is different from tears which may arise from a physical cause.

As for Stambha, it is a paralysed state of mind. When the mind is influenced by joy etc., when it is not subject to any sense – regulation, since it is gone beyond the ken of thought, and when external senses are subject to physical limitations

(for example, the verse तं ताण etc., Setu. II. 45), then, this paralysis overcomes a person who exhibits the stage of Stambha.

Thus Hemachandra explains the nature of the Sāttvika-bhāvas rather peculiarly, originally and authentically as well as exhaustively. Hemachandra's analysis shows that the Sāttvika-bhāvas are nothing but Anubhāvas in a subtle, mental sense.

Dhanañjaya's Views on Sāttvika-bhāvas

Traditionally, the Sāttvika-bhāvas or Involuntary states are separately treated, although they belong with the Consequents, because in the opinion of Dhanañjaya (D.R. IV.4) "they are different from the Anubhāvas just because of their arising from the inner nature (Sattva); and this is the reason for the realisation of such states". The eight involuntary states are : (1) Paralysis (Stambha), (2) Sweat (Sveda), (3) Horripilation (Romāñca), (4) Change of voice (Svarabheda), (5) Trembling (Kampa or Vepathu), (6) Change of Colour (Vaivarṇya), (7) Weeping (Aśru), and (8) Fainting (Pralaya). Dhanañjaya notes that of these, Paralysis is immobility of body, and Fainting is loss of consciousness. The characteristics of the rest are sufficiently clear.

However, each of the eight Sāttvika-bhāvas has its distinguishing characteristics. Thus, Stambha or Stupefaction is an outcome of wonder, grief, some disease, fear or an ecstatic joy. Sveda or Sweat or Perspiration is a natural consequence of exercise, heat, exhaustion, sickness, anger excessive joy, bashfulness or restlessness. Romāñca or Horripilation is a physical state in which hairs stand on their ends on account of the epidermic contact or fear, excessive cold, joy and anger, or due to bodily infirmity or some disease. Svarabheda or Change of Voice is caused by an intoxicated state of mind, old age, sickness, fear, anger or joy. Kampa or Tremor is a result of cold, fear, anger, joy, senility, some peculiar physical contact or disease. Vaivarṇya or Pallor is a change in the colour of the complexion or loss of bloom

on a face. It is generally due to some hesitation or dejection, grief or failure, of purpose. It is also caused by intoxication, wrath and acrimony. In the latter case, the face gets copper-coloured and the eyes are reddened. Thus, any change in the normal hue of the face is Vaivarṇya. Aśru or Weeping or Tears proceed from jubilation, lack of fortitude, smoke, use of collorium, yawning, grief, or consternation. Even steadfast gaze, extreme cold or certain diseases are capable of producing tears.

According to the poetic belief, tears that proceed from excessive joy or exestatic exultation are supposed to be cool and are distinguished as tears of joy from what are known as tears of sorrow which trickle down the face on account of bereavement or grief, and are conceived as hot. Pralaya or Swoon springs from some shocking event, unbearable grief, extreme exertion, overdose of stimulants, use of poison, protracted sleeplessness or physical strain caused by beating, flogging or hurt.

Pseudo-Suggestion or आभास: Semblance of Rasa, Bhāva, etc.

The relish of a sentiment is the highest kind of Aesthetic experience. This is true when the presentation of the sentiment is with reference to an appropriate or proper substratum. But when the presentation of a particular sentiment is done improperly, i.e., with reference to an inappropriate substratum, it is deemed undignified. In such cases, even though the suggestion of the Rasa or Bhāva takes place, it always remains below the high standard of aesthetic relish. In other words, the aesthetic appeal in such a situation gets dimmed. Under such circumstances it is only a **semblance** of Rasa or Bhāva that we get and so it may be called a pseudo-sentiment or Rasābhāsa. However, the inappropriateness of development of the Rasa may be due to the deficiency of proper suggestion or due to the inadequate development of the emotion which

may arise from the lack of some necessary ingredients as pointed out by Bharata.

This inappropriateness differs in its nature from Rasa to Rasa. Thus, for example, when the emotion of love of a woman is developed with reference to an adulterer or with reference to numerous paramours or low characters, it becomes generally disgusting and does not attain to the position of the शृंङ्गाररस. Again, if a man's incestuous love is demonstrated with reference to the wife of a sage or preceptor or a king, the extreme immorality of this love does not permit it to reach the position of the शृंङ्गाररस. Again, if the emotion of love is depicted only in the lover (man or woman) and not in the beloved, then for want of response, it falls short of the necessary ingredient of reciprocity, and the unilateral love fails to develop into the full-fledged Śṛṅgārarasa. Similarly, the amorous behaviour of a monk or ascetic or hermit, especially in a monk's robes, presents a ludicrous spectacle, and the description of the same is sure to yield a debased interest. Owing to these reasons, such descriptions are considered as untoward because of inapposite time, place or situation, and as such, they result in Suggestion of only a Semblance (Ābhāsa) of Śṛṅgārarasa.

Viśvanātha, Bhojarāja and others add the description of feelings of Love between animals, birds, insects, etc., to the list of semblance of Rasa. But Vidyādhara, in his Ekāvalī, does not agree with them.[102] He thinks that the existence of the Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas of a sentiment is as much a reality among animals as it is among human beings.

On the same principle, Humour becomes debased if the object of ridicule is the one who deserves worship and veneration. Similarly, if grief strikes a recluse, the pathos will be unreal. If wrath or fighting zeal are depicted towards sages, they result in semblance or pseudo-suggestion. If a coward or eunuch starts fighting or shows bellicosity, the resulting Heroic will be a semblance of the real Heroic. Conversely, if a well-known hero shows timidity, the Terrific Rasa will be a

semblance of the Bhayānaka. Similarly, if disgust is due to the sight of the flow of blood, marrow and fat of sacrificial beasts; wonder due to mesmerism, jugglery or other magical tricks; and dispassionate tranquility to be portrayed in an arch-knave, a villain or a Cāṇḍāla – all will give rise to the semblance of the respective sentiments.

Bhāvadhvani

There are immature sentiments also, besides the pseudo ones. Love in the form of devotion to God (Bhakti), reverence to superiors (Śraddhā) and affection towards kinsmen (Premarati) and such other sentiments as also those which do not find full development on account of some other sentiment in high progress at a particular spot, are all classified as Bhāvadhvani (भावध्वनि).

Bhāvabhāsa

Just as the sentiments are called 'pseudo-sentiments' for reasons of some impropriety either in their make up or the substratum, Bhāvas or feelings can also be 'pseudo-bhāvas' (भावाभास) in case their delineation is not done in an appropriate form or manner.

Bhāvodaya

Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa and Bhāvābhāsa are the suggested elements causing Camatkāra. Besides these four, there are other four phases like–

(1) **Bhāvodaya** or a sudden rise of feelings;

(2) **Bhāva-śānti** or subsiding of feelings no sooner than they arise;

(3) **Bhāva-Sandhi** or the confluence of such distinct feelings as are competent to suppress one another but fail to do so at a particular spot; and

(4) The commixture or variegation of feelings or **Bhāvaśabalatā** which consists in the suggestion of different feelings that are either neutral or in direct opposition with one another.

The commixture of feelings lends charm due to the rise in quick succession of various Bhāvas which presents a kaleidoscopic view of mental attitudes to be enjoyed by a sensitive reader or connoisseur.

Thus, all these four phases, viz. the rise, the fall, the confluence and the commixture of feelings, along with the main four principal elements of a work of art, are the object of dominant suggestion.

Winding up this topic of Semblance of Rasa and Bhāva in the case of animals, birds, insects, plants, etc., Hemachandra significantly adds : The figures Samāsokti, Arthāntaranyāsa, Utprekṣā, Rūpaka and Upamā are the life of these Rasābhāsas and Bhāvābhāsas-especially Samāsokti greatly helps Rasābhāsas, as can be seen in the instances cited in the text (K.A.S. 54-55 ff.)

Mammaṭa's Treatment of Semblance of Rasa etc. Compared with Hemachandra's

While Mammaṭa (K. P. IV-36) tackles the topic of Ābhāsa with just one Sūtra (Tadābhāsa anaucitya-pravartitāḥ), taking his stand on impropriety or inappositeness alone, Hemachandra first (II-54) makes sentience or insentience of the object, involved in the depiction of a sentiment, a criteria for Ābhāsa of Rasa or Bhāva and then, in another separate Sūtra (II-55) emphasises the criterion of impropriety or Anaucitya by stating that both Rasābhāsa and Bhāvābhāsa arise on account of inappropriate or improper delineation of the Rasa or Bhāva. Explaining the Sūtra (Anaucityācca), Hemachandra remarks in the gloss that Rasābhāsa and Bhāvābhāsa arise when mutual love etc. are absent. And he elaborates on this concept of the semblance of Rasa and Bhāva caused by the absence of reciprocity of feeling in the Viveka (P. 149). In point of fact, he reproduces the relevant portion from the Abhinavabhāratī where Abhinava discusses this point. The passage means : "Śṛṅgāra is nothing but the dominant emotion of love based on mutual affection. Here, on the other hand, Rati is a Vyabhicāribhāva being of the nature of a desire. Hence it is

not a permanent mood; it appears to be a so called Sthāyī in this case. In other words, it is not Rati but a Semblance of Rati or Ratyābhasa. Since, due to the lack of realisation that 'Seetā hates me and ignores me', Seetā cannot be said to reciprocate Rāvaṇa's love. If it had taken place, the ego of Rāvaṇa would melt away thinking 'Seetā is in love with me'. But the determination of Rāvaṇa is futile since that Rati does not become a Sthāyibhāva as it proceeds from passion (कामजमोहसारत्वात्) and hence it is the Ābhasa of the Sthāyibhāva of (रति). It appears there as silver does in the shell. It is thus a case of Ratyābhasa due to the semblance of Rati resulting in a semblance of enjoyment of Śṛṅgāra, called Śṛṅgārābhasa.[103] In the same way, we have Hāsyābhāsa; as for example, the following verse of (my cousin) Vāmanagupta : "If people do not believe in your extra-mundane deed, what can we say ? However, this much can be said : in view of the talkativeness that provokes laughter, we wonder who will not laugh at you ?" Here, since people laugh over a matter that deserves compliments, it is a case of Hāsyābhasa. Similar examples of the other Rasas can also be provided."

The verse (168) in the gloss illustrates रसाभास in which Rāvaṇa pines away to obtain Sītā whose name acts as a spell to him and he cannot live without her even for an instant; but, as Hemachandra remarks, herein we have Rasābhāsa because Sītā does not have love for Rāvaṇa (सीतायाः रावणं प्रति रत्यभावाद् रसाभासः). Verse 168 also illustrates the same Rasābhāsa wherein the poet addresses a wanton woman having many lovers. Here, the woman's feeling of love for several men gives rise to Rasābhāsa. The verse (170) from Bālarāmāyaṇa (I. 40), depicts the eagerness of Rāvaṇa with regard to Sītā. Hence it is an example of Bhāvābhāsa (Autsukya or eagerness being a Vyabhicāribhāva).

Hemachandra has thus, fully explained Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhasa, Bhāvābhāsa, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvaśānti, Bhāvasandhi

and Bhāvaśabalatā with apt illustrations and in consonance with the views of the Rasa-dhvani school.

The Divisions of Poetry : The Uttamakāvya

The last three Sūtras of the Second Chapter (II. 56-58), are devoted to the discussion of the Divisions of poetry.

Hemachandra divides poetry into **three** classes : Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama. Of these three classes of poetry, the Uttama or the best kind of poetry is a Vyaṅgyakāvya. In Sūtra 56, the Uttamakāvya is defined : The best kind of poetry is that in which the suggested meaning shines more prominently than the direct or literal sense of the poem. Such a Kāvya is called a Dhvanikāvya. This is illustrated in verse no. 171.

Hemachandra observes that in this verse it is the words 'Tvaddantāṅkita etc.' that are highly suggestive. They remind Rāvaṇa of his utter mortification at the hands of Vālin who pressed Rāvaṇa in his armpit and wandered over the whole earth. The troubled Rāvaṇa bit Vālin in his arm-pit as he was unable to get out of the queer situation. Here, the suggested sense is of the nature of an idea or statement, bereft of any Rasa or a figure of speech. A series of ideas are suggested here one after another – thus the word 'Dantāṅkita' suggests (1) Rāvaṇa's defeat (2) his capturing by Vālin and keeping him under the arm-pit (3) then Vālin's roaming the world with Rāvaṇa pressed (4) then freeing himself through Vālin's grace (5) his helpless condition, and (6) despite all this his egoistic and proud attitude.

In the Viveka commentary, Hemachandra provides illustrations of Rasadhvani and Alaṁkāradhvani. He introduces the examples by a statement that "in the same way we must understand that poetry is best where a Rasa or a figure of speech is suggested." The verse (177) illustrative of Rūpakālaṁkāra being suggested is cited from the Dhvanyāloka. The verse illustrative of Rasa-dhvani is also cited in the Viveka

(178). On this verse Hemachandra remarks that, here, we have the dominant mood of love being realised by means of proper Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, and it is an appropriate example of Rasadhvani. We are told to note that like Rasadhvani, Bhāvadhvani, Rasābhāsadhvani, Bhāvābhāsadhvani, etc., can also be illustrated with appropriate examples. In other words, Rasa, Bhāva, etc., constitutes the best type of poetry. Thus, the best type of Dhvani Kāvya occurs when (a) an idea is suggested, (b) an Alaṁkāra is suggested, or (c) a Rasa is suggested.

The Madhyama Kāvya

The next Sūtra (II-57) defines the (threefold) Middling type of Kāvya called Madhyama Kāvya. Where, in a poem, the suggested sense is not unquestionably superior to the expressed sense (Asati prādhānye), where the predominence of Dhvani is a matter of doubt (Sandigdhe prādhānye) or where the expressed sense is as prominent as the suggested sense (Tulye prādhānye), there we have the (threefold) Madhyama type of Poetry. The मध्यमकाव्य is generally styled as गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यकाव्य and it is illustrated in the Prakrit Verse (172) which is cited in the Kāvyaprakāśa (V. 46 ff) too : वाणीरकुडङ्ग etc.

This verse is an example of the Madhyamakāvya in which the Vyaṅgya sense is subordinated. Hemachandra observes in the gloss that the expressed sense 'Sidantyaṅgāni' is more striking here than the suggested sense.

The next verse (173) अयं स रशनोत्कर्षी etc. (Mbh., Strīparvan 24.19), contains the lamentation of Bhūrisrava's widow and illustrates how sometimes the suggested sense is subordinated to another prominently suggested sense, and thus, from the point of view of the subordinated suggested sense, the verse becomes an apt instance of Madhyamakāvya. In this particular verse, there is the sentiment of love in the utterances of the wife of Bhūriśravas – "This is the hand that pulled my girdle, pressed my breast, etc." – but, since she is uttering these

words on the dead body of her husband, there is the pathetic emotion also and, between the two sentiments, evidently the sentiment of love is subordinated to that of Pathos. Thus, the verse is an apt illustration of the Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya type of Kāvya.

In connection with his comments in the gloss that 'here the sentiment of Eros is subordinated to that of Pathos' (अत्र शृंङ्गारः करुणस्याङ्गम्), Hemachandra adds in the Viveka as to how theh and of Bhūriśravas which caused his wife to remember his love-exploits becomes a Vibhāva of the Pathetic sentiment and ultimately renders the Erotic sentiment to be subordinate to the Pathetic sentiment.

Hemachandra also gives in the Viveka (pp. 153-154) several verses with comments to illustrate how (1) (Vyabhicāri) Bhāvas become subordinate to other Bhāvas (Verse 179), (2) Rasābhāsa becomes subordinated to a Bhāva (180), (3) Bhāvapraśama becomes subservient to Ratibhāva connected with a king; and how (4) the rise of the feeling of Trāsa (भावोदय) (182), (5) the commixture of Āvega and Dhṛti (183), and (6) the variegation of the different Bhāvas such as Śaṅkā, Asūyā, Dhṛti, Smṛti, Śrama, Dainya, Vibhodha and Autsukya take place. Finally, Hemachandra observes that these are also termed Alaṁkāras such as Rasavad etc.[104] Although Bhāvodaya, Bhāvasandhi and Bhāvaśabalatā are not called by the name of Alaṁkāra, yet someone may well call them as such; so it is stated that they can be called Rasavad figures.

Now, at times, it so happens that the suggested sense is not easy to grasp; in such a case, the suggested sense has no beauty and does not appear prominently; hence it is a case of the Middle type of Kāvya, as e.g., verse 176 in Prakrit. Sometimes, however, the suggested sense is all too clear, i.e., it is as good as the expressed sense (here it is called Atisphuṭa) and is there only in name. In such a poem, there is no suggestion at all. For example, the verse (177) श्रीपरिचयात्

etc., says clearly that money makes a man clever and youth makes a damsel conscious of her graces. The suggested sense here is that the ladies' graces are effortless or natural, but this sense is as good as expressed and so the suggested sense, being revealed by the poet himself, does not cause charm like the uncovered breasts of a woman, Hemachandra observes. The point here is that the sense of a poem, like the breasts of a lady, is charming when it is concealed. Art, they say, consists in concealing, not in revealing. In fact, Hemachandra comments further on the word 'Gūḍham' in the Viveka by quoting the verse 'Mukhaṁ vikasitasmitam etc.', cited in the Kāvyaprakāśa (UII. 2, V. 9) under Gūḍhavyaṅgyam. In this verse, we have an instance of a 'concealed suggested sense.'

If a Vyaṅgya is Agūḍha, it becomes less charming than or is subordinate to the expressed sense, and that verse becomes an example of Madhyamakāvya or Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya. As we have seen, the verse (177) श्रीपरिचयात् etc. is an example of Guṇībhutavyaṅgya because the suggested sense there, being obvious, is less charming than the expressed sense. In short, Hemachandra's three divisions of Kāvya are based on the relative position of the suggested sense with reference to the expressed sense. This division of poetry is in keeping with the views of Rasadhvani theorists.

When there is a doubt as far as the prominence of the suggested sense is concerned, compared to the expressed sense, the second type of the Middle variety of poetry occurs. The verse (178) in Prakrit illustrates this type.

The **third** type of the Madhyamakāvya occurs when both the expressed sense and the suggested sense enjoy equal prominence. In the verse (138) quoted under **Garva** on Page 135 (K.A.S. II. 36 ff.), the suggested sense is : "Otherwise Paraśurām will annihilate both the Kṣatriyas as well as the demons." But the expressed sense - "If you refrain from insulting a Brahmin,

it is to your advantage – for, then we shall be friends, or" – is equally beautiful.

Mammaṭa's Eightfold Division Rejected

Hemachandra has treated of the **three** sub-divisions of the Middling type of poetry. But because Mammaṭa has given eight varieties of this type, Hemachandra makes it a point to remark that there are only three sub-types of this type and not eight (इति त्रयो मध्यमकाव्यभेदा न त्वष्टौ).

As for Mammaṭa's treatment of the मध्यमकाव्य, he takes up the sub-divisions of the Guṇībhūtakāvya at the outset of the fifth Ullāsa of the Kāvyaprakāśa. According to him, the varieties of the poetry of subordinated suggestion are : (1) Non-concealed (Agūḍha), (2) Subservient to another (Aparasyāṅgam), (3) Subservient to the establishment of the expressed meaning (Vācyasiddhyaṅgam), (4) Indistinct (Asphuṭam), (5) Of doubtful prominence, (6) Of equal prominence, (7) Implied by intonation and (8) Not striking (Asundaram).

In his gloss, Mammaṭa remarks that, like the full breasts of damsels, the hidden sense produces charm. But the sense which is not hidden, being obvious, becomes as if directly expressed. Hence it is subordinate only. Then he illustrates the non-concealed or explicit sense. Mammaṭa also illustrates Rasa as being subservient to the emotion (Bhāva); a Bhāva to another Bhāva, a Bhāvapraśama as subservient to an emotion, the rise of fear as subservient to an emotion, the conjunction of fury and equanimity to emotion. All these are cited by Hemachandra from the Kāvya Prakāśa (V).

Hemachandra says : "Not Eight (न त्वष्टौ)" and then he cites the Kāvyaprakaśa V. 45-46 of Mammaṭa, saying 'यथाह मम्मटः' (Viveka, p. 157).

The Adhama or Avara Kāvya

"Indeed, a poem lacking in Rasa etc. cannot be called a variety of poetry. So long as an idea or reality is not touched

on by the Rasa, it is not convincing. And all the objects or ideas in the world, always assume subordination to some Rasa or Bhāva. Ultimately, in fact, Rasas etc. are so many mental states which are developed through the Vibhāvas etc. There is hardly an object which does not give rise to some one or the other specific mental state. If it does not do so, then it is unfit to be a poetic subject" Hemachandra says in his Viveka (p. 158) with reference to the third type of poetry, viz., the Avara or Adhama type of poetry, which is defined in the next Sūtra (II. 58). In this variety, there is no suggested sense at all, but it is striking by means of the words and the expressed sense. So, from the point of view of Dhvani, this type of Kāvya, being devoid of Dhvani, is the lowest type. This type is regarded as quite inferior as poetry.

Mammaṭa says : "The lowest type of poetry is that which is devoid of suggestion and is picturesque either in word or sense." Citra, says the gloss, is what possesses Excellences and Figures of speech. 'Avyaṅgya' is what is devoid of a sense which is distinctly suggested. In such a Citrakāvya, the suggestion is too faint. It is the primary sense of the words or the words themselves that charm us in it. And on account of this, it has two varieties : (1) Arthacitra (where the sense appears to us as striking) and (2) Śabdacitra. In Śabdacitra, the figures charm us; in Arthacitra, the figures of sense charm us, since, in the view of the Dhvani school, it is the external appendage like Alaṁkāras that give beauty to this variety. It is called Adhama or Avara, the lowest which never reaches the height of a Dhvanikāvya but remains contented with the external beauty of the embellishments.

Hemachandra notes in the gloss, just before concluding the Chapter, that though these verses may be considered as having some sort of Rasa etc. in that they can be construed as having Vibhāvas of some Rasa. Yet the Rasa etc. is not clear or transparently delightful. Here there is no Vyaṅgya and as such they are called Avara or an inferior kind of poetry.

Incidentally Mammaṭa takes up the two sub-divisions of the Adhamakāvya, viz., Śabdacitra and Arthacitra, for further treatment in the 6th flash of the Kāvyaprakāśa. He notes there: The two kinds of poetry – the one striking in the word and the other striking in the meaning – have been mentioned before; the existence of the striking sense or the word is by the subservience or prominence of either the sense or the word. He adds in the gloss that it is not that in word-portraits there is no strikingness of the sense; or in the portrait of sense that of the word; as Bhāmaha (I. 13–15) says that even the charming face of a lovely lady does not shine without ornaments. It is this that they call beautification of the word (Sauśabdya); there is no such perfection of the meaning on account of the division of poetic figure into that of word and sense, both the beauty of the words and depth of ideas, i.e., सौशब्द्य and अर्थव्युत्पत्ति, are desired by us.

From a critical stand–point Hemachandra's threefold division of poetry is completely in agreement with the conventional divisions offered by Mammaṭa, although he differs from the latter's view of the types of the गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्य.

THE CONCEPTION AND TREATMENT OF POETIC BLEMISHES 4

The Notion of Poetic Blemish or Doṣa

The topic of Poetic Blemishes or Doṣas is regarded as an important topic in all works on Poetics. Hemachandra has defined Poetry as consisting of words and meanings without faults or blemishes, with excellences and with or without figures of speech. From this definition of Poetry, it can be seen that, amongst the characteristics of a poem, that which stands first in order and importance is "faultessness". This feature preponderates over all the others. The conspicuous position accorded to "faultlessness" of word and sense is due to the fact that a poem possessing even a multitude of excellences and figures of speech fails to charm us if vitiated by a single blemish; just as a body of woman, even though possessed of great beauty, does not attract us, if infected with a single spot of leprosy, as Daṇḍian puts it. But it is possible on the other hand, to desire some pleasure at least, from a poem that is untainted by a single fault even though not possessing any excellence or ornaments. In fact, in case of a poem, "freedom from blemishes" in itself constitutes an excellence (Guṇa).

Hemachandra's Detailed Exposition of Doṣas

Hemachandra has already given a general definition of Doṣa (blemish) as being detrimental to Rasa. Hence, he undertakes a detailed exposition of the concept of Poetic

Blemishes along with their definitions and illustrations in the span of ten Sūtras in Chapter three of his work.

The Aesthetic Criterion of Poetic Blemish

As Hemachandra's poetics revolves round the concept of Rasadhvani being the principal element in a poem, his general definition of Doṣa or poetic blemish as well as Guṇa or excellence clearly states: "Excellences and fauts are those attributes of Rasa which are the direct causes of heightening and marring respectively the effect of a Rasa-sentiment (K.A.S. I. 12). They are considered as attributes of words and senses only in a secondary sense (Bhaktyā). Thus, the relation of Rasa on the one hand and Guṇa as well as Doṣa on the other is that of a thing and its attributes. This, as we have seen, can be proved by the method of positive and negative proof. Faults and Excellences are a joint concept as both dwell in the same place. And it is well-known that blemishes dwell in a particular sentiment only - not in a word or a sense - otherwise, the fault would be a fault at all times and would never turn into an excellence; but, that is not so. Sometimes, a fault in one sentiment actually becomes a point of excellence in another Rasa. For instance, in the Bībhatsarasa, the blemishes such as Kaṣṭatva (cumbrousness) and others are actually treated as excellences. Similarly, obscenity and other faults are turned into excellence in Hāsya and other sentiments. It is obvious, therefore, that these **faults** cannot be dependent on, or be attributes of, word and sense. These faults have no permanent character. Where there is a Rasa, there are the attendent faults; when that Rasa is absent, the faults go away. Thus there is an invariable concomitance between Rasa and Doṣa, and consequently between Rasa and Guṇa.

According to Hemachandra, therefore, a poetic blemish is Anitya or Impermanent, if it is the cause of marring a poetic sentiment. Since Rasa is the Mukhyārtha, Doṣa mars its effect. This is Mukhyārthahati in the words of Mammaṭa, who defines Doṣa in those terms.[105]

Hemachandra categorises Doṣa broadly as (a) Rasadoṣa, (2) Padadoṣa, (3) Vākyadoṣa, (4) Ubhayadoṣa and (5) Arthadoṣas in the first seven Sūtras of Chapter III. Sūtra one defines the major poetic fault of naming the Rasa. Rasa, however, includes Bhāvas also, and as the gloss clarifies, the mention of Rasa, of Sthāyibhavās as well as Vyabhicāribhāvas by denoting them–, in other words, naming them–, constitutes the first and foremost poetic blemish. However, the Sūtra as well as the gloss states that a Sāncāribhāva may be mentioned by name and in such cases, it does not amount to a poetic blemish.

The Problem of "Vācyatvam"

Now, the use of the expression 'Vācyatvam' in the definition of the first Doṣa raises the question as to how Rasa, which is always suggested, can ever be expressed. Hemachandra explains this concept of the expressedness or वाच्यत्वम् of the Rasa etc., by means of a passage of Abhinavagupta (Viveka p. 159) which means : The expressedness of Rasa, etc., may be through words denoting the Rasa, etc., or through Vibhāvas, etc. In the former case, Rasas will not be realised or experienced. As in the verse "Yadviśramaya" ... etc.", Rasa etc. are not everywhere mentioned by words. In the example, the meaning which is the soul (i.e. Rasa) is realised through enjoyment of bliss in the form of one's mental state coloured by the latent impression, i.e., the dominant mood appropriate to the determinants or excitants and ensuants through identitication, immediately after the determinants and consequents are apprehended, despite the absence of the correct Vyabhicārins such as Abhilāṣā, Cintā, Autsukya, Nidrā, Dhṛti, etc. And it is well-known that merely by stating the words Śṛṅgāra, etc., in the absence of Vibhāvas etc. being represented, there cannot be any experience of Rasa in a poem; as, e.g., the couplet of the Naṭyaśāstra (6.15), in which the Rasas are enumerated by Bharata, does not make for any aesthetic experience. So, by the method of positive and nagative proof, it is certain that Rasa etc. can be suggested by the power of the expressed

sense called Vibhāvādi. So they are never expressed. Hence it is a fault to use their names to denote them. The second case is our own view. By this, Udbhaṭa's view in the verse (KASS. 4.3) 'Rasavaddars'itaspaṣṭa etc.', which lays down that Rasa can be mentioned by names, is refuted along with his theory of 'Pancarūpā rasāḥ' or Rasas have five forms.

Hemachandra's Sources on Doṣa

It is clear that Hemachandra begins the treatment of Doṣas by taking his stand on the principal of Rasa as the soul of poetry. In this respect, he follows the coification of Doṣa as Mammaṭa had attempted it by taking into account the earlier views on Doṣa including that of Mahimabhaṭṭa. As a follower of Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa states his idea of Doṣa clearly by saying that Doṣa is that which spoils the essence or the chief element of a Kāvya, viz., Rasa and, as such, it primarily pertains, as a property, to the Rasa. But, secondarily, of course, Doṣa is spoken of as pertaining to Śabda, Artha, Varṇa and Racanā also. Thus we have not only Rasa-doṣa but Śabda-doṣa, Artha-doṣa, Varṇa-doṣa and Racanā-doṣa as well.

It may be noted that Mammaṭa broadly conceives poems as sentimental or non-sentimental. While we may have a sentiment constituting the essence of the one, a striking sense or idea forms the main appeal in the other. This kind of conceptual division of poetry helps us understand Mammaṭas discussion of Doṣa.

Mammaṭa's term 'Mukhyārtha', in its general signification, applies to all poems, and it is the object of an apprehension which is primarily intended in a poem.

Basis of Classification of Blemishes

Now so far as the inteded apprehension is concerned, it should firstly be undelayed and secondly, it must be of an undiminished nature in a sentimental poem. So a blemish consists in—

(A) either non-production of the intended apprehension (a) where the apprehension is itself not produced and (b) where the apprehension is produced but after much delay and (c) where the apprehension is produced but (1) the Rasa is depressed or diminished (in a sentimental poem), or (2) the idea is not striking (in a non-sentimental poem), or —

(B) the destruction of the intended apprehension either (a) direct as in the case of Rasa-doṣas, or (b) indirect as in the case of blemishes pertaining to Word and Sense.

Accurate Definition of Doṣa

Thus the most accurate definition of a blemish is : that from which proceeds non-production or delayed production or destruction (direct or indirect) of the apprehension of an undepressed sentiment or a pleasing sense or idea.[106]

Apprehension and Varieties of Doṣas

These faults may be divided into three kinds : (1) Śabda-doṣas, which are apprehended prior to the apprehension of the sense of a word or sentence, (2) Artha-doṣas, which are apprehended after the apprehension of the meaning of a word or sentence, and indirectly depress the sentiment, and (3) Rasa-doṣas, which are also apprehended after the apprehension of the sense of a sentence and wich directly depress the sentiment. Out of these three, the first, i.e., Śabdadoṣas may be divided into blemishes of a word-Padadoṣa, of a part of a word-Padāṅśadoṣa, and of a sentence-Vākyadoṣa. The distinction between a Pada (word) and a Pedaikadeśa (a part of a word) is important since the former is a noun or a verb or a base of either, whereas the latter may be a termination, case, etc. Mammaṭa begins by describing the faults of the words first, since it is the words that enter into the composition of a sentence.

Hemachandra Alters the Method of Treatment

But Hemachandra begins his treatment of Doṣas by dealing with Rasadoṣas first. His Rasadoṣas are not very different

when we compare them with those of Mammaṭa. Mammaṭa thus provides a model to Hemachandra. It is interesting, therefore, to study the relevant portion from the Kāvyaprakāśa (VII).

The method adopted by Mammaṭa is to treat the Śabdadoṣas followed by the Arthadoṣas, and finally the Rasadoṣas.

Mammaṭa defines Rasadoṣas in three successive Kārikās (60, 61 and 62) of the VIIth Chapter of his Kāvyaprakāśa. These Rasadoṣas are :

(1) The expression of an (a) Accessory, or (b) a Rasa, or (c) a Sthāyibhāva (Permanent mood) by its own name or term;

(2) A far-fetched (a) Consequent, or (b) Determinant;

(3) Admission of a conflicting (a) Consequent or (b) Determinant;

(4) A repeated Heightening or Over-elaboration of a Rasa etc.;

(5) An unreasonable representation or untimely elaboration;

(6) An unreasonable interruption;

(7) An excessive expansion of even a Subordinate Element;

(8) Overlooking a Principal Object;

(9) Perversion of Character; and

(10) Celebration of an unrelated object.

These **ten**, according to Mammaṭa, are the blemishes of a Rasa. However, there are exceptions also. Thus, (1) in Kārikā 63, Mammaṭa declares that sometimes an Accessory, even though expressed by its own term, is not faulty; (2) A mention of conflicting Accessory etc. in such a manner that they may be sublated, is an excellence (etc. means Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas). (3) (i) A sentiment which is incompatible with another by reason of identity of its subjects, should have those subjects, made different; and (ii) A sentiment which is incompatible with another by reason of 'immediacy of succession'

should be separated from that another by (inserting between the two) a third Rasa which is compatible with both. (4) A Rasa (is not faulty) which, though, conflicting (i) is recalled; nor (ii) which is intended to serve the purpose of comparison; nor (iii) are those two Rasas faulty as regards each other which are subordinate to a third principal sentiment.

The above aspects of Rasadoṣas are explaind by Mammaṭa in a thorough manner with the help of illustrations.

Hemachandraf ollows Mammaṭa[107] in many particulars not only in regard to the blemishes of the Rasas but in respect of the other Doṣas as well.

The Rasadoṣas

So far as the Rasadoṣas are concerned, Hemachandra first deals with the expression of a Rasa by its own term or name. While in the Sūtra (III.1) he states that, barring sometimes the transitory feelings, the mention by its name of the predominant sentiment in a poem constitutes a poetic blemish; however, the mention in words of the transitory mental states is not a fault at times. By way of illustration, he quotes a verse from the Śṛṅgāratilake of Rudrabhaṭṭa, a work on Rasa. In this verse (183), all the sentiments are mentioned by their own names and this mention obviously mars the effect of the Rasas. The idea in the verse is that "Lord Śaṅkara manifested all the Rasas in himself by means of various things". Here, the names of Śṛṅgāra, Karuṇa, Vīra, Bībhatsa, Bhayānaka, Adbhuta, Raudra, Hāsya and Śānta – Sarva Rasas, i.e., all the nine Rasas, figure.

The next verse (184) illustrates the mention of the Sthāyibhāva Utsāha, which is a poetic blemish.

Hemachandra has said in the gloss that it is a poetic blemish to mention a Rasa, a Sthāyin, or a Vyabhicārin, by its own term. However, there is no fault if sometimes a Sāncāribhāva is mentioned by its own name. He cites a verse (185) as an example of the mention by name of the

transitory emotions such as Vrīḍā, Trāsa, Īrṣyā, Dainya etc. The mention of these emotions, directly, is bad; but had they been indirectly stated, the fault would have been less conspicuous. This verse is cited in the Kāvyaprakāśa (VII) also.

In this connection, Hemachandra notes in the gloss that if the sentiment is already developed by means of Vibhāva and Anubhāva, mere mention of the name of a particular Rasa does not offend so much. For example, in the verse "Yāte dvāravatīṁ etc.", the Longing or Utkaṇṭhā of Rādhā is suggested by the poetic description of the Vibhāva and Anubhāva, and the mention of the word 'Sotkaṇṭha' serves to state what is already established by suggestion. By means of the word 'sobbed', the said Anubhāva is used to show the cause of it; so, the statement of this by name is not faulty.

Hemachandra has made an exception in the case of Vyabhicārin, which may sometimes be expressed by name. He, therefore, cites a verse (186), already utilized in the Kavya-prakāśa to the same effect, and this is a Nāndī verse in the play Ratnāvalī of Śrīharṣa. Hemachandra also adopts the comments of Mammaṭa in the gloss verbatim. It means : Here the Vyabhicāribhāva or accessory Autsukya, 'Longing' is mentioned by name, because the mere mention of the ensuants or consequents would not have been equally significant (for the said consequence could have been due to causes other than Longing); hence the mention of the term Autsukya[108] is not regarded as a defect. So also in the verse "Durādutsuka-māgate . . . etc." (quoted by Hemachandra to illustrate the exceptional case where the accessory feeling – Autsukya etc. – alone is presented), the other, earlier, two verses represent instances of the Vibhāvas alone and the Anubhāvas alone. But here (where the other two factors are also indirectly implied, so that they do not vitiate the value of the rule or the general proposition that there should be all the factors present), though the poet has described the feelings of modesty or shyness (Vrīḍā), affection (Prema), etc. through

their respective consequents, in the form of turning aside, etc., yet the feeling of Longing has been mentioned by name because the mere mention of its ensuants in the form of "approaching nearer" would not have been equally expressive of what is intended.

The next Sūtra (III. 2) state that the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas of a rival Rasa mar a Rasa, if they are mentioned (1) in a manner in which they are not checked, (2) in one and the same object or person or substratum, (3) simultaneously, and (4) without being subordinated to the principal Rasa. In all these four instances, the poetic blemish is manifest. This fault is known as Vibhāvādiprātikūlya or Pratikūlavibhāvādigrahaḥ according to Mammaṭa.

The First Case of this Admission of the Factors of a Conflicting Rasa

These factors are three : (1) Determinant or Vibhāva, (2) a Consequent and (3) an Accessory. The verse (187), which is cited in the Kāvyaprakāśa in the same connection, illustrates the admission of two factors (Determinant and Accessory) of a conflicting Rasa. Here, the Erotic is the sentiment of the verse, but the statement that 'the dear of time is fleeting etc.' goes directly against Śṛṅgāra sentiment; for, it creates the impression of Śāntarasa by its reference to the transitoriness of the world.

In the above verse (187), Śṛṅgāra is marred by the transitory state of Nirveda also. So it is a case of the presence of adverse Vibhāva and Accessory. Hemachandra observes in the gloss that suitable examples of the admission of factor of a conflicting Rasa should be cited in the case of the Śṛṅgāra and the Bībhatsa; as also in the case of the Vīra and the Bhayānaka as well as of Śānt and the Raudra – all three pairs of opposite Rasas.

How to Avoid Chash of Sentimens and Factors ?

i. If the rival Rasa is unchecked (Abādhyatva) and very powerful, it is a case of a poetic blemish occurring there. But if

that rival Rasa is easily checked (Bādhya) and is weak, it is not only not a poetic blemish but, on the contrary, it adds to the beauty of the sentiment in hand. In the verse (189), King Pururavas experiences diverse feelings on seeing Urvaśī. But all these apparently contradictory feelings go to strengthen the feeling of love in his heart, and as such these feelings enhance the beauty of the sentiment of love.

The next verse (189) contains, in the first half, Śṛṅgāra-rasa mainfestly, but the chief sentiment is Śānta and the Śṛṅgārarasa is subordinate to it; hence it does not mar the impact of Śānta; on the contrary, it enhances its effect.

In this context, Ānandavardhana, the author of the Dhvanyāloka is quoted (III.30) to the effect that a slight apprearance of a rival Rasa creats a beautiful atmosphere and attracts the listless connoisseurse. Ānandavardhana also shows how to resolve the opposition between two Rasa. (Dhv. Āl. III. 20, 21, 22, 23 etc. Vide 'The' Dhvanyāloka and its ctritics', 170–71).

ii. Another method of avoiding the occurrence of the Blemish of the admission of a contradictory Rasa is that the two Rasas should have different subjects; thus, when the Heroic Sentiment is developed with reference to the hero and the Bhayānaka in connection with the villain, no blemish occurs.

iii. The third method of resolving the blemish of the rivalry of the Rasas is to describe these rival Rasas separately by making a third allied Rasa intervene between them so as to remove नैरन्तर्यदोष. Hemachandra points out that when developed with the same substratum simulataneously the sentiments of Śānta and Śṛṅgāra, being mutually antagonistic, produce a blemish; but, when a third friendly Rasa intervenes, no blemish results. For example, in the first act of Nāgananda, the atmosphere is of Śāntarasa, but, by introducing the Adbhuta-rasa – a friendly Rasa – between शान्त and शृङ्गार, the author has successfully developed the Śṛṅgārarasa of Jīmūtavāhan with reference to Malayavatī.

Thus, not only in a whole poem but in a single sentence, it is possible to remove rivalry of Rasas by introducing a third friendly Rasa. In the next three verses (192, 193 & 194), all cited in the Kāvyaprakāśa in the same connection, between two opposing Rasas, a third Rasa is introduced and thus the poetic blemish is averted. Hemachandra explains in the Viveka that if there are two different subjects, there would be no rivalry of Rasas. Someone may urge that herein we have only the Vīra – neither Śṛṅgāra nor Bībhatsa but only Rati and Jugupsā act as accessories towards the Vīrarasa. True. Still, the illustration is apt, for there is no rivalry between Rati and Jugupsā. This involves Āśrayaikya or sameness of substratum.

iv. The fourth method of resolving the rivalry of the Rasas and avoiding the blemish arising from it is to make one Rasa predominant and the other one subordinate. Now, this subordinate position of a rival Rasa may be natural or deliberate. For instance, in the sentiment of Love in seperation, disease, etc., though likely to give rise to Bībhatsa, are, by their very nature, parts of the love in separation, and hence they can never mar the effect of that Rasa. Disease etc. are parts of Karuṇa, too.

Very often, the indicators or consequents (Anubhāvas) of a contrary Rasa are brought near the predominate Rasa, but because these Anubhāvas of the Rival Rasa are not strong enough to develop the rival Rasa, they are subordinated to the main Rasa.

Sometimes two contrary Rasas are brought under and subordinated to a third Rasa – a predominant Rasa. In such a case, no Rasaprātikūlya takes place. Thus, in the verse (195), the fire of the cities burnt by Lord Śaṁbhu is described as clinging to the bodies of the wives of demons in those cities. Here, Raudrarasa arises from the description of the terrible fire. And Śṛṅgāra from the description of the prostrate lovers. Now, it is difficult to bring together these two rival Rasas. But the poet subordinates them to wonder and reverence for Lord Shaṅkara, and avoids the fault.

Now, someone may urge : How can two rival Rasas be brought together without giving rise to the blemish of Rasa-prātikūlya ? Hemachandra replies : 'The fault lies in introducing a rival Rasa in a new statement. If it is brought in a sentence merely by way of repeating a statement already made elsewhere, then there is no blemish, as, e.g., in the next verse (196) एहि गच्छ etc., ('The rich play (क्रीडन्ति) with the beggars who are possessed of the ghost of hope when they order them, 'come along', 'go', 'fall down', 'get up', 'speak', 'shut up'), the verbal forms (of order) are contradictory orders, but because they are all subordinated to the verb क्रीडन्ति, there does not occur any fault in having these contradictory thoughts in the same verse.

And if the statements in sentences can thus be subordinated to a third statement, it follows, naturally, that Rasas in those statements can also be subordinated to a Rasa which is the principal Rasa. Thus, in the verse 195 referred to above, one can argue that the great power of Śaṅkara and the poet's admiration for this is the chief sentiment in the verse, and the pathetic sentiment is subordinated to it. And the Erotic sentiment which is also suggested in the verse is subordinated to this Karuṇa. But both eventually become subordinated to the all-powerful Adbhutarasa (the admiration for the power and glory of Śaṅkara). Or the sense may be : the fire of the shaft of Śaṁbhu conducted itself in the same manner as does the lover, suggesting Śṛṅgāra, but on reading the poem as a whole, we find Karuṇa being suggested as a predominant Rasa. Thus, although Śṛṅgāra raises its head at the outset, yet, as soon as the statement of the tragic fate of the demons comes to the forefront, the Śṛṅgāra fades and ultimately its memory heightens the effect of the Pathetic sentiment by sheer contrast. In this way, these is no Rasa-prātikūlya or contrariety of Rasas in this verse. The verse describing the lamentations of the wives of Bhūriśravas provides a parallel instance (173). In this verse, the wives of Bhūriśrvas

say, "This is that hand that used to pull out my girdle, caress the plump bosom, touch the navel and the private parts and untie the knot of the lower garment", when they see his hand fallen on the battle-field. Now, says Hemachandra, it is the experience of each one of us that objects attractive by nature generate greater intensity of pathos when past enjoyments of that object are remembered. This is how the rememberance of love-dalliances in this verse is wholly subordinated to the predominant pathetic sentiment and seems to heighten it.

The next verse (197), too, illustrates the subordination of the Śṛṅgārarasa to the Śāntarasa. The verse means : "The imprints of teeth and the nail marks made on your body full of thrills by the lioness intent upon blood (also love) were gazed at with envy even by the other sages." Here the idea is that the marks of teeth and nails on the body of Buddha were as charming as on the body of a lover or just as an erotic person becomes eager by looking upon the marks so did the sages – this similarity is intended. But, on a closer look at the context, we realise that there is no Śṛṅgāra intended and as such Śṛṅgāra gives way to Śānta which is the chief Rasa of the verse. And this Śṛṅgāra is not at all contrary to the Śāntarasa – on the other hand, it actually heightens the effect of the Śāntarasa.

Commenting on this verse (197), Hemachandra explains that the sages were full of envy or eagerness because they hoped to reach the position of a Bodhisattva by their compassion.

However, Hemachandra notes in the gloss that, when the rival Rasa does not heighten the predominant Rasa, there occurs a poetic blemish of Rasaprātikūlya. Thus, a rival Rasa mars the effect of the predominant Rasa by making an unduly bold appearance, and in such a case we undoubtedly have the fault of Rasaprātikūlya, as, for example, in the next verse (198) cited from the Raghuvaṁśa (XI. 20) we have a reference to Tāḍakā's death at the hands of Rāma but the poetic description of her departure presents the picture of a woman

going to meet her lover. Now this unnatural Śṛṅgārarasa weakens the dominant Pathos, instead of heightening it. Hence, here, the Śṛṅgāra is contrary to Karuṇa, not conducive to it.

Eight Poetic Blemishes of Rasa

In the next Sūtra (III. 3) Hemachandra presents another set of **eight** poetic blemishes with regard to Rasa :

(1) The first of these regular Rasadoṣas consists in comprehension through a far-fetched Determinant or Consequent. This is instanced in the verse 199, where a woman, the विभाव intended by the poet, is apprehended with great difficulty, i.e., only after taking the context etc. into consideration, because this Determinant is not expressed; nor can it be implied by the Ensuants mentioned in the verse such as 'the shunning of pleasures' etc., since these Consequents are possible in the Pathetic sentiment etc. too.

It may be noted in passing that everywhere in this chapter, Hemachandra closely follows Mammaṭa who codified the principles of Doṣa for the first time in his longest treatment of Doṣa following the lead given by Ānandavardhana, the main architect of the Dhvani theory of Literature, not only in respect of definition, division and other theoretical details, but also in respect of most of the illustrations which he has cited here from the Kāvyaprakāśa. This becomes evident at every step in this chapter.

The next verse (200) illustrates comprehension through a far-fetched Consequent. Here, the Uddīpana Vibhāva, i.e., the Moon and the Ālambana Vibhāva, the Heroine, suitable to the Śṛṅgārarasa, terminate in a consequent, i.e., lead to the apprehension of a Consequent, after great delay, not immediately. For, before we apprehend the consequent, we must take into account the fact that, when a young man and a woman see each other at moonrise, they fall in Love. The Consequent or Anubhāva is thus far-fetched here.

(2) A repeated heightening of the Rasa is a poetic blemish[109] and, as Mammaṭa and following him Hemachandra says, this blemish is evident in the Kumārasambhava – the too frequent heightening of Pathos in the lament of Rati. It should be noted that this is a fault as regards a minor Rasa, not a principal one; thus the Quietistic Rasa in the Mahābharāta is not faulty because it does not produce dissatisfaction even though repeatedly heightened.

(3) An Unreasonable Representation (or Akāṇde Prathā) is instanced in the second act of the Veṇīsaṁhāra, in the representation of Duryodhan's – who, though was a Dhīroddhatanāyaka – dalliance with his wife Bhānumatī, at a time when so many heroes were dying.

(4) An Unreasonable Interruption (or Akāṇḍe chedana) occurs in the fourth act of the Ratnāvalī or in the Vīracarita, in the speech of Rāma – ' I am going to take off my bracelet ' whereas he and Paraśurāma were engaged in displaying an ever increasing ardour for fighting.

(5) An over-elaboration of a subbodinate element (or Aṅgasyātivistāra) means over-describing an element which is subsidiary as in the Hayagrīvavadha; where the detailed description of the diversion of the demon Hayagrīva throws into shade Lord Viṣṇu who is the central character of the play.

In the same way, when Love in separation is the chief Rasa, a poet should not indulge in the description of a sea, a forest, etc., merely to show his mastery of the figures of speech such as simile, metaphor, alliteration, etc. For example, the author of Haravijaya, during the description of the Separation of Kṛṣṇa from Satyabhāmā, introduces an uncalled for description of the ocean etc. just to show off his rhetorical skill. So also in the Kādambarī, which is a prose-romance with Love in Separation as the prevailing sentiment, the poet displays a great enthusiasm for a description of the irrelevant topics such as a forest, a city, kings, etc. The fault is witnessed

in the Harṣacarita in Bāṇa's life account, in the Śiśupālavadha in the love-scene when the avowed aim of the poet is to describe Vīrarasa. All this goes against the chief Rasa and is calculated to result in a poetic blemish from which even great poets have not escaped.

(6) In fact, the poets' foremost duty is to develop to the fullest extent the principal or predominant Rasa. Any break in the development of the principal Rasa leads to a poetic blemish; for, an unhampered development of the poetic sentiment is the essence of the poetic art. Thus, overlooking the principal element (Aṅgino'ananusandhānam), as in the fourth act of the play Ratnāvalī, where Sāgarikā, the heroine, is foregotten on the arrival of Bābhravya, is a poetic blemish.

Artistic Continuity

Hemachandra notes that continuity of the development of the Rasa is the essence of poetic beauty, as, for example, in the play Tāpasavatsarāja, the sentiment of love for Vāsavadattā, though subject to fear of interruption in the story, is continued uninterrupted throughout the six acts of the play.

(7) Celebration of an unimportant or unrelated thing or the description of the irrelevant, called Anaṅgaṣyābhidhānam, is a blemish. Some authors very often indulge in developing insignificant or irrelevant things, setting aside the chief sentiment. Anaṅga means that which does not contribute to the heightening of the Rasa of a poem. Description of the irrelevant or of something not helpful to the Rasa is instanced in the Karpūramānjarī where the king ignores the description of the spring made by the heroine as well as by himself but praises the bard's description of the same spring.

The Art of Characterization and Rasa

(8) The same principles apply to characterization in poetry. These characters can be : (i) Divine (God, Maheśvara, etc.), (ii) Human (Mādhava, etc.), (iii) Both human and divine (Kṛṣṇa. etc.), (iv) Of the Nether world (Pātālīya), (v) Both human and Pātālīya,

(vi) Divine & Pātālīya, and (vii) Divine-Himan and Pātālīya – in short, the characters are of seven types. These should be appropriately portrayed, keeping in view their natural traits.

As for these characters, if they are human, they should be treated as human; if supernatural or divine, then as such. When these characters are portrayed in a contrary manner, that goes against the development of a Rasa. A Particular character is, as a rule, fond of a particular Rasa. This rule has to be scrupulously observed.

So far as the sentiments of Love, Grief, Laughter and Wonder are concerned, they are common to human beings as well as divine characters. But even here, in the case of divine beings, the love in union should never be described. If a poet indulges in such a description, it will be as highly improper as to describe the love-amour of one's own parents. Kālidāsa has taken liberties with this rule by describing in detail the love-sports of Śiva and Pārvatī in the eighteenth canto of his Kumārasambhava. But in the case of Kumārasambhava, the description is so full of poetic beauty that it does not offend against good taste as it would otherwise do if a lesser poet had attempted it.

Similarly, the sentiment of Anger should be depicted as effective and quick in its results, as, e.g., the burning of cupid by the fire of Lord Śiva's third eye is described by Kālidāsa in his Kumārasambhava. This method of description is very artistic.

As for describing Utsāha, the basis of Vīra, in relation to going to heaven, the nether world and crossing the ocean, etc., it should be delineated in the case of beings other than men. For, these wonderful acts deserve to be performed by super-human creatures, if they are to appear real. Particularly the sentiment of wonder should be handled very carefully – i.e., it should appear natural in the characters.

And so far as human character are concerned, their actions are to be portrayed as well-known, proper and realistic. For, any attempt to exaggerate their doings will appear unreal and

will not result in the moral that one should act like the ideal hero and not like the anti-hero or villain. Any Violation of these general norms regarding the characters terminates in perversion of character (Prakṛtivyatyaya).

In regard to the forms of addressing the different characters in a composition, several forms are fixed in Poetics. To corroborate his statement, Hemachandra cites the view of Rudraṭa (K.A. VI. 19-20) who lays down these rules of address and that same view has inspired our author.

Propriety in Poetry

In this way, we are told, having regard to propriety in respect of place, time age, class, etc., and the dresses and behaviour of characters, one must write poetry. For Propriety is the essence of Art.[110]

Interestingly, Hemachandra elaborates on the idea of perversion of character being a fault in the Viveka Commentary. He has reproduced large chunks of texts – mainly from the Kāvyamīmāṅsā of Rājaśekhara who has given a long description of this subject. It seems Hemachandra found much meterial readily available on this subject and as such he has quoted extracts from this text (K.M. IX)

Thus, in connection with prakṛtivyatyaya, Hemachandra quotes passages from the ninth chapter of the Kāvyamīmāṅsā of Rājaśekhara. Rājaśekhara deals with 'Arthavyāpti' in this Chapter, and begins the chapter by setting afoot a discussion on the question whether Kāvyārtha or the theme of poetry is threefold or sevenfold. While Drauhini asserts, *it* is threefold, Yāyāvarīya or Rājaśekhara himself declares that it is sevenfold. This sevenfold classification has been adopted by Hemachandra in the gloss and it is explained and illustrated in the Viveka with the help of passages and verse taken over from the Kāvyamīmāṅsā (K.M. IX). In connection with propriety of Deśa, Kāla or Time, place etc., he again cites passages from the Kāvyamīmāṅsā. Thus from page 173 to page 176 and pages

179 to 198, almost 14 pages of the Viveka Vyākhyā, are occupied by these passages.

We may note that Ānandavardhana (Dhv. Āl. III. 19) mentions impropriety in the portrayal of Vṛttis or the behaviour of the characters and the Vṛttis of the rhetoricians.

In short, propriety is of the essence of poetic beauty. Propreity is the principal norm of Rasa i.e., of Rasa development, and it contributes directly to the successful delineation of a Rasa. This propriety as regards place, time, age, caste, dress, etc., is exhaustively explained in the Viveka Commentary by reproduction of almost a whole chapter of the Kāvyamīmāṅsa.

The Blemishes Pertaining to Word and Sense

Blemishes or Doṣas primarily pertain to Rasa and secondarily or metaphorically they belong to the Word and the Sense. Hence it is necessary to deal with Śabdadoṣas and Arthadoṣas. Now Śabdadoṣas either take the form of a Pada or a Vākya, and accordingly, we have (1) Padadoṣas of **two** types, and (2) Vākyadoṣas of **thirteen** types (K.A.S. III. 4-5).

The Padadoṣas

As against Mammaṭa's sixteen Padadoṣas or sixteen sub-divisions of the defective word, Hemachandra gives only two types of padadoṣas or the twofold blemish pertaining to a word. According to Mammaṭa, the defective word is (1) harsh to hear, (2) ungrammatical in form, (3) unconventional, (4) incapable, (5) suppressed in sense, (6) improper in signification, (7) meaningless, (8) inexpressive, (9) indecent in three ways, (10) ambiguous, (11) unintelligible, (12) valgar, (13) having a sense to be guessed, and then (14) obscure, (15) non-discriminated in predicate, and (16) the one causing repugnant implication. It must be noted that, according to Mammaṭa, the last three of these poetic blemishes, viz., Kliṣṭa, Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśa and Viruddhamatikṛt (i.e., nos. 14-16), are defects only when they occur in a compound word.

The Vākyadoṣas

Generally, a sentence-fault is that which resides in words which are faulty only in association with other words. In Solecism, Incapability and Meaninglessness, the fault does not depend on this association with other words; and, therefore, the fault is beyond the ken of a sentence-fault. This is the treditional view. But the correct definition of a 'Sentence fault' is : "A sentence fault is that which resides in words, more than one, some of which are capable of conveying the intended object". In Nyakkāro . . . etc., we have instances of both; for both the words expressing the subject and the predicate are faulty here; for, if the predicate must come after the subject, the subject must also come before the predicate. This explains the propriety of the word Aṅśa in Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśa, which means "a sentence, in which, a part, which is capable of being understood as the predicate, is not prominently mentioned". So, when Mammaṭa names it as such, he implies it as both; otherwise, to restrict it to a Padadoṣa, he would have called it Avimṛṣṭavidheya only. Thus, we have thirteen Vākyadoṣas. Now these Vākyadoṣas are homogeneous to those of a word. But there are twenty one other independent Vākyadoṣas of a different class given by Mammaṭa.

Hemachandra's Padadoṣas

Hemachandra mentions the twofold poetic blemish pertaining to a word : (1) Uselessness (Nirarthakatva) (2) Ungrammaticalness (Asādhutva).

(1) **Uselessness** involves the use of unnecessary words such as ca, vai, tu, hi, etc. As a rule, no unnecessary word ought to be employed in a composition. So, words like ca, etc., should not be used unless their use is necessitated by the context. But when these words are used as fillers in a metrical line etc., they constitute this blemish called 'निरर्थकत्व'. The verse (202) illustrates the use of 'hi' which is absolutely useless.

Even a fraction of a word, when used without being necessitated by the context, is useless (Nirarthaka). In the next verse (203), the expression Kuraṅgekṣaṇā indicates one lady. In verse 204, on the other hand, many activities of the eye are described; hence the plural is justified, as Hemachandra observes in the gloss.

Some authorities do not regard Uselessness or Nirarthakatva as a poetic blemish in case of Yamaka and other figures of word, as, e.g., in the quotation no. 205, cited from the Śiśupālavadha (X. 90).

(2) The second blemish of the word, called Asādhutva or grammatical incorrectness, occurs when the word used is ungrammatical. The verse (207) from the Kirātārjunīya (XVII. 63) contains the word 'Ājaghne' which is made up from 'Han' with 'ā' and is used in the Ātmanepada wrongly. For, Ātmanepada is sanctioned only when the thing struck is one's own limb, which is not the case here; since Arjuna strikes the chest of Lord Śiva.

In this connection, Hemachandra notes that there is no poetic blemish of Asādhutva, if ungrammatical words are used to quote the words of others. For, all imitations are innocent.

The Thirteen Vākyadoṣas Explained

The next Sūtra (III. 5) enumerates the thirteen faults of a sentence called Vākyadoṣas. These faults are (1) cacaphony due to omission of euphonic combination (Visandhi), (2) deficient in words (Nyūnapada), (3) containing redundant words (Adhikapada), (4) with (needlessly) repeated word (Ukta or Kathipada), (5) containing misplaced word (Asthānasthapada), (6) having deminishing excellence (Patatprakarṣa), (7) resumed though concluded (i.e., resumption of the concluded sentence for addition of an adjective – Samāptapunarāttam, (8) elision of a Visarga in excess (Avisargatvam), (9) having a marred metre (Hatavṛttam), (10) confused or having the words mixed up (Saṅkirna), (11) having a parenthetical expression (Garbhita),

(12) having a broken uniformity (Bhagnaprakrama), and (13) Irregular syntax (Ananvita).

The Conception of Vākyadoṣas

So far as the sentence-fault is concerned, we have noted above the concept of a sentence-fault in connection with Mammaṭa's Vākyadoṣas. Mammaṭa has dealt with two sets of Vākyadoṣas : (1) Those homogeneous to word-faults; and (2) those which are independent. But Hemachandra gives only one set of thirteen Vākyadoṣas mentioned above. These faults are peculiar to a sentence.

The first sentence-fault arises from the deformity of Sandhi or cacaphony due to omission of the euphonic combination (Visandhi). This fault takes three forms : (1) Disjunction of Sandhi, (2) Indecency of Sandhi, and (3) Harshaness of Sandhi.

Hemachandra defines Visandhitva as deformity (Vairūpya) due to disjunction or indecency or harshness of words.

(1) Disjunction of Sandhi occurs when a Sandhi is not made, although according to grammar, it must be made. This may be again two-fold : Optional and Necessary. Necessary disjunction may be of two kinds : (a) when the final i, u or e of the dual terminations of nouns or verbs are not subject to the rules of 'Sandhi' (b) when the Visarga or e, ai, o and au, although dropped or changed according to the rules, are to be considered as not dropped or changed. Optional disjunction is faulty, occurring but once. For, although grammar does not give an absolute injuction that such a Sandhi must be made, still the non-making of it clearly shows that the poet is lacking in a perfect commend over the language, and thus causes dissatisfaction in the mind of the reader. Both these disjunctions of the necessary type become a blemish when they occur more than once.

Indecency or indecorousness of Sandhi or Aślīlatva is caused by words suggestive of sense which cause disgust

and shame. Harshness of Sandhi occurs when the euphonic combinations between two words in a sentence are harsh.

Thus Sandhi is formed when two vowels combine or a vowel and a consonant join together or two consonants combine. If two vowels are brought together without joining (even though it is so sanctioned by grammarians), it is a fault. If the Sandhi is deliberately dropped, then, there is a still greater fault. For example, the verses (208 & 209), perfectly grammatical though they are, are bad; since in sentences in which saṁhitā, i.e., joining the vowels or consonant is obligatory, it is bad not to join them. Even the feet of a verse yields to this rule of Sandhi. There is however a choice as to the joining of vowels or consonants at the end of the second foot.

Visandhi occurs due to deformity giving rise to Aślīlatva or indecorousness. It takes place when the words, though used in their perfectly ordinary senses, suggest some sense which is indecent or loathsome or inauspicious, and give rise to Aślīlatva, as in the quotation (210), the word Virecakam has an indecent sense as well as a normal sense. Similarly, Ācāryabhāsa has two senses : a pseudo teacher and a teacher named Bhāsa. The word Virecaka causes disgust and Yābha, an obscene word, causes shame. In the same way, the verse (211) following this, yields the indecorous words Śepa, etc., by Visandhi, which reminds of Vrīḍā, etc.; hence they are all instances of Aślīla.

Propriety is the Magic Wand

In the verse 212, we have harshness of Sandhi. Hemachandra however notes that if such harsh words, difficult to pronounce, are used deliverately to imitate the words of a child, a woman or a fool, there is no blemish. Thus propriety of the speaker etc. removes the fault. In fact when such words are used in mimicry or jokes or in elocution etc., they become an excellent quality and cease to be faults.

(2) Hemachandra defines the second blemish of a sentence by saying that Nyūnapadatva is a fault which occurs when

words that are quite necessary to the context are dropped. For example, in the verse quoted from Veṇīsaṁhāra (I. 11), the word Asmābhiḥ is necessary in the second line and the word Ittham is required in the beginning of the fourth line, but both are not mentioned. Consequently the fault of deficient words occurs here. Much in the same way, in the next verse (213) from the Vikramorvaśīyam (IV. 29), the word Aparādhalavam is wrongly used; for, it means 'what little offence', which is absurd. Here, to suit the context, an additional 'Api' is required; hence there occurs the fault of Nyūnapa-datva. Similarly in verse 214, the method of using the forms of the pronoun Idam continued in the first three lines is abandoned in the fourth line, thus, giving rise to deficiency of words. In the same way, in the next Prakrit verse (214), the Upameyas, as against the Upamānas, are not mentioned actually and hence the blemish of deficient words occurs here. However, at times, the dropping of some words renders the stanza more charming than when they are used. In other words, the blemish turns into a Guṇa, as, e.g., in Verse 216, cited from the Amaruśataka (40). In this verse, a woman in the course of a sexual act, addresses her lover with supreme joy, and in her excitement, utters broken sentences. But, these broken words add to the beauty of the poem.

Neutralization of Doṣas

Sometimes the omission of necessary words is neither a fault nor any merit. In the verse from Kālidaās's play called 'Vikramorvaśīyam', from 'Tiṣṭhet.... to Prabhāvapihitā', there is one sentence. After that, with a view to make the sense clear 'Naitat yataḥ' or some such words ought to follow, but they are not used; still, the sense can be ealisy inferred. Therefore, the omission of necessary words in this case is neither a Guṇa nor a Doṣa.[111]

The Viveka Commentary comments on the expression. 'Avaśyavācyasya' in the definition of Nyūnapada. Here the expression means that the dropped or omitted words or deficient

words are quite important and necessary for the context. Significantly, Hemachandra observes here that there is no fault if a sense which needs to be expressed but is implied or suggested by an invariable association or through propriety, is not expressed at all; as, e.g., in the verse no. 332, 'Asti' is understood. In the next verse (333), too, the verb is suggested through propriety. Similarly, in the verse (334), the subject words Anala etc. are suggested by propriety.

In view of this, the non-expression of the sense should not be separately mentioned as a fault. Some writers assert that for the sake of the comprehension of a thing consisting of the thing and its attributes, the word denotative of it or a synonym thereof or a pronoun should necessarily be used and if it is not used then it constitutes the fault of deficient words, as e.g., in Dvayaṁ gataṁ.... etc. (Kumārasambhava V. 71). In this verse, the word Kapālin referring to the person and the thing is (1) denotative of the thing only (2) or the censure-worthiness arising through its contact with Kapāla, or (3) both these points of view prevail.

On the first view, for the sake of particular apprehension, the holder of the Kapāla should also be included in the denotation, so that his censure-worthiness can be suggested. On the second view, to apprehend the substratum of the Kapāla, the substantive needs to be mentioned either by the same word or by a synonyn or by a pronoun, so that its intended sense is conveyed.

This quotation is from Mahimbhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka (II.70 etc.), where it is called Vācyāvacanadoṣa. It is explained thus : "Now he takes up the fifth Doṣa in order. In the term Vācyāvacana, the negative prefix 'A' conveyes two senses : (1) non-mention of that which must be mentioned, and (2) the mention of that which ought not be mentioned. The संग्रह श्लोक clarifies this point, by stating that the blemish occurs when a thing is expressed by its own term when it is possible and also necessary to use a pronoun to express it. In the verse "Dvayaṁ gatam...

etc.", is the word Kapālin expressive of Lord Śiva (Dharmin) and his attribute (Dharma) of being possessed of a Kapāla? Is it donatative of both? Or, of the substantive, Lord Śiva, alone? Or of the attribute (of being possessed of Kapāla) which is fit to be censured due to its contact with the word Kapāla? Thus these **three** points of view arise. In the first view, it is necessary to admit one more use of the word 'Kapālin' for the comprehension of the attribute so that censure can be suggested. According to the second view, for the proper comprehension of the substratum of the attribute, by the same word or by means of a pronoun, the substantive must be mentioned, as e.g., in the verse 'Kuryām harsyāpi pinākapāṇer etc.' by Kālidāsa, the word Hara is used as a synonym of Pinākapāṇi. Hence the third view is untenable here. For, the same word, without repetition, cannot convey several senses. Hence here there is the poetic blemish of Vācyāvacana.

Although difference of sense implies difference of words, yet the repeated occurrence produces similarity only. Since there is only an illusion of identity underlying this repetition. Hence it is advisable to convey the sense separately. And this sense should necessarily be expressed either by a synonym or a pronoun in place of the term for the thing to be described. (See Vyaktiviveka II. 71–72).[112]

(3) The third Vākyadoṣa is अविकपद or a redundant word. A redundant word is a word, the meaning of which is not intended as instanced in the verse 217. Here the word Ākṛti in the expression Sphaṭikākṛti is redundant because the purpose of comparison is well served by the word Sphaṭika (Marvellous is that man who is clean like crystal etc.). The meaning of Ākṛti is 'conjunction of parts' which cannot be at all cannected with the sense of the sentence; and even if any other sense of it such as 'nature' etc., be connected with the sense of the sentence, somehow or other, still even that sense is not intended here, the purpose of comparison being served without it. It may be mentioned here that a word may be redundant

not only in a compound, but also when there is no compound. In the verse (218), cited from the Nāgānanda (IV. 15), the word 'Tat' is redundant; in verse no. 219, several words are redundant; in the line from the Meghadoota (Pūrvamegha), the termination 'Vat' is redundant, for the Bahuvrīhi Compound serves the purpose of Vat. In the verse 221, a quotation from the Kumārasambhava (V. 16), the termination 'in' is redundant; for, in the last two cases, a Bahuvrīhi Compound would as well serve the purpose. As for example, verses 222, 223 and 224 reveal redundancy of Taddhitas. When Taddhita comes as a necessay thing, in spite of the compound already used, there is no blemish.

(4) Repeated word also constitutes a Vākyadoṣa, being the fourth Vākyadoṣa. Hemachandra, following Mammaṭa, illustrates it with the same verse (235). Here the world 'Līlā' is needlessly repeated and so it constitutes the poetic blemish called 'Uktapada', a Vākyadoṣa. In this connection Vāmana's authority is cited (KASV. 5-1-1).

Thus the 'Uktapada' Vākyadoṣa occurs when the same word is repeated in the self-same verse; because, such a repetition shows the poet's lack of mastery over the expression. In the above verse, the poet should have used a synonym of 'Līlā' in the last line with a view to avoiding this blemish.

Uktapada Excused in Alliteration

But, as Hemachandra gives a proviso, this reprtition is permitted in the figure of speech pertaining to word called Lāṭānuprāsa or Alliteration. Thus, for instance, the word Pūrvāśā is employed twice but in a different connection, and hence it does not amount to a blemish; on the contrary, it becomes a Guṇa.

Uktapada No Doṣa in Dhvani

Again, sometimes in the Śabdaśaktimūladhvani, especially in the Arthāntarasaṁkramita variety of it, the repetition of one and the same word does not result in a Doṣa at all, as

illustrated in the well-known gāthā (237). Here the word Kamalāni is repeated, and, on the strength of Suggestion, the second word Kamala has a vastly different sense and so the repetition produces no blemish. The repeated word 'Kamalāni' means "fully expanded beautiful lotuses".

Besides, when the repetition of a word is done in order to re-state a thing already stated once, it is not only justified but is also quite necessary. Thus, in verse (238), the words 'Vinaya', 'Guṇaprakarṣa', etc., are justifiably and necessarily repeated without constituting a poetic blemish.

(5) The next poetic blemish occurring in a sentence is Asthānapada, a Vākyadoṣa, containing misplaced words. Every word has to be used in its proper place, lest it should convey an absurd sense. Hemachandra explains this fault by a verse (प्रियेण संग्रथ्य... etc., V. 239) from the Kirātārjunīya (VIII. 37), cited by Mammaṭa in the same connection. "The lover knitted the garland ... etc.". Here, the words 'nobody gave up the garland' ought to be arranged thus : 'A certain woman did not throw away the garland'. In other word, the word **Na** is misplaced before kācid, as न काचिद् विजहौ implies that not someone but all discarded the garland. Here Hemachandra's gloss agrees with that of Mammaṭa. However, Hemachandra gives several more examples of the Asthānapada Vākyadoṣa. Thus in the well-known verse (द्वयंगतम्...) from the Kumārasambhavam of Kālidās (V. 71) "Both of you have become objects of pity etc.", "Tvaṁ ca", i.e., 'and you also" is the sense desired and, therefore, 'ca' should have come after 'tvam'. Hemachandra elaborates on this verse in the viveka commentary (p. 210). He observes that the word **ca** indicates Samuccaya or inclusiveness and should be used immediately after that object with which the inclusion is intended. Similarly the word पुनः is also used immediately after the object to be excluded. It results in the poetic blemish of Asthānapada Vākyadoṣa if 'Punaḥ' is used elsewhere. For example, in the verse (340)

cited in the viveka, the word Punaḥ should have been used after the word Tena, as Hemachandra aptly observes.

Again in the verse (241) 'Śaktiḥ ... etc.', 'Itthaṁ procyeva' instead of 'Procyevettham' should be the correct arrangement. The next verse (242) (Your sword (beloved) has embraced the enemies and is polluted by untouchables (elephants) . . , etc.) contains the figure Vyājastuti, because herein, though the king is apparently censured, yet he is inwardly praised. In this verse, says Hemachandra, 'Iti Śrīniyogāt' should have been the correct way to arrange the fourth line so as to avoid the fault of Asthānapada.

On tbe use of the Enclitic

On this word इति, Hemachandra elaborates in the viveka commentary (p. 211) by reproducing the Saṁgrahaślokas (33-35) from the second Chapter of Mahimbhaṭṭ's Vyaktiviveka to which source he is considerably indebted in this chapter (III) of the Kāvyānuśāana. The point made in these श्लोकs, which recapitulate the preceding exposition, is : "The enclitic Iti marks off the statement intended in a sentence. Hence nothing other than the statement of the nature of the thing should be placed before this 'Iti'. Just as the attribute resides in the possessor of that attribute and so finds mention after it, so also words like Iti, etc. impart their limiting (enclitic) function or attribute to the word after which they come. Thus Iti etc. (indeclinables) should be used in the proper place. Because, if this propriety of order is not observed, then, the marking off of the things so intended will not be done, and some other unexpected object will be marked off; and, this will lead to absurdity of sense. Indeclinables like Ittham, Evam, etc., should be treated like other enclitics of the same type. Indeclinables like 'ca' etc. pinpoint the sense of that word after which they occur; otherwise, confusion of sense results. (If it is urged that this delimiting of the functions of Iti etc. is due to Aucitya or propriety, then we say this is pointless because this function

arises from propriety itself. Propriety is the essence of poetry. Hemachandra critically observes at the end that Akramatva, in this manner, should not be reckoned a separate blemish; since it is included in the Vākyadoṣa called 'Asthānapada'. Hence Akramadoṣa[113] is not treated of.

The gloss reproduces a verse (243) from the Raghuvaṁśa (XVI. 13) which illustrates the use of the word Tad without the corresponding relative term 'Yad' violating the rule : "There is an invariable relation between **Yad** and **Tad**". Hence, according to Hemachandra, the fault of Asthānasthapada occurs[114] here.

Correlation of 'Yad' and 'Tad'

Mammaṭa has discussed the question of the necessity of using Yad and Tad in a related manner in the Seventh Chapter (Doṣa-chapter) of the Kāvyaprakāśa under the Doṣa called Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśa. According to the rule, there is an invariable correlation between the relative Yat (who or which) and the personal pronoun Tat (he or it). This invariable correlation between Yat and Tat is of two kinds : Expressed and Understood. Where both Yat and Tat are mentioned, the correlation is said to be Expressed; where one or even both are not stated, the correlation is said to be Understood. In the latter case, the expectation is fulfilled through Implication and hence there is no fault. Mammaṭa has given instances of both – the expressed correlation and the understood correlation. In the latter case, (a) the relative pronoun may be understood as in the following three cases : (1) when the pronoun Tat refers to one, that is the subject of discourse (Prakṛānta) (e.g. in Kātarye Kevalā etc., Saḥ refers to [king Atithi who is the subject of discourse), (2) when Tat refers to one that is well-known (prasiddha) as in Dvayṁ gatam etc. (Here Sā refers to the digit of the Moon which is well-known), (3) when Tat refers to a thing that is known by one's self (Anubhūtārtha) as in Utkampinī etc. (Here Te refers to the eyes of Vāsavadattā whose beauty has already been experienced by Vatsarāja). In

these three instances, it is not necessary that Yat should be mentioned. The required meaning is got at through Implication (i.e.) without Yat. or (b) when the personal pronoun is understood when the relative Yat is used in the latter clause, the personal pronoun Tat need not be expressed, but may be understood, in the former by the context; it is therefore, not necessary to state Tat in the former clause; for, it may be obtained by implication. However, if Yat is used in the former clause, then the expectation, raised by it, will not be fulfilled, unless Tat is stated in the latter clause; and (c) when both the correlates are understood from the context as in Bhavābhuti's well-known verse: Ye nāma etc.: "This effort is for **him who** be born – etc."

Mammaṭa's View On Correlation

It may be noted that it is not right, according to Mammaṭa, to explain that when Tat refers to something that is well-known, etc., it does not require Yat, either expressed or understood. For, it is not based on the reading of such works as the Vyaktiviveka etc. and also because it is not favoured by our author himself who says that 'Tat does not requires the express use of Yat', but he does not say that Tat is not required. Thus in the example Tanoti yo'sau etc. the relative Yaḥ remains expectant owing to the absence of an express mention of the personal pronoun Tat and the impossibility of Implication.

In verse no. 244, which means: "The ears take the trouble of carrying the ear-rings, but the ear-rings adorn the cheeks, not the ears." According to the poetic convention: Nārdhe Kiñcidasamāptaṁ vākyam, i.e., no sentence should be left unfinished after the half of a verse, "Śravaṇānām" placed in the second line, ought to have been placed in the first half of the verse. In this connection, Hemachandra observes in the Viveka that by virtue of this statement, contained in the gloss, Ardhāntaraikavācakatvam is not mentioned by him as a separate sentence-fault. However, Mammaṭa has mentioned it.

It is a fault of isolating a word in a distinct half (as in the verse 244 here, e.g., the word Śravaṇānām placed in the distinct, second line) which occurs when an important word, signifying a reason etc., is isolated from the half to which it belongs, and is placed in the other half. This fault is not Saṅkīrṇatva, because the word does not fall in another sentence, but is simply placed in the other half of the sentence. This fault consists in the absence of expectancy which constitutes a fault. According to some, this fault may also occur when a word belonging to the second half, is placed in the first half.[115]

In the next Gāthā (245), the hair of the woman, who has just finished her bath, is fancied to be weeping, by means of drops of water, as if with the fear of being tied up. In this verse, there are two Utprekṣās, but the main Utprekṣā is connected with the word 'Rudantī'. Hence the word Iva, showing the Utprekṣā, should be placed next to Rudantī, and not with Bandhasya, as is done here. Hence there occurs the fault of Asthānapadtva. Here, our author quotes a couplet to support his view. The couplet or Kārikā states : "When there are many Utprekṣās, the word indicative of the Utprekṣā should be placed with that Utprekṣā which is the most important." This Kārikā is from Vyaktiviveka II (110).

(6) The blemish of diminishing excellence called Patatprakarṣa occurs where the excellence of either a figure or a composition is gradually diminished as explained in the verse "kaḥ kaḥ kutra . . . etc." (246). This fault appears when the style offends against uniformity and propriety. For instance, in the present verse (246), the excellence of the sense is increasing, since the elephant is more terrible than the bear, and so on with the buffalo and the lion; and yet the excellence of words consisting in alliteration (Anuprāsa) and harsh sounds is gradually falling off. However, when the excellence diminishes according as the sentiment falls off, as in the next verse (247), i.e., in the fourth line, there is no fault. In fact, in this particular verse, the diminishing excellence, we are told by

Hemachandra, becomes a Guṇa or merit. Here the first three lines contain a challenge by Paraśurāma and are full of the heroic sentiment and as such the style of composition abounds in compounds. But in the fourth line, the poet avoids, quite appropriately, a compound (though it was due in its proper course); for, the line in question contains a reverential reference to Lord Śiva and as such the style is soft, not harsh. Hence this fall of excellence is not a Doṣa; but it is a merit.

(7) Samāptapunarāttatva or Resumption of the concluded, is a blemish that occurs, as the very name indicates, when a sentence that is concluded is again taken up by some words, that qualify it, contrary to our expectation. The word that resumes the statement or the sentence may be connected with it (1) as an adjective or an adjectival phrase, or (2) as an adjectival clause. In the second case, Samāptapunarāttatva is no fault, as Mammaṭa puts it. This kind is illustrated in the verse (247), explained above, where the word Yena shows that the clause is adjectival to the first sentence which is principal. The illustration given by Hemachandra is verse no. 248. Here, in the first three lines, the poet says that it is impossible to describe the different qualities of the King Vīracūḍāmaṇi, the foremost of heroes. Having completed the statement thus, the poet once again states the same thing in another way, and as such, the fourth line appears like a superfluous tail attached to the main statement which, as Hemachandra observes, does not strike us as charming, and hence it is a blemish. But where the statement is not supplemented, but a new clause is composed, there is no fault as shown above in connection with the verse 247.

(8) Avisargatvam is a blemish when the disappearance of Visarga is carried to excess as in the verse 249 in which several Visargas are changed into U or O. To make this a sentence-fault, it is necessary that more than one Visarga should be blunted. The Upahata referred to by Upahatau in the definition is the change of the Visarga to U. Mammaṭa

calls it Upahata-visargatva, and it is that "where many visargas are consecutively changed to 'u' ". Another fault of Visarga is dropping of the Visarga called "Lupta-visarga". This fault creeps in where many visargas are dropped. The fault in both Upahata and Luptavisargatva arises due to the dissatisfaction produced in the reader by the harshness, i.e, looseness of the composition. Therefore, it is permanent. However, the presence of many Visargas is also a blemish.

(9) Hatavṛttatva or a metre condemned is a fault.[116] When a verse is composed in a faulty manner and does not scrupulously observe the rules of metre and of the proper stops in the metre and when the last syllable of every line is not in harmony with the Rasa which it contains. In short, Hemachandra mentions five varieties of Hatavṛttatva : (1) When there is a violation of the definition of a metre; (2) When there is a break in the ceasura; (3) Although the definition of the metre is followed, yet it sounds harsh to the ear; (4) When a verse ends in a short syllable; and (5) When it is inconsistent with the sentiment in a verse. Actually, however, we may look upon a Condemned Metre as nothing but a harsh metre including under it all the five varieties of the fault. This is because the general feature of harshness to the hearer is found to run through all of them.

Since Hemachandra has written a whole work on Prosody, he refers us to that work for further details regarding metrical rules and conception, and gives only instances of Hatavṛttatvadoṣa. The single-line quotation (250) illustrates the Vaitālīya metre in which the second foot offends against the rules of the metre by giving six short syllables in succession. And, in the next two quotations (251 & 252), the rule regarding ceasura is broken. In another illustration (253), the metre is Hariṇī, in which the first caesura in every line is at the end of the sixth syllable. Here, however, the letter Hā at which there is a causura, is dependent upon another word, i.e., Anyat, being joined to it, and thus breaks the causura. Thus it is harsh here.[117]

(10) The fault of Saṅkīrṇatva or Confusion consists in the insertion into a sentence of words belonging to a distinct sentence. In other words, there is a confusion of sense because the words of two or more sentences are mixed up together. For instance in the Prakrit verse (256), Hemachandra points out in the gloss the proper order of the sentences.

However, when sentences come in a string, as in smart dialogues, there is no fault of Saṅkīrṇatva as in the famous verse (257) cited here.

This fault thus consist in a delayed or even an undesirable apprehension of meaning. The word 'Vākya' in 'Vākyāntara', used in the definition of this Doṣa, serves to point out that here a simple sentence is meant, not a complex or a compound one. The difference between Kliṣṭa and Sankīrṇa is that, while in the former, absence of proper meaning is due to the position of words in one and the same sentence, in the latter, confusion prevails due to the mixing up of words in distinct sentences.

(11) Garbhitatva or Use of a parenthesis occurs when in one sentence another sentence is inserted parenthetically. Thus a distinct sentence is wholly inserted in a (1) principal sentence or (2) between two clauses of the principal sentence. The verse (258) परापकार etc. illustrates the first kind wherein the sentence "Vadāmi . . . etc." inserted parenthetically thrusts itself un-necessarily in the main sentence 'Parāpakāra . . . etc.'. The same verse is cited by Mammaṭa and Udyotakāra observes that the inserted sentence is capable of yielding a meaning, but in Saṅkīrṇatva it is not so. In fact, in Saṅkīrṇatva, some words only of one sentence are inserted into another; but in Garbhitatva, one whole sentence is inserted. However, the essence of the fault (want of proximity) is the same in both.

When use of Parenthesis becomes a Guṇa

Nevertheless, when the speaker is in a flurry of some emotion, such insertions add grace to the style. Thus, for

instance, in the verse (259) : ["The whole world was conquered by Parsurama; (while describing his exploits we are thrilled with wonder) and it was given to the Brahmins. This wonderful story started with him and died with him."] 'Vadanta eva" comes in the main flow of the sentence – but as it shows a great excitement on the part of the speaker due to Vīra and Adbhuta, no fault of 'Garbhitatva' is involved here. On the contrary, Hemachandra asserts, it terminates in a merit (गुण).

(12) When uniformity or harmony is broken, there occurs the fault of Bhagnaprakramatva. Thus, this fault consists in violation of Uniformity or Harmony. It may be noted that the word Prakrama, according to the commentary Prabhā, does not mean commencement but it simply means uniformity of the subject – whether the beginning of the subject is violated by its end or the end by its beginning, does not matter. However, as a rule, one should begin a statement with a particular word or a word in perfect harmony with it; for, the introduction of a strange word jars on our ears and as such the fault of Bhagnaprakrama, as Mammaṭa and Hemachandra call it, occurs, as e.g., in the one-line quotation (260), we have the words Ukta and Pratyabhāṣata. According to Hemachandra, there is no harmony or uniformity between these two words and as such there is the fault of violation of harmony. However, if Pratyavocata were usedi n place of Pratyabhāṣata, it would go well with Ukta. The word Tadvisṛṣṭaḥ in the next verse (261), cited from the Kumārasambhava (VI. 94) is faulty and should be replaced by Anena visṛṣṭaḥ. The word मन्योः in the next verse (262), cited from the Kirātārjunīya (VII. 32), used in the genitive, constitutes violation of harmony of the instrumental case which shows the reason of the Pāṇḍava brothers not being grieved at Arjuna's departure for penance. So also the word Gajājinasya in the genitive case breaks the uniformity; for, the word Bhasmaiva is used in the nominative case, and Kapālam agrees with it in the verse (263) from the Kumārasambhava (VII. 32). Hemachandra recommends that the expression should be reworded (using the nominative) to suit the contextual

harmony. Again, in verse 264, quoted in the Vyakti Viveka (II) from the Śiśupālavadha (V. 28), the idea is that the army used and enjoyed the waters of the mountain-rivers in a variety of ways and thus removed the stigma of the rivers that they were not enjoyed. Here the verbs are used harmoniously until the trend is broken, making it faulty due to violation of form. If the compound word is broken, the harmony will be restored and the blemish removed. As said above, Hemachandra is indebted to Mahimabhaṭṭa in this Chapter both in the body of the Kāvyānuśāsan text-specially the gloss, and in the reference material reproduced in the Viveka. The Vyaktiviveka has been drawn upon at several places here. In particular, he has taken over this present verse 'सस्नुः . . . etc.' (264) quoted in the Vyaktiviveka (II) along with Mahimabhaṭṭa's views by saying that in connection with this verse, some people allege that since herein by the verbs Nejana etc., the harmony of time which was started by Snāna etc. is violated, there is here Prakramabheda in relation to Time as well. Hemachandra obviously hints here at Mahimabhaṭṭa's position because the present verse is actually given by Mahimabhaṭṭa to illustrate Kālaviśeṣaprakramabheda.[118] Against this view, Hemachandra holds that since here no specific time is intended by the poet, this Doṣa should not be alleged to be present. To say this, he reproduces Mahimabhaṭṭa's own comments (V.V., II. p. 302). The Viveka passage (p. 217 ff.) thus represents verbatim the comments of Mahimabhaṭṭa who had anticipated the objection referred to above. The passage states : "Alternatively, this fault of violation of Uniformity of time should not be reckoned as a fault at all. For, Uniformity of Time arises from the intention of the author which is itself uncertain." As Patañjali says in the Bhāṣya, "What is popularly considered as Perfect or which is known to the people as an object of the distant past, if the user (of that form) is able to see it or if it is fit to be seen by the user, then that Perfect tense is not intended and in such a case, the imperfect or Laṅ is used, as e.g., in 'Jayanta conquered the creatures', etc. Besides, whether it is

beyond seeing or is unfit to see, there may be absence of intention, as e.g., in the statement 'an unmarried girl does not have a waist.' Now, Ajayat means that which was done in the remote past, and yet because it is worth seeing, it is not considered as remote, and as such the perfect (Parokṣa) past is not employed here. Again in 'Anudarā Kanyā', the girls has a belly, but it is so slender so that she is called a giril having no belly. Mahimabhaṭṭa, therefore, says in a Saṅgrahaśloka : "When a sense is dependent on intention for its presence or absence, the wise do not take into account the fault of violation of the harmony of time" (VV. II. 30).

The next illustration of Bhagnaprakratva (verse 265) is from the Kirātārjunīya (III. 40), and it has been quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa and by our author too. It appears that Mammaṭa is also indebted to Mahimabhaṭṭa in respect of ideas and illustrative verses on Doṣas just as Hemachandra is beholden to Mahimabhaṭṭa. The idea in the verse is "Success favours those who strive hard for fame or happiness or to surpass othres." In this verse, there is no uniformity of affix (the infinitive termination), as the trend of the verse to use infinitives is broken, causing disharmony of form; hence this fault. To get over this fault, Hemachandra recommends the words Sukhamihituṃ vā as proper. Mammaṭa, however, briefly, states that here we have disharmony of a termination, and then recommends the same taxtual change which Hemachandra has suggested. Incidentally, this verse occurs in the Vyaktiviveka (II. p. 293) and Mahimabhaṭṭa comments that here we have the fault of Prakramabheda coupled with another fault in the form of an improper use of the option-denoting word **Vā** in the sense of **Ca** which is connective. But he holds over the discussion of this second fault and deals with the fault due to disharmony of an affix (Tumun) and recommends that the proper text should be 'Yaṣodhigantum . . . vā'. In the Viveka Commentary, therefore, Hemachandra reproduces a passage of the Vyaktiviveka which in part precedes the present verse and also follows it in the source.

Hemachandra's quotation in the Viveka (p. 218) begins with the comment that in the above expression 'Sukham . . . etc.' the use of Vā cannot be said to be improper, being suggestive of an option between two equal options – as such, the objection is refuted.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has quoted the verse (Viveka, V. 343) from the Raghuvaṁśa (VIII. 85) to illustrate Pratyayaprakramabheda. In the next verse (Viveka, 344), Mahimabhaṭṭa observes that the poet has started the trend of mentioning the imperative forms and despite the change in the trend, the development of the idea goes on unhampered, because the use of imperatives was not done away with. Hence here there is no Pratyayabheda.

In the next verse (K.A.S., gloss, V. 266) the poet starts with the word Udanvat (the sea), but in the next sentence again mentions the sea by the word Apāṁ nidhiḥ. This is a fault. Mahimabhaṭṭa recommends a change which means : The earth is limited (bounded) by the sea and the sea is a hundred yojanas in expanse. This would ensure that the sea which is the subject of the verb 'child' would become an expressed and principal predicate and the fault befalling the compound word would be removed. Hemachandra has cited this last comment of the Vyaktiviveka gloss in the viveka and reproduced the next two verses (345–6). His instance (V. no. 267, gloss) of using synonyms in the same context explains Mahimā's Upasargaprakramabheda. The verse No. 270 illustrates Mahimā's Śabdaprakramabheda. Verse 273, 274, etc., illustrate this blemish in different figures. But verse 275 has a child as the speaker; hence there is no Doṣa here. Viveka (p. 220) contains a Vyaktiviveka passage which is interesting (V.V. p. 320 etc.). This is the way in which the violation of uniformity is explained. Ananvita is Hemachandra's last (13th) blemish of a sentence. It consists in absence or incompatibility of **connection** which terminates in absurdity of meaning or superfluity of sense (vide K.A.S. Gloss, p. 222).

The Eight Ubhayadoṣas

Next Hemachandra takes up the eight blemishes pertainnig both to Word as well as Sentence. These are (III. 6) :

(1) Unconventional Usage or Aprayuktatvam;

(2) Indecorous (in three ways) or Aślīlatvam;

(3) Incapable of giving sense or Asamarthatvam;

(4) Having an improper significance or Anucitārthatvam;

(5) Unpleasant to the ear or Śrutikaṭutva;

(6) Obscure in meaning or Kliṣṭatva;

(7) Having the predicative factor not discriminated or Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśam; and,

(8) Of repugnant implication or Viruddhabuddhikṛt (only when occurring in a compound).

A Comparative Study of Ubhayadoṣas

Now, Hemachandra's Aprayukta is called by the same name by Mammaṭa and Bhoja. Rudraṭa regards this fault as a sense-fault, and calls it Apratītam. Our author's Aślīlatvam (threefold) is Bhoja's Grāmyam – Asabhyārtham Aślīlatvam and it is manifold. Mammaṭa, however, calls it by the same name. Vāmana has two more divisions under Aślīla, in addition to those of Mammaṭa. According to him Aślīla is a padārthadoṣa. Bhoja makes Aślīla a sub-division of Grāmya and makes Amaṅgala and Ghṛṇāvat coordinate with it. Asamarthatva here is the same in Mammaṭa, Rudraṭa and Viśvanātha, but Vāgbhaṭa calls it Aprasiddha (e.g. Hanti). Hemachandra's Anucitārtha is common to Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. The Śrutikaṭu of Mammaṭa and Hemachandra is Vāmana's and Bhoja's Kaṣṭa and Śrutikaṭu of Vāgbhaṭa but Paruṣa and Duḥśrava of Vidyānātha (P.R.Y.B.) and Viśvanātha respectively. Hemachandra's Kliṣṭa is the Kliṣṭa of Vāmana's Padārthadoṣa Kliṣṭa, Bhoja's and Vidyādhara's Apuṣṭārtha and Kliṣṭadoṣa and Kliṣṭa of Viśvanātha. Vāgbhaṭa calls it Asammita. Hemachandra's Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśa is the namesake of Mammaṭa's as well as of Viśvanātha's same Doṣa.

Hemachandra's Viruddhabuddhikṛt is Mammaṭa's Viruddha-matikṛt but Vāgbhaṭa's Vyāhatārtha, Bhoja's Viruddha and Rudraṭa's Viparītakalpana. In point of fact all these are word-faults only.

Hemachandra's Treatment of Ubhayadoṣas

In dealing with these eight Ubhayadoṣas, Hemachandra derives help from and substantially draws upon the works of Rudraṭa, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Mammaṭa. Hemachandra explains his unconventional or unemployed faulty word as one not sanctioned by poetic tradition, though it is well-known among the masses alone (i.e., Grāmya or Vulgar) or in the Śāstras alone. In view of this, the defects of Apratīta, Asamartha and Nihatārtha in Mammaṭa's sixteen Padadoṣas do not need separate mention, being included in Aprayukta itself. However, Asamartha is retained by Hemachandra as an Ubhayadoṣa (of Pada and Vākya). Mammaṭa (K.P. VII. 51) gives sixteen Padadoṣas and then debars three viz., ungrammaticalness, incapable and uselessness from the field of Padadoṣa, retaining thirteen as Vākyadoṣas. The distinction of Pada-Vākyadoṣa is justified on the ground that where the defect lies in a single word in the sentence, it is regarded as occurring in the **word**, while, where it occurs in more than one word, it is taken as occurring in the sentence.

Incidentally Hemachandra cites Rudraṭa's verse (VI. 27) to express the view that slang words should not be used as Deśya words are not amenable to etymological explanations and are regional in character. But Aprayuktatva is a fault common to Word and Sense both in Mammaṭa and Hemachandra. The fault consists in delayed apprehension of the principal sense (Mukhyārthahati).

'Aślīlatva' or indecency causes the manifestation of shame, disgust or inauspiciousness. There are many subdivisions of these three. Hemachandra draws on Mammaṭa here. As this fault consists in the apprehension of a sense that diminishes the enjoyment of the Rasa or in causing dissatisfaction to

the reader due to suggestion of such a sense, it is no blemish of Jugupsā in certain Rasas (Śānta, for instance) where 'renunciation' is the aim. Similarly, Vrīḍā is no blemish in Love.

'Asamarthatva' is an interesting blemish. It means partially powerless word or sentence. This represents the principle of Ambiguity in English Literature as a poetic and stylistic device. But, as William Empson warns us (Seven Types of Ambiguity, p. 235) : "An ambiguity .... is not satisfying in itself, nor is it considered a device on its own, a thing to be attempted; it must in each case arise from, and be justified by, the peculiar requirements of the situation." Otherwise ambiguity degenerates into obscurity and dubiety.[119] But not when it is deliberate and suggestive. And when it results in Vyājastuti, it is a Guṇa.

Hemachandra follows a different authority in regard to Asamarthatva which consists in a (1) lack of expressiveness (Mammaṭa's Avācaka); (2) fanciful sense, and (3) doubtfulness or ambiguity and incapacity to convey the intended sense. It pertains to word and sentence. Thus Mammaṭa's Asamartha, Avācaka, Prasiddhihata and Sandigdha are included here under Asamartha. Hemachandra adopts verses and comments from Mammaṭa and also takes over passages from Vyaktiviveka in his Viveka. The long passage (V.V. p. 440) by Mahimā explains the Avācyavacanadoṣa which Hemachandra modifies slightly. This passage deals with verbal and semantic statements in a subtle, analytical way.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's Conception of Doṣas

It may be noted that in the second chapter of Vyaktiviveka, Mahimabhaṭṭa first explains Doṣa in terms of Impropriety and then sub-divides Doṣa into Internal (Rasadoṣa) and External (Word and Sense faults). He gives a fivefold classification to this external inappropriateness or poetic blemish : Vidheyāvimarśa, Prakramabheda, Kramabheda, Paunaruktya and Vacyāvacana. While the **internal** blemishes relate directly to Rasa as explained by the Dhvanyāloka, the enternal blemishes

are detrimental to Rasa through the via media of Vācya (i.e., Artha), working through Śabda. Thus the external doṣas are indirect and mediate. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa, a critic of the Dhvani theory, "admits unhesitatingly Ānandavardhana's doctrine of Anaucitya (incongruity) but proceeds to analyse the concept scientifically". Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy observes that this classification of Doṣas was for the first time enunciated by Mahimabhaṭṭa. They are as much logical as literary defects.[120]

Hemachandra reproduces Mahimabhaṭṭa's arguments on and off (e.g. V.V. II. p. 231 etc.; pp. 378, 388-9; also pp. 431–32, etc., as well as his Saṁgrahaślokas 73–77 etc.) in his Viveka at several places to elaborate on the different Doṣas of language and meaning and benefits from Mahimabhaṭṭa's superb analytical acumen. In connection with citations of Mahimabhaṭṭa's views, Hemachandra adds critical comments and shows that Doṣas are interconnected, overlapping and inclusive in many places.

In this connection we may draw the reader's attention to Hemachandra's method of drawing upon and connecting Mahimabhaṭṭa's views of Avācyavacanadoṣa with regard to Avaśyavācya (VV. 333 & 335). It is also noteworthy that even Mammaṭa has benefitted from Mahimabhaṭṭa's intensive deliberations on Doṣas. And it is no exaggeration to state that Mahimā's detailed discussion of well-known verses from Kālidāsa and others are quite thought-provoking and remarkable for their incisiveness and thoroughness (Vide 'Viveka', pp. 203-4).

Anucitarthatva consists in improper signification and is a permanent fault and this fault corresponds to Hīnopamā. It arises from a breach of propriety and Mammaṭa's illustrations under Upamādoṣas etc. are taken over by Hemachandra. Bhāmaha (II. 54 & 55) also deals with this aspect of Upamā. While accepting Mammaṭa's views here, Hemachandra adds the proviso that this is not a blemish

when the incompatibility of two things compared leads to a deliberate censure. This fault occurs in a word as well as a sentence.

Cacophony is a well-known word-fault. It consists of such harsh letters or syllables as manifest the excellence called Ojas and depress the principal sense. Such words are faulty only in case of a Rasa that is possessed of Mādhurya; since in the Heroic etc., they heighten the sentiment. It is not a blemish when a grammarian is a speaker, when there is imitation of another. Mammaṭa's Pratikūlavarṇatva is a sentence fault occurring in Rasa-poems. Hemachandra illustrates cacophony in a sentence and states (VII. 59) that "owing to the propriety of the speaker etc., even a blemish becomes excellence in certain cases, and in others, it is neither the one nor the other". We can see to what extent Mammaṭa's codification of Doṣa holds away over later writers like Hemachandra, Viśvanātha and others. These later authors not only accept Mammaṭa's views and comments but also his illustrative verses. In this connection, one realises the truth of Dr. V. Raghavan's remarks :

> "Hemachandra's treatment of Doṣas in Chapter III..... is almost a reproduction of Mammaṭa's Chapter on Doṣas. Hemachandra accepts all the Rasadoṣas; most of Mammaṭa's Pada-doṣas and Vākyadoṣas are accepted..... All the Arthadoṣas.....are also accepted......The number, nature and illustrations of all the flaws are the same...... In (his) own commentary on his work, Hemachandra has given additional matter drawn from Ānandavardhana and Mahimabhaṭṭa under the heads of Rasadoṣas, Avimṛṣṭavidheya and Prakrama and Krama Bhaṅgas." (Bhojas Ś'r. Pr., p. 246)

Similar views are also expressed by Shri Trilokanath Jha in his paper in the Journal of Bihar Research Society, Vol. XLIII (1-2) in connection with Hemachandra's indebtedness to Mahimabhaṭṭa.

Hemachandra's Klisṭatva occurs when there is a delay in apprehending the sense of a verse or a sentence owing to its faulty Syntax or its clumsy construction and results in obscurity of meaning. He adapts Mammaṭa's words. Mammaṭa had provided (K.P. VII. 51) that the blemishes of the Obscure, the Prominent non-mention of the Predicate or of the Apodotic or of the Emphatic and the Repugnant Implication or Suggestion occur in a comound only.

However, when the words remain separate, the blemish belongs to a sentence. Thus the blemish arising from the want of juxtaposition is a sentence-fault only. It may be noted that Obscurity is no fault when the adjectives are peculiar to certain persons such a Rāvaṇa, Śiva, etc., or in Enigma or Paranomasia, etc., when a delayed apprehension is desirable. And in the case of a drunkard etc., it is even an excellence.

Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśatva or the blemish of Non-discriminated in predicate occurs where the predicative part is not principally stated, as Hemachandra puts it. This blemish pertains to a word and a sentence. This blemish is one of the most prominent blemishes, and it has attracted much attention of the theorists. According to Mr. Mitra, the translator of the Sāhityadarpaṇa, the Sanskrit word 'Vidheya' "is not restricted to the sense of 'predicate' but is used also in the signification of a word that gratifies the expectation raised by a previous word, as also in the sense of one on which a stress is laid". For this reason, Mr. Mitra has coined the adjective Apodotic from the Greek word Apodosis which, in Greek, means the completive part of a sentence, which gratifies the expectation raised by the Protasis or the introductory part. Now, the prominence of the predicate implies its capability of being apprehended as the predicate and it has that capability when it is expressed after the subject, and is not subordinate to it. Thus this blemish extends to the verses Nyakkāro etc., and Kṣaṇamappa etc., because in the former, the required prominence is absent and in the latter, an express nagation

is not mentioned. Thus both the parts of the definition, i.e., the adverb Prādhānyena (prominently) and the verb Anirdiṣṭaḥ (not expressed) have got their proprieties. In a sentence, the subject and the predicate are the two principal parts, and to be known as such, both must be stated separately. Hemachandra adduces instances where this rule is violated, giving rise to the fault of prominent non-mention of the predicate. And, in the Viveka Commentary (p. 243), he deals with the aspect of Negation (Nisedha) with the help of a Vyaktiviveka passage (VV. II, opening passage). This discussion is comparable to Mammaṭa's discussion of the negative compound (Vide K.P. VII. V. 162), which stresses that the negation should be predicated, i.e., emphasised. Mammaṭa points to the famous stanza from the Vikramorvaśīyam (IV. 7) where this is done - and rightly. For, as the quotation (no. 73) in Viveka states, "When the affirmation is not principal, but the denial is so, the latter is termed an Express Negation or Prasajya Pratiṣedha in the case of which the negative associates with the **word** that qualifies the verb as in Na dṛptaniśācaraḥ (and not Adṛptaniśācaraḥ)". But, in the given examples Amukta or Anuktavān, the denial has **not** the appearance of an Emphatic Negation (i.e., it is not Na mukta or Na uktavān), being reduced to an unprominent condition in the Tatpuruṣa compound (Amukta or Anuktavān), and hence, faring like what is called a "Privation" or Paryudāsa. Thus, "when the affirmation is chiefly intended, and not the denial, it is to be recognized as that case of denial, which is called Paryudāsa, where the negative is **compounded** with another word, as in Jugopātmānam (Raghu. I. 21)". In this verse, there is no poetic blemish since the adjectives Atrastaḥ, Anāturaḥ, etc., go with the subject and are not predicates and as such they do not need prominent non-mention.

Two Types of Negation

Thus, there are two kinds of Negation : (1) Prasajya pratiṣedha in which the negation, instead of the affirmation, is

emphatic, and (2) Paryudāsa, where affirmation is more prominent than negation. Besides, on the basis of the general principle that if a word enters into a compound, it cannot be emphasised, it is laid down that when negation is not compounded it is Prasajyapratiṣedha and when it is compounded, it is Paryudāsa, However, Vāmana allows compounding in Prasajya pratiṣedha and hence it cannot be said to be admitted on all hands that whenever Nañ is compounded, it must be Paryudāsa. Hemachandra thinks that the negation in Anuktavān should be emphatic because it is a negation called prasajyapratiṣedha and so he states that the negative compound in Anuktavān is improper because the negative here is called Paryudāsa (compounded) and it gets connected with the verb. Besides, he adds, by reproducing an argument from the Vyaktiviveka, connected with the verse Saṁrambhaḥ Karikīṭa... etc. (V. 353 in our text, cited to illustrate Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśadoṣa in a sentence, p. 245) with the comments (p. 196), that it is not proper to resort to Paryudāsa here because it will prevent the sense from being comprehended or the sense will not fit in. This discussion proceeds apace and forms an interesting intellectual exercise in the Vyaktiviveka (II) (vide Viveka, Qs. 76-77) the discussion regarding the propriety of construction in relation to Uddeśya and Vidheya so as to avoid the Vācyāvacanadoṣa comes to an end (vide V.V.II. 94-95; also pp. 431-32) thus:

"The predicate should not be stated without stating the subject; for nothing, nowhere can stand stable unless it has found a substratum. This mutual relation of subject and predicate is of the nature of Rūpya-rūpaka; so, in it, the mention of predicate is never proper before a subject." (vide K.A.S., pp. 244-245). Hemachandra goes on to cite the view-point of patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, who has detected the blemish of prominent non-mention of the predicate in Pāṇini's, sūtra "Vṛddhirādaic" because the order of Anuvādya or Uddeśya and Vidheya is reversed here. But he defends this reversal on the ground that it signifies an auspicious beginning.

In view of the definition of Pramāṇa as given in Pramāṇavārtika I. 31 ("Pramāṇa or Proof is unobstructed or uncontradicted knowledge"), in poetry also the same methodology is recommended; as e.g., in the verse Iyaṁ gehe lakṣmī... etc. (U.R.C. I.38).

Hemachandra adopts the verse Trak tāravī nivasanaṁ (to emphasize the above points) and the verse (No. 353) Saṁrambhaḥ karikiṭamegha....etc. from the Vyaktiviveka (the last mentioned verse explains the same blemish in a sentence). However, the words **Yo'sau** in the fourth line (in verse 353) give rise to a discussion on another aspect of the same fault. Here the use of Yad without Tad is a blemish) for, Yad must be followed by Tad and between the two, Tad is very important and hence it should not be dropped. The discussion on this point is quite exhaustive as presented in the gloss. (K.A.S., pp. 245-247). Mammaṭa states that (1) The personal pronoun Tad, when it refers to an object (a) that is under discussion (b) well-known or (c) known by experience, does not require the use of Yad (K.P. VII, gloss); (2) If the pronoun Yad is used correlatedly in a sentence that follows, it does not require, because of its potency, the use of Tat correlated to the sentence that precedes; because herein Yad implies Tad; (3) But the pronoun Yat, used in the beginning, does not fulfil its expectancy without the use of Tat in a latter sentence; (4) When both are mentioned, nothing is wanting; (5) In some cases, both may be implied; as e.g. in Ye nāma kecid etc.; (6) Tat and Adas juxtaposed with Yat, signify well-knownness (Veṇī. I.13); (7) The use of Yat twice, with tat used once, implies all the objects singly, This lead is followed by Viśvanātha also.

Compound Words

While discussing Mahimabhaṭṭa's illustrative verse on Ambikākesarī, Hemachandra reproduces an expository passage in the Viveka (pp. 247-258) which runs into 12 pages. This

relates to the rule that the pronoun Yat used in the beginning does not fulfil its expectancy without the use of Tat (gloss p. 247, v. 358 ff). This discussion is connected with Mahimabhaṭṭa's exposition of the compounding of words under the **third** type of Vidheyāvimarsa (V.V.II). Hemachandra thus introduces the question of use of words in compounds that leads to the blemish of Avimṛṣṭavidheyaṁśa. Mammaṭa has also touched on this aspect under the compound words Āryānuja and Tātakalatra, where the words Ārya and Tāta are improperly subordinated in the compounds. Hemachandra, therefore, hits on presenting the traditional ideas on this question by means of the Vyaktiviveka passage referred to above. Mammaṭa already mentions that of his sixteen Padadoṣas, the last three of obscurity, prominent non-mention of the predicate and repugnant suggestion are possible only in a compound. However, it is a sentence-fault when the words are separated. Instances of Samāsas are also cited wherr this fault occurs.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's View on Compounds Summarised

In the verse (353) 'संरम्भः करिकीटमेघशकलोद्देशेन... etc.', Mahimabhaṭṭa's attention is first engaged by the negation in the word संरब्धवान्. In Asaṁrabdhavān, negation is prominent, not assertion. So compounding is not proper; for this is a case of Prasajyapratiṣedha. This is the first kind of Vidheyāvimarśadoṣa. The second type of this doṣa occurs in the same verse as the correlation of Yad and Tad is jeopardised (only Yad, without Tad, occurs herein and mere Yad refers to a known fact; as such, it does not convey any new meaning. Hence it is the sphere of Anuvādya). The long Vyaktiviveka passage cited by Hemachandra refers to the third type of Vidheyāvimarśadoṣa in the same verse. Mahimā introduces the topic of Samāsa by observing that "in the word Ambikākesarī, the genitive compound does not fit in well; for it is faulty. Now, generally, all compound words (except Dvandva or pairs) are made up of adjectives and substantives; for, otherwise, they

will not be capable of giving 'sense'. This relation takes **two** forms according as the qualifier and the qualified are in the same case or in different cases. The first relation characterises the Karmadhāraya compound. But where, in a compound, two or more words qualify a third (uncompounded) word, it is a fit case of the Adjectival Compound (Bahuvrīhi). Besides, when, in a compound, either a numeral word occurs or a negation occurs, then a Dvigu or a negative compound comes into being. When many case-relations operate, they typify the Tatpuruṣa but where an indeclinable dominates, there, the Avyayībhāva occurs.

"Thus, although a compound consists of an adjective and a substantive, yet when the adjective promotes the beauty of its substratum, i.e., the substantive and as such becomes dominant enough to occupy the position of an Emphatic (predicate) term and at the same time when the substantive is merely reduced to the status of a subject term, being subordinated to the predicate term, one should avoid the compounding of the two words. For, in the case where the two words are compounded, there the dominantness and the subordinateness respectively of the adjective and the substantive will cease to exist. As for opposition between the subordinateness and principalness as co-existing, this is not a meterial argument. As for the outcome, the outcome of the predicated thing or intended sense is the unique, charming sense of a sentence known to a few connoisseurs and is a subject peculiar to the Genius of the poet only." This view is illustrated with examples of the different compounds by Mahimā. On and off, Mahimā offers thought-provoking comments on the verbal and semantic as well as logical aspects of this topic. Mahimā particularly emphasises the fact that the emphasis that is experienced in the quaifying words (i.e., Predicates) is possible when these case-terminations are retained; hence when these cases are obliterated, the emphasis due to a predicate is not apprehended. And for this reason,

not only is there subordination through words in the adjective but there is also subordination in point of sense; for, they ascribe their attributes, known through other means of proof, to the substantive and thus increase the latter's charm. And by this we apprehend the prominence of the subject (i.e., Substantive) in virtue of the words and also the sense. For these substantives only serve as subjects. As, in a compound, there occurs the disappearance of a case-termination, the apprehension of promotion or demotion does not take place. Consequently, Rasa, which depends on the promotion etc. of the Sense, cannot be realised and thus the poem whose soul is Rasa suffers from the blemish of Vidheyāvimarśa. Hemachandra omits paragraphs in between and goes on to cover several aspects of the matter in hand. The upshot, however, is that anything emphasised by the poet must not be, as a rule, compounded with another. There is no rule that the other word must be a substantive only. It can be anything else.

However, the three Āntaraślokas (V.V. II. 18-20) cited in the Viveka (Qs. 82-83 p. 258) which follow the explanation of the linguistic beauty of the well-known verse Nyakkāro etc. (an acknowledged example of the Vidheyāvimarśa blemish), also answer the question - "Is it always a blemish to compound words?" - in the negative and state :

"But the employment of a compound is considered praiseworthy in Rasas like Vīra etc. (except in Śānta, Śṛṅgāra and Karuṇa) since such a mode of expression suggests the Rasas in question. For, Samāsas, Metres, the Vṛttis (like Kaiśikī, Upanāgarikā etc.) and Kāku are the suggestors of Rasa as they have the Vācikabhinaya as their Ātma or are included in Vācikabhinaya. And compounding should be done only half-way in a verse - not more; not in a substained way so as to pervade the four lines; otherwise it becomes like prose, which being non-metrical, is deficient in delineating the Rasas."

The role of a predicate implies predominance or emphasis; for, there cannot be dissociation (Vyabhicāra) between

Prādhānya and Vidheyatva. They always go hand in hand. Hence prominent non-mention of this important factor in a sentence is also a blemish.

The **eighth** and the last poetic blemish occurring both in a word and a sentence is **Viruddhabuddhikṛt** or one that causes repugnant suggestion or implication. This also occurs when the compound is resolved in another way, as e.g.. the word Akāryamitra, i.e., (1) an unselfish friend (2) 'a friend in evil'. The second sense is repugnant to the first sense, which is intended. However, the first method involves a Lakṣaṇā and so the second sense is more readily apprehended. Secondly, this blemish occurs when two nouns are so compounded as to form a third noun, which by custom, has a sense, opposed to that sense which is yielded by the two nouns; as e.g., Galagraha. Several other varieties are also illustrated where a sense repugnant to the intended sense is suggested. Hence it is no blemish if the repugnant sense is **intended**. In a sentence, a number of ambiguous words lead to this fault. But when this ambiguity is deliberate, no blemish occurs.

Arthadoṣas Explained

Hemachandra enumerates **twenty** blemishes pertaining to Sense. The blemish of Kaṣṭatva or obscurity of sense arises out of clumsiness of construction (Verse 370; K.P. VII, V. 268). Apuṣṭārthatva or Superfluity and Irrelevance is instanced when a sense which is not at all pertinent to the subject in hand is thrust in a verse. However, irrelevance is also understood by Mammaṭa as implying inconsistency or tautology. So irrelevance or superfluity yield two types of this fault and reflect on the poet's deficient powers. In Slesa or paronomasia etc., where a display of figures of word such as alliteration etc. is the principal point, there is no blemish of this kind, viz. Apuṣṭārthatva.

The other blemishes of Sense, with self-explanatory and tell-tale names, are Vyāhatatva (Contradictoriness), Grāmyatva

or Avaidagdhya (An unpoetic or rustic, vulgar sense), Aślīlatva (Indecorousness), Sākāṅkṣatva (Incompleteness), Sandigdhatva (Dubiousness or Ambiguity), Akramatva (Absence or Impropriety of order), Punaruktam (Tautology), Bhinnasahacaratva (Dissimilarity), Viruddhavyaṅgyatvam or Prakāśitaviruddhatva of Mammaṭa (suggesting a sense opposed to the intended sense), Prasiddhiviruddhatva (Opposition of the suggested sense to usage and is the same as the previous one having repugnant or inconsistent sense), Vidyāviruddhatva (Opposition to sciences), Tyaktapunarāttatva (Resumption of the concluded), Saniyamaparivṛtatva (Improper Non-limitation), Aniyamaparivṛtatva (Improper limitation), Viśeṣa and Aviśeṣaparivṛtatva (Improper non-specification and Improper specification), Vidheyāyuktatva (Improper predication) and Anuvādāyuktatva (Improper attribution).

Exceptions or Apavādas

After exhaustively explaining the different kinds of blemishes, both verbal and ideal, Hemachandra proceeds to deal with the exceptions to these blemishes in the **last three** Sutras of the third chapter (III. 8-10). He provides that all blemishes cease to be blemishes where there is Imitation. Again, if the speaker, etc., are proper, no blemish arises. Thus the force of the character of the Speaker, Hearer, Suggestion, Subject-matter, Context, etc., nullify and neutralise the blemish or turn it into a merit (vide K.A.S.III 9-10). However, Hemachandra does not duplicate his effort here since he has already dealt with Exceptions under the different Doṣas.

A Critical Reviews of Hemachandra's Treatment of Doṣas

This marks the end of Hemachandra's treatment of the poetic blemishes in so far as they relate to Rasa, Śabda and Artha. Looking back on the third chapter of the Kāvyānuśāsana, we find that the treatment of Doṣa is theoretically consistent from the standpoint of Dhvani-Kāvya and exhaustive from the point of view of Mammaṭa's codification which has taken into

account the contributions to the conception of Doṣa in its different aspects of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Ānandavardhana and Mahimabhaṭṭa. While defining, classifying and illustrating Doṣas, Hemachandra has borne in mind the important literary principle of Aucitya which is the governing principle of the Rasadhvani and as such he has tried to bring all Doṣas into an effective relationship with Rasa in terms of which he has defined the doctrine of Doṣa. On the other hand, Hemachandra adopts Vāmana's classification of Doṣas into Padadoṣas, Padārthadoṣas and Vākyadoṣas and Vākyārthadoṣas as modified by Mammaṭa and benefits from Rudraṭa's treatment also. He draws upon Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of Doṣas in ample measure – especially in his Viveka, and as adapted by Mammaṭa with illustrations. But, in the main, Hemachandra follows Mammaṭa in theory and practice, especially his codification of the Rasadoṣas in relation to the principle of Anaucitya. In view of this, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's remarks are not wide of mark : "Almost all the later writers slavishly follow Mammaṭa in their treatment (of Doṣas)." (Essays in Sk. Criticism, p. 166; vide also Dr. V. Raghavan, Bhojas Śr. Pr. pp. 242-46 & 248).

It will be seen that in our exposition of Hemachandra's treatment of Poetic Blemishes we have taken care to 'trace the influence of earlier authors' views on Hemachandra's concept and treatment of Doṣas and, as for Hemachandra's indebtedness to Mahimabhaṭṭa, we have shown from place to place how Hemachandra utilizes ideas and expressions from the Vyaktiviveka (II) of Mahimabhaṭṭa to fortify his exposition of the various types of Doṣas as also to enrich his discussions of the illustrative verses. It may be mentioned that in an exhaustive study of Hemachandra's indebtedness to Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka, published in the Journal of Bihar Research Society, Vol. XLIII, parts 1 and 2, Shri Triloknath Jha, has also provided a detailed chart of the passages of the Vyaktiviveka skillfuly utilized by Hemachandra in his work.

THE POETIC EXCELLENCES OR THE GUṆAS 5

Hemachandra has defined poetry as Word and Sense possessed of Guṇas or poetic excellences, and clearly laid down that the excellences are the causes of the heightening of the Rasa and hence primarily they are the attributes of the Rasa or Sentiment, and it is only figuratively or indirectly that they are said to belong to the words and the senses as these latter help the suggestion of the Rasa. He also has demonstrated by the method of positive and negative concomittance that Guṇas and Doṣas reside in the Rasa only and not in Words or Senses.

Hemachandra's Stand on the Guṇas

While dealing with Doṣa, Guṇa, Alaṁkāra and other poetic elements, Hemachandra clearly takes his stand on the Literary theory which regards Rasa or Rasadhvani as the soul of poetry. For, once you acknowledge the supreme importance of Rasa in poetry, you find it relatively simple to show the precise position of other poetical concepts such as Guṇa, Doṣa, Vṛtti, Rīti, Saṅghaṭanā, etc., in a poem. It was Ānandavardhana, who, in his Dhvanyāloka, for the first time, interpreted the different concepts of Doṣa, Guṇa, Alaṁkāra, etc., in their relation to Rasa. And, so far as the concept of Guṇa is concerned, he recognised only three Guṇas – Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, as against some **ten** Guṇas or Literary excellences of his predecessors (Dhv. Āl II.6, II.8, etc.).

Mammaṭa's Definition of Guṇas

Mammaṭa, who follows in the footsteps of Ānandavardhana, defines Guṇas as those attributes of the Rasa, that are like the heroism of the soul, that cause its exaltation and have an unceasing existence[121] (अचलस्थितयः).

In the gloss that follows this kārika (K.P. VIII. 66 ff.), Mammaṭa, elaborates on this : " Just as heroism etc. belong to the soul only, and not to the form, so also sweetness or Mādhurya etc. belong to the Rasa only, not to the letters. But, sometimes, on seeing the tall figure which is appropriate to heroism, the usage – ' His form alone is heroic ' – prevails and in others, even when someone is not brave, he is called brave only on the basis of his large physical frame or body, whereas in certain other cases even a brave man is called not brave only because of his short form. Just as such usages prevail amongst people who do not know for sure, similarly the use of Mādhurya etc. being prevalent (figuratively) for soft letters suggestive of tender Rasas (like Śṛṅgāra etc.), those who are devoid of the knowledge that excellences extend as far as Rasas, use Mādhurya or sweetness etc., for the letters suggestive of Rasas which are tender and the like and speak of untenderness of these letters which in fact help the tender Rasa etc. Therefore, the sweetness etc. are attributes of the Rasas which are manifested through the choice words (Varṇas) and these do not depend simply on the letters. We shall presently illustrate how these letters become suggestive of the Rasas."

Guṇas and Alaṁkāras Distinguished

Having thus explained the concept of Guṇa in its relation to Rasa, Mammaṭa turns to the discussion of the distinction between the concepts of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra. So in the next Kārika (K.P.VIII.67), he tries to determine the general character of Alaṁkāra in its relation to Rasa :

उपकुर्वन्ति तं सन्तं[122] येऽङ्गद्वारेण जातुचित् ।
हारादिवदलङ्कारास्तेऽनुप्रासोपमादयः ॥

i.e., Those (elements) that help occasionally Rasa, where it exists, through its parts, are the figures (such as) alliteration, simile and others like the necklace etc.

In the gloss that follows, Mammaṭa remarks : The Alaṁkāras help the principal Rasa when it exists through exaltation of the parts in the form of expressive words and their meanings. But when Rasa is not present, these Alaṁkāras tend to become merely a fanciful expression. And, in some cases, the Alaṁkāras do not help the Rasa which exists.

This is the difference between the poetic excellences or Guṇas and the poetic embellishments or Alaṁkāras, points out Mammaṭa. And adds that the contention of Udbhaṭa (in Bhāmahavivaraṇa) to the effect that, though in empirical terms the qualities such as bravery etc. subsist by inherence (समवाय) but ornaments such as necklace etc. subsist by conjunction (संयोग), yet in poetry, excellences like Ojas (floridity) etc. and embellishments like Anuprāsa etc. (Alliteration) both subsist by inherence (समवाय) only; and so any distinction between Guṇa and Alaṁkāra is blind traditionalism of the ignorant people, is wrong.[123]

Again, what Vāmana says – "Excellences are attributes which produce the poetic beauty, but the embellishments heighten it" – is equally untenable. For, the question is : Is poetry regarded as such due to the presence of all the excellences or due to a few of them? If due to (the presence of) all, then, how the Gauḍī and the Pāñcālī dictions or styles, which do not possess all the excellences, constitute the soul of Poetry? (For, Vāmana defines Rīti to be the soul of Poetry.) If due to a few, then examples like "अद्रावत्र प्रज्वलत्यग्निः – etc." will be called poetry when the excellences Ojas etc. are present. But, in examples like "स्वर्गप्राप्तिरनेनैव देहेन etc.", Viśeṣokti and Vyatireka are responsible for the appellation of poetry in the absence of (your, i.e., Vāmana's) excellences. For, this last verse, though bereft of letters suggestive of

sweetness and floridity is out of context and perspicuity is absent, contains figures, which are supposed to heighten the poetic beauty, produced by excellences which are absent, is a case of good poetry.

Three Guṇas only

So, there are three excellences only, viz., Sweetness,[124] Floridity and Perspicuity, and **not ten.**

In the foregoing discussion of the theory of Guṇa, it becomes clear that the Dhvani-theorists have a different or novel outlook on Poetic Beauty. For, while the predecessors of Ānanda-vardhana, in the field of poetics, treated of the concepts of Rīti and Guṇa as a means of external embellishments of poetry and "even when Vāmana calls Rīti the ātmā or essence of poetry, he means by it only external beauty of objective representation realised by means of certain standard excellences"[125], the Dhvani-theorists considered Rasadhvani to be the soul of poetry, and hence, in their opinion, other poetic elements stand subordinate to it. Ānandavardhana puts this quite effectively in the following Kārika (Dhvanyāloka II. 4) :

वाच्यवाचकचारुत्वहेतूनां विविधात्मनाम् ।
रसादिपरता यत्र स ध्वनेर्विषयो मतः ॥

Thus, the charmingness or otherwise of the Guṇas, Alaṁkāras or Doṣas is judged, by the protagonists of the Rasadhvani theory, not on their own account but in terms of the part they play toward the realisation of Rasa.

Hence Mammaṭa discusses the concept of Guṇa in relation to the promotional role it plays in ths awakening of Rasa. He interprets the poetic concept of excellences of composition in a new sense, following in the foot-steps of Ānandavardhana, and brings them into an effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a literary work, as "qualities which serve to heighten its charm." Dr. S. K. De puts this matter in a proper

perspective : The verbal form of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness (except by way of analogy), unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The Guṇas, therefore, are related to the Rasa, as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. The verbal form, the mere sound, produces the excellences only as a means or instrument; the real cause is the Rasa, even as the soul is the true cause of virtues like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also to the case of poetic figures (Alaṁkāras), and their place in poetry is justified by their relation to Rasa. They are compared to ornaments on a man's body; and as such, they adorn words and meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly (through sound and sense) the underlying soul of sentiment, but not invariably. If the Rasa is absent, they produce mere variety of expression. It should also be noted that the Guṇas are accepted, after Ānandavardhana, as **three** in number, and it is maintained that combinations of particular letters signify particular Guṇas, so that the **three** Vṛttis of Udbhaṭa (and roughly the three Rītis of Vāmana) are equalised to the three Guṇas defined by him.[126]

Mammaṭa categorically asserts that Guṇas are three only and that it is not necessary to accept the ten Guṇas of Vāmana. He, therefore, makes his three Guṇas comprehensive enough to include in them the ten Guṇas postulated by the earlier authorities. Thus, when we critically consider the ten Guṇas, we find that some of them can very well be subsumed under Mammaṭa's three comprehensive excellences; some constitute mere absence of blemishes while others are sometimes positive blemishes. Thus, Mammaṭa's Ojas comprehends Vāmana's Śleṣa, Samādhi and Udāratā; Vāmana's Arthavyakti is merely an aspect of Prasāda; Vāmana's Samatā, consisting of a certain uniformity of diction, is often a fault; while Saukumārya and Kānti, defined as freedom from harshness

(or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity, are simply the reverse of the defects Śruti-kaṣta and Grāmyatva. Dr. S. K. Dey[127] remarks:

"These consideration simplify the classification of the Guṇas, and put a limit to their useless multiplication or differentiation (witness, e.g., Bhoja's elaborate scheme of 24 Guṇas). Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that the distinction between Śabda-guṇa and Artha-guṇa is meaningless, for the latter need not be separately considered. The **mental activity** involved in the enjoyment of Rasa is made to justify only three (and not ten) Guṇas which are thus brought into effective relation with the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus, the Ojas is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (Vistāra) of the mind and resides in the moods of heroism, horror and fury; the Prasāda, proper to all the moods, is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense, extending over the mind at once (Vyāpti or Vikāsa), like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire among dry fuel (cf. Bharata VII. 7); while Mādhurya, residing normally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to and residing successively in degrees in pathos, love-in-separation and calm, is regarded as causing a softening or melting of the heart (Druti). The three conditions of the mind, viz., expanding, pervading and melting, which accompany the poetic sentiments are thus made the basis of the three Guṇas."[128]

Hemachandra's Theoretical Affiliations

In view of Hemachandra's thoretical affiliation with the Dhvani-theorists, whose scheme of poetics he adopts and follows scrupulously, it is natural for him to accept the three comprehensive excellences of poetry, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, as postulated, defined and explained by Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa.[129]

In his well-known study of Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Dr. V. Raghavan observes: "On Guṇas, Hemachandra is a follower of Ānandavardhana and he draws upon Mammaṭa and probably from Rājaśekhara, as we have suggested above.[130] He

establishes the Rasāśrayatva of Guṇas through Anvaya and Vyatireka.[131] This argument of his is worked out of a verse and the Vṛtti thereon in Ānandavardhana and out of Abhinavagupta's Locana on them. Closing his discussion on Guṇa in Udyota II, pp. 82-3, Ānandavardhana says :

Śrutiduṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca sūcitāḥ I
Dhvanyātmanyeva śṛṅgāre te heyā ityudahṛtaḥ II

Anityā dosāśca ye śrutiduṣṭādayaḥ sūcitāḥ. Te'pi na vācyarthamātre na ca vyaṅgye śṛṅgāre, śṛṅgāravyatirekini vā dhvaneranātmabhāve. Kiṁ tarhi dhvanyātmanyeva śṛṅgāre aṅgitayā vyaṅgye te heyā ityudāhṛtaḥ. Anyathā hi teṣāmanitya-doṣataiva na syāt (Dhv.Ā I.II).

"Bībhatsahāsyaraudrādau tveṣāṁ asmābhirupagamāt
Śṛṅgārādau tu varjanād anityatvaṁ samarthitameveti bhāvaḥ"
(Locana, p. 53)

There are some faults like Śruti-duṣṭa and Aślīla, which are not as such Doṣas. They are Doṣas only in Śṛṅgāra and such other Rasas. Śruti-duṣṭa in Bībhatsa and Raudra, and Aślīla in Śṛṅgārābhāsa and Hāsya are Guṇas. They are thus Anityadoṣas. Their Anityatva and Doṣatva are related to the particular Rasa in which they are Doṣa and in which they are not. Therefore, the Rasas decide their character and the avoidance of them is prescribed only with reference to the Ātman or Rasa. This argument is utilised by Ānandavardhana to show the existence of Rasa-dhvani as Ātman. He proves that the Ātman is a necessity if the terms Guṇa and Alaṁkāra are to be rendered intelligible, if the name Rasavadalaṁkāra is to become sensible, and finally if Śruti-duṣṭa and other Doṣas are to be held as Anitya-doṣas. This Hemachandra utilises and develops into an argument[132] to prove that Guṇas pertain to Rasa : "Guṇas are like Doṣas and exist in the same place. Doṣas are in Rasas and not in Śabda or Artha. If the Doṣa called Kaṣṭa should be in Śabda, then that Pada which is Kaṣṭa will eternally be Duṣta. So also a Pada will have to be eternally Aślīla. The real fact is that these Doṣas are Guṇas

in Bībhatsa and Hāsya. So the Doṣas are Anitya, Doṣas not by themselves but with reference to the Rasa of the context. Hence, that whose presence or absence make them Doṣa or Guṇa is their Āśraya."[133]

Hemachandra on the Distinction between Guṇas and Alaṁkāras

Hemachandra's views on Guṇas and Alaṁkāras are also recorded in his Viveka Vyākhyā (p. 33) under Sūtra 11, Chapter I, which provides an exposition of his words "Niralaṁkārayorapi" in the gloss on his defination of poetry. Here, he states :

"Anena kāvye guṇānāmavaśyaṁbhāvamāha.

Tathāhi-analaṁkṛtamapi guṇavadvacaḥ svadate;
alaṁkṛtamapi nirguṇaṁ na svadate."

Again, under Sūtra I. 13, wherein he defines Alaṁkāras or poetic embellishments, the gloss mentions that the figures of speech pertain to words and meanings which constitute the body of Kāvya whose soul is Rasa and help the Rasa, if it exists, and sometimes do not help it, though it exists. But when Rasa is absent, they render themselves as mere fanciful expressions, but the Viveka Commentary characteristically draws a clear-cut distinction between poetic excellences on the one hand and poetic embellishments on the other, albeit in relation to Rasa, the supreme aesthetic principle. The Viveka (p. 34) states :

"Ye tvaṅgini rase bhavanti te guṇāḥ. Eṣa eva guṇālaṁkāravivekaḥ. Etavatā śauryādisadṛaśā guṇāḥ keyurāditulyā alaṁkāra iti vivekamuktvā saṁyogasamavāyabhyāṁ śauryādināmasti bhedaḥ. Iha tūbhayeṣāṁ samavāyena sthitirityabhidhāya tasmād gaḍḍarikāpravāheṇa guṇālaṁkāra-bheda iti Bhāmahavivaraṇe yad Bhaṭṭodbhaṭṭobhyadhāt, tannirastam. Tathāhi - **kavitāraḥ sandarbheṣvalaṁkārān vyavasyanti nyasyanti ca, na guṇah.** Na cālaṁkṛtinā-mapod-dhārāhārābhyāṁ vākyaṁ dusyati puṣyati vā."

Thus Hemachandra emphatically states that between Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, the former is more important since there can be Kāvyas without Alaṁkāras but not without Guṇas, and that removal or addition of an alaṁkāra, whether of word or sense, cannot detract from or add to the charm of a true poetic expression.

Concepts of Conjunction and Inherence

Hemachandra also puts forward the view that Alaṁkāras exist through Saṁyogasaṁbandha, and Guṇas through Samavāya-sambandha, with Rasa; and, consequently, our author vehemently criticizes Udbhaṭa's contention, as found in his Bhāmahavivaraṇa, that both Guṇas and Alaṁkāras exist in a Kāvya through Samavāya.

And, so far as Vāmana's differentiation of Guṇas and Alaṁkāras, as given in the first two Sūtras of the first Adhyāya of the third Adhikaraṇa of his Kāvyālaṁkārasūtras with Vṛtti (Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ, tadatiśayahetavastva-laṁkārāḥ), is concerned, Hemachandra refutes Vāmana's contention by showing how verses which have Vāmana's several Guṇas present in them (Viveka, p. 26, VV. 130 and 131) fail to attain Kāvyatva and verses which do not have a single Guṇa as defined by Vāmana may be a Kāvya, just by virtue of a single figure called Utprekṣā (V.131).

It may be noted here that Mammaṭa has already disposed of all these points.

Hemachandra's Exposition of the Three Guṇas and Rejection of the Ten Guṇas

Having dealt with the general nature of the concept of Guṇa and its relation to Rasa (K.A.S. I. 12), Hemachandra takes up the treatment of the individual Guṇas in Chapter four in greater detail.

Interestingly, Hemachandra's exposition of the number and nature of the individual Guṇa involves a **double aspect** since, while in the body of the text of the Kāvyānuśāsana which

consists of the Sūtras (numbering seven in all) as well as the gloss we get the definitions and illustrations of the three comprehensive Guṇas, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, accepted by the Dhvani-theorists, in keeping with the theory that Guṇas are Rasadharmas, in the Viveka Vyākhyā or auto sub-commentary, we get a thorough disposal as also a complete refutation of the theories of Guṇa as propounded by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana who maintained that Guṇas are ten. Incidentally, the name of Maṅgala, poet and literary theorist, also occurs in the course of the discussion of the ten traditional Guṇas.

Guṇas are Three only; Neither Ten Nor Five

As we open the fourth chapter of the Kāvyānuśāsana, we find that Hemachandra mentions at the outset, in the first Sūtra, the three Guṇas, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, and explains in the gloss that the Guṇas are three and neither ten nor five. Here we must note that the three Guṇas that Hemachandra accepts are the three comprehensive Guṇas recognised as Rasadharmas by Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa and also by Hemachandra, as mentioned above. Hence, Hemachandra is reluctant to accept the ten Guṇas which were Racanādharmas or characteristics of style or the five Guṇas which are Pāṭhadharmas. To make his position clear at once, Hemachandra categorically declares that there are neither ten Guṇas as held by older theoreticians like Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana nor five as held by others.

In order to remove any doubt that may persist in the mind of the reader, Hemachandra gives three grounds for not accepting the older theories of Guṇa. He says that the reasons for regarding the Guṇas as three only are that (1) the definitions of the older Guṇas overlap and (often) vary, (2) the ten Guṇas of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana can very well be included under the three comprehensive Guṇas to be stated in due course, and that (3) some of these Guṇas are recognised to be the absence of Doṣas.[134]

Hemachandra also stresses the point made earlier that these (new) Guṇas or poetic excellences in reality belong to the Rasas and only secondarily to the word and sense in which they are embodied. This means, we should not expect Hemachandra to fall in with the view that Guṇas are ten and that they are either independent elements or are constituents of any style of composition, i.e., Mārga or Rīti, because the one fact common to all the early theories of Guṇa was that they treated of the concept of Guṇa as a means of external embellishment of poetry. This is what is called as Vācya-vācaka-cārutvahetu by the Dhvanikāra (II. 4). Since Hemachandra follows the Dhvani theorists, he considers Rasadhvani to be the most prominent factor in poetry; hence he considers the other poetic elements as subserving the Rasa. He, therefore, maintains that Guṇas concern directly the inner nature of poetry while the Alaṁkāras constitute such factors as are more or less external. As we know, Vāmana has quoted a pair of verses where the Guṇas were likened to the youth or the natural grace of a lady and the Alaṁkāras to the artificial ornaments of her body. This analogy of human virtues and ornaments is the most common sense interpretation of the terms Guṇa and Alaṁkāra and which, as P. C. Lahiri (Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa p. 201) remarks, "partially struck the earlier theorists". "But", says P. C. Lahiri, "they brought in this analogy[135] simply to demonstrate the essentiality of the element Guṇa in poetry, and they failed to explain the elements in relation to the underlying sentiment of a poem which, however, they totally ignored."

But, for the protagonists of the Rasadhvani theory of Literature, the Guṇas belong to and are properties of Rasa. The Guṇas belong to the Aṅgī-artha but the Alaṁkaras are related to the Śabda and Artha (aṅgāśritāḥ), as Ānandavardhana clearly states in Dhvanyāloka II. 6. We have taken note of this fundamental conception of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, as fully explained by Hemachandra, while dealing with the Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa of the Guṇas. We, therefore, pass on to understand

fully the Viśeṣa Lakṣaṇas of the Guṇas or individual Guṇa so as to realise its position and function in poetry.

Hemachandra's general definition of the Guṇa has presented to us the poetic excellence in its broad character, viz., that it belongs to Rasa; but, to form a definite idea about the nature of the element, we need some further light in the form of the Viśeṣa Lakṣaṇa. Now, since Hemachandra has defined and discussed Nine Rasas, the question arises : Does a particular Guṇa belong to all the Rasas or only to some of them ? And, in what sense can it be said to belong to the Rasas ?

Hemachandra sets about replying to these questions in the course of his discussion in the body of the text. The method of treatment adopted here is (a) to define each of the three Guṇas first, and then (b) to show its relation to the particular Rasas and then (c) to lay down the characteristic conditions of that Guṇa with illustrations and counter-illustrations.

Thus in Sūtras 2, 3 and 4 of chapter four, our author deals with the excellence called Mādhurya or Sweetness or Delectability. Mādhurya is that quality which causes the heart of a reader to melt. Now Mammaṭa uses the words "Āhlādakatvaṁ mādhuryaṁ śṛṅgāre drutikāraṇam". So Hemachandra's words 'Drutihetur mādhuryaṁ śṛṅgāre' represent Mammaṭa's definition verbatim sans the single expression Āhlādakatvaṁ which is an explanatory term for Mādhurya. Otherwise Mammaṭa and Hemachandra agree in holding that Delectability or Mādhurya (is sweetness which) causes melting (of the heart) in the Erotic sentiment. In other words, Mādhuryaguṇa is predominantly found in a poem containing the Śṛṅgārarasa (i.e., Sambhogaśṛṅgāra). Like Mammaṭa, who adds in the gloss that the word Druti (melting) means, as if, the heart is dissolving, Hemachandra also uses the words Ārdratā (used by Ānandavardhana and explained by Abhinavagupta) and 'Galitatvam iva' to explain the word Druti in the Sūtra (IV. 2). The gloss mentions that Mādhurya is also the quality of Rasas

such as Hāsya, Adbhuta and others that are helpful to this Sambhogaśṛṅgāra. But, Mādhurya is seen in an intense form in the Śānta, Karuṇa and Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra (IV. 3). Why? Because it causes intense melting in these last three Rasas. The characteristic conditions of Mādhurya or the suggestors of it are mentioned in the next Sūtra (IV. 4).

1. In Mādhurya, letters with the nasals belonging to their respective classes should come. In other words, consonants of the five classes (i.e., from Ka to Ma) should come.
2. But no letters of the Ṭa class should come in (अटवर्ग:).
3. Short forms of Ra and Ṇa or R and Ṇa with short vowels may be used.
4. As far as possible, compounds should not come in (Asamāsaḥ).
5. On the whole, the style should be delicate or soft (Mṛduracanā ca).

Incidentally, Hemachandra refers to Bhāmaha's definition of Mādhurya (B.K.A. II. 3) wherein Bhāmaha mentions **Śravyatva** or sound-harmony as the requisite characteristic of Mādhurya. Hemachandra, however, controverts Bhāmaha's view by remarking that sound-harmony is not a differentia of Mādhurya as it is common to Ojas and Prasāda.[136] Only causing the heart to melt (Ārdratā) is the hall-mark of Mādhurya which differentiates it from the other Guṇas[137] (Viveka, p. 289).

Again, referring to the use of the term 'Śṛṅgāra' in the second Sūtra (IV. 2) where he defines Mādhurya, the Viveka clarifies that although Śṛṅgāra means both Sambhoga and Vipralambha types, yet, since Vipralambha is separately mentioned later on, the term Śṛṅgāra is used here in the narrower sense of love-in-union, on the analogy of Gobalivarda or the cow and the ox (Viveka p. 289).

Further, in regard to the use of the words Hāsyādbhutadayo rasā aṅgāni, the Viveka explains that though it is true that Ojas is there to cause Vikāsa or expansion of the heart in

Hāsya and Adbhuta, yet since Hāsya and Adbhuta are subsidiary to the sentiment of love, only intense Mādhurya is experienced in it.

Next, Hemachandra defines Ojas. Ojas or Floridity is an excellence in a poem that inflames the heart of a reader. It is found in the sentiments of Vīra, Bībhatsa and Raudra in an ascending order of intensity. Mammaṭa defines Ojas or floridity (K.P. VIII. 69-70) by saying that "Ojas, which causes expansion of heart through excitability (Dīptatva), subsists in the Heroic sentiment. It rises in the Disgustful (Bībhatsa) and the Furious (Raudra) Sentiments in due order."

In the gloss, Hemachandra explains Dīpti as Ujjvalatā (brightness) or the Expansion of the heart. He clarifies that the word Kramena (in due order) in the definition of Ojas implies that the intensity of Ojas is found in Bībhatsa more than in the Vīra, and still more in Raudra, and also in Adbhuta, the subsidiary Rasa of the three rasas, viz., Vīra, Raudra and Bībhatsa. Mammaṭa states in his gloss that Ojas is present in a greater degree in Bībhatsa than in the Vīra, and in a still greater degree in the Raudrarasa.

The well-known conditions of Ojas are stated. The example cited to illustrate Ojas is the same in Mammaṭa and Hemachandra (428), and provides an excellent instance of Ojas.

As a counter-illustration of Ojas, Hemachandra cites the verse (429) from the Veṇīsaṁhāra (III. 33) wherein "the main Rasa is Raudra, but the style is so tame, being void of compounds and hard words, that the Ojas which was needed to develop this Raudrarasa is entirely marred in its effect."

"Prasāda" is the third Guṇa to be defined and illustrated. It is to be found in all the Rasas for it consists in felicity of expression which attracts the hearts of the readers and makes them understand the poem quite easily. Prasāda, therefore, is compared to (1) a fire in dry fuel and (2) to transparent water which pervades a pure piece of cloth; for, like these two things, Prasāda occupies the heart of a reader immediately and makes

the sense perfectly clear. It is present in all the Rasas, and it cause Vikāsa or pervasion of the heart at once.

Vṛttis and Ritis in Relation to Guṇas

In the gloss that follows, Hemachandra significantly remarks : "And these **letters** (Varṇāḥ) that **suggest** the three Guṇas, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, are sometimes termed as Vṛttis called Upanāgarikā, Paruṣā and Komalā, which correspond to the three Guṇas. However, some other rhetoricians term them as Rīti's or styles. Mammaṭa says (K.P. IX. 80-81) :

> "The letters suggesting the excellence called Mādhurya are termed as the Upanāgarikā-vṛtti; the letters that suggest Ojas, come to be called by the name of Paruṣāvṛtti, and Komalā (or Gramyā) Vṛtti corresponds to the rest of the letters (that suggest Prasāda-guṇa). These same three Vṛtti's, viz., Upanāgarikā etc., correspond to the three styles of compositions called Rītis such as Vaidarbhī and the rest."

Incidentally, earlier, while commenting on the counter-illustration of the Mādhurya-guṇa (V. 426), Hemachandra had said in the gloss that the letters (of the Ṭ–class in the verse under consideration) were unfavourable or detrimental to the dominant sentiment of Śṛṅgāra. Taking the word 'Varṇāḥ' (letters) in the gloss, Hemachandra further elucidated it in the Viveka Vyākhyā by saying that **letters** include the compounds and style also. Besides, when letters, compounds, diction, etc., are mentioned or defined, the terms Vṛtti's and Rīti's also get mentioned and defined ipso facto. For, the Vṛtti's and the Rīti's are not different in nature from the letters words, etc.[138]

Hemachandra, thus disposes of the long-standing controversy regarding the distinctness of the concepts of Vṛtti's, Rīti's, etc., among older rheтericians who preceded the Dhvani-theorists.

But critically speaking, it is quite clear from the lines quoted from the Kāvyaprakāśa (IX. 80–81) by Hemachandra in support of his views expressed in the gloss (p. 292) that Hemachandra's immediate authority and source of information is Mammaṭa. And, it was Mammaṭa who codified the scattered but significant teachings of the Dhvani-theorists so as to bring the different concepts of Sanskrit poetics such as Guṇa, Doṣa, Lakṣaṇa, Vṛtti, Rīti, etc., into an effective relationship with the supremely important poetic principles of Rasa and Dhvani.

Concepts of Rīti and Vṛtti in the Pre-Dhvani and Post-Dhvani Periods

In the different stages of its development, the concept of Rīti is associated with (a) regional or geographical modes of literary criticism, (b) a stereotyped and standardised manner of expression or diction or style of composition, and lastly (c) with the character of the poet.

Rīti in speech is a literary manner and it corresponds to Bharata's Pravṛtti in manners. Bāṇa is the first classical author who refers to certain literary characteristics peculiar to certain geographical regions. He thus mentions four different traits of composition : (1) Over-using Double Entendré, (2) Plain Ideas, (3) Imaginative Conceits, and (4) Bombastic Diction.

From a theoretical point of view, Vaidarbhī and Gauḍī represent the two earliest styles. While Bhāmaha was not keen to distinguish the two styles sharply, Daṇḍin declared the Vaidarbhamārg to be the best style. It was so, because of the presence in it of **ten** Guṇas which constitute its life. And, in the opinion of Daṇḍin, the reverses of these ten Guṇas, are seen in the Gauḍī which is thus bad poetry.

Though Daṇḍin talks of Guṇas, his Guṇas are not sharply differentiated from Alaṁkāras.[139] Besides the word 'Viparyaya' in Daṇḍin lends itself to many interpretations, and the distrinction between Vaidarbhī and Gauḍī styles hinges on the

correct meaning of this term 'Viparyaya'. For, "some Guṇas are given by Daṇḍin himself as excellences of both Mārgas."[140]

Rīti is shown by Dr. V. Raghavan to correspond to the term 'style' in English as against Dr. S. K. De (SK Poetics-II, p. 115) who maintains that 'Rīti' is not equivalent to 'style'. This 'Rīti' is associated with Guṇas, and is based on Guṇas. Dr. V. Raghavan says that "though Bhāmaha does not definitely give in so many words the relation of Guṇa and Rīti, we can clearly see that his verses imply the theory of Rīti as based on Guṇa.... When we analyse Daṇḍin, we see that not only Guṇas, but Alaṁkāras also go to distinguish the Rītis."[141]

As for Daṇḍin's Guṇas, Dr. Raghavan notes: "Thus, an examination of Daṇḍin shows that the Mārgas are characterised not merely by a set of fixed features which pertain to collocation alone. The Guṇas mean much more than what they seem to."[142]

It is in Vāmana that we have a declaration to the effect that Rīti is the soul of poetry. And this Rīti is constituted by the Guṇas - both of word and sense. Dr. Raghavan observes: "These comprehend poetic expression in all aspects.... Thus these so-called Guṇas comprehend Bandhaguṇas, Alaṁkāras and Rasas.... Vāmana defined his Guṇas in such a way as to enable us to take them as characteristics of the best style of poetry.... To the two Rīti's, Vaidarbhī and Gauḍī, Vāmana first added a third, the Pāñcālī. The Gauḍī in Vāmana is not the bad style in Daṇḍin. It is a good style.... The Pāñcālī is the Vaidarbhī devoid of Ojas and Kānti."[143]

Vāmana's partiality, however, is for the Vaidarbhī style of poetry; for he asks poets to practice and achieve that style (KASV I.2.14-18).

Incidentally, the ideas of styles or Rīti's have always been associated with qualities such as sweetness, force, vigour, clarity, etc. This led to the practice of Rīti's by all poets of all places and its geographical overtones got lost. As a result,

the theme or the propriety of the poetic sense came to regulate the nature of Rīti. Thus arose the concept of Vṛtti.

Dr. V. Raghavan writes : "The Rasas and the Arthas pertaining thereto (i.e., to a poem) have their own quality of sweetness, vigour, etc. These were studied by Bharata, and by others following him, in the concept of Vṛtti. The Vṛtti was applied from Drama to Poetry. Kaiśikī is the Vṛtti of Śṛṅgāra and Ārabhiṭi of Raudra, Vīra and Bhayānaka and Bībhatsa Rasas. To this Vṛtti, the Rīti came to be related. The sweetness and delicateness associated with the Vaidarbhī made it possible to link it to the Kaiśikī Vṛtti and the Śṛṅgāra Rasa. Śṛṅgāra, Kaiśikī Vṛtti and the Vaidarbhī Rīti went together always. The Gauḍī easily linked itself to Ārabhaṭī Vṛtti and Rasas like Raudra. The Pāñcālī and the Lāṭiyā occupy middling positions. . . . Thus the emotional situation came to determine the mode of expression. Hence Bhoja treats of Rītis and Vṛttis under Anubhāva. The Vṛtti differs from Rīti as more intimately connected with Rasa and its ideas. To the Rasa, Rīti was related more on the basis of verbal expression, the Śabdasaṁghaṭanā. In this stage, the Guṇas, Mādhurya etc., which were still the constituents of Rīti, become mere Śabdasaṅghaṭanādharmas."[144]

Ānandavardhana on Vṛtti and Rīti

But when we come to Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, we find that Vṛtti is stated to be an expression appropriate to Rasa. The expression of Artha is the Vṛtti of Kaiśikī etc.; the expression of Śabda is the Vṛtti of Upanāgarikā etc. These Śabda-Vṛtti's, Upanāgarikā, etc., are the Rīti's. In Dhvanyāloka III. 33 and in the gloss thereon, Ānandavardhana states this quite explicitly. Ānandavardhana distinguishes Vṛtti's on the basis of Śabda and Artha in Dhvanyāloka III.47 ff. Abhinava considers both the Vṛttis as Rasocitavyavahāra and, holds that while Kaiśikyādi all four are Arthavṛttis, the Śabdavṛttis are three, viz., Upanāgarikā etc.

But what about Rīti in Ānandavardhana's scheme? While Ānandavardhana holds Rīti as dependent on Guṇa like the Vṛttis, Upanāgarikā, etc., strictly speaking there is no room for Rīti in either Ānandavardhana's scheme or in Abhinavagupta's. Although Rīti can be Rasocitaśabdavyavahāra, yet that role is assigned to the Vṛttis, Upanāgarikā, etc., which now means not varieties of Anuprāsa, but the use of words suitable to Rasa. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Mammaṭa gives an equation of the three Rītis with the three Vṛttis. For Mammaṭa, Vṛtti (Anuprāsa) is the arrangement of letters suitable to Rasa.

Finally, Mammaṭa observes that it is these three Vṛtti's that are called the Vaidarbhī Rīti, the Gauḍī Rīti and the Pāñcālī Rīti according to some.

Hemachandra's Stand on Rītis

It is clear that Hemachandra almost entirely follows Mammaṭa in this regard. And like Māṇikyachandra, he would say : "Etena rītayo vṛttyātmakā ityarthaḥ."

It may be pointed out that Hemachandra, while he quotes and completely follows Mammaṭa here, does not treat of these three Vṛiti's, which are the same three Rīti's, in the Śabdalaṁkāra Section (Adhyāya V) but, with a slight improvement, treats of them in this (Guṇa) Chapter, as Dr. V. Raghavan rightly points out ('Some Concepts etc.', p. 188). Therefore he does not consider them (three Vṛttis) as Anuprāsa Jāti's but merely as three kinds of Varṇa Saṅghaṭanā.

After noticing the treatment of Vṛtti's and Rīti's in Bhoja and Jagannātha, Dr. V. Raghavan observes : "Fortunately these Vṛttis disappear in later literature. Even the old Vṛtti's, Upanāgarikā, etc., pass into obscurity and Hemachandra is perhaps the last to mention them. Later writers completely forget the names Upanāgarikā etc. as Vṛtti's standing for such use of words as are suggestive of Rasa."[145]

Concept of Compatibility : Departure from Rules Sanctioned

In the last Sūtra of the fourth chapter (IV. 9), Hemachandra, like Mammaṭa (K. P. VIII), sanctions a change in the fixed nature of composition in accordance with its suitability to the nature of (1) the speaker, (2) the subject-matter and (3) the type of work or discourse. He says : "Sometimes composition and so forth become otherwise owing to the propriety of the speaker and the like. Speaker etc. means the person who speaks, the nature of the subject-matter dealt with or the composition and 'so forth', means the composition, the metre and the letters (Kāvyānuśāsan IV. 9).

In a short comment in the Viveka Ṭīkā (p. 292), Hemachandra observes that if the subject-matter here were suggestive of wrath etc., then the bombastic diction etc. would fit in here; nor again is this piece not to be represented so that it would permit deviation of composition etc. In fact this piece is a representational type. Hence, composition and diction such as bombastic etc. would be appropriate in sentiments like Raudra etc. For this reason, the sanction for a change in the arrangement of letters etc. springs from the propriety of the speaker etc.[146]

Now, one may wonder why the soft and delicate words are not employed in the portrayal of Śṛṅgāra in an Ākhyāyikā type of composition, as mentioned by Hemachandra in his gloss just discussed. Hemachandra clarifies this statement in the Viveka by saying that since Ākhyāyikā and Kathā are both prose romance works or Gadyakāvyas, and since prose is by definition forceful in style, using altogether soft words is an impossible proposition.[147]

So far as his gloss relating to the avoidance of long compounds in dramas is concerned, the Viveka elucidates the point that the objection is not only with regard to the avoidance of long compounds in plays where Karuṇa and Vipralambha

Śṛṅgāra Rasas are portrayed (where it is understandable) but even in regard to plays having Raudra Rasa. One may wonder why. He says : If Rasa is principal, then all hindrances and opposition to it must ruthlessly be removed. And a long compound is one such (hindrance). For, employment of compounds in numerous ways may perhaps deter the process of Rasa development; hence excessive zeal for use of compounds is not proper – especially in a dramatic poem. That too in plays having Karuṇa and Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra Rasas. For, these are delicate and as such the words and senses become slow in yielding the poetic sentiment when even a slight lack of clarity occurs.

Again, when some other Rasa like Raudra etc. is to be portrayed, then a medium compound does not hurt; or where there is a Dhīroddhatanāyaka, a long compound does not hurt. Owing to the propriety of the subject-matter to the Rasa invariably associated with its inclusion, such a medium or long compound should not be altogether avoided.

Besides, the Guṇa called Prasāda pervades all the Rasas and contexts. It is already stated that it is common to all the Rasas. And, even the absence of compounds, if it is destitute of Prasāda, it by itself cannot suggest Karuṇa and Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra Rasa. But when Prasāda is not abandoned, even a medium compound suggests the Rasa. Hence Prasāda must be a guiding factor (i.e., it must be employed). By virtue of this, in a verse (455) like Veṇīsaṁhāra (III. 32). ("Yo yaḥ Śastraṁ bibharti .. etc.") only Prasāda obtains; neither Mādhurya Guṇa nor Ojas is available, due to the absence of a Samāsa. Still there is no dearth of charmingness since the intended Rasa is manifested here.

In another (last) paragraph in the Viveka (p. 294), Hemachandra supplies additional information regarding the propriety of diction, letters, compounds, etc., in literary compositions such as Muktakas, Sandanitakas, Prabhandhagata

Muktakas, Paryāyabandhas, etc. Further, in cases of Raudra Rasa, when the Saṁghaṭanā consists of long compounds, one should avoid Vṛtti's such as Paruṣā and Grāmyā. But in Parikathā, no holds are barred. In the Khaṇḍakathā and Sakalakathā types of compositions (well-known in Prakṛta), owing to plenty of Kulakas, there is no harm in using long compounds. As for proper meters, Rasa is the criterion of propriety. In a Sargabandha composition, where Rasa dominates, the standard of propriety is Rasa. Otherwise, chaos. Between the two Mārgas (or styles ?), those who compose Mahākāvyas, should be intent on Rasa at all times.

Hemachandra's Refutation of the Older Theories of Guṇa

While introducing his concept of the threefold Guṇa in the body of the text of the fourth chapter, Hemachandra remarks in the gloss that there are only three Guṇas, and there are neither ten Guṇas as the older theorists believed nor five Guṇas as others think. To justify this rejection of the two older theories – one, holding that there are **ten** Guṇas, and another that there are **five** Guṇas – he provides three logical grounds. Thus, according to Hemachandra, (1) as the definitions are overlapping and various; (2) since the so-called **ten** Guṇas can be included under the three Guṇas to be defined here; and, (3) because several of these Guṇas have been recognised as absence of blemishes, the Guṇas are **not ten or five**, but only **three.**

After this brief and businesslike clarification regarding his concept of the number and nature of the Guṇa in the body of the text, Hemachandra goes on to give the definitions of his **three** Guṇas and their illustrations. However, he takes up the detailed elucidation of this matter-of-fact assertion in the Viveka Commentary and therein devotes nearly fifteen pages (pp. 274-288) to the thread-bare discussion of the tenfold as well as the fivefold classification of the Guṇas, only to **refute** these older theories and set at rest the controversy about the number of Guṇas, once and for all.

Dr. Raghavan's Critical Review

Dr. V. Raghavan has attempted a critical resume of this portion and offered comments in his survey of the concept of Guṇa in a historical perspective. He writes : "In Chapter IV of his Kāvyānuśāsana, Hemachandra deals with Guṇas. He follows Ānandavardhana and accepts only three Guṇas, and these, as Rasadharmas. He briefly states in his Vṛtti that Guṇas are not five or ten but only three. He takes up this bit of his Vṛtti and elaborately states in his commentary the ten Guṇas of Śabda and Artha according to Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Maṅgala's view is also referred to in the course of his discussion. The style of the passage here resembles that of Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyamīmāṁsā. Firstly Bharata's view is given with the words 'Iti Bharatḥ'. Then others' refutations follow. The results are summarised then and there. The names of the several authors on Guṇa are referred to then and there, 'Iti Vāmaniyāḥ'- and so on[148]

"Coming now to the commentary of Hemachandra on his own text, we have already referred to the discussion about the ten Guṇas in it which, we suggested, Hemachandra took from Rājaśekhara. In these discussions, sometimes Daṇḍin is presented as refuting Vāmana. It is anachronistic but the whole discussion contains Pūrvapakṣas and Khaṇḍnas fashioned in an imaginative manner. None of the ancients refuted definitely others' views on Guṇas. Maṅgala is first cited as criticising Bharata's idea of Ojas. But Maṅgala's idea of Ojas is not given, and Daṇḍin is next referred to as refuting Bharata's Ojas. Maṅgala and Vāmana are next quoted as refuting Daṇḍin's idea of Ojas. From here we may take it that Maṅgala took Ojas as Gāḍhatva, like Vāmana. Maṅgala is no more quoted. The names occurring in the rest of the text are only Vāmana, Daṇḍin and Bharata. To the author's criticisms of one another, the text adds its own criticism. The line of criticism seen in Mammaṭa is followed. Certain things are shown to be no Guṇa at all, being Vaicitrya or Vaidagdhya of a very general nature; certain others as Alaṁkāras etc., and certain others are dismissed as absence of flaws.

"The value of this part of Hemachandra's Commentary is enhanced by his reference to strange views on Guṇas which we do not find referred to anywhere else. We shall now notice these views."[149]

Five Guṇas as Pāṭha-dharmas

"On page 200, after a critical scrutiny of the ten old Guṇas, Hemachandra says :

"Ojaḥprasādamadhurimāṇaḥ sāmyaudārye ca pañcetyapare."

Even earlier, he referred to the view of five Guṇas. This view holds Ojas, Prasāda, Mādhurya, Sāmya and Audārya as the five Guṇas. And these are curiously held by their advocates not as Guṇas in the sense in which we have been talking of Guṇa still now, but as Pāṭha-dharmas. Hemachandra thoroughly pooh-poohs this theory. The advocates of this theory hold that 'non-stop' reading is Ojas; reading with stops here and there is Prasāda; reading with rise and fall, perhaps in a sing-song manner, is Mādhurya; clear and perfect reading with proper pronunciation (Sthāna) is Audārya; and reading in neither too low nor too high a pitch is Sāmya. The Guṇas as Pāṭha-dharmas may refer to the actors' speaking of the text in dramas and we saw above under Bharata how the definition of some Guṇas in Bharata might be taken to refer to speaking and acting also.[150]

Five Guṇas as Metrical Qualities

"Another interesting view then given by Hemachandra is that some consider these five Guṇas given above as belonging to certain metres : Ojas in Sragdharā, etc., Prasāda in Indravajrā, Upendravajrā, etc.; Mādhurya in Mandākrāntā etc.; Samatā in Śārdūlavikrīḍita etc.; and Audārya in the Viṣama vṛtta's. Hemachandra criticises this view also as of those who have not seen much poetry; for, he shows cases where these metrical associations are Vyabhicarita.

Chandoviśeṣaniveśya guṇasampattiriti kecit I
So'yamanavagāhitaprayogānāṁ vibhāga-kramaḥ II

pp. 200–201[151]

In the section on Vāmana, we have referred to the views of those who considered Guṇas as Pāṭha-dharmas and to Samādhi in Vāmana as a Guṇa of the metre.[152]

After this illuminating critical analysis of the Viveka text on Guṇas by Dr. Raghavan, we now turn to the text itself with a view to attempt a short summary of the refutation of the ten Guṇas of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

A Critical Summary of the Viveka Passage on the Disposal of the Ten Guṇas

On page 274, of the Kāvyānuśāsana, under Sūtra 1, Chapter IV, Hemachandra's Viveka commentary begins by stating that the Guṇas are three only, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, and that they primarily pertain to the Rasas as pointed out earlier while describing their general nature (I. 12). Hence, when some theorists posit these other excellences as residing in the Śabda and the Artha, it is not proper.

With these words, Vāmana's list of the ten Guṇas (KASV. 3.1.4.) is introduced anonymously. These Guṇas are Ojas, Prasāda, Śleṣa, Samatā, Samādhi, Mādhurya, Saukumārya, Udāratā, Arthavyakti and Kānti. These are called the ten qualities of the Bandha or style of composition.

(1) Then, first of all, Bharata's definition of **Ojas** is paraphrased or summarized. It is based on Verse 106, Chapter XVI of the Nāṭyaśāstra (G. O. S. Edn.), and it means that Ojas is the endowment of grandeur by the poet to a subject which is in itself inconspicuous or low by means of the powers of words and senses.

This Ojas is illustrated by a verse (402) which describes lowly creatures like jackals, birds, dogs, insects, etc., that hover around a dead body, and the poet eulogizes the ability of the corpse to oblige all creatures.

Thus, according to Bharata, Ojas is achieved by Śabdārtha-sampatti. Rich expression or the exaltation of ordinary things is the Ojas of Bharata. This quality, undoubtedly, transforms lowly things into lovely noble objects.

But Maṅgala, a poet and a renowned literary critic, interposes here and objects (and Hemachandra nods in agreement) to the above definition of Ojas (given by Bharata). He raises the point that if Ojas, as you say, is the endowment of grandeur to lowly things by the richness of language, then the reverse device of poets in belittling conspicuous and noble subjects should be deemed to be the opposite of Ojas or brilliance in poetry. To explain this point, he cites a verse (403) from the Vairāgyaśataka (29) of Bhartṛhari in which the mythical mount Meru, described as a mass of solid gold, is decried by the poet as useless for both the poor and the rich alike. Incidentally, the poet tries to bring out suggestively the useless lives of the ungenerous rich.

This verse does not lack in Ojas, in Maṅagla's view, just because it does not satisfy Bharata's definition of Ojas.

This discussion pertains to one of the two verses of Bharata on Ojas. The Banares edition contains this verse as well as another, alternate, definition of Ojas by Bharata. The other verse defines Ojas as the collocation abounding in Samāsas, a conception of Ojas which has persisted in Poetics.[153]

Interestingly, Daṇḍin's views on Ojas are quoted (p. 275) at this stage. Daṇḍin's point is that the above defined Ojas cannot be a Guṇa because poets have three ways of describing things : (1) Making small things exalted, (2) Making great things small, and (3) Describing things as they are. Therefore, Ojas is abundance of compounds (K.Ā. I. 80 : ओजः समासभूयस्त्वम् etc.) This Ojas is generally an ornament of prose, but even in poetry the Gauḍas welcome it. The former Ojas is found in prose romance works such as Akhyāyikā etc., but the second type of Ojas is found in the verse (404) cited here

which abounds in long compounds and is full of compact words. But, since Daṇḍin brackets Ojas exclusively with the Gauḍīyā Rīti or Mārga (Daṇḍin has two Mārgas : Vaidarbha and Gauḍa), naturally Vāmana, the chief protagonists of the Guṇa-cum-Rīti doctrine, as also Maṅgala, strongly object. They argue that, as Ojas is accepted by the Rīti School to be commonly shared by the three styles (Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī and Pāñcālī), it is illogical to relate Ojas to Gauḍī only.

They, therefore, propose that Ojas is compactness (of style of composition). In his Kāvyālaṁkāra Sūtras (3. 1. 5.), Vāmana defines Ojas as 'Gāḍhabandhatvamojaḥ' and comments : 'Bandhasya gāḍhatvaṁ yat Ojaḥ.'

The author of the text (Viveka), thereupon, dismisses Vāmana's definition of Ojas, and remarks : "Please look for some other cause of Ojas; do not insist on Gāḍhatva; for that in fact is detrimental to Ojas. Hence Gāḍhatva is not Ojas."

Now, since Vāmana's ten Guṇas are both Śabdaguṇas and Arthaguṇas, there are twenty Guṇas with the same names (VKAS. 3-1-4 and 3-2-1). So, the author of the text presents Vāmana's views (VKAS. 3-2-2) on Ojas as an excellence of sense : 'Ojas is the maturity of expression or genius as regards sense.'

Thus Ojas is Arthapraudhi. This Prauḍhi itself is of five kinds (VKAS. 3. 2. 2-3) : (1) Padārthe Vākyavacanam (2) Vākyārthe padābhidhā (3) Vyāsa (4) Samāsa, and (5) Sābhiprāyatva. These five imply (1) The use of a sentence when a word would suffice (e.g. instead of saying 'the moon', the poet says 'the light emanating from the eye of Atri'), (2) The use of a word in place of a sentence (e.g. saying 'she twinkles' instead of 'she is not divine, but a mortal woman'), (3) Amplification of ideas (e.g. relation of Sorrow and Joy instanced in a full verse), (4) Samāsa is shortening or contracting the sense of many sentences in a sentence, and (5) Sābhiprāyatva or poetic emphasis (e.g. in Keśapāśe Sukeśyāḥ, there is the emphasis or 'Sābhiprayatva' on 'Sukeśyāḥ').

Hemachandra, however, looks upon Vāmana's fivefold Arthapraudhi (Ojas) as a mere fanciful expression or strikingness of sense and criticises it. The Sābhiprāyatva variety of the Ojas of Sense is not a Guṇa, but merely the absence of the blemish called Apuṣṭārthatva. Besides, to affirm intention in regard to sense is a folly. If it is of the speaker and hearer, then it cannot be an Arthaguṇa. If it consists in implying another idea, then it is the same as the intention of the speaker arising due to the poet's power; for, it does not arise if not presented poetically. Hence, Praudhi is in fact of the Speaker only – you may freely affirm it of the sense; so enough of it.

(2) Prasāda is defined by Bharata as that Guṇa by which, even without being told, the sense of the word is clear because of the fact that the idea comes out even before the words come out (or the idea is expressed in easy words : Sukhaśabdārthayogāt). Both the Kasi Edition and the K. M. Edn. use 'Sukhśabdārtha' to imply quick and easy comprehension.

But the followers of Vāmana dub the illustrative verse (407) as an expression of substantives promoted by adjectives. So, Prasāda is looseness (Śaithilya) (VKAS 3. 1. 6).

Now the question is how this Prasāda can be a **Guṇa** since it means looseness of composition or style which is the reverse of Ojas (or Gāḍhabandhatva); so, it is a Doṣa.

Vāmana replies that this Śaithilya by itself is a Doṣa, but it is called the Guṇa 'Prasāda' because of its association or co-existence (Samplava) with Ojas.

How can there be admixture of two opposite qualities, i.e., Śaithilya and Gāḍhatva ? Well, knowlebgeable critics like jewellers say that it is clearly experienced that these contrary qualities of Gāḍhatva and Śaithilya exist together. It is also said : "Just as in Tragedies the co-existence of Sorrow and Joy is a matter of experience for connoisseurs, even so association of Ojas and Prasāda is felt to be true in actual experience."

The author of our text, now, remarks that this is a futile instance and the futility of the instance destroys the thing sought to be explained. To explain :

"In a tragic play, the spectator is first pained by pathos and subsequently, owing to the expertise of the representation by characters etc., is delighted. But, in regard to Ojas and Prasāda, they are required to be experienced at once. And, to tell you the truth, all Rasas result in delight and so in happiness; so, your example does not fit in here.

So Prasāda (in our view) is the cause of Vikāsa."

As for Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Prasāda, it is described as Arthavaimalyam, i.e., Plainness of Sense. It is explained as words capable of giving up sense at once. In other words, straightforward expression is Prasāda of Artha. (This Prasāda is similar to Arthavyakti – both of Śabda and Artha. It resembles Bharata's Samatā also – just sufficient words is Prasāda. Useless words represent the Viparyaya of Prasāda.) Now, says Hemachandra, this Guṇa having sufficient words is achieved by avoiding the blemish of Adhikapadatva; so it is a negative of a Doṣa, not a Guṇa.

(3) Śleṣa, according to Bharata, is the quality of expressions, apparently looking plain but revealing a world of ideas. Bharata's verses on this Guṇa are **two**, belonging to the two recensions. The first is 'Vicāragahanaṁ sphuṭaṁ caiva svabhāvataḥ (V.l. Vicārya grahaṇaṁ vṛttyā)', and the second is 'Ipsitenārthajātena. . . .etc.' This Guṇa is defined as related to Padas and Artha. The second verse 'Ipsitenārthajāten . . .etc.' describes Śleṣa as the harmony of sound and sense, of word and idea. Hemachandra's version is illustrated by a verse from the Kumārasambhavam (5. 24) which contains a description of the first drops of rain falling on Pārvatī – a pen-picture which harbours a minute description of the beauty of Pārvatī's form.

Hemachandra's version is of the first verse and his criticism is that this is Vyavahāravaidagdhya, and not any Sandarbhadharma.

Now followers of Vāmana say that the true nature of Guṇas consists in Racanā-rūpatā (poetic 'form' or style or diction of a composition). Hence Śleṣa is Masṛṇatva (Viveka, p. 278). It is explained as : "Where several words appear as though they are one" (VKAS 3.1.11). The first verse of the Kumārasambhavam (1.1) is a fit illustration of this Śleṣa (409). Incidentally, Vāmana's Arthaśleṣa (Ghaṭanā Śleṣaḥ) is not mentioned here. This Ghaṭanā is Krama, Kauṭilya, Anulbaṇatva and Upapattiyoga. Krama is orderly description, Kauṭilya occurs in Cātus, Vakrokti's, etc. (love-expressions), Anulbaṇatva has affinity with Daṇḍin's Kānti and Saukumārya of Artha or Lokasīmā-anatikramaṇa, and Upapatti is explained as 'poetic devices'.[154]

But Daṇḍin intercedes to say that in Śleṣa, the letters are not loose (Asithilam 'sliṣṭam') and the letters are not of small-breath-value (Alpaprāṇa). The illustrative verse has a compact style.

Therefore, the author of the text says : "This is a kind of Ojas only. Or it is an instance of a Gauda text incognito; so it should be disregarded. For, the Gauḍas find looseness agreeable (K.Ā. I. 43-44). Anuprāsadhiyā Gauḍaistadiṣṭaṁ bandhagauravāt. So there is contradiction here. (Here Daṇḍin follows Vāmana's views.)

As for Ghaṭanāśleṣa, the verse 'Dṛṣṭvaikāsanasaṁsthite etc.', from Amru, illustrates it.

But our author dismisses the Arthaśleṣa altogether by saying that this verse is nothing but a strikingness born of plot-construction, not a Guṇa. For, Ghaṭanā by definition is "Aghaṭamānasyeva vākyārthasya buddhicāturyeṇa ghaṭaṇam iti" – a clever execution of an improbable idea indeed.

(4) Sama is a Guṇa that involves a principle of Aucitya in the use of Alaṁkarās and Guṇas themselves. They must mutually beautify each other and suit each other. It is a very comprehensive Guṇa. This version is based on the verse "Anyonyasadṛśaṁ yatra tathā hyanonyabhuṣaṇam / Alaṁkārā

Guṇāścaiva. . . etc." (Nāṭyaśāstra C.S. XVII. 100). But the other recension of Bharata's verse describes Samatā as an even collocation not too full of soft, simple, words or words without much meaning or words difficult to understand. Only the needed words should be used, avoiding superfluity; but clarity is necessary. "Nāticūrṇapadairyuktā . . . etc." (Nāṭyaśāstra XVI. 101).

Daṇḍin objects by saying, "How can Alaṁkāras and Guṇas beautify each other when their substrata differ ?" Besides, Śleṣa, Yamaka and Citra generally function devoid of Guṇas. Even Anuprāsa is frequently used thus. So, Samam is evenness of composition (K.Ā. I. 47). This evenness is soft, hard and medium in composition as it arises from the sequence of Prauḍha, Mṛdu and Madhya letters. Thus, Samatā is even collocation and has three varieties : all-soft, all-harsh (Sphuṭa or Prauḍha) and/or soft and harsh mixed.

But Vāmana criticises this concept of Samatā as not different from the Vṛttis. He, therefore, states that Samatā consists in not giving up until the end the specific Rītis with which the composition has begun. This holds in the case of Muktakas as well as Prabandhas (VKAS 3.1.12–13). Thus Samatā is Mārga–abheda or Uniformity of style. Three verses are given to illustrate each of the three styles kept up uniformly. The author of the text remarks that those critics who should know better about the art of composition do not at all times consider Samatā as striking. In fact, in the example (Verse 419 from the Hanumannāṭaka VII. 44), giving up of the soft style is actually a Guṇa. Hence Samatā is no Guṇa.

As for Samatā as an Arthaguṇa, it is defined by Vāmana as avoidance of (the Doṣa) Viṣamatā (Avaiṣamyaṁ Samatā) (VKAS. 3.2.5). It is explained as absence of the Doṣa called Prakramabhaṅga or Prakramabheda. Sometimes, however, the Prakrama may be breached. So Prakramabheda is Vaiṣayam and Avaiṣamyam.

Thus, it is absence of Doṣa, not a Guṇa.

(5) Samādhi is defined by Bharata (in neither of the two recensions) as transference of characteristics. Daṇḍin defines it as the application of the characteristic of one object to other objects without offending word–usage: e.g. "Kumudāni nimīlanti kamalānyunmīlanti ca".

But followers of Vāmana term it as a variety of Atiśayokti and lay down that "Rise and Fall (of the line in a verse) is Samādhi" (3.1.13). These correspond to Ojas (Gāḍhabandhatva) and Prasāda (Śaithilya) respectively. Vāmana objects to this; for, here there is a mingling of Ojas and Prasāda like the two streams of two rivers. Thus Samādhi is an independent Guṇa.[155]

Here, too, Daṇḍin follows Vāmana and criticises his 'Samādhi' as a fluctuation of the high and the low. So Samādhi is application of the characteristics of one to another (K.Ā. I.93).

The author of our text says that if this metaphorical Vṛtti is called Guṇa, what then is wrong with Yogavṛtti ?

Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Samādhi is Arthadṛṣṭi (VKAS 3.2.6). It is explained in the gloss (VKAS 3.2 8–10). In short, Vāmana's Artha Samādhi is no Guṇa of Arthasandarbha. It is a Guṇa of the poet and his Pratibhā. It goes with the equipment of a poet (VKAS I.3.16–20). Again, the idea of originality and imitation is also inherent in these Sūtras.

(6.) Mādhurya of Bharata is the quality which does not make a sweet thing stale or cloy, however much it may be repeatedly heard. The Vāmanīyas say (VKAS 3.1.20) : "Mādhurya is 'pṛthakpadatvam' or "words standing separate". It consists in freedom from long compounds. Bhāmaha says that writers who favour Mādhurya do not compound their words.

Incidentally, Vāmana's followers sarcastically remark that Bharata's definition of Mādhurya amounts to saying that it is like words of the beloved which may be full of lack-lustre expressions.

Here Daṇḍin is represented as saying that the view of Vāmana in regard to Mādhurya that "it is words standing

separate" is contrary to experience. For, we do experience Mādhurya or sweetness in compounds as well. (Even Ānandavardhana points out that there is Mādhurya in compounds). So, according to Daṇḍin (K.Ā. I.51) "Madhura is Rasavat" i.e., Sweetness is flavour (in words as well as the existence of flavour in the sentiment expressed; because of that quality the wise are intoxicated as bees with honey).[156]

This Rasa is twofold : either in speech (वाग्रस) or idea (वस्तुरस). Of this twofold Rasa, Rasa in speech is achieved through alliteration of letters and syllables. But Anuprāsa is an Alaṁkāra. So, how can it be a Guṇa ? And, Vasturasa i.e. Rasa in idea, consists in absence of vulgar sense. For, vulgarity of sense arises from uncultured meaning in a composition; as, for example, in verse 428 (ब्रह्मचर्येपितप्तोऽहम् etc.).

However, the author of our text says that this is only an absence of Doṣa, not a Guṇa. And this also serves to refute Vāmana's Arthsaguṇa Mādhurya, defined as Uktivaicitrya or strikingness of expression. For, the Uktivaicitrya is a quality of poetry in general.

Therfore, Mādhurya is pleasure (caused by fluidity of heart). This view is of the Dhvani theorists.

(7) Sukumāratā of Bharata is defined in two parts which can be related to Śabda and Artha. For Mādhurya and Saukumārya there are no two recensions in Bharata.

In the verse (Nāṭyaśāstra XVI.104 or 105) of Bharata, it is said that words must coalesce closely and must be easy to pronounce. Sukhaśabdatā may also mean the use of words easy for Abhinaya. And Sukumāra-artha means delineation of fine and delicate ideas.

But in connection with the illustration given for Vāmana's Sukumāratā (Raghu. 2.55), our author cites criticism of Bharata's Sukumāratā and Vāmana's definitions to the effect that this Sukumāratā is nothing but the absence of harshness or cacephony in expression. In short, it is absence of Śrutikaṭutvadoṣa.

And so, it is a kind of Mādhurya. For Vāmana also agrees with Bharata in saying that Saukumārya (a Śabdaguṇa) is merely agreeable words or diction (Sukhaśabdameva).

Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Saukumārya is absence of Pāruṣya (VKAS 3.2.11). It is a mark of refinement in expression. Refined speakers avoid blunt language but use polished expressions to convey the same sense.

But our author, who altogether avoids quoting Daṇḍin here, attacks Vāmana's definition and example of Artha-saukumārya, and brands it as the absence of the Amaṅgala variety of the Aślīlatvadoṣa which consists of avoiding blunt and inauspicious expressions. So, in the verse (431), instead of saying 'was killed' or 'murdered', the poet uses a refined expression "Nito'tyantapravāsatām". He adds: "If your Artha-saukumārya is a special expression, let it be included under the figure Paryāyokta" (Vide Kāvyaprakāśa X. 115).

(8) The Udāra Guṇa is defined by Bharata almost in terms of the later Udāttālaṁkāra. The definition seems to be more of Artha than of Śabda. Thus, in the version adopted by Hemachandra, Udāra is the quality consisting in the particular meanings, in varied forms, conveyed beautifully (Nāṭyaśāstra GOS XVI. 110). In another recension, it is exaltedness where there are super-human sentiments (Divyabhāva), varied feelings and erotic and marvellous moods (Śṛṅgāra and Adbhuta Rasas).

The followers of Vāmana point out that the Guṇa of Udāra or Udātta is not different from Ullekha.

So, Udāratā is Vikaṭatva wherein words, as though, dance. It is a Śabda Guṇa (VKAS 3.1.22). Here Vāmana infuses poetry into his conception of Guṇas - here, as elsewhere, he speaks of the **dance of words,** the brilliance of words, the rise and fall of verse, all these are really poetic notions of Guṇa. But our author flatly refuses to accommodate this Guṇa in his new scheme, and remarks that this is not a Guṇa, but it is

influence of Anuprāsa which is slightly non-soft (Iṣad amasṛṇaḥ anuprāsaprabhavaḥ). It is but a variety of Ojas.

As for Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Udāratā, it is defined as "absence of unpolished utterance". It is Daṇḍin's Agrāmyatā Mādhurya. This is only an absence of Doṣa, not a Guṇa.

(9) In Arthavyakti, according to Hemachandra's Anuvāda, which follows neither of the two verses of Bharata, the sense or objects appear real though not real or substantial in actual fact.

According to Bharata (N.S.C.S.S. XVII. 105), Arthavyakti is clear Abhinaya of ideas and objects or perspicuity of sense. When Abhinaya is going on, even before the actors' actual Prayoga, the spectator grasps the coming idea by virtue of mental union with the theme. The other verse (NS XV. 106) means explicitness of description of the nature of things as they appear in the world by means of well-known predicates.

But this quality of Arthavyakti (i.e., clarity of Abhinaya) is not different from Prasāda. This view is ascribed to Vāmana and his followers. Hence, where the thing is grasped before the expression, it is Arthavyakti.

But Daṇḍin points out that this is Prasāda only presented in another garb. But Arthavyakti (K.Ā. I. 73) is absence of implicitness (i.e., it is explicitness of sense); thus, if the ocean is to be described as red, its cause must be stated. If it is not stated, then there will be Neyatā.

But our author rejects this Arthavyakti as absence of the Doṣa of Aneyatā. How can it be a Guṇa ? For, if all the Doṣas, which are many, are treated as Guṇas in reverse, then there will be a hundred Guṇas !

Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Arthavyakti (VKAS 3.2.13) is the pictorial quality in a word-picture. It is a composite picture painted by a poet, where the different things making the picture are distinct and clear.

But such sphuṭatva is present in the Svabhāvokti (Jāti) figure too. So it is an Alaṁkāra, not a Guṇa, says our author. He cites a couplet (126) which says : "The speech of poets presents delightfully and graphically pleasant ideas and forms".

(10) Bharata's Kānti is pleasing to the ear and the mind. The two recensions identically present this idea. It leans towards Mādhurya. Its definition includes Prasāda. Kānti produces repose of heart when it is heard.

Vāmana's Novel Conceptions

Critics like Vāmana realise that this Guṇa (Kānti) is identical with Mādhurya. So, they propose Aujjvalya as Kānti (VKAS. 3.1.25) or 'Brilliance of Words'.

It may be pointed out that Dance of Words (Udāratā) and Brilliance of Words (Kānti, Śabdaguṇa) are entirely new conceptions of Guṇas stated by Vāmana. The absence of Aujjvalya makes language faded, so the critics say. Vāmana's Śabdaguṇa Kānti is borrowed from Painting. It is described as Aujjvalya : "The faded and dull appearance of old pictures, पुराणी छाया, is what results when verses have no Kānti. Only poetic language can achieve Kānti."

But Daṇḍin says in a "tongue in cheek" manner that since Ojas has Aujjvalya, it will be Kānti ! So, Kānti is conformity to general usage (Lokasīmā-antatikramaṇa) i.e., absence of the unnatural, the grotesque seen in dialogues (Vārtās), laudatory speeches (Varṇanās), etc., e.g. "Gṛhāṇi nāma tānyeva . . . etc." But crossing accepted usage is lack of Kānti – both in Vārta and Varṇanā.[157]

But Vāmana says, it is Atiśayokti and not another Guṇa.

Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Kānti is Dīptarasatvam (VKAS. 3.2.14). Vāmana mentions Rasa here; so Vāmana takes Rasa as a Guṇa, unlike Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin who called it Alaṁkāra (Rasavad). Dr. Raghavan notes : "There is an advance in considering Rasa as Artha-guṇa, for Vāmana considers Guṇa as superior to Alaṁkāra and as inseparably related with

Kāvya."[158] Note that Dīptarasatva means prominence of sentiment.[159]

Our author caustically comments : "Rasas like Raudra etc. are fiery, others like Śṛṅgāra etc., its reverses; so, the portrayal of Śṛṅgāra etc. will be AKĀNTĪ, as per your definition !"

Or, better still, Kānti is included in our treatment of Rasas and Dhvani.

Conclusive Rejection of Ten Guṇas

Thus, Hemachandra proves that the **ten** Guṇas of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana are (1) overlapping and confusing in definition, (2) included in our Guṇas (three), and (3) some are mere negation of Doṣas. We may note here that Mammaṭa has actually shown this very effectively in Kāvyaprakāśa VIII. 72 and in the gloss that follows it. So, **neither** ten Śabdaguṇas **nor** Arthaguṇas stick. All Guṇas are Rasaguṇas – even letters, compounds, diction, etc , are Rasavyañjaka.

As for Pāṭhaguṇas, we may note that Bharata has devoted a separate section to a consideration of the most proper way of correct speaking in the drama according to the emotions (Pāṭhyagunāḥ). And Vāmana also refers to Pāṭhaguṇas.

THE POETIC EMBELLISHMENT 6

The Concept of Poetic Embellishment

Hemachandra devotes two chapters (K.A.S. V–VI) to the treatment of the poetic embellishments. Looking back, we find that in his definition of poetry (I. 11), our author has mentioned the poetic embellishments – both of the word and the sense as belonging to the body poetic. He has also determined the general nature of these embellishments so as to bring them into an effective relationship with Rasa in subsequent discussions. And following Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa, Hemachandra has clarified that the poetic embellishments or Alaṁkāras dwell in the body poetic (Aṅgāśritā alaṁkārāḥ : I. 13) and help the Rasa through the word and the sense, if Rasa exists; if Rasa does not exist, they simply serve poetry as 'turns of speech'. Secondly, in order that they help the development of Rasa (and that is the raison' d'etre of their presence in a poem), according to Hemachandra, the Alaṁkāras should be employed with great discrimination and judgement. To put it more simply, the Alaṁkāras should be always ancillary to the Rasa, helping the readers to enjoy the Rasa in full. They should never try to ride roughshod over the emotional element in a poem (I. 14). They should be employed according to the context and the poet should exercise the utmost care in choosing and using, or even rejecting sometimes, the poetic embellishments. That is where the skill of the poet is tested. Normally,

therefore, the Alaṁkāras should not be pressed too far, and if pressed, they should culminate in the promotion of Rasa.[160] In neglecting this golden advice, the poet degenerates into follies. Finally, Hemachandra has differentiated Alaṁkāras from the Guṇas on the ground that while the former are like ornaments with which the body is decked and which, for that reason, decorate the soul indirectly, the latter are intrinsic and inherent to the emotional context of a poem. None the less, these poetic embellishments are as much a part of the poetic medium as any other element in poetry.

Aesthetic Considerations

This is so far as the General nature of the Alaṁkāras is concerned. But it is absolutely necessary to know what the poetic and aesthetic considerations are that underlie the conception and employment of poetic adornments before a theorist deals with the individual figures of speech. Dr. K. Krishnamurty observes : "In the first place, it is never possible to appreciate the definitions of particular figures in the absence of a general notion of Alaṁkāras. Secondly, it is not at all possible to exhaust all the individual figures in any scheme of rhetoric, since they are innumerable. Just as the modes of human speech are infinite, the figures of speech in poetry too are infinite, based as they are on human speech."[161]

The Distinction between Śabdālaṁkāra and Arthālaṁkāra

The external framework of poetry consists of Word and Sense, often called Kāvyaśarīra on the analogy of human body, and Alaṁkāras or poetic figures make this body poetic charming by certain expressive devices. And without stating directly, Bhāmaha implies his acceptance of the figures of word and sense i.e., Śabdālaṁkāra and Arthālaṁkāra in 'Śabdābhidheyālaṁkārabhedād' (I. 15) i.e., we accept the distinction of Śabdālaṁkāra and Arthālaṁkāra (though others hesitate to do so). Daṇḍin also agrees with this view by saying (I. 10) 'Śarīraṁ tāvadiṣṭārthavyavaccinnā padāvalī'; for here he emphasizes

meaning as much as word. On the question of the need of the poetic embellishment, Bhāmaha categorically states : 'Na kāntamapi nirbhūṣaṁ vibhāti vanitānanam' (I. 13) i.e., A damsel's face, though beautiful, does not shine, if it be devoid of ornaments.

Śabdacitra and Arthacitra

Interestingly, Mammaṭa quotes **three** verses (I. 13, 14 and 15) from Bhāmaha's work in the opening portion of Chapter VI of the Kāvyaprakāśa where he explains that the division of Kāvyas into Śabdacitrā and Arthacitrā is not intended to be mutually exclusive. There are many cases where both occur. In fact, in almost all cases, by some minute scrutiny the presence of both (Śabda-Artha-citras) may be proved. In such cases, Mammaṭa lays down the useful guide-line that the **author's intention is our guide** in determining whether the passage should be considered as coming under Śabdālaṁkāra or Arthālaṁkāra. And the author's intention is revealed by his dependence upon either Śabda or Artha for the beauty of the verse. For both Śabda and Artha lead to Camatkṛti and Mammaṭa clinches the issue by quoting Bhāmaha's verses; for, in the verses quoted from Bhāmaha, a final reply is given to those who regard only Rūpaka etc., i.e., अर्थालङ्कारs, as ornaments and not alliteration etc., i.e., शब्दालङ्कारs. The reply is : "We, however, accept both the varieties of Alaṁkāras, that of Śabda as much as that of Artha". By the by, Bhāmaha gives equal prominence to Śabda and Artha in poetry, as his definition of poetry 'शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्' clearly shows (I. 16). For him, Word and Meaning taken together constitute Kāvya.[162]

Hemachandra's Exposition of the Poetic Embellishments based on Word and Sense

Hemachandra classifies Alaṁkāras into two classes,[163] those of Śabda and those of Artha and refuses to recognize those Alaṁkāras that are based on both Śabda and Artha called Śabdārthālaṁkāras or Ubhayālaṁkāras in poetics. Since

Śabdaśobhā precedes Arthaśobhā in the poetic medium (i.e., ideas find expression through words), our author first defines and illustrates the **six** figures of speech based on Śabda. These **six** verbal figures are Anuprāsa, Yamaka, Citra, Śleṣa Vakrokti and Punaruktābhāsa (or Punaruktavadābhāsa). Mammaṭa, however, defines **seven** main verbal figures, viz. : (1) Vakrokti (two types), (2) Anuprāsa (two types) which includes the three styles of composition called Vṛttis viz. Upanāgarikā, Paruṣā and Komalā (originally treated of by Udbhaṭa)[164] corresponding to the three well-known Rītis, Vaidarbhi etc., (3) Lāṭānuprāsa (or Śabdānuprāsa or trope) of five kinds, (4) Yamaka or Chime (5) Śleṣa or Pun (Eightfold) (6) Citra (or Pictorial and Verbal Play) and (7) Punaruktavadābhāsa in a word and in a word-cum-sense. Rudraṭa deals with Śabdālaṁkāras in his "Kāvyālaṁkāra". He enumerates, defines and exhaustively illustrates **five** verbal figures. They are Vakrokti, Anuprāsa, Yamaka, Śleṣa and Citra. Bhoja classifies Alaṁkāras into those of Śabda, Artha and both, and gives 24 Śabdālaṁkāras of which Śleṣa, Yamaka, Anuprāsa and Citra of various kinds are already known to us.

Six Verbal Figures of Hemachandra

Hemachandra begins by explaining the old Śabdālaṁkāra Anuprāsa (K.A.S.V. 1). Anuprāsa is defined by Bhāmaha as "Sarūpavarṇavinyāsam" and as "Varṇasāmyaṁ" by Mammaṭa implying thereby a similarity of letters. Hemachandra, like Udbhaṭa, recognizes that Varṇa should be replaced by Vyanjana, for there is no charm in mere similarity of vowels. Mammaṭa also clarifies in his gloss (K.P. IX. 79) that even when the vowels are dissimilar, the sameness of consonants constitutes the similarity of letters. Hemachandra, like Mammaṭa, also emphasizes that the allitration should heighten the effect of a Rasa i.e., it should be favourable to the sentiment (Rasādyanugata). Mammaṭa, following Udbhaṭa, relates his Anuprāsa to Cheka and Vṛtti and defines Vṛtti (or style) as the function of the particular letters which helps the suggestion

of sentiment (IX. 79b). While Cheka is defined as the **repetition of the several consonants only once,** the Vṛttyanuprāsa is the repetition of even the one consonant more than once. Interestingly, Hemachandra includes all these sub-types of Mammaṭa under his comprehensive Anuprāsa. He believes that there is no strikingness in repeating one consonant but once. Hence, it follows that the repetition of one letter should be more frequent, but that of a group of letters may be once or more frequent.

Normally, Anuprāsa is devided into Chekānuprāsa, Vṛttyanuprāsa and Lāṭānuprāsa. While there is a regulation as to the number (two or more) of letters in Chekānuprāsa, there is no Niyama as such in the Vṛttyanuprāsa except that it should be favourable to Rasa-development. The Vṛttyanuprāsa or Anuprāsa-jāti, which according to Mammaṭa consists of one or several consonants repeated **twice or several times,** includes under it the three Vṛttis or styles called Upanāgarikā, Puruṣā and Komalā. In fact, Udbhaṭa explicitly states : "The separate grouping of similar consonants in the three styles of composition (suiting the different Rasas) the poets always call Alliteration or Anuprāsa.[165] This means that one must understand the three Vṛttis (styles) first; for Anuprāsa, which is inherent in them will be understood easily from them.[166]

But as Hemachandra has correlated these three styles with the three Guṇas in chapter four he omits this topic here altogether, while Mammaṭa gives a detailed treatment of these three Vṛttis along with the figure Allitration. Mammaṭa's effort is to reorganize the different concepts of poetics so as to bring them in relation to Rasa. Hence he stresses that Vṛtis mean the function of the particular letters which help the suggestion of Rasa. Hemachandra, too, relates them to Rasa through the three Guṇas in his own way – of course in confirmity with the teachings of Ānandavardhana.[167]

Lāṭanuprāsa is but a variety of Anuprāsa according to Hemachandra. It is a Śabdānuarāsa and involves repetition of words and is a favourite of the people of the Lāṭa country (modern South Gujarat). Udbhaṭa defines it as the repetition, owing to the difference of purpose, of the same words, as stems or forms or both, yielding different meanings, though their form and their original meaning is the same. It has five varieties. Mammaṭta explicitly states (K. P. IX. 81) that Lāṭānuprāsa is Śābda (verbal), when the difference lies only in the import of words. Lāṭānuprāsa thus is alliteration of the words (as different from that of single consonants), identical in form and sense but differing in import or application (Tātparya). It is popular in the Lāṭadesa. Others (like Vāmana) call it "Padānuprāsa". Vāmana deals with only two figures of word: Yamaka and Anuprāsa, in that order (VKAS 4.1). And he defines Anuprāsa as that similarity of letters which is different from Yamaka. The reason why he defines Anuprāsa in terms of Yamaka is not far to seek. For, Yamaka, in Vāmana's Language, is the repetition of words or letters, having multiple (more than one) sense, with regulation of place. However, only word can have multiple sense, not letters. And repetition of words having the same sense cannot come within the purview of Yamaka. Repetition of letters, then, will be the repetition of incomplete words or parts of words, which cannot have signification. Thus we have Pāda Yamaka. But Padānuprāsa is implied in Vāmana's gloss on 4-1-8.

To return to Hemachandra's treatment of Lāṭānuprāsa, we notice that the words and their senses are the same but the connection is different. These words may be a noun or any other part of speech and may be repeated once or many times. This is a very straightforward way to explain the Lāṭānuprāsa and it is no wonder that this variety of Anuprāsa should be popular among the people of Lāṭa (Gujarāta). Mammaṭa's Lāṭānuprāsa comprises five sub-types (IX.82).[168]

Yamaka is the second Sābdālaṁkāra treated of by Hemachandra (V.3). He defines Yamaka as the repetition in

the same order of a letter or letters (consonants with vowels), having different meanings, either very closely or at close intervals. Rudraṭa defines Yamaka as a repetition of such Varṇas as are (1) similar in sound (2) similar in order but (3) distinct in meaning (K.A.III). Thus, both Rudraṭa and Hemachandra hold Yamaka to be the repetition of similar syllables, vowels and consonants together, in the same order, but with distinct senses. Mammaṭa speaks of Yamaka (as the repetition of (a group of) letters in the same order with a different meaning – when there is a meaning, in identical terms (K.P.IX.83). We can very well appreciate Hemachandra's emphasis on Śrutyaikya and Kramaikya as well as Satyartha and Anyārtha because he wants to stress these four things viz. the similarity of sounds and order as also of sensibility and difference of meaning to distinguish Yamaka from other figures of word.

This Yamaka is found in one foot rhyming with another and even in one part of a foot rhyming with another part of the same foot. In fact, Hemachandra illustrates all possible varieties of Yamaka in the text and the Viveka commentary. And after giving practicable numerical varieties, our anthor states that Yamaka can be of innumerable types!

YAMAKA : A Literary Excess

But before he concludes the discussion on Yamaka, Hemachandra observes that, critically speaking, all these varieties of Yamaka serve only to show off the powers of versification possessed by a poet and do not serve to promote any of the four goals of life and, therefore, they are regarded as impediments or intumescence (Kāvyagaḍu) of poetry which obstruct the enjoyment of a Rasa.

"A poem is composed" continues Hemachandra, "to stimulate tenderminded persons on to the goal of life. But understanding Yamaka, which causes obstruction to Rasa enjoyment and is wholly artificial and an appendage(पृथग्यत्ननिर्वर्त्य),

is not easy (i.e., is a strain on the mind). And, in fact, descriptions of rivers, hills, oceans etc. are themselves impediments to the enjoyment of Rasa, then what to speak of these यमकs, jarring poetry ?" In this mater, we should heed the advice of Ānanavardhana (Ddv. ĀI.II.77) who stresses the aesthetic norm that figurs should come in naturally and effortlessly a poem. To substantiate his attack on Yamaka, Hemachandra quotes in the gloss two verses of Lollaṭa. Here Lollaṭa decries the poetic practice of outlandish extravaganza in the form of descriptions of rivers etc. and of over-indulgence in verbal jugglary and poetic acrobatics such as Yamaka, Chitrakāvyas etc. It is only parading one's power or is a sort of blind imitation of the old tradition.

Thus Hemachandra roundly condemns the practice of classical poets to over-indulge in excesses of Yamaka and Citrakāvya and derives authority from Lollaṭa's two coupletes and Ānandavardhana's words of sanity (K.A.S. p. 307). However, in the same breath, he defines the figre Citra next (K.A.S.V.S). **Citra is a verbal figure**. Citra is primarily the name given to the Adhama-kāvya in which the poet is in no mind to develop a Rasa or Bhāva which has no power of suggesting the Vyaṅgya sense and which, therefore, depends for beauty on the charm of words or sense. Such a Kāvya is, in the words of Ānandavardhana, devoid of Rasa or suggestion, but looks like a copy of the real Kāvya, being a composition depending on Kevalavācyavācakavaicitrya. It is a mere Alaṁkārambandha and therefore a Citrakāvya.

The verbal figure Citra arises when the letters of a poem can be arranged in the form of a lotus, sword etc. Citra can be a Bandhacitra, Ākāracitra, Gaticitra or Sthānacitra. Bhoja deals with this figure in the second chapter of the Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa. Bandhacitra includes arrangement of letters in the form of a plough, a pestle, a drum, Gomūtrikā, a bow, a wheel, etc. as does Ākāracitra. It is called Citra also because it causes surprise by its peculiar arrangement of letters. Thus

by making the word Citra signify 'wonder', the figures like Gatapratyāgata, Ardhabhrama, Sarvatobhadra, Dhenu and other classes of Gaticitra can be included under Citra. There are other types of Citra also.

The verbal acrobatics of the Citra Alaṁkāra certainly obstructs the relish of Rasa as a protuberance of a sugarcane prevents its juice from being tasted.[169]

Hemachandra provides examples to illustrate poems having all long vowels, letters of the same class, Gatapratyāgata, Murajabandha as also poems called Cyutacitrakāvya, Gūḍhacitrakāvya etc. But, in the final analysis, all these verses are acrobatic feats in the domain of poetry and they hardly represent good or high class poetry. Hemachandra has cut short the matter in the text but culled many examples of the remaining varieties and presented them in the Viveka commentary.

The fourth Śabdālaṁkāra to be considered by Hemachandra is Śleṣa. It arises when two parallel ideas are expressed by the same sentence – almost every word yields a different meaning and so words have either to be split up in order to yield a different meaning or they stand as they are and yield different meanings. It has many varieties according as the pun is on a syllable, a word or a gender.

Can Abhaṅgaśleṣa be regarded as an Arthālaṁkāra ?

Hemachandra first explains Pun in which words need to be split into two or more parts in order to arrive at the double meaning (Sabhaṅgaśleṣa) and then he goes on to discuss the other kind of Śleṣa viz. Abhaṅgaśleṣa, in which no word-splitting is necessary, and in which the words as they stand are interpreted in two ways. The question that arises here is whether **Abhaṅgaśleṣa can or cannot be regarded as an instance of Arthālaṁkāra**.

Hemachandra says : "**No**; for, if, for the word Udaya (in Verse 490), we substitute the word Śaktyupacaya or Giri, the

Śleṣa disappears at once. This shows that the figure is entirely dependent on words and thus it is a word-figure and not a sense-figure. This test is carried out on the maxim : "Śabdasattve alaṁkāraḥ śabdāsattve na alaṁkāraḥ". This is the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, adopted by Mammaṭa. Udbhaṭa uses the test of Śabdaparivṛttisahatva or Śabdaparivṛtti–asahatva, which means the same thing. Hemachandra, too, uses this test in the case of श्लेष.

Another point of theoretical significance and practical utility arises when in a verse both Upamā and Śleṣa occur. In such a case, Hemachandra says, preference should be given to Upamā; for rigidity as regards difference is not proper. In fact even a verbal resemblance may give rise to Upamā.[170]

The Province of Śleṣa

"What then is the province of Śleṣa ?" – one may ask. Hemachandra replies that instances of pure unmixed Śleṣa are many (e.g. V. 490). But, where two figures (Śleṣa with another figure) come together and where Śleṣa is not fully developed, the other figure must be given predominance in the poem. In a verse, for instance, Śleṣa may give rise to Virodha and ultimately Virodha gains prominence. Consequently, the figure in the verse will be Virodha and not Śleṣa. In the verse 'Anurāgavatī sandhyā etc.' there is Śleṣa, but it does not become strong and, in fact, gives way to Samāsokti. Hence, in this verse, the only figure is Samāsokti (not Śleṣa). This last verse (533) is discussed in the Viveka-ṭīkā (p. 329). He cites other instances (VV. 534, 535, 536 and 537) where either some other Arthālaṁkāra predominates or the Saṁkara Alaṁkāra stands out but not Śleṣa.

Bhāṣāśleṣa

When a verse appears to be written with the same words in two or more languages with no difference in meaning, it is called Bhāṣāśleṣa. It is of fifty seven types. Earlier, on page 325, Hemachandra referred to Bhāṣāntara-bhaṅgaśleṣa in the

gloss and elaborated on it in the Viveka, drawing upon Rudraṭa and others in point of theory and illustrations. Here he refers to this Bhāṣāśleṣa with a view to distinguish between the two sorts of Bhāṣāśleṣa. While the earlier variety yields two different meanings from the same words of two different languages e.g. Sanskrit and Māgadhi (cf. Rudraṭa's K.A. 4.12), the present one (Sū. 7), i.e. two or more languages but the same words, has only one meaning (e.g. Mālatīmādhava VI. 10; Rudraṭa 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21 etc.). Here a funny instance in which the same meaning (Arthaikya) with the same words is common to six languages is given (K.A.S., gloss, V. 497) from the Devīśataka (74).

What is Vakrokti ?

Vakrokti is the next Śabdālaṁkāra treated of by Hemachandra (V. 8). The definition implies that this is the Vakrokti dealt with and popularized by Rudraṭa. Even the example is from Rudraṭa's work (K.A. 2.15). This figure occurs "when a person interprets (or misinterprets on purpose) the words of another person in order to nonplus him." This figure is obviously based on Śleṣa (of both Sabhaṅga and Abhaṅga types).

It should be noted that Vakrokti means poetic speech and Alaṁkāra in general as well as a kind of poetic figure of this name (as here) involving clever dialogue turning on ordinary and word-split (Abhaṅga and Sabhaṅga Śleṣa) puns. We do not meet with Vakrokti as an individual figure in Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin, both of whom use the word Vakrokti for 'striking speech' or Alaṁkāra in general. But Daṇḍin connects Śleṣa with Vakrokti. But, it is only Rudraṭa who treats of Vakrokti as an individual Śabdālaṁkāra (K.A. 2.14, 2.16) and not as poetic speech or Alaṁkāra in general. Rudraṭa's Vakrokti is a dialogue involving intonation cleverly employed to change the meaning and another variety of the same employs word-split pun. Thus Rudraṭa has Śleṣavakrokti and Kākuvakrokti. But Rājaśekhara criticises Kākuvakrokti. Ratnākara's Vakrokti-Pañcāśikā (a poem)

contains Vakrokti involving Sabhaṅgaśleṣa, one of the varieties of Rudraṭa, which Hemachandra has adopted here. When we come to Mammaṭa, we find that he defines Vakrokti in the very first Sūtrā (K.P. IX. 78) of his Śabdālaṁkāra chapter. Here it is Equivoque through **Pun** (Śleṣa) or Intonation (Kāku). Hence Mammaṭa accepts Rudraṭa completely; for his twofold Vakrokti is based on Sabhaṅgaśleṣa and Kāku.

Kākuvakrokti Rejected by Hemachandra

So far as Hemachandra's Vakrokti is concerned, we find that he refuses to accept Kāku as a variety of Vakrokti. He follows Yāyāvara (Rājaśekhara) who criticises Kāku as a mere Pāṭhadharma and so does not admit it as a variety of poetic embellishment and Hemachandra quotes Rājaśekhara (K.M. VII) in the gloss (p. 333). Thus Hemachandra is not only firmly against admitting Kākuvakrokti, but being a follower of Ānandavardhana; he includes Kāku under Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and accepts only Subhaṅgaśleṣavakrokti as a Śabdālaṁkāra.

It may be noted that Mammaṭa has added Abhaṅgaśleṣa also to what Rudraṭa has, and, on this point, Hemachandra follows Mammaṭa.[171] Hemachandra correlates the discussion of Kākuvakrokti with what Ānandavardhana has said about Kāku being a variety of Subordinate Suggestion (Dhv. Āl. III. 39) and reproduces in the Viveka (pp. 333-336) long passages from the Nāṭyaśāstra to prove this.

All the same, Hemachandra divides Kāku into two types : Sākāṅkṣa and Nirākāṅkṣa. He also defines and illustrates these two types. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni offers a detailed critical study of the concept of Kāku in Sanskrit Poetics in his 'Studies in Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra' (pp. 28-36). He traces the various ideas associated with Kāku in the history of poetics and brings together the opinions of Bharata, Rudraṭa, Rājaśekhara, Abhinavagupta, Bhoja, Mammaṭa, Hemachandra, Ruyyaka, Vidyānath, Viśvanātha and others on Kāku. Bhoja, however, makes a major type of Śabdālaṁkāra called Vakovākya by taking the element of dialogue from the concept of Vakrokti.

The last Śabdālaṁkāra in Hemachandra's list of six word-figures is Punaruktābhāsa. It occurs when two words, exactly similar in form but only apparently similar in meaning, come together. These two words appearing like synonyms have, in fact, entirely different meanings. In the instance cited (V.501) from the Devīśataka of Ānandavardhana, the words Bhāsi and Virājase, Dviṣām and Arīṇām, Senām and Vāhinīm, Udakam and Payaḥ, apparently mean the same thing but in reality mean entirely different things. Mammaṭa defines it (IX 86) as semblance of repetition which involves oneness and sameness in diverse forms. The golss states that the appearance, on the face of it, of one and the same meaning in words of diverse forms, with or without meaning, is Punaruktavadābhāsa. It subsists in a word and also in both the word and sense.

Udbhaṭa's Punaruktābhāsa

Udbhaṭa begins his work (KASS) with the discussion of the figure Punaruktavadābhāsa or Punaraktābhāsa and he is believed to be the first author to treat this figure which is both a Śabdalaṁkāra and an Arthālaṁkāra. The test that is applied in distinguishing a Śabdālaṁkāra from an Arthālaṁkāra is its Parivṛttisahatva or Parivṛttyasahatva. If an Alaṁkāra is solely dependent on the form of words so that the Alaṁkāra is lost if the words are substituted by other synonymous words, then the Alaṁkāra is a Śabdālāṁkāra and when such substitution of synonyms does not destroy the Alaṁkāra, then it is an Arthālaṁkāra. Mammaṭa gives this test in K.P. IX and X. Mammaṭa, therefore, considers Punaraktavadābhāsa both a Śabdālaṁkāra and Ubhayālaṁkāra. As Śabdālaṁkāra it is either Sabhaṅgaśabdaniṣṭha or Abhaṅgaśabdaniṣṭha. In Vidyādhara's Ekāvali, this figure is called Arthalāṁkāra, like in Ruyyaka's work, because the sense is repeated, as it were. And though it is an Arthālaṁkāra it is treated at the head of Śabdālaṁkāras because the author wants to show that the opposite of the poetic defect Prarūḍha, which arises only when there is repetition of sense, is an ornament.

Twentynine Arthālaṁkāras or Embellishments Based on Sense

After defining and illustrating Śabdālaṁkāras in Chapter Five, Hemachandra takes up the treatment of **twentynine** Arthālaṁkāras or figures of sense in Chapter Six. These figures are called Arthālaṁkāras because their beauty (Vicchitti or Vaicitrya) depends on the Artha or the sense of the Kāvya.

Rationale of Treatment

Hemachandra enumerates the twentynine individual poetic figures of sense in the Viveka commentary. These are Upamā, Utprekṣā, Rūpaka, Nidarśanā, Dīpaka, Anyokti, Paryāyokta, Atiśayokti, Ākṣepa, Virodha, Sahokti, Samāsokti, Jāti, Vyājastuti, Śleṣa ,Vyatireka, Arthāntaranyāsa, Sasandeha, Apahnuti, Parivṛtti, Anumāna, Smṛti, Bhrānti, Viṣama, Sama, Samuccaya, Parisaṅkhyā, Kāraṇamālā and Saṁkara. While defining, discussing and illustrating these Arthālaṁkāras in the sixth chapter, Hemachandra's special attention is directed towards reducing the number of these figures from about sixty of his predecessors like Mammaṭa and others who also based their aesthetics on the Rasa-dhvani theory of literature. It was a remarkable thing to do for any theorist at a time when the tendency was to invent new figures and thus swell the rank of the total number of the Alaṁkāras. It is natural, therefore, that students of Sanskrit Poetics should want to know the rationale of Hemachandra's treatment in this chapter not only in regard to the reduction of the number of figures accepted for treatment but also in respect of the theoretical viewpoint or influence behind this reduction.

Hemachandra's Critical Outlook

Now, for one thing, in the course of his treatment and criticism of the various poetic figures, Hemachandra himself advances plausible arguments for the inclusion or exclusion of several figures and shows how certain figures, though looking apparently different from each other, have a common

element of beauty or a common governing principle which would justify their amalgamation into one figure, notwithstanding the fact that they were all treated as independent and separate figures by Mammaṭa and others. This critical outlook of Hemachandra towards the very basis of classification of the figure of his predecessors is, naturally, reflected in the reduced number of the Alaṁkāras here. And Hemachandra has, from time to time, supplied explanations as to why several separate Alaṁkāras are brought together to form one figure.

The Individual Figures Discussed

This becomes clear when we analyse the criticism of the various figures. Hemachandra **begins by defining Upamā or Simile,**[172] along the same lines as Mammaṭa, but with the addition of the word Hṛdyam i.e., delightful or charming or poetically striking. This delightful similarity distinguishes the poetic similarity from any mundane comparison which is based on existence or epistemological grounds and which, therefore, is no similarity at all; for the prosaic and drab comparisons met with in the practical world are no match for a delightful similarity struck between two separate objects. Hemachandra significantly remarks in the gloss (VI. 1. ff) that the quality of Hṛdyatva or delightfulness is a common characteristic of all the poetic figures. This, then, is the rationale of Hemachandra's classification and treatment of the poetic figures. Now this adjective Hṛdya, added by Hemachandra to Mammaṭa's definition of Upamā, can be traced to Udbhaṭa's definition of the same figure in which the word Cetohāri qualifies the term Sādharmya.[173] Thus Upamā is that **charming similarity,** existing between Upamāna and Upameya which are expressed by words and whose Pravṛttinimittas viz. Deśa, Kāla, Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā, etc. are mutually different from each other. While Bhāmaha speaks of **Sāmya,** Udbhaṭa speaks of **Sādharmya.** But Mammaṭa improves on both and gives a pithy and accurate definition by inserting the word भेदे which accounts for Deśa, Kāla etc. and implies the object as well as the standard of

comparison. For the distinguishing features of Upamā are distinctions of Upameya and Upamāna and Sādharmya or similarity. It is pertinent to note that the words Sāmya, Sādṛśya and Sādharmya are understood sometimes as Dharma or Sambandha. Most of the Ālaṁkārikas following grammarians take it as Sambandha or relation, which is brought out by the common property found in both Upameya and Upamāna also referred to as Anuyogi and Pratiyogi (though inadequately). This Sādharmya is not possible between a cause and its effect, but is only possible between an Upameya and Upamāna.

In the gloss as well as the Viveka commentary, Hemachandra points out that even though the same words may stand both for the Upameya and the Upamāna, there can be Upamā on the supposition that the Upamāna has extraordinary qualities (Asādhāraṇatā). In fact such is the supposition that underlies an **Ananvaya** figure (Viveka pp. 339-40).

Thus Ananvaya is included under Upamā quite justifiably.[174]

So far as divisions of Upamā are concerned, Hemachandra brings Alaṁkāras like Upameyopamā, Ananvaya, Malopamā, Rasanopamā, all based on simile (Upamāmūlaka) under Upamā and carves out an independent path for himself. He has thus deviated from Rudraṭa, Mammaṭa and others who had attempted elaborate schemes of divisions of Upamā and other figures. All varieties of Upamā are included under Pure Simile by Hemachandra – thus including Samastaviṣayā, Ekadeśaviṣayā, Utpādyopamā and other varieties such as Kalpitopamā. To explain the rationale of this unusual contraction of the varieties of Upamā, Hemachandra explains the ground or aesthetic criterion of this contraction in the gloss (p. 348). "These and such other minor varieties of simile, if defined and illustrated exhaustively, would unnecessarily increase the bulk of the work. So there is no separate treatment of these varieties, viz.Ananvaya, Mālopamā, etc.", observes Hemachandra. This attitude of Hemachandra also explains why he did not

indulge in hairsplitting discussions and unnecessary devisions of Upamā but attempted only those broad divisions such as Pūrnā and Luptā with their limited varieties. Mammaṭa, on the other hand, divides and sub-divides Upamā. However, Hemachandra explains typical varieties with significant examples both in the text as well as in the Viveka commentary (pp. 341-347).

According to Hemachandra, Utprekṣā is **fancying** some unreal or imaginary characteristic in a thing which is the subject matter. These characteristics may be Guṇa or Kriyā; but at times an absence of these may be conceived or the qualities of another thing may be conceived to be our own. The Guṇotprekṣā is instanced in verse 531 which describes Lord Mahāvīra's noble qualities. These qualities may also be fancied to be absent. Similarly Kriyā may be present or absent.

Aesthetic Criterion of Utprekṣā

Unlike Mammaṭa, Hemachandra does not mention any varieties of Utprekṣā, since, in his view, they do not add much to the beauty of the figure in poetry. Mammaṭa's Utprekṣā is based on identity, not difference. But Hemachandra's instances (VV. 532 and 533) show that he recognizes both identity and difference. He also observes, and rightly, that even when Tadyogotprekṣana is admitted, we should always remember that it should be favourable to the Rasa and that any fancy should be extra-mundane or extra-ordinary and striking; for mere drab fancy does not amount to any poetic beauty. Thus the fancy should be transcendent at all times (Viveka p. 348). By the by, just as there is Dharmyutprekṣā (Mukhaṁ candraṁ manye), so also there is Dharmotprekṣā i.e., of identity and difference (Bheda-abheda).

In **Rūpaka** (VI. 5) two separate things are identified with each other. Etymologically Rūpaka brings about identity (Ekarūpatāṁ nayati). The idea of Sādṛśya or similarity is stressed here. Again when both Upameya and Upamāna are

stated, then it is the Upameya that assumes one-ness with the Upamāna and not the other way around. This naturally excludes examples like Āyurgṛatam which rest on causal relations and not likeness.

Hemachandra observes that total identity (absence of any Bheda) of the Upameya and Upamāna leads to Atiśayokti (VI.10).

In the first kind of Atiśayokti, with a view to describing the object of comparison in a picturesque way, the poet resorts to exaggeration (i.e., obliteration of difference) and deliberately conceals the **real** difference between two objects. But in the second kind of Atiśayokti difference is shown where there is really identification.

Thus Hemachandra connects Rūpaka and Atiśayokti on the principle of identification.[175]

Nidarśanā of Hemachandra (VI. 6), defined as an illustration (Dṛṣṭānta) that serves to corroborate the matter in hand, which may be general or particular, is comprehensive enough to comprehend within itself not only Nidarśanā but also Dṛṣṭānta, Prativastūpamā and Arthāntaranyāsa (which is separately defined). Hemachandra, however, defends his views by citing a quotation (151) which defines Nidarśanā as involving 'the corroboration of a general or particular statement by (only) a **particular** one' and in Arthāntaranyāsa as "containing a corroboration of a particular proposal by a General one." This is the distinction that we should bear in mind, according to the viveka-ṭikā (p. 353). Hence Arthāntaranyāsa, logically belonging here, is treated of separately on the basis of a very thin difference.

Mammaṭa's Nidarśanā (K.P. X.97) is an unlikely connection (between objects) which leads to the **idea of similarity.** But his Nidarśana or illustration is exemplification only. It may be noted that Mammaṭa's instance of Prativastūpamā is cited here (v. 550) under Nidarśanā. And Hemachandra takes up this matter in the Viveka commentary (p. 354) for further discussion. He points out that **it is not proper to treat**

Prativastūpamā and the two types of Nidarśanā separately; for they are taken care of by our definition of Nidarśanā. Not only that, even Dṛṣṭānta of Mammaṭa[176] comes under our Nidarśanā. Hemachandra speaks of Nidarśanā by common attributes as also by opposite attributes.

Dīpaka (VI. 6) occurs where Prakṛta and Aprakṛta are mentioned together by one characteristic, which acts like a lamp (दीपक). Here the fact that so many subjects come together by means of one common characteristic causes charm or strikingness. Hemachandra's interpretation of the definition extends to Mammaṭa's Tulyayogitā which involves a string of Prakṛta things (K.P. X. 104) and Hemachandra cites here Mammaṭa's illustrative verse (559). Mammaṭa's Dīpaka (X. 103) is not different from Hemachandra's, since the gloss of Hemachandra is nothing but a paraphrase of Mammaṭa's gloss.

Hemachandra includes Tulyayogitā as well as Anyonya under Dīpaka. So far as Kārakadīpaka (admitted by Mammaṭa) is concerned, Hemachandra cites a verse (560) with many Kriyās connected with a single Kāraka or subject; but Hemachandra does not admit it as a variety of Dīpaka and dismisses it is a naturalistic pen-picture (Jāti) only. In regard to the verb Gurukīkriyate in the verse 555, there is a controversy. As a verb it performs a necessary function but it cannot be an Alaṁkāra, says the opponent. Hemachandra replies that the common verb is not the point of beauty in this figure, but the fact that so many subjects are connected by a one verb or quality creates the charm here. Again there is an element of Upamā in Dīpaka but it is not so pronounced as in Upamā and that constitutes the difference between the two figures.

Anyokti of Hemachandra (VI. 8) corresponds to Aprastataprаśaṁsā of Mammaṭa and has five varieties (Pāncadhā-K.P. X. 98-99). It consists in the **suggestion** of the relevant by a statement of the irrelevant and is widely used in the Sanskrit literature. Hemachandra distinguishes it from Nidarśanā and

Arthāntaranyāsa as well as from Vyājastuti and Śabdaśaktimūladhvani.

The main difference between Paryāyokta (VI. 9) and Anyokti, according to our author, is that in the former the suggested sense is expressed picturesquely but in the latter it is not expressed but implied. Atiśayokti (VI. 10) has been already referred to in connection with the treatment of Rūpaka. It also covers Mammaṭa's Viśesa. Hemachandra's Ākṣepa (VI. 11) consists in abruptly cutting the statement short with a view to conveying something more. It also involves denial which is apparent. The verse cited is from Bhāmaha (II.69).

Virodha (VI.12) is apparent contradiction of things, qualities, activities and proper nouns. So Vyāghāta treated by others is set aside. Virodha covers **Vibhāvanā** and **Viśeṣokti**, two separate figures. It includes Asaṁgati, Viṣama and Adhika of Mammaṭa.

Hemachandra also considers figures like Sahokti (VI. 13), Samāsokti (VI. 14), Jāti (VI. 15), Vyājastuti (VI. 16), Śleṣa (VI. 17), Vyatireka (VI. 18), Arthāntaranyāsa, Apahnuti, Parivṛtti,[177] Anumāna[178] as also Smṛti, Bhrānti, Viṣama, Sama, Samuccaya, Parisaṁkhyā, Kāraṇamālā and Saṅkara (VI. 31). When we critically look at these figures we find that Hemachandra's treatment of Sahokti, Samāsokti, Jāti or Svabhāvokti, Vyājastuti, Vyatireka, etc. follows the path beaten by Mammaṭa. Hemachandra conforms to the guidelines provided by Mammaṭa, though, now and then, he adopts expressions and instances from Rudraṭa and others. In fact, the influence of Rudraṭa, Mammaṭa and others is quite evident in this chapter.

Hemachandra's main aim seems to be to comprehend minor figures under the major varieties sanctioned by earlier authorities. He thus tries to squeeze the figures Ekāvalī, Nidarśanā and Viśeṣa under Atiśayokti. Prof. R. B. Athavale criticises Hemachandra's tendency to include other figures under some of the well known figures by hook or by crook ! (K.A.S. Vol. II. p. 209).

Hemachandra's Ākṣepa comprehends Pratīpa and his Virodha takes care of several figures (above). His Sahokti has nothing special about it. Under Samāsokti, Hemachandra raises a discussion of mixture of Samāsoktī and Śleṣa. Hemachandra's views are clear here. He says that since Samāsoktī subsists on Śleṣa there is no question of mixture but there is only Samāsoktī based on Śleṣa. His definition of Jāti, otherwise called Svabhāvokti, made famous by Daṇḍin (K.A. II. 8) who considers it as a mark of difference of the twofold literature (K.A. III. 363), has nothing special about it – in fact it is a lack-lustre, routine definition.[179] His Vyājastuti, Vyatireka of eight kinds, Arthāntaranyāsa, Sasandeha and others figures follow a beaten path. We cannot understand why the figure Anumāna is included here when several more poetic figures are dropped. His Viparyaya and Smṛiti are none-too-new or charming for that matter. His Viṣama and Sama do not strike any new beauty.[180] His Parisaṁkhyā includes Sāra. This is clear from the illustrative verse taken over from Rudraṭa (VII. 97) who adduces it as an instance of Sāra (VII. 96) and the other verse explains his Parisaṁkayā of the Apṛṣṭa variety (vv. 656, 657). Kāraṇamālā involves Hetu but Hemachandra denies it a place as a poetic figure as it lacks beauty and merely mentions a pair of cause and effect.[181] Thus Hemachandra's list of the figures of speech based on word and sense comes to an end.

The last Sūtrā of the Chapter (VI. 31) defines the Saṅkarālaṁkāra or the coming together of two or more figures in the same verse. This happens (1) when, two figures occur in the same verse, though independently, (2) when, sometimes one figure gives rise to another figure and thus becomes a means (Aṅga) of another figure (Aṅgin), (3) when, sometimes there is doubt as regards the existence of a particular figure in a verse, for the words can be interpreted in favour of two or more figures, and lastly, (4) when, in the case of the Ekapadasaṁkara, two figures occur in a word or a compound. Hemachandra gives several instances to explain these four varieties of Saṅkara.[182]

The Criterion to Decide Alaṁkāras

A poem is made up of word and sense and both these are indispensable to it. Now, we need a criterion to decide whether a particular figure is a Śabdālaṁkāra or an Arthālaṁkāra; for in every figure, both the word and the sense are invariably present. This point assumes considerable theoretical importance in works on Poetics.

Hemachandra answers by saying that not only in the case of figures but even in the case of Doṣas and Guṇas this difficulty arises. In all such cases, the only criterion is to use the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. This is the method advocated by Mammaṭa (K.P. IX & X) in the context of the figure Śleṣa (K.P. IX 85) based on Śabda (i.e., the Abhaṅgaśleṣa). The issue at stake here is how Śleṣa can be regarded as a verbal figure, when Udohaṭa and others have classified it with Arthālaṁkāras ? Mammaṭa replies by pointing out the principle or criterion of Anvaya and Vyatireka, i.e., the test of co-presence and co-absence, for deciding whether a Doṣa, Guṇa or Alaṁkāra depends on Śabda or Artha on the basis of their presence or absence. In K.P. X.141 (gloss) Mammaṭa reiterates the above principle and points out that no other principle holds the ground. Hence, a figure is classified as pertaining to that word or sense whose presence and absence it follows. Mammaṭa also alludes to the principle of Āśrayāś-rayibhāva (accepted by Ruyyaka) and says that even here Anvaya-Vyatireka will have to be resorted to.[183]

A Critical and Comparative Review

It is interesting as well as instructive to compare Hemachandra's treatment of the poetic embellishments with that of the earlier authors like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, Bhoja and Kuntaka and to note to what extent Hemachandra is influenced by the earlier writers' theory and practice so far as the definitions and illustrations of the various Alaṁkāras are concerned.

A scrutiny of the Kāvyanuśāsana text as well as the Viveka commentary clearly shows that among the earlier authorities in the field of Poetics, authors like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa as well as Kuntaka, besides Ānandavardhana, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, have been drawn upon by Hemachandra while treating of the topic of Alaṁkāra. He has cited the views of Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa and Ānandavardhan as well as Kuntaka and Mammṭa and drawn illustrations from several earlier works. He has also cited Daṇḍin and borrowed examples.

Kuntaka's Novel Conception of Alamkāra

Even a cursory perusal of the Vakroktijīvita unmistakably shows that Kuntaka's approach to Alaṁkāras is marked by novelty and freshness. He is against hackneyed methaphors like Mukhachandra etc. He hopes that men of taste will support him. He is against sub-divisions without differentiation and significantly remarks that merely citing a new example does not justify a new type of figure.

Kuntaka's radical outlook on such a vital poetic element as Alaṁkāra could not fail to affect the swelling numbers of technical figures and resulted in the reduction of individual figures. Hemachandra's effort to reduce the number of individual figures considerably had the theoretical support of Kuntaka's novel exposition of the idea of beauty in poetry.

Kuntaka reorganizes the entire gamut of poetical concepts in terms of his Vakrokti, which by its nature is opposed to Svabhāvokti and as such he presents a revolutionary concept of the beauty of the poetic embellishments. Consequently, he redefines the traditional Alaṁkāras in terms of poetic beauty alone, and rejects technical notions of the rhetorical devices called Alaṁkāras. He rejects Udbhaṭa's conception of Dīpaka and discusses afresh the beauty of metaphorical expression which consists in a special flash of Kavipratibhā or poetic genius. Kuntaka is an advocate of Sarasa and Ullekha

Alaṁkāras headed by Rūpaka. It is such poetic embellishments that impart aesthetic appeal to poetry.

Dr. S. K. De's Review of Hemachandra's Method

Dr. S. K. De reviews Hemachandra's treatment of the individual poetic figures in Chapters five and six of the Kāvyanuśāsana and remarks : "Hemachandra's treatment of poetic figures, however, is somewhat peculiar. He speaks of six Śabdālaṁkāras, viz. Anuprāsa, Yamaka, Citra, Vakrokti and Punaruktavadābhāsa. The Arthālaṁkāras are much reduced in number and limited to twentynine. . . . He includes Saṁsṛṣṭi under Saṁkara, and treats Ananvaya and Upameyopamā as varieties of Upamā. The Aprastutapraśaṁsā similarly goes under Anyokti. All figures like Rasavat, Preyas, Ūrjasvin and Samāhita that have a touch of Rasa and Bhāva are omitted as being comprehended (so also Mammaṭa thinks) in the class of poetry called Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya. Hemachandra does not deal with Parikara, Yathāsaṁkhya, Bhāvika, Udātta, Āśīḥ and Pratyanīka for reasons explained by himself at pp. 292-4. Hemachandra, however, defines some figures somewhat broadly so as to include other recognized figures in them, e.g. his Dīpaka includes Tulyayogitā, his Parāvṛtti would contain the Paryāya and Parivṛtti of Mammaṭa, his Nidarśanā would comprehend Prativastūpamā, Dṛṣṭānta and Nidarśanā of other writers."[184]

7

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Treatment of the Characteristics of the Hero and the Heroine

General Introduction

The subject of **dramatis personae** or the characters is intimately connected with the theory of drama. The author of the Deśarūpaka, a well known work of Dramaturgy, lays down (I. 11) that Dramas are classified according to Plot, Hero and Sentiment.

Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, the earliest extant treatise on dramaturgy as well as poetics, is also the earliest known work on the subject of **dramatis parsonae** i.e., the Hero, the Heroine and the other characters. Hence it is clear that the important types of characters and their classification can be traced to the Nāṭyaśāstra. However, the scheme of classification followed in the Nāṭyasāstra has undergone a great deal of change in the works of later authorities.

Bharata treats of Nāyaka as the principal character of a drama, and not as Ālambana-vibhāva of the Śṛṅgārarasa. This is clear from the fact that Bharata deals with the subject of Nāyaka-Nāyikā-bheda, not in the sixth and the seventh chapters, which deal with Rasa ard Bhāva, but in the concluding chapters which deal with the different characters of a drama. Consequently, the fourfold division of the Hero into Dhīroddhata,

Dhīralalita, Dhīrodātta and Dhīrapraśānta taken over in succeeding works, as it is given in the Nāṭyaśāstra has little to do with the Hero of the erotic emotion. Again, Bharata's fivefold division of the man, based on his behaviour towards the women, is a division of Puruṣa and not that of the Hero. And even the list of general and popular classification into Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama, as given by Bharata, is, in fact, concerned with man and woman.[185]

The anonymous author of the Agnipurāṇa, a work of doubtful authenticity and date, makes certain innovations of considerable significance in the conceptual outlook on the subject of the hero and the heroine of a Sanskrit play. In this work we find that (1) the subject has been brought topically under the Śṛṅgārarasa, thus bringing it under the discussion of the Heros and the Heroines as the Ālambanavibhāvas of the erotic sentiment. (2) There is a new fourfold classification of the Hero into Anukūla, Dakṣiṇa, Śaṭha and Dhṛṣṭa, with clear affiliation with the subject of erotics, and for which reason, it is adopted in later works down to our own times. This new orientation given to the subject of the Hero and the Heroine results in a double conception of the Hero, firstly as Dhiroddātta etc. and again as Anukūla etc., in later theory in total disregard of Bharata's original conception of the Hero of a drama, and not the Ālambanavibhāva of the Śṛṅgārarasa.

Rudraṭa and Rudrabhaṭṭa 'wisely' eliminate the classification of the Hero into Dhīrodātta etc. and retain the only other classification into Anukūla etc. Further, Rudraṭa defines these last four types viz. Anukūla etc. and Rudrabhaṭṭa defines as well as illustrates them.[186] Referring to the sixteen qualities of the hero, mentioned in Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṁkāra XII. 7-8, Namisādhu observes that, as the erotic sentiment is dependent on the hero, his qualities are detailed.

The next important theorist, the most authoritative writer on Dramaturgy after Bharata, who exercised considerable influence on later works on Dramaturgy including the present

chapter of our work which is almost entirely based on the Daśarūpaka, is Dhanañjaya. His work, the Daśarūpaka, synthesizes "the two main classifications of the Hero; for, he says, each of the four types of the Hero (Dhīralaita etc.) as an Ālambana-vibhāva of the Śṛṅgārarasa is again of four kinds viz. Anukūla, Dakṣiṇa, etc.[187] He has also mentioned the Pratināyaka or the opponent of the Hero. The threefold classification of the Hero into Jyeṣṭha, Madhyama and Adhama (Higher, Middle and Lower) has been attributed by him also to the Hero alongwith all the other characters. It should be understood that the Daśarūpaka is primarily a work on dramaturgy and not on the erotics. This is why the Śṛṅgāra Nāyakatva here is only a phase of the life of the general Hero of the play and therefore has no claim to any independent treatment in his work.[188]

Bhoja has as many as six bases for the classification of the Hero. To the **divisions** of the Nāyaka into (1) Uttama etc. on the basis of his qualities; into (2) Dhirodātta etc. on the basis of his general characteristics; and into (3) Anukūla etc. on the basis of his relations with Heroine, Bhoja adds the classifications of the Hero (4) into Nāyaka, Pratināyaka, Upanāyaka and Anunāyaka on the basis of his relative position and importance in a plot, (5) into Sāttvika, Rājas and Tāmas, according to his nature and (6) into Asādhāraṇa and Sādhāraṇa, strangely, according as he has one or more wives. It may be remembered here that Bhoja associates each of the four main types of the Hero, viz. Dhīroddhata etc. with one of the four types of the Śṛṅgāra which he has divided into four types viz. Dharmaśṛṅgāra, Arthaśṛṅgāra, Kamaśṛṅgāra and Mokṣaśṛṅgāra. Thus the Hero of Dharmaśṛṅgāra is Dhirodātta, that of Artha-śṛṅgāra, Dhīroddhata, that of Kāma, Dhīralalita and of Mokṣa, Dhīrapraśānta.[189]

Hemachandra's Classification

On Hemachandra's classification of the Nāyaka and the Nāyikā, Dr. Rākesh Gupta remarks : "Hemachandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana has repeated Rudraṭa's principal scheme of

classification into **sixteen** types. But while taking up the other eightfold classification, he says, unlike Rudrabhaṭṭa and Dhanañjaya, that it is applicable only to the Svakīyā. Parakīyā, according to him, can be of only **three** types : Virahotkaṇṭhitā, Abhisārikā and Vipralabdhā. With regard to the courtesan he does not speak of this classification at all.[190] The topic is concluded with the mention of the Pratināyikā or the rival wife."

Thus Hemachandra's treatment of Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda is based on the scheme of classification adopted by Rudraṭa as well as on the outlook and the method of presentation adopted in the Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya who is indebted to the Śṛṅgāratilaka.[191] In fact, Dhanañjaya "reproduces in toto the three classifications of the Śṛṅgār. Tilaka with all possible brevity and conciseness, giving only short definitions and omitting illustrations and other details."[192]

The Daśarūpaka discusses the characteristics of the Hero and the Heroine and the dramatis personae of all types, in the second Prakāśa. We have already noted that Vastu, Neta and Rasa form the basis of classification of a dramatic composition. And since the topic of the Vastu or subject matter has been dealt with in the first Prakāśa of the Daśarūpaka, Dhanañjaya takes up for treatment the topic of the Neta or Nāyakabheda in the second Prakāśa to be followed by the theory of Rasa.

Hemachandra's Treatment of Nāyaka–Nāyika–Bheda

At the outset Hemachandra briefly explains the reason why this chapter on the characteristics of the Hero and other characters is included in this work. He says that in view of the fact that Kāvya or Literary compositions contain the Hero and other characters, it is proposed to describe their characteristics.

Both men and women fall into three **natural** types : Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama. The Uttama type is possessed

of virtues only. The Madhyama type possesses many good qualities with a few defects. But the Adhama type is all defects. The servants of the Hero such as Viṭa, Ceṭī, Vidūṣaka etc. are of the Adhama type.

The Hero (Nāyaka), belonging to the Uttama or Madhyama type, is defined (VI. 1) as one who is possessed of all the good qualities or virtues and who pervades the entire composition. The word Nāyaka is explained as the chief person or principal character around whom all the events in a composition revolve and who enjoys the fruit or the consumation of the poem.[193] Thus the Hero enjoys the most exalted position in a drama or a poem and his personality towers over the personalities of the other dramatis persone. The following observations of Dr. N. S. Shastri admirably sum up the importance of the Hero in a Kāvy – be it a play or a poem :

"…..Whatever the sentiment or the motive of the play be, there is always a principal action or the de'nouement therein. Whosoever is to enjoy the benefit of all efforts or in whose interest are all movements directed is the person who reaps the real harvest. The motif or the resultant benefit is called the fruit (Phala) and the enjoyment of the Phala is called the Adhikāra.[194] One who has the Adhikāra is, no doubt, the Adhikārin and it is he who becomes virtually the principal character in a drama. He is called the Netā, Nāyaka or the hero, because the entire dramatic action culminates ultimately into his benefit. He, in fact, becomes the substratum of all actions and is the basic or the pendent factor (Ālambana) of the principal sentiment in a show; and thus ranks foremost for consideration.[195]

Hemachandra defines the personal traits, qualities and merits of the Nāyaka or Netā in terms of two couplets quoted from the Daśarūpaka (2. 1–2) which state that "the Hero should be well–bred, charming, liberal, clever, affable, popular, upright, eloquent, of exalted lineage, resolute and young; endowed with intelligence, energy, memory, wisdom, (skill in

the) arts, and pride, heroic, mighty, vigorous, familiar with the codes, and a just observer of laws."[196]

This list of Guṇas is intended to make the Hero 'समग्रगुणः', as Hemachandra has characterised him in the gloss on VII. 1. There, Hemachandra states that the Hero should be possessed of all good virtues, the qualities and traits of personality which make him fit to be the leader (Netā) of a play and the other physical qualities (Sāttvikaguṇas) of his will be enumerated next. It will be noted that Dhanañjaya includes the quality of Śāstric vision in the list of the essential qualification of a hero. Viśvanātha (S. D. III. 30) sums up the qualities required of a Nāyaka thus : "Munificent, clever, high-born, handsome, youthful, enthusiastic, prompt, devoted to people, powerful and tactful is the nature of a hero."

The Nāṭyadarpaṇa, however, is extremely brief : "The Hero is one who achieves the fruit and does not suffer calamities." [197]

The Eight Sāttvika Guṇas of the Hero

Such a Hero is possessed of eight physical (Sattvika) qualities. It should be noted here that the author of the Daśarūpaka takes up these qualities for description after it has dealt with the first and the second classifications of the Hero[198] (II.3,6) and the other subsidiary male characters (II.8 and 9). He enumerates the eight physical qualities in II.10 and describes and illustrates each of these in the subsequent portion.

It is thus obvious that Hemachandra has altered the order of the topics a little bit. However, the eight "physical qualities" of Hemachandra are the same as those of Dhanañjaya. They are : Sobhā, Vilāsa, Mādhurya, Gāmbhīrya, Sthairya, Tejas, Lalita and Audārya. Dhanañjaya characterises these as "Paurusāḥ gunāḥ" or "manly qualities" which spring from "one's nature".

These qualities are called 'Sattvajāḥ' because they are born of Sattva which means a bodily change. But, as in most cases, physical change is due to a mental change, so these qualities are both mental as well as physical. However, since the change is noticeable in the body, they are stated to be predominantly physical.

As remarked above, the eight qualities enumerated by Hemachandra are literally met with in the Daśarūpaka (II.10). Not only that, even the explanations of these eight qualities as given by Hemachandra (VII.3-10) tally with those given by Dhanañjaya (II.11-14). It is a safe bet, therefore, that we keep in view Dhanañjaya's conception of these individual qualities while trying to understand Hemachandra's text on the Sattva-guṇas. It may be noted that irrespective of the type to which the hero belongs, he has certain general characteristics as his personal merits and these are the eight Sāttvika characteristics, termed as manly qualities 'based on nature', mentioned by Bharata and adopted by all succeeding authors without any change in their conception. This point has been noted above.

Hemachandra adds explanatory comments which not only bring out the essence of the definition but also shed light on the examples. It may be noted that some of these qualities derive their sense from the general qualities of the hero mentioned earlier i.e., Netā vinīto etc. (D.R. 2.1-2).

The Types of the Hero

According to Hemachandra, Dhiroddhata, Dhīralalita, Dhīraśānta and Dhīroddhata are the four types of the Hero **in general** (VII.11). But, when the poem treats of love, then the Hero is again of four types. That is to say, in Śṛṅgārarasa, the hero is either Dakṣiṇa or Dhṛṣṭa or Aunkūla or Śaṭha in all the four general types of the hero. Each type of the Hero in Dhīrodātta etc., therefore, becomes **fourfold** and, with the **fourfold** division of each of these heroes, in matters of love, the number of types of the Hero is sixteen. Hemachandra defines each of these types (K.A.S. VII.12-19).

Overlapping of Types Possible

Now, as a rule, the Gods, as heroes, are of the Dhirodātta type; kings are of the type of Dhīralalita, commanders and ministers are of the Dhīroddhata type; and Brahmins and merchants are of the Dhīrapraśānta type. This rule is of course not hard and fast. For, Rāma, although a king, is a Dhīrodātta type. Whereas Mādhava in the Mālatimādhava play, though a son of a minister, is of the Dhīralalita type.

This is why Hemachandra quotes Bharata's two Kārikās (N.S. 34.18-19 C.S.S.; N.S. 24.18-19 G.O.S.) which lay down only a general rule that there may be an overlapping of types. The viveka commentary has one passage (the only passage in this chapter) which takes up the discussion of a theoretical point.

Hemachandra quotes the Nāṭyaśāstrā passage (24.18-19 G.O.S.) which means that the Gods are to be considered Dhīroddhata, the kings, Dhiralalita, the Senāpati and the ministers, Dhīrodātta and Brahmins and merchants are to be thought of as Dhīrapraśānta. This is the first fourfold division of the Hero.

The viveka passage (mentioned above) elaborates the idea of the Nāṭyaśāstrā passage first and then reproduces an argument from the Avaloka of Dhanika on D. R. II.5 and II.6 (Dhanika's whole passage is quoted with some variations).

The Interchangeability or Otherwise of Types of Heroes

The passage in question raises an important point as to whether the four types of the Hero described above are (1) interchangeable or (2) fixed or not. Now, here we should remember that the question relates to the first classification of the Heroes. But it may be asked as regards the second classification of the Hero as lovers. The argument can be summarised as under :

"The term Dhīroddhata denotes **states** or stages characterised by qualities mentioned with them and are like the stages of a cow : a calf, a bull, and a great bull; they are not fixed generically; If that were the case, the various opposing stages being depicted in great works of master poets would be incongruent. For Jāti is fixed. Take for example the work of Bhavabhūti, viz. the play Mahāvīracarita. Herein the selfsame Paraśurāma is depicted as Dhīroddhata, Dhīrodātta and also as Dhīraśānta. And still no one can find fault with this variegated depiction of the different stages or states of Paraśurāma. For, in the case of a person (a minor character) who is not a hero of the poem or drama, his qualities etc. are not rigidly fixed. (In other words his type of character can be changed). On the other hand, in the case of Rāma and others, who happen to be the Hero in a poem or drama, there can be no change throughout the play or poem. Thus, when Rāma, who is by definition the Dhīrodātta Hero, kills Vālin by trick, he is suddenly changed to a Dhīroddhat type of a hero. This is not desirable and should be avoided.

However, in the case of the four types of the Hero as a lover, viz. Dakṣiṇa, Dhṛṣṭa, Anukūla and Śatha, the types may change – whether main or minor."[199]

This is an important issue which Dhanika has settled once and for all. Hemachandra has quoted it almost verbatim in his commentary in the same context.

The Hero as a Lover

Hemachandra has already introduced the second classification of the Hero as a lover in his gloss on VII.11. He takes up the four aspects of the Hero's role in the erotic sentiment. Dhanajñaya (D.R.II.6) states : "When the Hero has been captivated by another woman, he may be gallant or clever (Dakṣiṇa), deceitful (Śaṭha) or shameless (Dhṛṣṭa) towards his previous love." But if the hero has only one lady-love he is faithful or Anukūla. These four types Hemachandra defines and illustrates on the same lines as found in the Daśarūpaka.

The Opponent of the Hero : Pratināyaka

A character who is an adversary of the hero or one who is the declared foe of the hero is called the Pratināyaka or villain. The Hero is always a Dhīra character, possessed of excellent virtues; the villain, on the other hand, is always considered as avaricious, vicious, cunning, sinful and voluptuous as a person, who, at the same time, is possessed of great strength and resources.

Hemachandra describes the Pratināyaka exactly as Dhanañjaya does (D.R. II.9), though he replaces the word Ripu with Pratināyaka, quite appropriately. This advarsary of the Hero, called Pratināyaka, is avaricious, Dhīroddhata (vehement), stubborn, criminal and vicious, e.g. Rāvaṇa is the Pratināyaka of Rāma and Duryodhana is the Pratināyaka of Yudhiṣṭhira.

The Characteristics of the Heroine

The Heroine is the other very important character in a Kāvya who naturally occupies a very prominent place in a love-play. The proper portrayal of the character of the Heroine requires excellent dramatic or poetic skill on the part of the poet; for such a portrayal ensures the ultimate success of the work of art. Sanskrit writers on Dramaturgy and Rasa have developed the subject of Nāyikābheda extensively as well as intensively, particularly with regard to the delineation of Rasa, especially the Śṛṅgārarasa.

In connection with the portrayal of a heroine's love, Dr. S. K. De writes :

"Love sways women's heart no less than it sways man's; but its effect differs in different types of men and the ways of wooing and love differ accordingly. The science of Poetics and Erotic take a delight in classifying these different types and analysing the varied effects of love on them. Thus we have arrangements into divisions and sub-divisions, according to rank, character, circumstances and the like, of all conceivable types of the hero, the heroine, their assistants and adjuncts, as

well as of the different shades of their feeling and gestures; and the sentiment of love is defined, analysed and classified industriously in all its finite moods and situations. The procedure, no doubt, possessed an attraction for mediacre scholastic minds, but it also throws a great deal of light on the practice of the later poets who often follow these prescriptions faithfully. In his character as a lover, the hero is classified, for instance, into the faithful (Anukūla) who confines himself to one, the gallant (Dakṣiṇa) whose attention is distributed equally among the many, the sly (Śaṭha) and the saucy (Dhūrta).......... But the hero may also be high spirited, naughty, sportive or serene, according to his temperament. In the same way, **the heroine**, in relation to the hero, may be his wife (Svīyā) or belong to another (Parakīyā) or be common to all (sāmānyā). The svīyā is subdivided again into the adolescent and artless (Mugdhā), the youthful (Madhyā) and the mature and audacious (Pragalbhā); or, in other words, into the inexperienced, the partly experienced, and the fully experienced. Of these the adolescent and artless heroine is the greatest favourite with the poets, who delight in depicting with a graceful touch the first dawn of love in her simple heart. Kālidās gives a fine description of the charms of adolescence in his picture of the girl Pārvatī budding into womanhood; but the artless emotion of the adolescent heroine are best described by Amaru.... Later theorists introduce greater fineness into the analysis by subdividing each of these heroines again, according to her temper, into the self-possessed, the not self-possessed and the partly self-possessed; or, according to the rank, higher or lower, each holds in the affection of the hero. The Parīkiyā or another man's wife, who is theoretically rejected in orthodox Poetics as a heroine, but who, according to other Sāstras is the highest type of the heroine, is twofold, according as she is maiden or married; while the Sāmānyā heroine, who is sometimes extolled and sometimes deprecated, is only of one kind, the Vesyā or the courtesan. The **sixteen types of heroine** thus obtained are further arranged according to **the**

eightfold diversity of her condition or situation in relation to her lover, into **eight more different types;** viz. the heroine who has her lover under absolute control (Svādhinapatikā), the heroine disappointed in her assignation through misadventure or involuntary absence of the love (Utkā); the heroine in full dress expectant of her lover (Vāsakasajjā), the heroine deceived (Vipralabdhā), the heroine separated by a quarrel (Kalahāntaritā), the heroine outraged by signs of unfaithfulness in the lover (Khaṇḍitā), the heroine who ventures out to meet her lover (Abhisārikā) and lastly, the heroine pininga way for the absence of the lover who has gone abroad (Proṣitapatikā). Of the last, the typical example is the Yakṣa's wife in the Meghadūta; but fine studies of the other types are to be found scattered in innumerable verses in the Anthologies."[200]

Hemachandra, like Dhanañjaya (D. R. II. 15) divides the Heroine into three types : (1) Svakīyā, (2) Parakīyā and (3) Sāmānyā. The word Tadguṇā in the definition shows that she has the hero's qualities. The Svīyā or Svakīyā is the hero's wife and possesses good character, uprightness, bashfulness, homeliness etc. This Svīyā may be (*i*) inexperienced (Mugdhā), (ii) partly experienced (Madhyā) and (iii) experienced (Prauḍhā or Pragalbhā). According to Hemachandra, this distinction is due to difference of age and self-consciousness (Vayaḥ and Kauśala).[201]

Hemachandra illustrates the Mugdhā, the Madhyā and the Pragalbhā types in the twofold aspect of each i.e., in respect of age and experience. So we have 1 (a) Vayasā Mugdhā (b) Kauśalena Mugdhā, 2 (a) Vayasā Madhyā (b) Kauśalena Madhyā, 3 (a) Vayasā Pragalbhā (Prauḍhā ?) (b) Kauśalena Prauḍhā.

Now, in so far as the expression of their anger towards their lover is concerned, the Madhyā and the Prauḍhā types fall into three sub-types each. Thus we have : 1 (a) Dhīrāmadhyā (b) Dhīrādhīrāmadhyā and (c) Adhīrāmadhyā. Similarly, we **get : 2 (a) Dhīrā Prauḍhā (b) Dhīrādhīrā Prauḍhā** and **(c) Adhīrā**

Prauḍhā. But the Mugdhā is so young and inexperienced that she does not know how to express her anger; she only knows how to weep. Therefore, she is of one type only.

The Madhyā as well as the Prauḍha can be of six types as seen above. Both again are either Jyeṣṭhā or Kaniṣṭhā i.e., Senior or Junior in point of enjoying the husband's favours. Thus there are twelve varieties of the Svīyā, Madhyā and Prauḍhā types. Add to it the one type of Mugdhā. And we have thirteen varieties of the Svakīyā type.

The Concept of Parakīyā

The Parakīyā may be another's wife or a maiden (VII. 28). But she is not helpful in a principal Rasa (as per orthodox poetic theorists), hence, Hemachandra says, her divisions etc. are not given in a detailed manner here. Again, the word Ūḍhā (married) is a sign of identification. For, even a keep is called Parastrī.[202] But so far as the Kanyā (Parakīyā) is concerned, she, being under the control of her father etc., is called Anyastrī (another's woman), though unmarried. Dhanika remarks that she may either be unobtainable from her father, or she may be obtainable. In either case she is in another's custody (or, may be, one is afraid of one's wife) so the love affair with a Kanyā is always a clendestine one, as e.g. Mādhava's love for Mālatī and Vatsarāja's love for Sāgarikā. Of course, the poet is free to depict her love either in a principal Rasa or in a subsidiary Rasa.[203]

Gaṇikā is the Sāmānyā Nāyikā (VII. 29).[204] Hemachandra explains the word Gaṇikā by means of a rather fanciful derivation of the word : "Kalāprāgalbhyadhaurtyābhyāṁ gaṇayati kalayati Gaṇikā." That is to say : "A woman who attracts (Gaṇayati–Kalayati) men by her proficiency in fine arts (Kalāprāgalbhya) and by her cunning. Gaṇikā is, more naturally or properly, 'a woman common to a Gaṇa or a congregation or a mass of people.' For, anybody can approach her and buy her love. Sāmanyā is explained as common to all, whether a good man or a bad man, a refined man or an

idiot. A Gaṇikā's love is synthetic or artificial, based on feigned affection, intent on monetary profit. She is, in short, out to earn money by pleasing the customer.[205]

Hemachandra mentions (VII. 30)[206] the eight states (Astau Avasthās) of a Nāyika's love towards her husband. But it will be seen that all these eight states are possible only in the case of a wife; when a woman is not a wife, but another's woman or merely an unmarried girl, all these states are not possible; only the last three (viz. Virahotkaṇṭhitā, Vipralabhā or Abhisarikā) are possible.

These peculiar eight states of the Nāyikās (Svā and Parā) are duly explained by our author.

Dhanañjay (D.R. II.28) remarks that "the heroines of the last six types (i.e., all except the Svādhinapatikā and Vāsakasajjā) are characterized by reflection, sighing, weeping, change in colour, weakness and absence of ornaments; (but) those of the first two varieties (i e., Svādhinapatikā and Vāsakasajjā), by playfulness, radiance, and joy." The Avaloka points out that the heroine connected with another (Parastrī), wether maiden or wife, cannot be of all these varieties. For instance, Mālavikā should not be regarded as Khaṇḍitā.

Now each of the varieties mentioned so far may be either Uttama, Madhyama or Adhama (D.R.II.45 refers to this threefold classification of all characters viz. Nāyaka, Nāyikā, etc). We thus get, by successive multiplication, the total of 384 types of Heroines.[207]

It may be noted that Hemachandra reproduces the commentary of Dhanika (D.R.II. 28 ff.) Verbatim under K.A.S. VII.31 where he states that Parastrī type of the heroine can have only **three** of the eight states, Svādhinapatikā, etc.

This is the force of tradition – stereo-typed divisions, stereo-typed restrictions, stereo-typed conventions, which make even Hemachandra, a thinker of no mean order, to follow Dhanañjaya, and Dhanika without a question. And this is a

27

subject – that of Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda – where Dhanañjaya is a greater authority than Hemachandra. Even Hemachandra realizes this – that is evident at every step in this chapter. Of course, Rudraṭa and Rudrabhaṭṭa also cast their influence on our author, may be, through the Daśarūpaka.

Hemachandra is a Follower of Bharata

Hemachandra's exposition of the twenty Sāttvika Alaṁkāras (Natural Graces) of the Heroine, reminds us of the twenty graces mentioned by Bharata. Bharata classifies them under three heads : Aṅgaja or Physical, Ayatnaja or Involuntary and Svabhāvaja or Dispositional. Hāva, Bhāva and Hela are Angaja; Śobhā, Kānti, Dīpti, Mādhurya, Pragalbhatā, Andārya and Dhairya are Ayatnaja; and Līlā, Vilāsa, Vicchitti, Vibhrama, Kilakiñcita, Moṭṭāyita, Kuṭṭamita, Bibboka, Lalita and Vihṛta are Svabhāvaja. All these are defined by Dhanañjaya in his Daśarūpaka (II.30–41). And Hemachahdra is a follower of Bharata, as he himself declares at the end of this chapter (Asmābhir Bharatamatānusāribhir etc. p. 431).

Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda : A Highly Conventionalized Subject[208]

Dr. S. K. De's remarks are interesting.

The subject of the classification of the Hero and the Heroine is a highly conventionalized one in Sanskrit Literature, both creative and critical. It is intimately connected with the drama in general and Śṛṅgārarasa in particular. In the classical period of Sanskrit Literature love-poetry bloomed in its fullness which brought in its wake an overflow of amourous descriptions which followed conventional patterns. The Kāmasūtrā had a contribution to make in this field. The science of Erotics had indeed a profound influence on the theory and practice of poetry of this period. As it deals with the art and practice of love, it has sections on the ways and means of winning and keeping a lover, courtship and signs of love, on marriage, and conduct of married life, and on the practical psychology of

the emotion of love. Poetics, in its treatment of love came under the influence of Erotics.[209]

But when freshness and originality dwindle, convention reigns supreme. During the middle ages the theorists and poets tried to surprise us, instead of please and delight us, by highly conventionalized and stereotyped, though minutely worked out, details of description and illustration of the modes in which the Nāyikās express their erotic feelings. No wonder then that artificiality of scholastic formalism marks both the theory and practice of love-poetry. Thus convention becomes the rule rather than the exception. This is true of the Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda also since though these attempts indicate considerable power of analysis is more of the form than of spirit, based on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials.[210]

TYPES OF LITERARY COMPOSITIONS OR FORMS OF LITERATURE

8

In chapter eight of his work, Hemachandra divides literature (Kāvya) into Prekṣya and Śravya types or forms. Of these two types, Prekṣya is that which can be witnessed and Śravya is that which can be heard while read by oneself. Under Prekṣya come all the varieties of a drama. While under Śravya can be subsumed all varieties of a poem which is enjoyed as it is read.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta's Lofty Conception of Poetry

Poetry, whether dramatic or poetic, is the creation of a poet. Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the preceptor of Abhinavagupta and the author of the lost masterpiece of Sanskrit Poetics, the Kāvyakautuka, describes the poet as both a seer and a depictor of human emotions; for poetry is both Darśana or profound intuition, insight or vision and Varṇana or apt desiction or portrayal of that vision. Thus, a poet is a seer, a Ṛṣi inasmuch as, with his divine vision, he fathoms the very secrets and the peculiar characteristics of all kinds of things. It is because of his power of seeing the essence of things that the poet is called a Kavi, another type of Ṛṣi. But the poet not only perceives or conceives, he also executes. Thus he is a master of depiction and narration. In fact, the etymology of Kavi is from the root 'Kavṛ' which means to describe, to portray. A poet, therefore, describes things with supreme skill and absorbing interest. Thus Darśana and Varṇana, these two

qualities, constitute the characteristics of a poet. The first poet Vālmīki was both a seer and a master of description. He naturally was a real poet. For, true poetry depends on the poet's ability to give a proper form and shape to his lofty vision.

The Prekṣya literary form is again twofold : (1) Pāṭhya and (2) Geya.

The Pāṭhya types of representational (i.e., dramatic) poetry consist of (1) Nāṭaka, (2) Prakaraṇa, (3) Nāṭikā, (4) Samavakāra, (5) Īhāmṛga, (6) Dima, (7) Vyāyoga, (8) Utsṛṣṭikāṅka, (9) Prahasana, (10) Bhāṇa, (11) Vīthī, (12) Saṭṭaka etc. It is well known that the first eleven types of dramatic compositions or forms are enumerated and defined by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra. But though the twelfth variety, Saṭṭaka, represented by Rājaśekhara's Karpūramañjarī is outside Bharata's list, yet it is included here because it satisfies all the tests of the Pāṭhya kind of poetry. Hemachandra remarks that dramatic forms from Nāṭaka upto Vīthī are Vākyārthābhinayasvabhāva (वाक्यार्थाभिनयस्वभाव).

Hemachandra's Twelve Rūpakas

Hemachandra thus gives **twelve** Rūpakas and not the traditional **ten** types of major plays i.e., Daśarūpakas. These twelve types of Prekṣya forms should now be defined by Hemachandra. But Hemachandra quotes Bharata's Kārikās which define the first eleven types of dramas. Thus Hemachandra quotes (47) Bharata's Kārikās to define the Nāṭaka, the Prakaraṇa, the Nāṭikā, the Samavakāra, the Īhāmṛga, the Dima, the Vyāyoga, the Utsṛṣṭikāṅka, the Prahasana, the Bhāṇa and the Vīthī. But, to define the Saṭṭaka he quotes Bhoja's words (Śr. Pr. XI, p. 466). Bharata begins by announcing that he will describe the **tenfold** division of plays (Daśarūpavikalpanam) together with names, functions and modes of production. He includes Nāṭaka, Prakaraṇa etc. but excludes Nāṭikā which Hemachandra has included here. Abhinavagupta

observes that old writers on the subject of drama like **Kohala** mention additional types of plays such as Saṭṭaka, Toṭaka and Rāsaka. Bhoja ignores the Toṭaka and recognizes only twelve kinds of the play including the Nāṭikā mentioned elsewhere in the Nāṭyaśāstra. But, according to his plan, Bharata only defines his well-known **ten** Rūpakas.

The Saṭṭaka

The definition of the twelfth variety of the drama is quoted from the eleventh chapter of Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa. According to this definition, Saṭṭaka is a variety similar to Nāṭikā. It is devoid of a Viṣkambhaka or a Praveśaka. The language of a Saṭṭaka drama is one throughout. It is written either (neither) in Sanskrit or in Prakṛta (generally in Prakṛta). The reading of the verse in regard to language has given rise to different interpretations.[211]

Other varieries of the drama, such as Toṭaka and others, are mentioned by Kohala and other writers on dramaturgy, but Hemachandra merely alludes to them in the one-line gloss (p. 445).

The Twelve Types of Musical Compositions

After defining the twelve types of Major Rūpakas, Hemachandra enumerates twelve varieties of **Geya Rūpakas or Musical Compositions.** They are (1) Dombikā, (2) Bhāṇa, (3) Prasthāna, (4) Śiṅgaka, (5) Bhāṇikā, (6) Preraṇa, (7) Rāmākrīḍa, (8) Hallisaka, (9) Rāsaka, (10) Goṣṭhī, (11) Srīgadita, (12) Rāgakāvya and others.

In regard to the differentia of the Geyakāvya or Geyarūpaka, Hemachandra remarks that they are Padārthabhinayasvābhāva (पादार्थाभिनयस्वभाव) and have been propounded by the ancient theorists. This explanation enables him to adopt the definitions of these Geya varieties from the Abhinavabhāratī where several Anuṣṭubha verses are cited by Abhinava to define Dombikā and other Geya Rūpakas.

Basis of Classification of Geya Rūpakas

In the meanwhile, Hemachandra has introduced a basis of classification of the Geya varieties in the Viveka commentary. He says that the Geya compositions are threefold : (1) Soft (Masṛṇa) (2) Wild or Boisterous or Tempestuous (Uddhata) and (3) Mixed in character (Miśra).

Basing our understanding of the Geya compositions on the nine Anuṣṭubha verses (59–67) quoted from Abhinavabhārati and the **two** Āryā verses from the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja (68–69), besides the last Anuṣṭubha verse (70), we may state the conceptions of the twelve Geyarūpakas.

(1) **Dombikā** is a soft composition which delights the minds of kings with songs or speech pregnant with secret love-affairs.

(2) In **Bhāna,** the female dancer or the musician describes the terrific incidents in the lives of Varāha, Nṛsiṁha and such other incarnations of God.

(3) In **Prasthāna** the singer or dancer (a girl) disguises herself as one of the animals such as an elephant, a lion etc. and imitates their gait or mode of walking.

(4) In Śiṅ**gaka** the actor or the actress plays the part of a heroine who, in the presence of her female friends, imitates the wild behaviours of her lover. The behaviour of the rogue (in love-matter) or a Dhūrta may also be described in it.

(5) In **Bhāṇikā** we find the frolics of a child and the imitation of the fights of hogs, lions and others.

(6) The **Preraṇa** type of Geya composition is accompanied by Prahelikā (i.e., dialogues solving riddles) and is full of humour.

(7) **Rāmākrīḍa** describes the season.

(8) **Hallisaka** contains circular dances. The dance consists in a male member standing in the midst of ladies like Lord Krisna in the midst of Gopis. The dances are conducted by a host of ladies and are performed with the accompaniment of music and timing.

(9) A **Rāsaka** is played or staged by many dancing girls to the accompaniment of variegated timing and rythms and consists of upto sixtyfour pairs – one pair consisting of a man and a woman – or couples. It is soft as well as Boisterous. This definition is from the Śr. Pr. of Bhoja.

(10) In **Goṣṭhi** the incidents of the life of Lord Kriṣṇa – his exploits such as the killing of the demon Riṣṭa and others are shown.

(11) In **Śrīgadita,** high-class ladies sing and praise the merits of their husbands, or sometimes they remonstrate with their husbands. This is also from the Śr. Pr. of Bhoja.

(12) The last variety of the Geya composition is called Rāgakāvya in the list of such compositions (vide K.A.S. VIII.4). But the verse cited (Q.No.70) defines a Kāvya (?) by stating that this type of a Geya composition has a well-arranged plot, full of various sentiments and it is beautified by the employment of different rhythms as well as by different musical Rāgas.

These are the regular, twelve kinds of Geya compositions which are marked by song, dance and music and are full of sentiments.

It may be noted that Hemachandra has used the word Ādi at the end of the list of these Geya compositions. This Ādi or et cetera refers to the other kinds of the Geya-kāvya such as Śampā (or Śamyā according to Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Bhoja, (S.P. XI, p. 468), Chalita, Dvipadā and others. However, Hemachandra, instead of explaining these varieties, refers us to the works of Brahma, Bharata, Kohala and other ancient authors on Dramaturgy and Poetics.

The Sravya Kāvya and Its Varieties

After briefly outlining the varieties of the Prekṣya Kāvya, Hemachandra now turns to the treatment of the five main types of the Śravya Kāvya. These five varieties are (1) Mahākāvya, (2) Ākhyāyikā, (3) Kathā, (4) Campū and (5) Anibadha.

Thus the Śravyakāvya comprises all the varieties or forms of poetic compositions which are to be distinguished from the dramatic compositions included under the prekṣya Literature.

Of the five literary forms which are to be heard when read, the first and the foremost form of poetic composition is **the Mahākāvya.**[212]

1. The Mahākāvya as a Literary Form

Hemachandra defines the Mahākāvya as a verse form, composed in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhraṁśa or Grāmyabhāsā, with divisions of the chapters or cantos called Sarga, Āśvāsa, Sandhi, Avaskandha and Kabandha in the different languages. The end of the canto – by whatever name it may be called and in any language – is marked by a change of metre and it possesses joints (Sandhis). It is rendered attractive by the beauty of word and sense. Thus –

(1) The Mahākāvya is generally in a verse form i.e., it is a metrical composition mostly.

(2) It is written in Sanskrit, Prakrit and other languages including the Apabhraṁśa and the folk languages.

(3) It has well arranged chapters (Sargas) with a change of the metre at the end of each canto.

(4) It is beautified by the five Sandhis viz. Mukhasandhi, Pratimukhasandhi, Garbhasandhi, Vimarśasandhi and Nirvahaṇasandhi which are an indispensable factor of a Mahākāvya.

(5) It has charming words with charming sense.

The Five Sandhis

Since the five Sandhis are peculiar to a drama, and have been defined by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra (XIX.39–43), Hemachandra quotes five Kārikāś of Bharata to define them. These are the well known Mukhasandhi, Pratimukhasandhi, Garbhasandhi, Vimarśasandhi and Nirvahaṇasandhi. These five Sandhis, when properly harmonised and co-ordinated with different factors such as Bīja, Bindu etc. and Ārambha, Yatna, Prāptyāśā etc., ensure the systematic begining, development and end of the story.

Beauties of Form and Content

As for Śabdavaicitryā, Arthavaicitryā and Ubhayavaicitryā, or beauty of expression, meaning and of both, Hemachandra notes down several characteristics of the Mahākāvya – both pertaining to form and content – which have become bye-words in Sanskrit Lterary Criticism. And these passages have been taken over by Hemachandra from Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa as Dr. V. Raghavan has shown.[213]

In connection with the beauty of expression and the manner of presentation, we should note the following points :

(1) The poet should not be too short.

(2) The style should not be uneven; it should present a harmonious blending of all parts.

(3) It should not be too lengthy nor should the cantos be loosely connected, i.e., they should not be unconnected. In other words, the development of the theme should be smooth and logical and the flow of the narration should sustain interest.

(4) Blessings, salutations and mention of the subject matter should mark its beginning. Again, the aim of the story, the object of the composition, the eulogy of the poet, of good people and the censure of evil–minded people may also find a mention in the introductory portion.

(5) It may contain tricks of words, conundrums, pictorial figures etc.

(6) It may sometimes have some special words, names of the author etc. at the end of the canto or the poem.

As for beauty of content or meaning, the following points are mentioned :

(1) The four goals of life are securable through the poem. So it should have at least one of these as its aim.

(2) It has a hero who has sterling qualities of character.

(3) It depicts Rasas and Bhāvas.

(4) It should suggest good actions and prohibit bad ones and should contain poetic justice.

(5) A new poet should know how the different factors of style etc. should match with the subject or Rasa and how a balanced poem is written.

(6) It contains descriptions of seasons, cities, rivers, wars, expeditions etc.

(7) It also describes sun-rise, sunset, moon-rise etc.

(8) It should give delightful pen-pictures of the Heroes, Heroines, the princes etc.

(9) It shold have accounts of political happenings and of wars etc.

(10) It should have description of excursions, water-sports, drinking bouts, wooing, mating etc.

In regard to beauty of both form and meaning, the following points emerge :

(1) The style must be Komala, i.e., full of soft words, if the poet describes love and so on.

(2) The metre should be conducive to Rasa. According to Sanskrit critics, certain metres suit certain sentiments.

(3) The poem should be able to win the hearts of the people of all types – Samastalokarañjakatva. This and many of the above points arise from the principle of propriety or Aucityā.

(4) It is to have expressions adorned by good figures of speech or Alaṁkāras.

(5) The sense of propriety in regard to place, time, movement, characters in the story etc. must be scrupulously observed.

(6) It may have other minor incidental stories introduced.

(7) It should resort to the **two styles of composition** or Mārgadvaya (of Daṇḍin).

Varieties of the Mahākāvya

Hemachandra also cites examples of Mahākāvya compositions in Sanskrit, where it is called Sargabandha, e.g. Hayagrīvavadha etc.; in Prakrit, called Āśvāsakabandha, being divided into cantos called Āśvasakas, e.g. Setubandha etc.; in Apabhraṅśa-bhāṣā, called Sandhibandha, being divided into cantos called Sandhis, e g. Abdhimanthana; and in folk Aprabraṁśabhaṣā or rustic tongues or dialects, called Avaskandhabandha, being divided into cantos called Avaskandha, e.g. Bhīmakāvya etc.

Definition of Mahākāvya : Not too Rigid

Explaining the significance of the word 'Prāyah' in the definition of the Mahākāvya, Hemachandra remarks that there is **no harm** in calling the cantos of a Sanskrit Mahākāvya as Aśvāsaka, as, for instance, it is found in Hariprabodha and others. Again, Prāyaḥ also allows the use of one and only one metre throughout the poem. Without any change, in long poems such as Rāvaṇavijaya, Harivijaya and Setubandha.

2. The Akhyāyikā Form

The second type of the Śravyakāvya is the Ākhyāyikā. It is an autobiographical work of some outstanding personality who is, of course, the hero of the story. It is narrated by the

hero. There is a sprinkling of some verses in Vaktrā and Aparavaktrā metres, suggesting coming events. The word for every chapter is Ucchvāsa. It is composed in Sanskrit and is in prose, though a few verses, occasionally introductory, do not hurt the form of Ākhyāyikā. The Harṣacarita of Bāṇa is the well known example of Ākhyāyikā form.

3. The Kathā Form

The **third type** of the Śravyakāvya is the **Kathā**, sometimes likened to the modern Novel. It is written either in prose or verse and may be composed in Sanskrit or Prakrit or any and every language (Sarvabhāṣā).

The hero in the Kathā form of literature is of the Dhīraśānta type, noble-hearted and happy-go-lucky-type, going easy in life. The Kādambarī of Bāṇabhaṭṭa is the best example of the Kathā form and it is in prose. But the Līlāvati, a Kathā, is written in verse.

The Kathā, written in all languages, whether Sanskrit, Prakrit, Māgadhī, Śūrasenī, Piśācī or Apabhraṁśa, is a Kathā, a story, a flow of narrative, hence, easy to define. Hemachandra mentions a few varieties of the Kathā.

An **Upākhyāna** is a short story introduced in the course of a big story with the object of giving some moral to the readers. But the same Upākhyāna when narrated by one person with an accompaniment of music and gestures is called an Ākhyāna. The Govindākhyāna is an example of this form.

A **Nidarśana,** on the other hand, is a form of story, narrated with a view to preach or instruct by means of the lives of animals, birds or low persons. The famous book of moral stories, the Pañcatantra of Viṣṇuśarman and the Kuṭṭanīmata of Dāmodaragupta are the well-know examples of a Nidarśana.

In a **Pravahlikā** kind of story there is a dialogue or conversation between two persons who narrate the story through the dialogue, partly in Prakrit, as, e.g. Ceṭaka etc.

Manthallikā, is a story in either the Mahārāṣṭrī Prakrit or the Paiśācī dialect and its subject matter concerns insignificant, lowly subjects. It is also a Manthallika in which a Purohita, a minister or an ascetic is rediculed for not carrying to completion an undertaking. Gorocanā and Anaṅgavatī are the two tales to illustrate this variety.

The **Parikathā** is a peculiar kind of story in which various incidents are narrated in a variety of ways. The Śudraka story is the instance in point.

A **Khaṇḍakathā**, like the Indumati, consists in the narration of a part of a well known story, either from the middle or from the portion at the end.

A **Sakalakathā** is a complete story with all its various incidents narrated in extenso till a de'nouement is reached. The Samarādityakathā is an example of Sakalakathā. Hemachandra explains it as 'Caritam' (Viveka p. 465). When out of a well known story the life of one person is related it is called an Upakathā.

The **Bṛhatkathā** relates the lives of many persons, contains marvellous incidents and has chapters which are named Lambhas. Hemachandra concludes this discussion of the Kathā form in prose or verse by making it clear that the definitions of all these (minor) varieties of stories are not attempted because these are types of the main variety or literary form called Kathā.

4. The Campū Form

Campū is another main type of the Śravya Kāvya. It is a well known type of literary composition which is written partly in prose and partly in verse. As a rule, it is composed in Sanskrit. The author, at times, introduces his own name or the names of other persons in a Campū. Its chapters are called Ucchvāsas. The Vāsavadattā and the Damayantī are the examples of a Campū.

5. The Anibaddha Composition or Form

Sanskrit literature abounds in many lovely, stray verses. These single verses which are unconnected are subsumed under the fifth type of Śravya Kāvya viz. **Anibaddha**. Hemachandra defines the Anibaddha Kāvya as **Muktakas** and others (VIII. 10).

The Anibaddha type of literary form includes Muktakas, Sandānitaka, Viśeṣaka, Kalāpaka, Paryā, Kośa etc. When a verse is complete in itself and is independent of any other verse or idea, it is called a Muktaka. Amaru's Muktakas oozing sentiments are well known. His one hundred stanzas on love in its many facets are excellent in point of poetic charm and beauty.

When two such verses form a group, it is a Sandānitaka. Three such verses make a Viśeṣak. A Group of four verses forms Kalāpakas. A Group of five or more verses upto fourteen forms a Kulaka. These may be in any and every language but in verse form.

When a number of such stray verses is introduced in a big poem it is called Paryā. Generally in a Mahākāvya such Paryās are found copiously in the portrayal of seasons, sunrise, night, etc.

When there is a collection of one's stray verses it is Kośa. Even the collection of the stray verses of others is called Kośa; for instance, the Gāthāsaptas'atī of Hāla is a Kośa.

Other types of stray verses are Samghāta and Saṁhitā. These are collections of a single poet. When the subjects are varied, it is a Saṁhitā. Thus the class of Anibaddha is endless. This sense is conveyed by the word Ādi in the list (VIII.9).

Lastly, Hemachandra points out an important rule that the five Sandhis, the beauty of style and matter, as mentioned in connection with the Mahākāvya are equally applicable to Akhyāyika, Campū and other forms of literature.

A Critical Review of Hemachandra's Treatment of Literary Forms

Unity of Purpose

Hemachandra first classifies Kāvya or literary compositions into Prekṣya or Dramatic and Śravya or Poetic. He brings out the distinction between the two main branches or classes of literature by stating that the Prekṣya or the Dramatic class of the literary works is Abhineya or is to be acted out or staged, while the poetic literature called Śravya Kāvya is Śravya or to be heard or read. But Rasa is common to both Kāvya and Drama and it is to evoke it that poets compose poery or drama. Kāvya and Drama are only two forms to evoke the same Rasa. Thus **all literature is one** when looked at from the point of view of aesthetic relish.

Dramatic and Poetic Compositions : Justification of Distinction

How does one justify the classification of literature into Drama and Poetry ? Well, though the aesthetic relish or the Rasa to be evoked is one, yet the methods of achieving this are different in Poetry and Drama. "In poetry, the poet describes the attendent emotional circumstances which rouse the Rasa, and in drama, actors present the same in person." The following verse sums up the difference neatly :

"Anubhāvavibhāvānāṁ varṇanā kāvyamuchate;
Teṣāmeva prayogastu nāṭyaṁ gītādirañjitam."

Thus Abhineyatā and Anabhineyatā or the method of representation and that of description mark off the Dṛṣya and Śravya Kāvya. And this is the essential ground of differentiation. Otherwise both the stageable play and the readable poem are Kāvya, the poet's work, which the quotation from Bhaṭṭatota so highly values and prizes. Bhoja also maintains that a poet who composes a play is greater than the actor who enacts it (Kavīneva bahumanyāmahe).

Twofold Dramatic Composition : Criterion of Division

The Prekṣya compositions are significantly classified into two broad types : (1) The Vākyārthābhinayasvabhāva[214] compositions, called Daśarūpaka or Dramas and (2) The Padārthābhinayasvabhāva Geya Rūpakas. It may be noted that while the expression Vākyārthābhinaya refers to Rasa (i.e., the nature or essence of a Rūpaka is to evoke Rasa; hence Rūpaka is termed Raśāśraya. cf D.R. I.7) : "Daśadhaiva Rasāśrayam" i.e., it (the Rūpaka) is tenfold and is based on sentiments, the other expression Padārthābhinaya refers to the pantomimic nature of the Geya Rūpakas. The word Padārthābhinaya is used by Dhanañjaya in connection with Nṛtya or Dance or Pantomine and this term is translated by Haas as 'a representation of any object' (D.R. II. 9). Further, Dhanañjaya makes it clear that while Nāṭya or Rūpaka is Rasāśraya, Nṛtya or dance is Bhāvāśraya i.e., based on the (emotional) states and it is auxiliary and helpful to the Nāṭya. The Pratāparudrīya also says that these two, Nṛtta and Nṛtya, are Nāṭyāṅgas (3.2). It would, therefore, appear that the Geyarūpakas of Hemachandra are connected with the Nṛtya, type of Pantomine as defined in the Daśarūpaka. However, the interrelation of the three concepts of Nāṭya, Nṛtya and Nṛtta is an interesting subject.[215] Bharata's work deals with three kinds of stage presentation : the Tāṇḍava, the Lāsya, both of which are dances, and a class of dramas called Daśarūpaka.

Hemachandra Follows Bharata

Hemachandra follows the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata completely. For, he reproduces the relevant Kārikās from the Nāṭyaśāstra to define and explain not only the Daśarūpakas but also Nāṭikā, which is a separate, eleventh rūpaka according to Hemachandra. Bharata speaks of "ten dramas" in Chapter XX of the Nāṭyaśāstra. But defines eleven varieties – he deals with Nāṭika after the Nāṭaka and the Prakarṇa. Abhinavagupta says that the Nāṭikā is included in the concept of Daśarūpaka since

it is only a derivative form, being based on the Nāṭaka and the Prakarṇa.

Kohala Codified the Derivative Types of Drama

It seems Kohala, the next great writer after Bharata so far as the subject of Dramaturgy is concerned codified these derivative types of Drama (N.S. 36.65 C.S.S.). Thus while in Bharata we get the ten Rūpakas and the Nāṭikā, in Kohala the minor varieties, the new types of dramas and dramatic representations received a systematic treatment. Vātsyāyana mentions some of the Uparūpakas (such as Hallisaka and Nāṭyarāsaka) in his Kāmasūtrā.

Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Abhinavagupta

But it is Abhinavagupta who deals with the minor stage shows for the first time (Abh. Bh. Chap. IV). Abhinavagupta quotes verses (Anuṣṭubhas) defining some Uparūpakas with the words "Taduktaṁ cirantanaiḥ". We find these verses with the same remark in the Kāvyānuśāsana also, under the list of the twelve Geya Rūpakas (VIII. 4). In Bhāmaha (I. 24) there is a reference to the Nāṭaka as well as to the Dvipadī, Śamyā, Rāsaka and Skandhaka (a dance), the last four being intended for Abhinaya and it is said by Bhāmaha that these latter varieties are extensively explained by others : 'Uktonyaistasya vistaraḥ.' Daṇḍin (K.Ā.I. 39) also mentions Lāsya, Chalika, Samyā etc. as meant to be seen, Prekṣārtha.

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika

As mentioned earlier, the Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya distinguishes Nāṭya which is, Rasāsvaya, from Nṛtya, which is, Bhāvāśraya, saying that the former is (i.e., the Rūpaka class) is Vākyārthābhinaya and the latter (i.e., the Nṛtya class) is Padārthābhinaya. The Avaloka confirms this distinction on the same grounds. Dhanañjaya's and Dhanika's explanations of the concepts of Nātya and Nṛtya means that the scope of the Nṛtya class is smaller than that of the Rūpaka class.

Dr. Rāghavan deals with this subject in his paper on Daśarūpaka as also in his thesis on Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Chap. XX). He puts the whole matter in a proper perspective thus : "Daśarūpaka considers Tātparya as the Śakti by which Rasa is understood and that the Rasa so understood is similar to Vākyārtha, the sense of the sentence as a whole which is got at through the meanings of its word-units, the Padārthas to which Vibhāvas are likened (D.R. IV p. 120). Therefore, the Tātparyavādin, and mainly the Daśarūpaka and the Avaloka on it, are responsible for introducing this new nomenclature and terminology to distinguish the major and the minor dramatic varieties. Vākyārthabhinaya and Padārthābhinaya are not phrases born in the Kashmirian traditions represented by Abhinavagupta".[216]

Hemachandra Distinguishes two Kinds of Stage Performances

Hemachandra adopts these two expressions found in the Daśarūpaka and Avaloka[217] to effectively distinguish the two kinds of stage performances, the Rūpaka and the Geya Rūpakas exactly as Bhoja does.[218] But, unlike Dhanañjaya, Hemachandra, lika Bhoja, adds, in a straightforward manner, to the ten Rūpakas, two more, the Nāṭikā and the Saṭṭaka, and mentions the Rasāśraya varieties as twelve. Dr. Raghavan applauds this step of Bhoja and says : "Surely these two are also Rasāśraya and deserve to be separately mentioned as drama proper, being much more perfect as drama than the nonologue Bhāṇa included in the Nāṭya or Rūpaka or Rasāśraya class."[219]

Nāṭikā and Saṭṭaka Differentiated

As for Nāṭikā, Bharata (N.S. XX 60-63 C.S.S.) holds that it is derived from Nāṭaka and Prakarṇa and Dhanañjaya (D.R. II) follows him; for he holds the Nāṭikā as Saṁkīrṇa ('cross-bred'), born of the Nāṭaka and the Prakarṇa. Our author, Hemachandra, so completely follows Bharata that he

quotes the definitions of Bharata, without saying a word about the first eleven types of Rūpakas. Hemachandra's twelfth Rūpaka, Saṭṭaka is derived from Bhoja.[220] But in some other works the additional types are given as Nāṭikā and Prakaraṇī. Abhinava considers Nāṭikā, Toṭaka, Rāsaka, Prakaraṇikā etc. as sub-species or Avāntaraprapañca of the Daśarūpaka. But it is obvious that Nāṭikā leaned more towards the Nāṭaka, while Prakaraṇikā towards the Prakarṇa. "And Bhoja's Śr. Pr. is the first work we now have from which we get the definition of Saṭṭaka," as Dr. Raghavan concludes. Abhinava mentions the Saṭṭaka and gives the Karpūramañjarī, in Prakrit, as an example, saying 'Śṛṅgārarase sātiśayopayoginī Prākṛtabhāṣā iti Saṭṭakaḥ karpūramañjaryākhyāḥ rājuśekhareṇa tanmātrā eva nibaddhāḥ.' Rājaśekhara himself says in the prologue of the play that Saṭṭaka is similar in all respects to the Nāṭikā but is devoid of Praveśaka and Viṣkambhaka.

Hemachandra Avoids the Controversy

Hemachandra reproduces Bhoja's Āryā on Saṭṭaka with the reading 'Aprākṛtasaṁskṛtayā', which goes against the prevalent notion that the saṭṭaka is entirely in Prakrit. It may be taken to mean that the Saṭṭaka was neither in Sanskrit nor in the (literary) Prakṛta. However, Dr. Raghavan smends it to "Aprākṛta-(prākṛtayā) saṁskrtayā". But Saṭṭaka itself is called saṭṭaya in Prakrit and the form Sāḍaka also occurs. Besides, the Mātyadarpaṇa gives it as Sāṭaka while Vādijaṅghāla calls it Saṭṭikā. Hemachandra does not enter into the controversy but quotes Bhoja's Āryā here and observes in the Viveka (p. 445) that like in a Nāṭikā, in the Saṭṭaka too, the love-theme is invented.

Thus, it is possible to state that Hemachandra, like the Daśarūpakakāra, the Avalokakāra and Bhoja, classified dramatic performances into those depicting a complete theme and a complete Rasa with other subsidiary Rasas and those depicting only a Bhāva of a Rasa.[221]

Pāṭhya and Geya Rūpakas

Hemachandra calls this class of minor shows as 'Geya Rūpakas' and adds by way of comments in the Viveka commentary that the performance of a Geyakāvya is either (1) soft or (2) boisterous or (3) mixed (soft and boisterous) Masṛna, Uddhata or Miśra. Further, in another passage in the Viveka Vyākhyā (p. 447) a question is raised as to the distinction between a Pāṭhya Rupaka and a Geya Rūpaka. To clarify this issue, we get a line which specifically speaks of 'Gītāśrayatva' and 'Vādyādeḥ prayogaḥ', which two characteristics highlight, the two essential aspects of Song and Music in a Geyakāvya.

Emotional Fragments

And song and music agree with the nature of the Uparūpakas or dance-ballets which, as Dhanañjaya says, are emotional fragments i.e., forms which are Bhāvāśraya. But as the passage in the Viveka says, some forms have speech, song, instrumental music and dance and some resemble the Nṛtta, which is only Tālalayāśraya (D.R.I. 9). And the ancient Indian drama "as envisaged by Bharata is of the nature of a dance-drama, with music and dance–movements, it is the Uparūpaka class of performances that is so far excellence; for in them music and dance predominate, most of them are merely dances accompanied by songs, interpreting through Abhinaya or gesture, the emotional contents of the song."[222]

The Uparūpakas in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa

The authors of the Nāṭyadarpaṇa, a work on dramaturgy by Hemachandra's two pupils, Ramachandra and Guṇachandra, speak of thirteen other Rūpakas, besides the twelve main Rūpakas dealt with by them. These are Saṭṭaka (written in one language, not in mixed Sanskrit and Prakrit), Śrīgadita, Durmilita, Prasthāna, Goṣṭhi, Hallisaka, Nartanaka, Prekṣaṇaka,

Rāsaka, Nāṭyarāsaka, Kāvya, Bhāṇa or Bhāṇakā and Bhāṇikā. It may be noted that these other types of Rūpakas[223] are relegated to the commentary i.e., not defined in the main text by the authors of the Nāṭyadarpaṇa because, as they say, they are not so interesting and that they are not mentioned by the "Vṛddhas" (N.D.,G.O.S., p. 198).

Dr. K. H. Trivedi has studied the Nāṭyadarpaṇa critically (L.D. Series No. 9). He remarks, "the N.D. recognizes only **thirteen** out of the eighteen subordinate types later known as Uparūpakas. The N.D. and the K.S. as well, call them other types of drama ..... the N. D. ..... differentiates them from the ..... Rūpakas on the basis of the place of Rasa which predominates in the latter. In the Uparūpakas Rasa has a subordinate place. It is the element of music and dance that prevails here in most cases ..... the B. P. calls the varieties of dance (Nṛtyabhedāḥ)" (pp. 204-205).

The Number of Uparūpakas Varies with Different Authors

It may be noted that the number of these so called Uparūpakas varies with different writers at different times. As for the number of these Uparūpakas, some instances can be stated. Abhinavagupta mentions **nine** types. Dhanika mentions **seven** of them. Bhoja has **twelve** varieties. Hemachandra enumerates **twelve** but uses the word Ādi at the end of the list. So his list is not hard and fast. Also, Hemachandra has **three** more Śrīgudita, Kāvya and Goṣṭhī added to the list of Abhinava. He has adopted Abhinava's verses which define the **nine** shows. The other two definitions are found in the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja. And the **last one** is said to be from Kohala, quoted by Abhinava and it purports to be the definition of the Rāgakāvya. The Sāhityādarpaṇa is the first to call these shows as Uparūpakas and mentions **eighteen** varieties. But the largest number, **twenty,** is given in the Bhāvaprakāśa of Śāradātanaya. Thus one thing is clear that the minor dramatic

compositions did not start with Bharata. Perhaps Kohala found them in the popular tradition and codified them. Even the Daśarūpaka does not treat of them. This may be due to the fact that the minor Rūpakas were like dence-ballets and Rasa did not predominate their themes, but dance and music prevailed. **Hemachandra thus distinguishes Pāṭhya Rūpakas from the Geya Rūpakas. Dhanika and Śārdātanaya call it as Nṛtyabhedas.** Perhaps they preeceded the regular Rūpaka. However, though some of these so-called Uparūpakas are in the form of dance (e.g. Rāsaka, Hallikaka etc.), yet some other forms like the Prakaraṇikā etc. are as good as Nāṭikā, Saṭṭaka and even the other major Rūpakas. So Hemachandra's use of the word Rūpaka for these Geya varieties is justified.

It is said that Nāṭaka is the source of all dramatic compositions. Thus all types of shows, both major and minor, draw upon the Nāṭaka and follow the model of the Nāṭaka. Dr. S. N. Shastri writes : "Thus they (all shows) follow to a large extent the model of a Nāṭaka in respect of the scheme of plot, the use of language, the poetic artifices, the dramatic etiquette and conventions which become responsible for their make-up on the whole. If the model of the pattern becomes known, all other types which follow the pattern in general become easily intelligible. For this reason Bharata and other canonists have dealt with the scheme of Nāṭaka at length".[224]

Parikathā, Khaṇḍakathā and Sakalakathā

These three types or forms of story are inter-related. They narrate stories expounding one of the four Puruṣārthas or all of them. Parikathā gives many anecdotes to expound a Puruṣārtha; the Khaṇḍakathā is very much smaller in scope; the Sakalakathā is bigger in scope than the Parikathā.

The Parikathā is a narrative in Sanskrit or Prakrit while the Khaṇḍakathā and the Sakalakathā are narratives, small and big, always in Prakrit and verse. The main thing common to

all the three of them is that in them the narration of the story is stressed, and not so much the Rasa.

Language as a Basis of Classification

While speaking of the Muktaka etc., Ānandavardhana makes language the classifying condition. Thus, the Muktaka etc. upto Kulaka can be in any language; Parikathā is in Sanskrit; Khaṇḍankathā and Sakalakathā are in Prakrit; the Sargabandha (Mahākāvya) is in Sanskrit; Rūpaka and Uparūpaka are in all languages, i e., Miśra. Ākhyāyikā and Kathā both are in Sanskrit.

According to Ānandavardhana, the Akhyāyikā and the Kathā are generally in prose, so far as the medium goes. Ānandavardhana bases another typification on Rasa and Narration of the story. Now, Ānandavardhana's remark that in Parikathā, the interest is in the story only, also applies to the Khaṇḍakathā and the Sakalakathā. The Sargabandha may be Rasa-tātparya or Kathā-tātparya.

Bhoja also describes the non-dramatic literary forms or Śrvya-kāvya-bhedas. Among its twentyfour varieties are mentioned : Ākhyāyika, **Upākhyāna, Nidarśana, Pravahlikā, Manthalikā Maṇikulyā,** Kathā, Khaṇḍakathā, **Upakathā, Bṛhatkathā,** Campū, **Parvabandha, Kāṇḍabandha,** Sargabandha, **Āśvāsakabandha, Sandhibandha,** Avaskandhabandha, Kāvyaśāstra, Śāstrakāvya, Kosa, Sanghāta, **Samhitā** and Sāhityaprakāsa (Śr. Pr. XII). The underlined forms are new.

Hemachandra's View-point on Kathā and Akhyāyikā

Dr. V. Raghavan observes : "Hemachandra follows Bhāmaha and Bhoja on Ākhyāyikā (p. 388), but makes this ingenious suggestion that the hero in an Ākhyāyikā is a Dhīroddhata and in a Kathā, a Dhīraśānta. This is due to his own deduction from Bhāmaha's remark that in an Ākhyāyikā, the hero relates his own story; but in a Kathā someone else does; for, how can a noble man, Abhijāta, be conceived as vainly singing of his own doings ? From Bhāmaha's line

(I. 29).... Hemachandra draws out his distinction of the heroes of these two as Dhīroddhata and Dhīrasānta respectively."[225]

Hemachandra's gloss on sūtra 7 (VIII. 7) echoes the above ideas (p. 462). He also adopts Daṇḍin's words (K.Ā.I. 23) 'Apādaḥ Padasantāno Gadyam' to give a precise and acknowledged definition of prose. The expression means : "A group of words without metrical feet is called Prose". This prose is divided into two classes : Ākhyāyikā and Kathā. According to Daṇḍin there is no fault to describe one's own virtues when one is speaking of actual facts : "Svaguṇāviskriyādoṣo nātra bhūtārthaśaṁsinaḥ" (I. 24). Dandin's attitude, thus, turns out to be a complete refutation of Bhāmaha on the point (K.Ā. I.23 to I.30).

Hemachandra cites Harṣacarita and others as the examples of an Ākhyāyikā and his definition agrees with the Harṣacarita. Hemachandra's Kathā shares this feature in common with the Ākhyāyikā in this that the Hero does not describe the story. But the hero is Dhīraśānta. Again, the Kathā can be both in prose and verse :"गद्यं पद्यं वा सर्वभाषा कथा." This is an important feature of the Kathā. While the Ākhyāyikā has to be in Sanskrit and in prose, the Kathā may be in any language and in prose or verse. Hemachandra's distinction is thus noteworthy (VIII. 7 and 8).

Varieties of the Kathā Form

Another noteworthy point is that Hemachandra subsumes all other varieties of the Kathā such as the Ākhyāna, Nidarśana, Pravahlikā, Manthallikā, Maṇikulyā, Khaṇḍakathā, Sakalakathā, Upakathā and the Bṛhatkathā under Kathā itself. His remark that all these are subtypes of the Kathā and so no separate definitions of these are attempted. This reveals his forthright attitude on this subject. We are tempted to contrast Hemachandra's limited varieties with the 24 varities of Bhoja. We have **two** main prose types and **ten** subtypes of Kathā besides Kathā. Thus prose

varieties are twelve in Hemachandra's opinion (VIII. 8 ff). He follows Bhoja in general.[226]

Hemachandra's Noteworthy Definition of a Mahākāvya

Hemachandra's Mahākāvya is noteworthy in the sense that it is not restricted to the Sanskrit language only, but extends to the Prakrit Language with all its dialects and also covers the folk-languages or dialects. He also considers the Pañcasandhis or five joints or junctures as the indespensable features of a Mahākāvya. In all other respects his Mahākāvya resembles the traditional Mahākāvya.

In the gloss on VIII. 8, Hemachandra mentions the many features that go to make a Mahākāvya. These are the same features that we find in Daṇḍin's Kāvyadarśa (I. 15-19) and which Dr. Raghavan states are completely borrowed by Bhoja (S.P., p. 627). Bhoja calls it a Sargabandha like the Heyagrivavadha of Bhartṛmeṇṭha. Hemachandra mentions several characteristics under Śabdavaicitrya, Arthavaicitrya and Ubhayavaicitryā. All These are found mentioned in Daṇḍin (I.14, 18 etc.).

In his work on Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa,[227] Dr. V. Raghavana has shown how Hemachandra is indebted to Bhoja in several respects and contexts. One of such contexts is the discussion of the Śravya-kāvya. In this connection Dr. Raghavan writes :

"The treatment of Srāvyakāvya in the VIIIth Chapter of the Kāvyānuśāsana, pp. 330-341,[228] to the end of the work is completely a reproduction of the section on Guṇas and Alaṁkāras of Prabandha as a whole and the definitions with examples of the types of Śravyakāvya given by Bhoja in Chapters XI and XII of the Śr. pr. (Vol. II) ..... Especially, the various elements of Śabdavaicitryā, Arthavaicitryā and Ubhayavaicitryā given by Hemachandra on pp. 334-341 are Bhoja's Guṇas and Alaṁkāras of Śabda. Artha and both with reference

to the Prabandha as a whole. The commentary of Hemachandra here is, again, nothing but a reproduction from the Śr. Pra. The rare and lost works quoted here, the definitions of various types of Kāvyas found here are all from the Śr. Pra." (P. 709).

Hemachandra's Method of Combination

Bhoja also gives Prabandhālaṁkāras in three sets.[229] The passage in question is quoted by Hemachandra. This includes Hemachandra's definition of a Mahākāvya (VIII.6) as well as the gloss concerning Śabdavaicitrya, Arthavaicitrya and Ubhayavaicitrya (pp. 455-60). The interesting thing to be noted here is that under each head of Śabda, Artha and both, Hemachandra has combined the Prabandhaguṇas with the Prabandhālaṁkāras quoted from Bhoja. Thus under Śabdavaicitrya he mentions the first four Guṇas and then states the Alaṁkāras. Similarly under Arthavaicitrya he mentions five Guṇas and then Alaṁkāras. Finally under Ubhayavaicitrya he cites four Guṇas and then the Alaṁkāras. This is followed by the names of some rare works. Just as he has combined the text on Guṇas and Alaṁkāras of the work as a whole, Hemachandra has mixed up the explanations of these in his Viveka Vyākhyā also. Hemachandra's presentation is really very ingenious and remarkable for that reason.[230]

Dr. Raghavan has critically studied Bhoja's text on these threefold Prabandhaguṇas and the threefold Prabandhālaṁkāras. We would like to summarize his explanation below for easy reference, for it has a bearing on Hemachandra's text under review.

Dr. Raghavan's Explanation of the Prabandhaguṇas and the Prabandhālaṁkāras

Bhoja takes Guṇa with Śabda and Artha in a Prabandha as a whole. What are the Guṇas of Prabandha? It is the proper composition of the various types of works or forms of literature.

The Guṇas are thus the features which go to make up the best poem. It is almost a statement of the criticism of the work as a whole. Śabdaguṇas are the physical or formal features. Arthaguṇas pertain to the content and the theme. The Ubhayaguṇas embrace both of the Śabdaguṇas two deal with size. The Mahākāvya must be sufficiently long (Asaṁkṣiptagranthatvam). But the Sargas should not be tediously long (Anativistīrṇasargatva). Aviṣamabandhatva is explained as causing delight to the reader's mind. Hemachandra omits Aśravyavṛttatva, But the Ubhayaguṇa Arthānurūpachhandastvam takes care of it. The metre should be suggestive of the Rasa. Bhoja's Śliṣṭasandhitva is slightly modified by Hemachandra who has Parasparasambaddhasargāditvam i.e., the cantos must run into each other and fit in. The Arthaguṇas emphasize the essence of the Mahākāvya, the hero, his greatness, development of Rasa and the philosophical purpose of poetry viz. fourfold end of life. The epic is heroic, has one dominant Rasa with all sentiments helping it. The fourth Arthaguṇa deals with the social advice or the moral of a poem or the poetic justice. The last Arthaguṇa viz. Susūtrasaṁndhānakatva refers to well-knitness of the work as a whole. Thus it is a general guṇa.

The Ubhayaguṇas relate to both śabda and Artha. The relate Śabda and Artha with each other and lay emphasis on certain principles of harmony and appropriateness, Aucityā. Thus Rasānurūpasandarbhatva means perfect harmony of words and ideas with Rasa. This implies propriety of Vṛtti and Rīti. Hemachandra omits Pātrānurūpabhāvatva because it relates to a drama. We have explained the propriety of metre. The guṇa of Samastalokarañjakatva refer to Ānanda, the primary aim of Art, which is aesthetic bliss. The last Sudalaṁkāravākyatva means that mere guṇas are not enough, but Alaṁkāras are equally essential in a Kāvya. This takes us to the topic of the Prabandhālaṁkāras.

It will be seen that the novel name under which the above guṇas are given, does not alter the fact that they are features

of a Mahākāvya given by Daṇḍin (K.Ā.I.14-19). And the rest of the verses of Daṇḍin on Mahākāvya (K.Ā.I.20-22) contain features included here as Prabandhālaṁkāras.[231]

Hemachandra Indebtedness to Bhoja

Dr. Raghavan says : "Hemachandra takes as much as he can from Bhoja and gives them in his own way. He is a faithful follower of Abhinavagupta and of the Prasthāna inaugurated by Ānandavardhana, and cannot follow Bhoja who calls everything Alaṁkāra. So he casts off Bhoja's classification of those into Guṇas and Alaṁkāras, calls them neither Guṇas nor Alaṁkāras but simply Vaicitryā. But he accepts Bhoja's classification of these into those of Śabda, Artha and those of both. This certainly simplifies Bhoja's scheme of division of the features into Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, which division was however good in as much as the class of Guṇas was constituted of the more importnt, features, more vitally related to the nature of Mahākāvya than the other class of Alaṁkāras. But, this attitude of his, Hemachandra forgets towards the end while explaining the Ubhayavaicitrya called Śabdalaṁkāravākyatvam in his commentary here, he reproduces Bhoja completely and holds these feature as Guṇs and Alaṁkāras."[232]

Hemachandra slightly modifies Bhoja in certain places and slightly adds to Bhoja's list in some places. Thus the Śabdālaṁkara of Bhoja called Bhinnavṛttasargāntatva is separate by Hemachandra, dropped from the Vaicitrya list and included as a major feature in the definition of a Mahākāvya itself, along with Śabdārthavaicitrya. Anativistīrṇasargāditva is elaborated by Hemachandra into Anativistīrṇa – parasparasaṁbaddhasargātitva. In Maṅgālacaraṇa, only three types are stated but the new types of Bhoja are dropped. Again Śravyavṛttatram omitted and the five Sandhis are excuded from the Ubhayālaṁkāra list but inserted in the definition of the Mahākāvya itself, at the outset. In commenting on them, Hemachandra reproduces Bhoja fully.

Bhoja explains all the Alaṁkāras of the Prabandha one by one. The first Śabdālaṁkāra refers to the begining of the Kāvya. The second, elaborated by Hemachandra, refers to the details of the poet and his work, the purpose of the work, etc. The next Śabdālaṁkāra refers to change of metres at the end of a Sarga. It is dropped by Hemachandra. The next feature of Śabda or form is use of word-figures and tricks in entire Sargas. The next one is the marking of the last verse of each canto with some favourite word. Such words or marks may contain one's favourite idea or name or auspicious word or benediction. The Arthālaṁkāras are based on Dandin's description of the Mahākāvya (K.Ā. I. 16-17).

Daṇḍin uses the expression 'Susandhibhiḥ' (I. 18) and Bhoja takes it as a Guṇa but Hemachandra includes it (Satsandhi) in the definition. It means the close relation between one canto and another. However Daṇḍin does not refer explicitly to Sandhis in a drama, whereas Hemachandra quotes the Nāṭyaśāstra Kārikās on the dramatic junctions called Mukhasandhi etc. (see ante). Bhāmaha says the Mahākāvya has five Sandhis (I. 20). Thus Bhoja (and Hemachandra) follows Bhāmaha. This becomes clear when Bhoja explains Mantrādūta etc. in terms of the Artha Puruṣārtha (Bhāmaha I. 21). Hemachandra omits the dramatic features. About Deśakālapātraceṣṭā etc. it can be said that it distinguishes the Mahākāvya on account of the former's vast range of action, time, character etc. Hemachandra omits Dvisandhāna.

In K.Ā. I. 21-22 Daṇḍin lays down that "to describe the hero first and then the defeat of the hero's foes by the superior qualities of the hero is a method naturally nice. Also, to describe the heredity, valour, learning and other attainments of the hero's rival at first and then to describe the hero's excellence by the defeat of his foe - this method too appeals to us. He uses the word "Mārga" for these **two methods.** Thus Daṇḍin gives **two** methods (Māargadvaya) of bringing out

the glory of the Hero. Bhoja (and Hemachandra) follows Daṇḍin. These two Mārgas are referred to in the last Ubhayālaṁkāra 'Mārgadvayānuvartanam' Bhoja discusses the theme of the Mahākāvya as the depicting of the fall of the Pratināyaka and of the prosperity of the Nāyaka.

Bhoja remarks, following Daṇḍin (I. 20), that not all of these features of Śabda, Artha and of both need to be introduces everywhere : "Even if a few of the said elements are lacking, poetry does not depreciate in level, **provided** the excellence of those that have been adopted pleases the scholars ..... K.A.I. 20".[233]

HEMACHANDRA'S THEORY OF LITERATURE 9

Differentia of Literature

It is quite significant that at the very outset of his work Hemachandra should touch upon the **differentia** of Literature. While pointing out the interconnection between his Śabdānu-śāsana and Kāvyānuśāsana, our author mentions that, while the former work discusses 'Correct Speech', the latter work treats of the 'Poetic aspect of language' in its correct form. Here we cannot fail to notice that this distinction between the correct speech or the language of ordinary parlance as well as of the scientific treatises and the poetic speech (Kaver Bhāratī) is aesthetically very important.

Linguistic Dualism

To begin with, Hemachandra's 'Correct Speech' represents that aspect of language which possesses formal completeness and relates to the connection between vocabulary and perception. This is the language that serves the purpose of social communication quite well. And it thus becomes a fit medium of concepts about things and its vocables acquire the capacity to denote a number of things and ideas. This is the literal or denotative aspect of languages which helps the scientist to communicate or express his idea of the world. There is another aspect of this 'correct speech' which, when it represents different modes of thought, acquires a metaphoric character.

And, in the words of I. A. Richards, "thinking is radically metaphoric. ... To think of anything is to take it as of a sort ..... and that 'as' brings in ...... the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric grapple .... by which alone the mind takes hold".[234]

There have always been theorists – literary critics, linguists, psychologists and philosophers alike – who insist that language is not primarily an instrument for the communication of thought or for the expression of belief, and they have tried to put forward a more adequate semiotic. Like Edward Sapir, these theorists emphasize "the expressive as against the referential aspect or function of language". Ogdan and Richard put forward a theory of 'linguistic dualism' under two general headings of meanings: (1) The scientific, descriptive, representative, referential, denotative and cognitive meaning or use, and (2) The emotive, expressive, non-cognitive etc. kind of meaning or use. And the Poetic, Ethical, Metaphysical and Religious utterances are included under the emotive or second type of use of language.[235] For, it is well-known that in a linguistic utterance, one has to supply imaginatively some appropriate context, and tone of voice in which it might occur. This is more pronounced in poetry because great poets may and do reveal to their readers information which words do not carry as per their dictionary meanings. This happens by virtue of the poets' dexterity in the use of language and their ability to exploit their medium to the maximum extent. As a result, poetic utterances act not as symbols, but as signals; they are not signs, nor do they mean in the way in which the word Rain is a sign of, or means, rain, but rather in the way in which dark clouds are signs of, or mean, rain, or a frown is a sign of concentration or disapproval.[236] On any view, linguistic utterance has always a purpose, use, point, function or intention, and its having this purpose is not part of what it says. And this accounts for the distinction between 'meaning' in the sense of conceptual content and 'meaning' in the sense of purpose or point.

Hemachandra's theoretical affiliations with the Dhvani theory are not in question. He is a follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta so far as the central principle of poetics is concerned. And according to these authorities, the purpose of a linguistic utterance cannot be accounted for either by the denotative power of language, which accounts for the primary conceptual content, or by the secondary power or the secondary conceptual content as Mammaṭa makes it clear (Kāvyaprakāśa II. 18 f. & 23). This purpose is always suggested and it is the Meaning of Meaning which characterises poetry.

Hemachandra is an aesthetician of the New School and hence he realises that, though the poet uses formally correct language as the medium of poetic expression, still the poet's purpose in using that language is not to denote, or even to indicate, but to suggest sentiments. And this differentiates the poetic speech from the other linguistic utterances which are utilitarian in character. This is, as Paul Valery asserts, "the poetical language in which words are no longer the words of daily, practical use. They associate no more according to the same attractions; they are charged with two values simultaneously engaged and of equivalent importance; their sound and their instantaneous paychic effect...... The purpose of poetry is not at all to communicate to someone a finite notion – for which prose should suffice...... wholly other is the function of poetry. While a unique meaning is asked of prose, here it is the unique **form** which ordains and survives. In a poem, therefore, sense must not prevail over form. ... A beautiful verse indefinitely rises from its ashes; it becomes again..... harmonic cause of itself".[237]

E. H. Gombrich admirably sums up this aspect of Art: "...Communication need not come into this process at all. ... substitution may precede portrayal, and creation communication ... a new frame of reference is created ..."[238]

Art is a Matter of Attitude, A Frame of Reference

This "frame of reference" is brought about by the poetic use of language in Literature. That is to say, in poetry, "we may... be putting before our hearers some feeling or attitude of ours, but we do so by expressing it and not by talking about it. ..."[239] This is the differentiating mark of the Aesthetic experience according to Abhinavagupta. And, Hemachandra completely follows Abhinavagupta's theory of Rasāsvāda. In Ānandavardhana's new aesthetics, the referential function of the words and the meanings is subordinate to its aesthetic function. Mammaṭa (K. P. 2 ff.) categorically states that in poetry, Word and Sense become subsidiary owing to its being concentrated on such processes as are subservient to particular sentiments. This distinguishes poetic creation from Vedic injunctions and Epic exhortations or didactic narratives. In Dhvanyāloka I.13, Ānandavardhana himself lays down that in a Dhvani composition, the expressed sense as well as the expressive words both subordinate themselves so as to suggest that sweet and beautiful idea – which abounds in the works of great poets.[240] And Hemachandra does not lag behind in this matter. As a matter of fact, his discussion of the aspect of poetic delight in Kāvyānuśāsan I.3 and his lucid exposition of it in the gloss that follows as well as his apt quotations from the Kāvyakautuka of Tauta as also from Bhaṭṭānayaka's work provide ample and unmistakable proof of his theoretical sirength and equipment.

The Poetic Purpose

Hemachandra's emphasis on the delightful character of the aesthetic enjoyment is entirely in keeping with his faith in the doctrine of Rasadhvani. For, "the arts – all of them – have as their essential common characteristic a suitability for being observed in the 'aesthetic attitude' and thus a suitability for yielding 'aesthetic pleasure'.[241] Hemachandra clearly endorses the view that in the ultimate analysis "aesthetic pleasure" is

the sine qua non of poetry, the other two aims, glory and advice, being ancillary. For, beautiful things are those which are apprehended with pleasure : 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever'. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya quotes Longinus to say that our souls are somehow naturally exalted by the true sublime; and, as if rearing or prancing, are filled with joy and exaltation.[242] The Longinian doctrine of Transport, too, requires the poet so to speak in his verse that he may **teach,** that he may **delight,** and last but not least, that he may **move.** Hemachandra's view on Art Experience finds an adequate echo in these words of Victor M. Hamm :

"The products of fine arts are primarily intended for the delight of perception and contemplation which they elicit, and if they provide this, they do their work."[243]

The Aesthetic Experience

On 'aesthetic experience', Hemachandra completely subscribes to **Abhinavagupta's interpretation** of Bharata's famous dictum on Rasa in terms of the Rasadhvani doctrine of Ānandavardhana, setting aside the views of Lollaṭa, Śrīśaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka and others. But Hemachandra is especially fond of Bhaṭṭa Tauta's profound observations on the Art, Philosophy and Nature of the poetic process. But it is in Abhinavagupta's writings that Hemachandra finds the culmination of the true theory of Art. P. Pañcāpageśa Śāstrī aptly brings out this feeling of success on the part of Sanskrit aestheticians in his preface to his well known classic 'The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure'.[244]

"Basing their discussions on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra and confining their activities to the explanation of his Rasasūtra, those great men sought a true and correct explanation of the experience called 'Kāvyarasāsvāda' or the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. Some stumbled; some halted; others caught a shadow on the way and declared it substance; and some went right to the soul of the affair and were in a position to cry out 'Eureka' !"

The Role of a Sahṛdaya

Ānandavardhana extols the role of the **Sahṛdaya,** the connoisseur or the responsive critic, who is described as that person who has by a process of incessant application to standard poetical works so enlarged his mind that he can easily identify himself with the particular aspect of the person or the thing described and merge his individuality in the universal element of the poem, or the universal element in him in the individual element of the poem. And it is in the context of this responsive reader that Ānandavardhana proceeds to point out the nature of the pleasure that the critic realises. This delight is of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment, and as such those only are real Kāvyas which are capable of suggestively bringing about this aesthetic delight.[245]

The Grounds of Poetry

Hemachandra follows Ānandavardhana as interpreted by Abhinavagupta completely. Ānandavardhana makes this aesthetic delight the chief criterion of poetic creation and connects it with the concept of Pratibhā or poetic imagination. This Pratibhā or poetic genius is none other than that quality which enables the poet to create 'a thing of beauty'. It is a capacity that gives to 'airy nothings a form and shape'. In Dhvanyāloka 1.6, Ānandavardhana declares that the goddess of learning herself yields that real essence of suggestion and manifests the extraordinary and sparkling genius of the great poets, who among a host of poets, are only two or three, or five or six, like Kālidāsa etc. Just as the delight referred to above belongs to both the poet and the connoisseur so also does the Pratibhā belong to both (described as the creative and the appreciative aspects of Pratibhā by Rājaśekhara).

According to Prof. Gopinath Kaviraj, the word Pratibhā, which literally means a flash of light or revelation, is usually found in literature in the sense of wisdon characterised by immediacy and freshness.[246] In Hemachandra's poetics, poetic

delight and Pratibhā are undoubtedly intimately connected as his quotation from Bhaṭṭa Tauta (I. 3 ff) establishes. He makes Pratibhā the sole cause of poetry (I. 4) and admits the ultimate supremacy of the poet's imagination. Tauta's celebrated definition of Pratibhā, relied on by Hemachandra, admirably sums up "the creative aspect of Imagination – its power to conceive ever-new thoughts and images and to express them in living word".[247] While Mammaṭa employes the word Śakti and toes the line of Vāmana almost verbatim,[248] Hemachandra takes the word Pratibhā directly from Abhinavagupta but explains Pratibhā in terms of the Jain Philosophy so far as the antenatal capacity (vide Vāmana 1-3-16 ff) of Pratibhā is concerned.

Pratibhā Explained in terms of Jain Philosophy

Discussing Prajñā and Pratibhā, Prof. Gopinath Kaviraj observes that in Jain philosophy, Kevalajñāna and Darśana are the synonyms of Pratibhā, Prajñā, etc. of the other systems and adds that "according to Jain Philosophy Omniscience or the possession of the factulty of Absolute Knowledge and Supreme vision is an eternal property (being also the Essence) of the Soul, which it has apparently lost or allowed to be obscured under the influence of a beginningless series of Karmas, hence known as a veil of knowledge or vision. By means of spiritual culture, this veil may be withdrawn – and the soul will regain its lost knowledge until at last – it will become once more Omniscient – being established in its Pure and Eternal Essence".[249]

Hemachandra's explanation of the concept of Pratibhā in terms of Jain philosophy constitutes his contribution to Indian poetics. Not only this. His purpose here seems to stress the necessity of poetic culture also. This is clear from the fact that it is with the aid of spiritual culture that the veil clouding our innate vision can be withdrawn and this implies that though Pratibhā is the sole cause of poetry, a modicum of poetic

culture is called for in any poetic activity. Hence, Hemachandra's treatment of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsas as aids to Kāvyakarana is apt. T. N. Sreekantaiya notes that "Pratibhā is ever the only direct source of poetry ... Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa contribute but indirectly to the creation of Poetry by regulating and refining the working of the poet's Pratibhā. Hemachandra has made the best pronouncement on this question. . . ."[250]

It is interesting to note that since the days of Homer, the idea of poetic genius or imagination has characterised the Western Poetics in different garbs and under different names. Beginning with the theory of divine dispensation, we come to the Longiniun Sublime and his term "transport" or Ekstasis. The question there was: 'Are poets born or made ?' In other words, 'Natural gifts or studied art ?' And both the poet's genius as well as his acquired art were included in the 'Sources of elevation', viz., conceptions, passions, figures, diction and composition.[251] But poetic imagination receives a shot in the arm with Coleridge's elaborate exposition of it and the Romantic poetry is its best illustration.

The Education of a Poet

Hemachandra admits that poets can and do benefit from a knowledge of the ways of the world and from the different Śāstras as well as from constant practice in poetic composition under expert guidance. In saying this, he is not breaking any new ground because Mammaṭa had already dealt with these aspects of poetic training or poetic culture.[252] Hemachandra's credit lies in elaborating on Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa by bringing together relevant ideas from Rājaśekhara, Kṣemendra and others, and in providing rich illustrative material on these topics.

The Poetic Studio

Learning and Practice are cognate concepts as they both refine the poetic talent. It is a course in poetic training (Kaviśikṣā) to be undergone by a would-be-poet so as to master the theoretical and practical aspects of the poet's craft. F. W. Thomas studies the interesting topic of The Making of

the Sanskrit Poet[253] and notes that "This distinction of natural genius from culture. . . . reappears in most of the rhetoricians. . . . It is, however, the 'Jain writers who let us participate most particularly in the secrets of the poetic studio. . . . (and) Hemachandra gives the fullest directions."

Plagiarism

Hemachandra treats of Shadow-dependence in one of the four ways; dependence in one, two or three lines; dependence in sayings; verse-filling and word-replacing; practice with meaningful words and so on. These points are in line with Rājaśekhara's points as adopted by Hemachandra. Rājaśekhara in his turn had Ānandavardhana's points before him. As F. W. Thomas remarks, "This extract brings us close to the subject of plagiarism, the penumbra of literary craft." F. W. Thomas analyses the causes and nature of literary borrowing and concludes : "Our Indian theorist does not go far into the matter. . . .he allows his appropriator a fair latitude. . . . in most of the excuses he accepts, there is a good deal of human nature, and that they have often prevailed in practice outside of India."[254]

Dr. V. M. Kulkarni reviews Indian views on Plagiarism and credits Ānandavardhana with giving a clear exposition of the topic of originality and literary theft, Vāmana having provided the first vague reference in his classification of Artha. But Saṁvāda in Ānandavardhana becomes Haraṇa in Rājaśekhara and Hemachandra has adopted important aspects of the former's views on Plagiarism. The highlight of Rājaśekhara's treatment is that it covers almost all aspects of the problem and pronounces bold opinions on them.[255]

Kṣemendra, the Kashmirian polymath, also treats of borrowing on a small or large scale in his Kaviśikṣā manual, and justifies it in the case of certain literary genres. He advises a would-be-poet to cultivate a number of things and among these he includes Vākyārthaśunyavṛttābhyāsa and

'Purātanavṛtteṣu padaparāvṛttyabhyāsaḥ and gives illustrations of this practice. Hemachandra benefits from this. Kṣemendra also names poets as Chāyopajīvī, Padakopajīvī, Pādopajīvī, Sakalopajīvī and Bhuvanopajīvya (i.e., one who is a source to all poets, viz., Vedavyāsa).

On Hemachandra's contribution, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni has this to say : "We find a placid borrowing from. . . Rājaśekhara. . . and Kṣemendra. . . . With the exception of verses 42-43, 59-60 that are taken from Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa, and examples of Padasamasyā and Pādasamasyā which he has added, the rest of this portion is borrowed from Rājaśekhara's K. M."[256]

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy reviews Rājaśekhara's treatment of borrowing in word and idea and objects to the use of the term plagiarism in this connection, but suggests the term 'misappropriation' for the twofold अन्ययोनि Artha. He remarks that "Rājaśekhara's originality consists only in adding a fourth variety, viz., Parapurapraveśasadṛśa to Ānanda's three and a third division of Artha. . . . to Vāmana's two, to accommodate both the approved forms of Haraṇa or Skṁvāda. This is not misappropriation or plagiarism, but an original re-creation which is creditable to any poet."[257]

Dr. Krishnamoorthy finds Hemachandra's indication of the general background of thought underlying the treatment of Śabdārthaharaṇa helpful. This consists in treating this topic under Śikṣā as Chāyādyupajīvana along with Kavisamayas. Haraṇa thus occupied a prominent place in the syllabus of Kaviśikṣā in the times of Rājaśekhara. Hemachandra adopts the latter's sub-divisions under his Chāyā. The illustrations are the same. Thus Rājaśekhara may be regarded as the first codifier of the practical courses of training offered traditionally to Sanskrit poets in ancient times.[258]

Poetic Conventions

We have been discussing "the wedding of wit and learning", i.e., of the inventive or imaginative faculty and the

faculty of learning and practising. The rhetotico-poetical tradition contains an armory of flashing devices. In an age of literary self-consciousness and rhetorical stereotyping, the conventions, which appear 'flat conventions' today, represented "the language of a highly civilised and sophisticated past.... manifesting itself in literary and social conventions or fixities" in poetry. The aspect of poetic practice meant "cleverness in weaving metaphors and other poetic figures, at the trick of producing a double meaning, at manipulating complicated schemes of alliteration and rhyming, at following up quick composition, at making complete verses out of broken lines and sentences, and similar ingenious practices."

Manuals of Kaviśikṣā give a list of Kavisamayas or poetic conventions but the Kāvyamīmāṁsā of Rājaśekhara "mixes up the topics of Kaviśikṣā with those of Poetics proper." Dr. Suryakanta opines that Rājaśekhara's treatment is not scientific, though it is thoughtful and exhaustive.[250]

In Defence of Literary Conventions

Dr. V.M.Kulkarni connects the question of poetic convention with that of poetic flaw. Thus propriety and fidelity to poetic truth justify certain modes of expression and typical poetic conventions which find a legitimate place in Poetics.[260] On Hemachandra's contribution, Dr. Kulkarni writes : "While treating of this topic in his Kāvyānuśāsana, (Hemachandra) reproduces verbatim passages after passages from the Kāvyamīmāṁsā. He, however, does not indicate his source. . . Hemachandra does not give a definition nor the origin of the poetic conventions. Hemachandra reverses Rājaśekhara's order, ignores his classification of the poetic conventions into Svargya etc. He brings under the heading 'Niyama' all the Svargya and the Pātālīya and Prakīrṇaka-dravya-samayas of Rājaśekhara.[261] But the impact of Rājaśekhara's and Hemachandra's works is evident in all later discussions of this topic.

On the traditions and conventions of Sanskrit poets, F. W. Thomas' defence is noteworthy : "They were carefully

schooled; they practiced assiduously, like Stevenson. They appealed to an instructed audience; and they were competitive. Hence we must not judge from a modern point of view their adherence to old themes, their conventionality in ideas and expressions...... undoubtedly they made ample use of their notebooks and collectanea. ... This is the poetical convention (Saṅgati) which naturally was the stock-in-trade of the poor poet (Kukavi), who belonged only to the genus; when the great...... or creative.....poet makes use of such things we must think of his audience which knew them very well and concentrated its attention upon the new turns given to them. .....His work is, as he says, 'a special free creation from the laws of destiny' (K.P. I.1); and so it is not 'life'; but...... literature."[262]

Belles-Lettres

While defining Kāvya, Hemachandra steers clear of all controversies and compartments of the earlier 'schools' and 'theories' and mentions Word, Sense, Dosa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra in his definition in a spirit of synthesis and accommodation. Obviously, here he follows the lead provided by Mammaṭa, who did much not only to fix the new principle of Dhvani in poetry, but also to work up and rationalise into a synthetic and comprehensive system the already accumulated ideas, elaborated by previous thinkers but flowing through different channels in the respective systems of Bhāmaha, Vāmana and the post-Bharata dramatic Rasa-writers and put them in the convenient and concise form of systematic text-book.[263] Viśvanātha subjects Mammaṭa's definition of poetry to severe criticism because it is considered by him as a half-hearted attempt to appease earlier conservative views on poetry and also because it fails to include Rasa or Dhvani in it more openly as the most important poetic principle. This criticism applies to Hemachandra's definition with equal force. However, Hemachandra devotes the immediately succeeding Sūtras (I.12 etc.) to clarify his pro-Dhvani stand and brings Doṣa,

Guṇa and Alaṁkāra into an effectiva relationship with Rasa-dhvani and follows it up with elaborate accounts of Dhvani (I.19 etc.) and Rasa (II) as well as of Doṣa (III), Guṇa (IV) and Alaṁkāra (V–VI). For this reason, Viśvanātha's criticism of Mammaṭa's definition of Kāvya loses much sharpness in regard to Hemachandra's definition. However, from a technical point of view, the charges of such a definition being negative, too narrow or inconsistent and incomplete apply, more or less equally, to Hemachandra's Kāvyalakṣaṇa. But, in practical terms, we can say with Dr. P. V. Kane that this definition "has the great merit of being simple and easily understood. . . . Everyone is familiar with the terms Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra. By using them, Mammaṭa conveys a tolerably clear and accurate idea of the character of poetry'.[264]

The Body Poetic

Hemachandra mentions four kinds of words and correspondingly four kinds of senses in place of the threefold division espoused by Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others. Mammaṭa classifies Gauṇī as a sub-division of Lakṣaṇā. Hemachandra's deviation, however, need not surprise us or detain us here because we have dealt with this earlier on. Prof. R. B. Athavale, however, criticises Hemachandra's division of Lakṣaṇā and opines that nothing much is achieved by separating Gauṇī.[265]

Hemachandra is businesslike in his treatment of the 'expressed sense'. He is unwilling to pursue any longer the discussion of the fourfold activity of the denotative word as it is not directly related to poetics. He, however, sticks to the Grammarian's view of Saṅketa. While he follows Mammaṭa closely on Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā, he altogether drops the purport-sense from the body of the text, though he discusses it in his Viveka. But Hemachandra takes the palm when he rejects Rūḍhā Lakṣaṇā in favour of Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā and maintains that all instances of the former are instances of primary meaning (Vācyārtha). This is very true. For, as Paul Henle explains, a metaphor requires a clash of terms and

when this 'clash' disappears, a new literary sense is born. "When metaphors become trite, they become powerless and literal". Thus "metaphors" like 'hood of a car' (where 'hood' originally was a metaphor) tend to vanish ...... by becoming literal...."[266] "These are the frozen metaphors of which Lāvaṇya is a good example. ...... The later tradition calls this Nirūḍhā Lakṣaṇā but Abhinava is surely correct.... to regard such words as Anurāgā....as examples of Vivakṣita-vācya, and not Tiraskṛtavācya" (cf. Locana, pp. 147, 462).[267] And the raison d'être of Metaphor is to "free the poet from the necessity of referring via conventions of reference", as Winifred Nowottny so ably puts.[268] Hence, so far as faded metaphors are concerned, Hemachandra is quite definite that we should take all such instances as Kuśala etc. in the normal sense (Mukhyārtha) only.[269] Thus words like Kuśala, Dvirepha etc. typify Abhidhā, and not Lakṣaṇā.

The Aesthetic Meaning

Any durable and cogent theory of aesthetic meaning must "free poetry from the sterner preprogatives and the heavy responsibilities which the didactic view of communication confers upon it. All utilitarian views of linguistic expression stand repudiated by a true theory of aesthetic meaning and artistic expression. It effects a dissociation of the feeling and responding side of human consciousness from the side of knowing and rational valuing. There (are) two emotive directions in which the dissociation could work – towards the inspirations of the author of poetry and toward the responses of his audience".[270]

The distinguishing feature of the aesthetic meaning is the unique alliance of the creative and the appreciative faculties. In fact, in Ānandavardhana's poetics, ably elaborated by Abhinavagupta, "the only criterion for judging on literary matters was the gift of a sound literary taste, or a responsive heart. The concomittance of poetic genius and critical taste is the unique achievement of the theory of poetic suggestion"

"A new philosophy of Beauty", observes Dr. K. Krishnamoorthi, "may be said to have dawned with the re-interpretation of Rasa, from the standpoint of the Spectator's response. This is common to the different new interpretations propounded by Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. . . . .The new significance given to the ancient term Rasa . . . . . makes it a term which corresponds very much to what we mean today by the term 'aesthetic experience'. It can be found in the contemplative moment of the spectator. . . . Its nature is nothing but unalloyed joy, a joy latent in every soul, but patent by the impact of art. In one word, it is 'transcendental', Alaukika".[271]

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthi has ably shown that the thesis of the Dhvani theorists is that 'Dhvani' is the quintessence of poetry; and 'Rasa' is the quintessence of 'Dhvani'. Dhvani is an exclusively poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of every element in the medium of language like Ālaṁkāra, Guṇa and Rīti to serve the ultimate artistic end of Rasa. In other words, Dhvani is the whole poetic process itself. All the elements of Vācyavācaka charm contribute to and culminate in the supremacy of the Vyaṅgya effect, viz., Rasa. Thus we get real Dhvani.[272]

Hemachandra bases his aesthetics on these sound principles as enunciated by Ānandavardhana and expounded by Abhinavagupta. In fact, he quotes Abhinavagupta's passages on Rasa-Experience and allied topics to demonstrate his unflinching fidelity to Abhinavagupta's aesthetics. Prof. S. P. Bhattachary observes that "in Chapter I, the author's guides are the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana. He has occasionally utilised the Kāvyaprakāśa, especially in the treatment of the Vṛttis, though Hemachandra chooses to differ from Mammaṭa here and there. . . . His efforts for being exhaustive in his treatment are evidenced in his taking the cue from Ānandavardhana's specifications of four varieties of Vastudhvani, followed **in toto** by almost all the later writers and amplifying them to thrice their number with apt illustrations in Prakrit."[273]

And so far as the Vyañjanā process is concerned, "our author has faithfully followed Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa, and advanced the stock arguments used by these two authors" to justify the postulation of this novel power of language. "Though in the body of the text Hemachandra does not discuss at length the significance and the necessity of the Dhvani Sense, in his Viveka, he brings together all the views for and against Dhvani and closely follows Mammaṭa. In fact here the whole of Viveka is a faithful copy of the major portion of Kāvyaprakāśa, fifth Ullāsa."[274] But the fact that Hemachandra "did not often abide by the principle of Parivṛitti–sahatvāsahatva, an innovation, though a logical view, noted in the K. P., is evident from his following earlier writers (and Rucaka has done the same thing in his saṅketa on the K.P.) in not including the Ubhayaśaktimūla there defined as a third variety of Vyaṅgya Kāvyas."[275] Hemachandra also discards Mammaṭa's threefold division of the Arthaśakti mūlavyaṅgya (Svataḥ-sambhavī etc.) on the plea that even a natural sense does not appear charming without the magnificient utterance of a poet. Thus Hemachandra is quite clear about the aesthetic fact that Kavipraudhokti is essential for the creation of a charming poem (Kāvyānuśāsan I. 24 ff). He frankly says (Viveka p. 74) that dividing on such flimsy grounds, without a vital poetic principle, serves to mislead pupils only. In view of the acceptance of the divisions of the Arthaśaktimūla by the stalwarts of the Dhvani school,[276] Hemachandra's bold rejection on aesthetic grounds deserves special mention.

Hemachandra subsumes Rasādi Dhvani under Arthaśaktimūlavyaṅgya (I. 25). His scheme of dividing Dhvani is less elaborate than that of Mammaṭa. It appears, he accepts Ānandavardhana's lead, who indicates the broadest distinction and avoids permutations and combinations (cf. Dhvanyāloka III. 45–46).[277] Hemachandra's reason for rejection of the **drift sense** is that it is connected with Abhidhā or the direct sense. This also shows his high priority for poetic suggestion.

First Class Poetry

Hemachandra amalgamates Rasa with Dhvani in the best tradition of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and stresses that Rasādi is always suggested by Vibhāvādi. When these Rasādi, being principally suggested, occupy the predominant position in poetry, they constitute the soul of poetry – Kāvyātmā. Such a Kāvya is called First Class Poetry. Hemachandra's rationale of the classification of poetry into Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama remains identical with that of Mammaṭa, but he attempts this only after completely explaining the Rasa-principle (II. 56 etc.).

The Dynamics of the Aesthetic Process

"Greatness in Literature is not the product of style, or structure, or appropriateness of language. It is not even ensured' by a lofty concept. Rather it springs from the harmonious combination whereby diverse faculties unite to produce one common good."[278] Hemachandra acknowledges that Rasa-dhvani provides the keynote of the aesthetic unity of the whole work[279] and subscribes to Bhaṭṭa Tauta's emphasis on prior vision and the subsequent objectification in the aesthetic process – the Kavikarma. For, the continued, unremitting activity of the poetic consciousness underlies all formal and technical excellence of a poem. It is the Kavivyāpāra that makes both sound and sense, expression and idea, subservient to itself, the basic reality in poetry. In Abhinavagupta's words' Creativity is "consciousness capable of original invention, its distinguishing characteristic being the capacity to create poetry, possessed of relishable feeling, clarity and beauty." Hence, Poetic Blemishes, Excellences and Embellishments have been treated of by Hemachandra in consonance with the standpoint of Rasadhavani alone. And the principle of Propriety[280] plays an important role in the determination of the relative position of Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra in Hemachandra's Poetics.

10

CONCLUSION :
A Critical Review of Hemachandra's Achievement

It has indeed been a very rewarding experience going through the three-layered text of the remarkable theoretical work on Sāhityaśāstra by Hemachandra. We mean the Kāvyānuśāsana, of course. Though the theoretical, critical and illustrative material provided by Hemachandra in this single volume on Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy is extremely extensive in range and the presentation at three different levels – that of the Sūtras, that of the Commentary or gloss and that of the Viveka Vyākhyā – is challenging to our powers of comprehension and correlation, yet our enthusiasm to overcome the hurdles of extent and complexity of treatment is sustained – nay, enhanced by the logical, graded, organized and systematic method of treatment adopted by the author. As it is, the title of the work suggests that it is a scientific manual of poetics meant to present a systematic body of knowledge not only on Kāvya but also on Nāṭaka and on other topics, types and forms of literature. It is in view of this nature of the work that we find herein treated almost all topics and herein represented almost all shades of opinion on poetics uptill that day. To name only the most salient aspects of Poetics, Hemachandra has either fully discussed or mentioned in passing the differentia of literary language; the ends of poetry; the ground and the aids of poetry; the

poetic trainings; the poetic conventions; the nature and divisions of poetry; theories of four types of words and senses; the drift power and the drift sense; the varieties and instances of Dhvani; the rules regarding the governance of the relation of Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṁkāra with Rasa; employment or rejection of Alaṁkāra in actual practice; Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa, Bhāvābhāsa, Bhāvaśānti, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvaśabalatā, etc.; the entire Rasa-theory with its apparatus and schools of interpretation; the nature and types of Doṣas in theory and practice; the number of Guṇas and their nature and function in poetry; the poetic blemishes of Word (Six) and of Sense (29); the Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda and its allied aspects and the different types of Literary 'forms' or Compositions, the rationale of their distinction, their aims, grounds, nature and examples. It may be stated that the method of treatment is so comprehensive that while discussing and explaining the abovementioned topics, a great deal of interesting as also critical material is presented with ample illustrative literature which not only provides tremendous intellectual stimulus to the student but also sharpens his awareness of the long tradition and of the many facets of the science of poetics and dramaturgy at the time Hemachandra came on the scene. It also refines his poetic, aesthetic and critical sensitivity.

The Pros and Cons

Much has been said about Hemachandra's lack of originality.[281] Well known scholars like Dr. S. K. De, Dr. P. V. Kane, Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and others have pointed out this aspect and tried to show the sources of Hemachandra's moral and material inspiration in writing the present work. On the other hand, scholars like Ācarya A. B. Dhruva, Prof. R. C. Parikh[282] and B. P. Bhattacharya[283] have not only defended Hemachandra's attitude of 'I take what is good for me from whichever source I can', but they have also tried to explain the rationale of such an attitude and to

justify this in terms of the actual good it has done to the present work.

There is no doubt that Hemachandra had before him the entire tradition of Sanskrit Dramaturgy and Poetics, and he had the benefit of a hindsight while writing this present work. And he has utilized earlier works without hesitation or moral compunction. But this he has done with a view to make his work a comprehensive, representative and reliable text-book on Alaṁkāraśāstra as recognized by the new school of Dhvani theorists. Keeping in view this aim, Hemachandrācary has freely utilized the works of Bharata, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Rājaśekhara (K.M.), Kuntaka, Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Bhoja, Kṣemendra, Mammaṭa and Rucaka (or Ruyyaka i.e., the author of the Saṅketaṭīkā). And the impact of such a versatile and extensive reference material is there for everyone to see. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya recognizes this fact, after a critical study of five chapters of Hemachandra's work "as those directly associated with citations from the eleventh century Kashmir writers". Let me quote him :

Hemachandra's Perspective

"In the department of poetics, where as an early Nibandha writer he (Hemachandra) made his name, constructive work had given place to systematizing and coordination by the end of the tenth century and it had become the fashion to formulate, elucidate or tabulate whatever was taught by great masters ..... By the end of the eleventh century, the epochmaking Kāvyaprakāśa appeared. ...... It was nothing but a terse and compact treatise, incorporating whatever its author thought noteworthy in the field of poetics from the view point of a practical and inquisitive student. It has explored the labours of Ānandavardhana and of his expositor, the philosopher-poeticist Abhinavaqupta, the two great masters whose teachings and examples have been marked, presented and recorded almost in every page of Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana

(Viveka, P. 66). Hemachandra, who used the K.P. liberally, however, did not forget to present what is worth noting in the writings of other Kashmir writers like Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the illustrious Alaṁkāra teacher of Abhinava, and Rājanaka Tilaka, who might have been a younger contemporary of Mammaṭa, and the Great Bhoja, also of the eleventh century, of another land and of a different line of thought..... works wh'ch..... have served to heighten the interest which Hemachandra took in them..... One prominent feature of the K.A... (is that) each chapter of the work has as its source one or more writers as authority. The K.A. is thus in a sense like a treatise, where different chapters are written by different authors who are acknowledged masters on the subject."[284]

Hemachandra is held to have derived help from his "uptodate MSS collection" which included Rājānaka Tilak's (i.e. of Rucaka's father and teacher's) work. He is also shown to have drawn upon the Saṅketa Commentary of Rucaka on the K.P.[285] Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya notes that though the Viveka on the K.A. came by way of supplement, a few additions to the original work in the Vṛtti portion were made still later on as was the habit of the author in course of revision work (e.g., p. 292, pp. 31-34, pp. 258-263, N.S.E.). "The K.A.'s direct citations, except in the case of the illustrations and their connecting statements in his treatment of the Vṛttis (Sense-functions) in Chap. I, of his citations from the Nāṭyaśāstra..... in Chap. VIII and of three extracts from the Abhinavabhāratī (Vol. I-2nd Ed. p. 341, pp. 282-83; Vol. VII (C/o Vol. II) pp. 152-53) in his Vṛtti, are all found in the Viveka, which professedly is a supplement.[286]

A Comprehensive Approach

Hemachandra uses prose for his Sūtras or Kārikās like Vāmana and is very terse and businesslike in his Vṛtti, but elaborate in his citations. His illustrations, in which he tries to be comprehensive, are from Kāvyas. His efforts for being

exhaustive have been pointed out in the preceding pages. He amplifies Ānandavardhana's specifications of four varieties of Vastudhvani to thrice their number with apt illustrations in Prakrit. He follows the age-old practice of giving stock examples quite scrupulously but, being conscious of the practical nature of poetics, adds here and there examples which serve to widen the student's range of study. He avoids unnecessary and irrelevant elaboration in the gloss (e.g. the Padaprakāśyatva of Bhāvādi etc,, gloss. p. 87). But he does not hesitate to add often supplementary matter in the Viveka when it is needed for the advanced student. His zeal for clarification ('Bhama dhammia', for instance, is fully explained) makes him quote profusely (Vide under Sūtras I.8, I.10, I.16 ff, I.24 ff, II.1, II.17 ff, III.3 ff, etc.)

The Sources of Hemachandra's Work

Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya has shown in detail and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni has graphically tabulated the different authorities and sources of Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana. Thus in chapter I, we can see the influence of the Kāvyaprakāśa and the author is guided by the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana in the dominance of the Vyañjanā view. Hemachandra has occasionally utilized the K. P., especially in the treatment of the Vṛttis, though he strikes a different note from Mammaṭa here and there (on Gauṇī, Kavipraudhokti, Divisions of the Madhyama-Kāvya, Kākuvakrokti, etc.). In this connection, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni remarks, "Hemachandra shows independence of thought and judgement in good many places, refusing to follow blindly his acknowledged authorities. To wit, he rejects. . . . three of the six Kāvyaprayojanas given by Mammaṭa (pp. 5-6); he differs with Mukulabhaṭṭa and Mammaṭa for he holds that Lakṣaṇā is based on Prayojana alone. . . . He rightly rejects the threefold classification of Artha into Svataḥ Sambhavī etc. . . . as found in the Dhv. (pp. 72-73) and the K. P. (IV. 39-40). Hemachandra criticises Dhanika for describing Jīmūtavāhana as Dhīrodātta (vide KS p. 123 ll. 19-21 and DR II. p. 37). If Mammaṭa speaks

of the eight kinds of Madhyama-Kāvya, Hemachandra holds that there are only three kinds of it (pp. 152-157)...."[287]

In the second chapter, he draws upon the N.S. (VI-VII) and the Abhinavabhāratī as also Locana and Bhoja's views (ref. to an account of the intermingling of Bhāvas and of Rasābhāsa). The divisions of Kāvya on the basis of Vyañjanā, as we have it in the K.P. marks the end of the chapter. The illustrations, over and above those based on the Dhvanyāloka, the Locana and the Abhinavabhāratī are picked up from the Daśarupāvaloka, the Śṛṅgāratilaka and from both of Bhoja's works on the Śāstra, especially the Saravastīkaṇṭhābharaṇa. And the Viveka draws upon the Locana and the Abh. bh. for the exposition of verses (Abh. bh. Vol. I pp. 286, 303-307; Locana pp. 80-81, 110, 67, 75, etc.), while the author takes his stand on Abhinava's acceptance of the nine Rasas and has three long passages from the Abhinavabhāratī on his topic, one of which discusses the Sāttvikabhāvas as emanating from the transformation of the human body in the elemental aspect. The. Abh. bh. extract in the Viveka on Rasa-experience is sometimes fuller, more direct and better connected as in the case of the interpretation of Saṅkuka. It is noteworthy that his estimate of Karuṇa-Vipralambha as a variety of Karuṇa Rasa is fundamentally different from that of the Nāt. Śās. and the Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa but agrees with the view of the Daśarūpaka.[288]

Hemachandra's Doṣa-doctrine is in keeping with the Rasa-dhvani doctrine and as such his inspiration on Rasadoṣas also lies in the Dhv. Āl. and Locana; still his dependence on Mammaṭa and his source-author Mahimabhaṭṭa is evident in Chapter III which deals with Doṣas. "Mahimabhaṭṭa's hand is writ large on this portion, as is indicated by the long excerpts running over page after page in the Viveka. Sometimes the wording in the Viveka is delusive, but there is no difficulty in finding out the source."[289]

We have noted Dr. Raghavans views on the treatment of Guṇas by Hemachandra. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni observes that his

treatment of the topic of Guṇas (Ch. IV) is indeed remarkable, for its presentation and style invariably remind us of Rājaśekhara's K.M.[290] We have endeavoured to study Hemachandra's treatment of Guṇas at two levels as fully as possible, and tried to view it in the background of Ānandavardhana's conception of and Mammaṭa's treatment of the poetic excellence.

So far as Hemachandra's treatment of six figures of word is concerned, it is shown to be based on the N.S. XVII, KD, Rudrata, SK II, KP (VIII, X) IX, Abh. Vol. II (pp. 383-392) and Devīśataka with Kayyata's commentary, whereas the treatment of twentynine figures of sense "is mainly based on the works of Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, Kuntaka, Mammaṭa, and to some extent on the SK and Locana".[291] "Although Hemachandra takes his cue from Kuntaka and his reasoning in reducing the number of Arthālaṁkāras is not always satisfactory nor convincing, the fact remains that his treatment of this topic is, to a good extent, novel.[292] Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya opines that "the Arthālaṁkāra section .... is the weakest portion in the K.A., as is also the case in the K.P. Hemachandra's efforts to reduce their number-67 in Rudraṭa's K.A. and 61 in the K.P. but 29 in the K.A. which have been provoked by Kuntaka's attitude in the V.J., towards particular Alaṁkāras -- are at the root of this, which is something unusual in him. Besides Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa (and his commentator Namisādhu), the acknowledged authorities on the subject in the old school, he has requisitioned the help of the V.J. and very likely the Udbhaṭa-Viveka of Rājānaka Tilaka ...... Hemachandra's apparent half-hearted compliance with the theory of Parivṛttisahatvāsahatva...... a point discussed and dismissed by Rājānaka Tilaka ..... and the rejection of (the extra Śabdālaṁkāras and) a few Arthālaṁkāras sponsored by Bhoja in the S.K. are significant. Of equal, if not greater, importance is his incorporation of Mahimabhaṭṭa's cogent observations in relation to Svabhāvokti (V.V. pp. 390-91 :

"Ucyate .... pratibhārpitaḥ"). ... His indication in the Viveka ..... of Arthāntaranyāsa is essentially different from what Nidarśanā and Anyokti (The nomenclature is after Rudraṭa, K.A. VIII. 74 and the treatment after the V.J. which calls it with the old name Aprastutapraśaṁsā) as defined by him reminds one of the confusion apt to be created by the treatment of that figure in the Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin (e.g. II. 173)".[293]

On the question of traits of characters dealt with by Hemachandra in Chapter VII, we have attempted a fairly comprehensive review of that chapter, keeping in view his dependence on the N.S. XII and the Abh. Vol. III as well as the D.R. (II) and Avaloka and the SK (for a few verses).[294] It may be noted that although Bharata's analysis is indicatory, yet it is "more detailed, more varied and more comprehensive of the different aspects of character, conduct and condition than what is found preserved or developed in later works of dramaturgy, poetics or erotics", as Dr. Raghavan remarks.[295]

Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya's Comments on Literary Forms in the Kāvyānuśāsana.

"The other way of dividing Kāvyas based on their form, which is as old as Daṇḍin, is found in the last chapter (VIII) of the Kāvyānuśāsana, as it is also in the Kāvyālaṁkāra of Rudraṭa. The source-book for the whole chapter in all its details is the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Chapter XI), following which we have a mention of twelve major Dṛśya Kāvyas and eleven minor ones (with one of them left out and two given a different name). The Nāt.Śās., or to be more precise, the Abh.bh., among Kashmir works is used in the text and in the Viveka, on the Dṛśyakāvyas generally and the Geya (and Rāga-Kāvyas), which are treated more fully by his pupil Ramachandra in his Nāṭya-darpaṇa. The Viveka practically on this point is nothing but excerpts from the Abh.bh. Ramachandra's fancy for twelve Rūpakas as opposed to the time-honoured numbering of Bharata is to be traced to Hemachandra's treatment. Amongst noted Alaṁkāra-Nibandha writers, Hemachandra is the first to include

dramaturgy in his purview though his accounts, even including that in the Viveka, are only scrappy. . . . Hemachandra's citation in this chapter from Bhaṭṭa Tauta, who had a pronounced leaning towards Dṛśyakāvyas, brings into relief the thinness of the veil separating Dṛśya .. from Śravya Kāvyas, a point hinted at by earlier authorities including Vāmana. His affiliation to the Kashmir line of thought is apparent in his echoing the view of Ānandavardhana on the place of lyrics in literature" (Dhv. Āl. III).[296]

Evaluation

Hemachandra's dependence on and indebtedness to different prominent authorities in regard to different aspects of Sanskrit Literary Theory confirms the inevitable impact of great works of theory on later Nibandhas and speaks volumes about the weight of tradition in technical and scientific theoretical works. It is, therefore, not fair to dismiss the Kāvyānuśāsana as an unoriginal work. For, "was, for the matter of that, any of the Alaṁkāra Nibandha writers, including the great Mammaṭa, original in the strict sense of the term ?", asks Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya. In view of this, it is not quite correct to describe the Kāvyānuśāsana as a compilation lacking in originality of a result of plagiarism. In fact, it redounds to the credit of the author of our work that he never loses sight of his theoretical affiliations and supports his stand by means of originsl citations from his illustrious predecessors too wellknown to be specified by name. Besides, we should not forget that Hemachandra was writing a scientific work on Poetics and Dramaturgy and as such his citations and assimilations are there on purpose and are quite justified. And Hemachandra has made appropriate use of the masters' works which he considered as universal sources for authoritative writings on the subject of poetics. We should therefore assess the worth of the present work on the basis of Hemachandra's marvellous power of organization of his material as well as his genius for assimilation and selection of relevant thoughts, examples and

passages to corroborate his views so as to make his work as authentic, reliable and durable as possible. It was to prepare "a good text-book lucidly setting forth various topics of Alaṁkāraśāstra in the very words of the masters and serving as a good introduction to the study of the well known authorities" that Hemachandra wrote the Kāvyānuśāsana, and not to lay claim to any unique originality.[297] And after going through the whole work, at three levels, it can be said with confidence that the Kāvyānuśāsana represents a remarkable attempt at presenting a wide range of poetical topics in terms of the Rasadhvani doctrine. Thus, in the field of poetics, Hemachandra's work, as a scholar and a teacher, "is far more important than of those who put forward extracts from different authors or commentators and heap them up in a loose disorderly fashion. In a country where much of its valuable heritage has faced the risk of being irretrievably lost, the services of such writers can hardly be overestimated."[298]

A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF THE LIFE AND WORKS OF HEMACHANDRA

11

Thanks to the efforts of scholars like Dr. G. Buhler, Prof. R. C. Parikh and others, a connected account of Hemachandrācārya's early life is not a matter of mystery or conjecture. Accordingly, Hemachandra was born in 1088 or 1089 A. D. in Dhaṅdhukā near Ahmedabad in a Moḍha family. He was called Cāṅgadeva in his childhood. He was initiated in Jainism by the famous Jain monk Devachandrasūri, under whom he mastered many branches of Indian Learning or "crossed the ocean of learning." His fascination for the "land of learning" (Kashmir) indicates the deep infiiuence of Kashmirian Scholars' work on his Śāstric predilections and is suggestive of the fact that "some of Hemachandra's teachers might have been Kashmirian Paṇḍitas." This explains his adherence to the doctrines of poetics developed in Kashmir by such authorities as Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. For, Kashmir, from early times and particularly in this period, has been the land that furnished the material groundwork and gave the signal io start for investigations by writers all over the country.[290] It stands to reason, therefore, that the life of Hemachandra, who grew to be a man of extensive and extraordinary learning, should have "something to do with Kashmir in matters of learning."

This fits in well with the statement of the Prabhāvakacarita that Hemachandra studied in the next twelve years after ordination "Logic and Dialectics as well as Grammar and Poetics and that he mastered these subjects at once on accont of the power of his intelligence which shone clear and pure as light."[300] The underlined expression incidentally tallies with Hemachandra's definition of natural genius (K.A.S. I.5). And Hemachandra's later scholarly attainments show that the statement of the Prabhāvakacarita as to his capacities is right and that he must have indeed possessed more than ordinary power of intellect.[301]

Hemachandra's term of apprenticeship came to a close in V. S. 1166 (or 1110 A.D.) as he was then ordained as a Sūri or Ācārya, an independent exponent of the Holy Scripture and a successor of his teacher."[302] Thus we find that he acquired the name Hemachandrāchārya as per the custom of the Jain ascetics, at the age of twentyone.

Hemachandra's acquaintance and friendship with two of Gujarat's most illustrious Kings, Siddharāja Jaisiṁha and his successor Kumārapāla, provides a glorious chapter as much in the history of Gujarat as in the history of Sanskrit Literature. Leaving aside questions of how and why and when Hemachandra came into close contact with these two kings, we would do well to focus our attention on the literary outcome of this contact. And in these terms Hemachandra's achievement is stupendous by any standard.

To begin with, it was at Siddharāja's instance that Hemachandra composed his magnum opus, the Siddhahema grammatical treatise. This was the first great technical work in his Anuśāsana series. It was fittingly called 'The Śabdānuśāsana' and the title 'Siddhahemachandra' was given to it to commemorate his deep respect for and love towards the King Siddharāja who was a great lover of belles-lettres. Siddharāja entrusted Hemachandra with the preparation of a new grammar

as he had an earnest desire to have great works written in his kingdom and country as it was done in Mālavā and as he thought that Hemachandra, who had a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit literature and the Brahmanical sciences as well as proficiency in the poetic art, "was worthy of becoming the Bhoja of Gujarat".[303]

Prof. Buhler hits the nail on the head when he maintains that "the success of his grammar appears to have induced Hemachandra to extend further the scope of his work and to write a number of handbooks which should give the students of Sanskrit composition – and more particularly of the poetics – complete guidance to corr ect and eloquent expression. This endeavour led to the compilation of a number of lexica and text-books of rhetorics and metrics as well as of a formal artistic poem which contains the history of the Caulukys kings and princes meant for illustrating the grammatical rules".[304]

Prof. Buhler holds (p. 36) that after his appointment as the Court-Pandit about V.S. 1194, Hemachandra undertook the task of writing complete series of manuals for the worldly science and specially for Sanskrit composition. Of these, the Grammar and its appendices with the commentary, perhaps also both of the Sanskrit Lexics and the first fourteen cantos of the Dvyāśraya were completed befor Jaisiṁha's death. After V.S. 1199, he appears to have pursued his plan further without worrying about the loss of his position in the court, and worked tirelessly as a private scholar. The first work belonging to this period is his Mannual of Poetics.[305] This is the Kāvyānuśāsana which we have studied, criticaliy, comparatively and comprehensively, in the preceding pages.

Hemachandra's Works

Hemachandra's literary output is so extensive in volume and varied jn subject-matter that tradition credits him with the authorship of innumerable works. But Hemachandra himself refers to his main works in the colophon to the T.S.P.C.

According to this information, the main works of Hemachandra are the following :

(1) The Śabdānuśāsana, the Grammar with appendices and Commentary,

(2) The Dvyāśrayakāvya,

(3) The Kāvyānuśāsana,

(4) The Yogaśāstra,

(5) The Chando'nuśāsana,

(6) The Nāmasaṁgrah, i.e., The Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, Deśināmamāla and other lexicons; and,

(7) The T.S.P.C.

To these, we should add :

(8) The Vitarāgastutis,

(9) The Dvātriṁśikās; and,

(10) The Pramāṇmatmāṁsā.

We have shown above the interconnection of the Anuśāsana series and Prof. Buhler, Prof. A. B. Dhruva and Prof. R. C. Parikh have maintained that Hemachandra aimed at treating of "all that the Brāhmaṇas knew". Prof. Jacobi observes that "Hemachandra has very extensive and at the same time accurate knowledge of many branches of Hindu and Jain learning combined with great literary skill, and an easy style. His streagth lies in encyclopaedical work rather than in original research but the enormous mass of varied information which he gathered from original sources, mostly lost to us, makes his works an inestimable mine for philological and historical research" (Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol.VI, p. 591).

Hemachandra's Poetic Works

Prof. R. C. Parikh justifiably states that "Hemachandra's Śāstric works engage so much of our attention that we hardly think of his poetical works, but, a careful study of his Poetic works reveals him to be a poet of no mean order. His two

Dvyāśrayas, his illustrative verses in the Rāyaṇāvalī (or the Deśināmamālā) and the Chandonuśāsana, the T.S.P.C. and the devotional hymns, throw a flood of light on his poetic faculty".[306]

Dr. S. P. Narang[307] is right when he sums up that "Hemachandra was an erudite Jain monk who not only digested and reproduced numerous branches of Sanskrit learning but also wrote new technical treatises and lucid poetry. Due to his multifarious productivity in language and literature, he was extolled with the epithet 'Omniscient of the Kali Age' (Kalikālasarvajña). His works comprise dictionaries, philosophical treatises, Sanskrit literery criticism, grammar, original poetry and commentaries." Dr. Narang provides an interesting analytical outline of Hemachandra's Dvyāśrayakāvya and also refers to the several works ascribed to him (pp. 6-14) to which we refer the inquisitive reader. Learning was Hemachandra's first love, so much so that "even during the period of his greatest power, when his friendship with Kumārapāla claimed much of him, Hemachandra remained true to his literary aspirations. Besides the Yogaśāstra... and an exhaustive commentary thereon, he wrote between V. S. 1216 and 1229, the Triṣaṣtis'alākāpuruṣacarita, the life of sixtythree best men."[308] Thoug essentially a religious work, this work reveals "genuine poetic qualities of description, emotion and story-telling and proves Hemachandra to be a Mahākavi."[309]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Prelude

1 "Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists" in JOAS (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1957) p. 117.

2 Dr. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 289.

3 Prof. R. C. Parikh, Introduction (p. 62) to K. A. S. (2nd Ed. 1964).

4 Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Ibid, p. 117.

5 Ibid, p. 117.

6 Viḍe, Ibid, p. 117.

7 Ibid, p. 129 & f.n. 50.

Chapter One

1 Vāmana introduces his name as well as the title of his treatise through his benedictory verse (1.1). He too begins with 'Pranamya', as does Bhāmaha (I.1). The Kāmadhenu commentary mentions four objectives of a benedictory verse : (1) Observation of the ancient tradition, (2) Unobstructed completion of the work through propitiation of the deities, (3) Unhindered reception of the work by the readers, and (4) Introduction of the **subject-matter** and

the **aims** of the work. Interestingly, Kāmadhenu adds that the mentioning of the name of the authors ensures glory and publicity.

2 Vāgbhaṭa (secondus) glorifies the Ardhamāgadhi speech in almost identical terms (vide The Kāvyānuśāsana, V.1; N.S. Ed. 1915). The 'Speech of the Jinas' is also propitiated by the authors of the N.D. (I.1). Mammaṭa's benedictory verse characteristically glorifies the poet's Muse and none else (K.P. I., V.1).

3 cf. "Maṅgalaṁ cābhidheyaṁ ca
Sambandhas'ca Prayojanaṁ I
Catvāri kathaniyāni
Śāstrasya dhuri dhīmatā" II

4 Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya notes that "Grammar went hand in hand with rhetoric and poetics.... so much so that it was in and through them that speech has... spread its triumphs over thoughts and things". Vide "The Psychological Basis of Alaṁkāra Litt. etc.," in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Vol. III(2), 1925, p. 661. Thus, Bhāmaha mentions (I.9) Grammar as the essential of poetry (Also seeI.10 & V.4). Daṇḍin (I.6) states that speech employed aright is a desire-yielding cow. But employed amiss, it betrays the degradation of its employer. Vākyapadīya (I.13) underlines the same idea. For the words 'Sādhu' & 'Asādhu', Vide, Vākyapadīya I.25. 27, 29. Daṇḍin (I.3-4) also stresses the same point. Vide also "Indian Poetic Tradition" for the esoteric and aesthetic significance of Sādhu Vāk (Introduction, pp.11-12.)

However, later theorists like Mammaṭa take this aspect of the 'correct speech' for granted. For grammatical and syntactical correctness is essential fort he mastery of the medium. See Vāmana's K. A. S. (1.3.4.) for a further explicit statement on this point.

5 This topic is connected with the nature and cause of Kāvya which is dealt with in a separate sūtra (I.3). But since the word Kāvya in I.2 needs explanation, it is explained in terms of Tauta's quotation. This quotation is connected with Tauta's theory of the Imagination – which theory was reverentially accepted by Abhinavagupta in his Locana and which became canonical in later works. This poetic imagination "is that gift of mind by whose aid one can visualise myriad new things anew. It is by virtue of this gift alone that one deserves the title of a poet. His poetry abounds in imaginative description." Tauta's views on the office of the poet are also quoted by Hemachandra on p. 432 (Chapter–VIII, quote–46). Tauta's aesthetic philosophy goes to the very heart of the poetic art. Vide Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya's, observations in "Studies in Indian Poetics" ("Three Lost Masterpieces of Alaṁkāraśāstra") : "Some of his (Bhaṭṭa Tota's) dicta as thoes concerning the relative place of Pratibhā (originality). . . . and information (Vyutpatti) in affording the clue to poetic inspiration; . . . . concerning the mechanical or formative function (Vibhāvavyāpāra) coming to the aid of creative impulse or poetic intuition (Darśana) through description (Varṇana) are well known and form instructive and refreshing reading."

6 Hemachandra's gloss here in unmistakably an echo of Mammaṭa's gloss on K.P.I. 2 of. Bhāmaha (I. 2) and Rudraṭa (I. 4–12). Dhanañjaya redicules the idea that "from dramas, which distil joy, the gain is knowledge only, as in the case of history and the like; for **it is a case of turning your face away from what is** delightful !" (D.R.I. 6). Also read the Avaloka on this verse : स्वसंवेद्यपरमानन्दरूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपानां फलम् ।

7 This didactic aim of poetry is, in fact, extra–literary. But since Moralists put forward the stock argument –

'काव्यालापांश्च वर्जयेत्', it is imperative that poeticists must convincingly establish the acceptability of Kāvya. In K.A.S. (1. 1. 1-2) Vāmana makes an important point which serves as a reply to the moralists. Mammaṭa reply (K.P. I. 1) seems to lie in showing the uniqueness and superiority of the poetic creation. Bhāmaha (V. 3) points out that being delightfu land indirectly instructive Kāvya has a greater appeal. This is Mammaṭa's and Hemachandra's view also. Abhinava is followed by both.

8 "Sarasvatyāstattvaṁ kavisahṛdayākhyaṁ vijayate", Locana, opening verse (p. 1).

9 From here the discussion of the subject of The Making of A True Poet starts.

The question of the interplay of various factors in the creative process has engaged the attention of Literary theorists and Art critics through the ages but it has defied elearer explanation. The main reason for this is that it is impossible to attemp an objective analysis of the inner workings of a creative mind. The problem is also complicated by the social and cultural values associated with the role of a poet. Difference of opinion regarding the origin of creativity also hampers clearer exposition. Hence, inspite of researches by specialists and theorizing by critics and philosphers, the eternal question still remains : "Are poets born or made ?"

Theorists like Bhāmaha (I. 5), Daṇḍin (I. 103), Vāmana (1.3. 16 and gloss), Rudraṭa (I. 14), Mammaṭa (I. 3) and others try to answer this question in their respective works. Hemachandra insists that Pratibhā is the sine qua non of poetic creation. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy (Essays in Sk. Litt. Criticism, p. 174) gives credit to Vāmana for describing Pratibhā in an acceptable way. Rudraṭa distinguishes Sahajā and Utpādyā varieties of Prtibhā or Poetic Imagination.

10 Vide IV K.A.S. III. 3 off. See Chap. IV Infra.

11 cf. Bhāmaha VI. 24 : नाप्रयुक्तं प्रयुञ्जीत etc.

12 VKASV. 1.3-5-6, 7-11 etc. Vāmana gives greater details. Vide Dr. S. K. De, HSP-II, p. 43.

13 Rājaśekhara describes Śāstra as growing like a big river (K.M. II).

14 Dr. S. K. De denies Kaviśikṣā a place under general Poetics. HSP-II (Chapter-X), p. 287.

15 Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, "Sanskrit Writers on Plagiansm" in "Studies in Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra", pp. 2-3. (p. 54) Also See F. W. Thomas' paper on 'The Making of a Sanskrit Poet' in Sir R. G. Bhandarkara Comm. Vol., BORI, 1917.

16 Ānandavardhana deals with Saṁvāda or coincidences in poems by different great authors (Dhv. Āl. IV. 11). He warns that all such coincidences should not be regarded as identical (involving plagiarism).

17 Quoted by Dr. P. V. Kane from the Alaṁkāraśekhara, p. 20 (Nir. Ed.).

18 Vide Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya on "Three Lost Masterpieces of Alaṁkāraśāstra" in "Studies in Indian Poetics", pp. 29, 32 etc. He laments the loss of Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa and underlines the position of the three lost works as **feeder-streams to later writers** (p. 29).

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy ('Studies in Indian Aesthetics and Criticism', p. 33) discusses the recovery of Udbhaṭa's work in his article "Fragments from Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa".

19 Dhv. Āl. II. 19 ff. Infusing poetry with suggestion, its soul, and following faithfully the specified ways in which

the gallaxy of figures like metaphor etc. can be harmonized with Rasa-development – such aspects can never be overemphasized.

Chapter Two

20 Vide 'Indian Theories of Meaning' by Dr. K. K. Raja pp. 253-54.

21 Ibid p. 19. Dr. K. K. Raja writes : "The essential nature of a word lies in its significative power (Śabda : Śaktam padam)"; Vide pp. 19-24 for a critical review of the diff. theories on the primary signification.

22 Vide K.P. II. 8, gloss.

23 'Saṅketo gṛhyate jātau guṇadravyakriyāṣu ca'.

24 K.P. II. 8 ff.

25 Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja clearly explains the nature of the metaphoric usage in 'Indian Theories of Meaning', Chap. 6, p. 231 etc.

26 'Guṇanimittā vṛttirgauṇīvṛttiḥ' **or** 'Guṇebhya āgatā gauṇī.'

27 Gautama applies the term Upacāra to this secondary function of words. Vide 'Indian Theories of Meaning', pp. 233–234. The motive element is greatly emphasized by the Literary Critics.

28 Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja writes : "According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa and other Mīmāṁsakas Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā are **two separate functions** of words; but other schools of thought, who also accept this distinction, consider them as **two varieties** of the secondary power of words, and they use the term Lakṣaṇā to cover both, the former being called Gauṇī Lakṣaṇā or Upacāra and the latter Śuddhā (pure) Lakṣaṇā." (Emphasis added) Ibid, p. 240.

29 Ibid, p. 240 (see f.n. 28, above).

30 Vide Dr. V. Raghavan's Bhoja's Śr. Pr. pp.18, 88, 92. Bhoja includes Mukhyā, Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā under Abhidhā or Vṛtti. Bhoja's Gauṇī is twofold .

31 Mammaṭa clearly states in K.P. II. 9 (gloss) that "this twofold (indication) is pure as it is **not mixed with Upacāra** (i.e. fancied identification based on resemblance). Vide 'Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 241 for a lucid exposition. Also cf. K.P. II. 12 ff.

32/33 Mammaṭa devotes a separtes Sūtra (K. P. II. 6) to Tātparyārtha.
Vide Dr. K. K. Raja, Ibid, p. 151.

34 Ānandavardhana uses the term Sahṛdaya. Abhinava defines this term in his Locana (p. 38). And in the same work (p. 68) he reiterates that in poetic enjoyment the connoisseur's active participation is a must. Bhaṭṭa Tauta supports this joint effort of the poet and the reader (Locana, p. 92).

35 V. J. I. 8. Kuntaka says : "The 'meaning' is that which is signified and the 'word' is that which signifies. This is so **well known** that it needs no elaboration. But in the province of poetry their true nature is as follows (I.9). cf. Dhv. Āl. I.3 For 'Prasiddha' cf. Dhv. Āl. I.3.

36 Vide K.P. II. 12 ff. In the twofold qualitative indication, cognition of identity despite difference in substratum and the cognition of complete identity (respectively) is **the purpose.** But in the two varieties of pure indication the capability of bringing about the result in a way distinct from others and without fail is the purpose.

37 "Irony" is explained as "a peculiar mode of thought and expression in which the meaning of the speaker is contrary to the literal sense. It is a form of covert sarcasm, mockery, a satire, perhaps the most crushing

and irresistible figure of rhetoric." The Encyclopaedia American, Vol. 15, p. 390.

For a fuller discussion of Kāku or Intonation, read Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's paper on "The Treatment of Intonation (Kāku) in SK. Poetics" in his 'Studies in Sanskrit Sāhitya'sāstra', Chapter III, pp. 28-36.

Hemachandra rejects it as a figure and takes it as a case of subordinate suggestion but provides all useful information about Kāku. Vide Ibid pp. 33 & 35.

38 Vide 'Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 258 (re : Lakṣaṇā and Arthāpatti).

39 Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Introduction (p. 28) to 'Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka.' Prof. Hiriyanna considers the theory of Dhvani wide enough to cover all forms of Art. Vide Art Experience, (1954), p. 71.

40 Dr. Krishnamoorthy, Ibid, pp. 25-26.

41 Abhinava explains that here there is neither prohibition of going nor another Vidhi to redress another prohibition. cf. Mālatīmādhava III. 3.

42 K.P. III. 23 etc. Here Mammaṭa underlines that in the suggestiveness of the meaning, there is cooperation of the word. He stressess in the gloss that a sense which is known from any other means of proof is never suggestive. This is an important characteristic of Dhvani.

43 Hemachandra notes that Prakaraṇa is Aśabda whereas Artha is Śabdavān. Hence the former is non-verbal but the latter is verbal or mentioned in so many words.

44 Auciti is a restrictive factor of the sense of a homonym. It is a contextual factor with several others and a key to Ambiguity and Equivocation cf. V.P. II. 316.

Also see The Indian Theories of Meaning. pp. 48-56.

45 On Kāku ref. to K. M. (VII). It is a modulation of voice and the soul of poetry according to Rajaśekhara. It helps reveal a meaning not expressed and is related to the process of suggestion.

Vide Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's views on Kāku, "Studies in S. K. Sāhityaśāstra", pp. 38-36.

46 Vide f.n. 45 above. cf. "In considering utterances, it must be constantly remembered that they occur in a context, with a certain intonation, and that this context and intonation are essential to their analysis and interpretation." Paul Henle, 'Language, Toyught and Culture', p. 123.

47 Vide Dhvanyāloka (II), p. 74 (B. P. Bhattacharya's ed.).

48/49 Svataḥsambhavī is a subdivision of the Arthaśaktimūla-vyaṅgya. Abhinava admirably brings out the suggestion in the verse 140 cited in Viveka.

50 Abhinava says that Śābdīvyañjanā is due to double entendre' (e.g. Goparāga) but Ārthī is due to context (Prakaraṇa).

51 Gloss on Dhv. Āl. 1.23.

52 B. P. Bhattacharya's ed. of Dhvanyaloka (II), pp. 109-110.

53 cf. Dhv. Āl. II.28 for the difference between an expressed and a suggested poetic figure.

54 Cited in the Dhv. Āl. under II.27 where the reading is Vīrānām (Vide Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's ed., p. 92) Here it is an example of Upamādhvani.

55 Viveka, p. 74.

56 Cited in the K.P.X (v. 407) as also in the Locana.

57 Vide Ekāvalī III. 1 (with Taralā) K. P. T. 's ed.

58 Vide, Taralā on EK. III. 1

59 Abhinavagupta on Dhv. Āl. I.1 declares that Rasadhvani is relishable through the poetic process only and that is the real Dhvani; that indeed is the soul of a poem. This is never expressed by its own terms; nor can it be evidenced in the worldly affairs.

Vide K. Ram Pisharoti's summary of the Locana, The Dhvanyāloka, pp. 283-88, Indian Thought, 1917.

60 Vide Dr. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics, p.110, f.n. 9. Also read Notes to Dhv. Āl I.9 (p.309).

Chapter Three

61 cf. Dr. S. K. De : "... the solution depending upon the explanation of the two much discussed terms 'Saṁyoga' and 'Niṣpatti' in Bharata's original dictum...." – 'Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics', p.193.

62 Vide K. M. Varma's "Seven Words In Bharata: What do they signify ?" Orient Longman, Bombay etc., 1958.

63 R. Gnoli observes : "The Nāṭyaśāstra is a work of deep psychological insight." Introduction to 'The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta'. p. XIV.

64 i. e. the Sahṛdaya of Ānandavardhana.

65 Hemachandra, in fact, omits some portion and in other respects rewrites the text but retains the main thrust of Abhinava's thesis. We get the full meaning of Abhinava's view if we read Mammaṭa's text with our author's gloss – which method is employed here.

66 Vide K.A.S. p. 104 (gloss), vv. 93-95 and Viveka, pp. 104-105

A. Sankaran explains some of these verses in his "Some Aspects of Sanskrit Literary Criticism" pp. 75-76 etc.

67 J. L. Masson and M. V. Patawardhan's studies provide an in-depth discussion of Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics.

68 K.A.S. II. ff.

69 Vide 'Aesthetic Rapture' Vol. I, p. 54 (N.S. VI) "Now the Rasa called Vīra has only noble people for its characters. . . . ."

70 'Vibhāva iti kasmāducyate etc.' N.S. VIII. 3 ff. But in Chapter VI extensive details of Ālaṁbanavibhāvas are given. This is the sense of the present reference.

71 Cf. The Daśarūpa, Hass, p. 132.

72 Vide A. Sankaran, Ibid, p. 99.

73 In both the verses, the word Śoka occurs. Hence it is not Rasabhūta but Vācyabhūta.

74 Vide R. Gnoli, The Aesthetic Exp. etc., p. 31, f.n. 7.

75 Based on a wrong interpretation of N.S. VI. 46 according to Abhinava. According to this school of Indian philosophy, the external objects are a menifestation of Prakṛti which consists of pleasure, pain and stupor; so the objects also consist of pleasure, pain, etc.

76 Cf. Hemachandra's definition of poetry in K. A. S. I. 11. It is a 'classical' defnition in view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of Rasa.

77 Cf. Abhinava's comments on Dhv. Āl. II.4 Also read S. D. III 2-3 on Aesthetic Experience. According to Viśvanātha, Sattva is nothing but the mind or inner sense (Manaḥ) devoid of any contact with Rajas or Tamas. Mammaṭa uses 'Sattvodrekaprakāśa' (K.P. IV. p. 68).

78 Vide Gnoli, Ibid, p. 48, f.n. 1, for the association of the aesthetic with the mystical experience.

79 Vide Ibid, Appendix III, p. 113. In his Locana on Dhv. Āl. II. 4, Abhinavagupta reviews Bhaṭṭanāyaka's position.

80 See further, p. 220, "So it is settled that Rasa is the aim of the poem."

81 Gnoi, Ibid, p. 51, f.n. 1.

82 Viveka, p. 97, last two lines and continued on p. 98, first para–upto the end of the quotation no. 37. In between, Hemachandra has omitted a few lines. Even Quote–35 is absent in the Abh. bh. portion in Gnoli's text (p. 11). Hemachandra also omits "Āmnayasiddhaḥ. . . . .etc." –" the three well known verse. (See Gnoli, Ibid, p. 12).

83 Viveka, p. 98, Quote–37.

84 This consciousness or Pratipatti lies in passing from the original to another. It is termed propulsion, order or command (Vidhi or Niyoga) in Mīmāṁsā. The followers of Prabhakara use विधि/नियोग, but the disciples of Kumārila prefer Bhāvana.

This shift of sense is explained by means of the three verses (p. 98, Quote-37) cited here from some work on Poetics (may be the Hṛdayadarpana of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, a lost work).

85 Ekaghana means 'dense', 'compact', 'uniform' etc. and implies, 'non-interference of obstacles (विघ्नs). Vide, Gnoli, Ibid, p. 59.

86 Vide, Gnoli, Ibid, p. 59, f.n.4.

87 The significant term Nāṭyadharmī (N.S. VI.25, XIII. 70 ff) refers to all the theatrical paraphernaliascenery, costumes, traditional conventions, etc.

88 The styles or Vṛttis are four : Kaiśikī, Sāttvatī, Ārabhaṭī and Bharātī (Vide D. R. Hass, p. 74). The Pravṛttis or

local usages are also four: Dākṣiṇātyā, Āvantī, Auḍramāgadhī and Pāñcālī. These very from country to country and add local colour.

89 Abhinava observes in his Locan on Dhv. Āl. I. 5 ff.: "Rasa is simply the tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for instance, to the Vibhāvas and the Anubhāvas of the mental state of sorrow (Śoka). The expression that the Sthāyins become Rasa arises, solely, by correspondence (Aucitya). For a gist of the Locana text vide K. Rama Pisaroti, The Dhvanyaloka with Locana in English, Indian Thought, 1917. pp. 361-363.

90 The Viveka (p. 109) points out that ladies and gents (Vibhāvas) and seasons, garlands etc. (Vibhāvas) are completely found in plays like the Ratnāvalī etc. The Vibhāvas in both these aspects must be considered as of Śṛṅgara as a whole. This is as it should be, for, otherwise there will not be one Rasa, due to difference of Vibhāvas. In Muktaka, however, we have to imagine the Vibhāvas.

91 Vide, Viveka (p. 114) under "Saṅkrāntyeti".

92 Abh. bh. Vol. I, p. 321.

93 Ibid, p. 321.

94 Dr. S. K. De doubts if Bharata accepted Śānta as a Rasa at all as the text in question is far from genuine. Abhinava's words also imply that Rasas are generally eight, but some add a ninth. Vide "Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics", p. 139.

Also read Dr. V. Raghavan, 'The Number of Rasas', Chap. I.

95 Abhinavabhāratī regards, rather curiously, Nirveda as the Uddīpanavibhāva with Tattvanjñāna as the Sthāyin.

96 "सर्वथा नाटकादावभिनयात्मनि स्थायित्वमस्माभिः शमस्य निषिध्यते समस्तव्यापारप्रविलयरूपस्याभिनयायोगात् ।"

97 Dr. S. K. De puts the views of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika on Śānta in a proper perspective when he remarks that "Dhanañjaya himself would object to Śānta only in the Nāṭya.... but he would permit it in the Kāvya... But..... Dhanika would not allow Śānta even in poetry." Read further for Dhanika's reasons, Dr. De's "Some Problems of S. K. Poetics" p. 142.

98 The Viveka (p. 126) explains it as 'the most permanent among all permanent moods" as it underlies all Sthāyins and is Sthāyin **by nature**; for it does not need causes to arouse it like Rati etc.

99 Hemachandra takes up Tattvajñāna (Viveka, p. 139) for elucidation. Following Abhinava, he states that Tattvajñāna or knowledge of truth here is Samyagjñāna which causes Nirveda to be born; but this Tattvajñana does not mean Ātmajñāna; for the latter is the Sthāyin of Śānta. This Nirveda is not capable of causing Puruṣārthasiddhi or of becoming a Sthāying like Utsāha, Rati, etc., (i.e. capable to colour others) or like Hāsya, etc; but depends on another Sthāyin. Hence it is only a Vyabhicārin.

100 Vide Viveka (p. 144) under 'Prāṇabhūmiti'. It may be noted here that while elucidating the Rasasūtra, Hemachandra follows Abhinavagupta, (but) in his treatment of the allied aspects of Rasa theory he is influenced by Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya hints at this (Vide "Hemachandra and the Eleventh Cent. Kashmir Poeticists", pp. 120-21, f.n. 12-15). Prof. Bhattacharya refers to Bhoja's views being adumbrated by Hemachandra on Rasābhāsa and adoption of the Nine-rasa view of Abhinava with three long extracts from the Abh. bh. "one of which discusses the

Sāttvikabhāvas, as emanating from the transformation of the human body in the elemental aspect."

101 On Hemachandra's Sāttvikabhāvas, P. Pañcāpageśa Śāstrī (Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure, pp. 41–42) gives a cogent explanation wherein he state that Bharata explains Sāttvikabhāvas in the primary sense of "those conditions of the mind that give birth to the external signs such as stupefaction, perspiration and horripilation". Thus the external signs are only **the Anubhavas of the conditions of the mind.** Even Glāni and Śrama (accessories) seem to denote not the mental conditions but the external expressions of them. So we have to understand by Sāttvikabhāvas the conditions of mind and stambha, Sveda, Romāñca as their external signs. Hemachandra elaborates Bharata's explanation a little further and brings out the meaning of the passage of Bharata (N.S. VII. 93). This is Hemachandra's contribution.

102 Vide Ekāvalī (K.P.T.'s ed.) p. 106 (Text); Notes; pp. 445–46 where S.K. V. 20 is quoted and S. D. is referred to. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya (Ibid, f.n. 40) states that Bhoja's view is adumbrated by Hemachandra on Rasābhāsa.

Vide, Dr. Raghavan, 'Introduction to Indian Poetics', p. 110. Kṣemendra covers Rasābhāsa etc. in Aucityavicāracarcā (I. 16) under Rasaucitya.

Cf. De (HSP–II), p. 279 Viśvanātha (S.D. III. 263-66) elaborately summarizes some other cases. Vide, The Sāhityadarpana (I, II, X) by P.V. Kane, Notes, p. 29, for Viśvanātha's concept of Rasābhāsa.

Shri S. P. Bharadwaj thinks that Bhamaha and Daṇḍin imply acceptance of Rasābhāsa and believes that this concept evolved earlier. He finally holds that the concept

arose in the commentaries on The Nāṭyaśāstra. Vide : "The Exponent of Ābhāsa concept in Rasa Theory" in Festschrift Charudev Shastri, 1974.

In an excellent review of the concept of Rasābhāsa (Studies in Indian Poetics, pp. 91-100), Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya blames Mammaṭa for being 'terse and concise at the expense of precision' in his definition of Rasābhāsa. His failure to explain what Anaucitya means causes confusion and leads to two sets of views : Anaucitya in the sense of (1) non-applicability of the definition of the Rasa concerned or (2) as partial application thereof. Hemachandra follows the second line but supplements it with another idea derived from "a tradition different from that usually associated with Bharata. . . . **There is no Rasa but Rasābhāsa in connection with animal's (Tiryakṣu) is a view of this line of thought which has been subjected to adverse criticism"** (Vide Ekāvalī, B.S.S. Ed. p. 106 for this criticism. But vide Rasārṇava-sudhākara (p. 268), a **stray** advocate of the tradition represented by Bhoja, for a counter-attack. Udbhaṭa uses Anaucityapravṛtta and Ābhāsa. . . . known to Mammaṭa (Vide Ibid, pp. 91-92, 94-97). Dr. Krishnamoorthy commends Bhoja's clarification, which Hemachandra heeds. (Essays etc., pp. 114-136) Hemachandra treats of Rasābhāsa in two Sūtras (II. 54 and 55) and is more explicit on Anaucitya. He proves to be a good follower of Ānanda-vardhana. (Vide K.A.S. pp. 16, 18, 65, 102, 149, 199 etc.)

Finally, J. L. Masson and M. V. Patawardhan refer to the curious fact that "the important concept of Ābhāsa is not dealt with" in the N. S. and lament Bharata's oversight in distinguishing genuine situations from spurious ones. They criticise many of later discussions as they "smack of too much theorizing". Vide 'Aesthetic Rapture' Vol. I, p. 42.

103 Dr. H. R. Miśra observes: "This synthesis (of Abhinava), ...admits that the Ābhāsa of all other Rasas except the Hāsya (its Ābhāsa also) are nothing but cases of the Hāsyarasa.....". The Theory of Rasa in Sanskrit Drama, p. 388.

104 Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar opines that "All instances of Rasavadalaṁkāra would, according to Mammaṭa, be cases of Dhvani and Guṇībhūtvyaṅgya. Thus 'Ayaṁ sa raśanotkarṣī....' is Dhvani viewed as Śṛṅgāra". Vide Notes on K.P. II.

For the definition of Rasavadalaṁkāra in the Dhvani theory, Vide Dhv. Āl. II 4 ff. Also vide Dr. S. K. De, HSP. II, 192-93 & f.n. 18.

Chapter Four

105 K.P. VII 49. On the different concept of Doṣa, vide, 'Outline of Sanskrit Poetics', p. 41.

106 Vide Prof. D. T. Chandorkara's Ed. of the K.P., Chap. VII (Poona, 1983), p. 5 (Notes).

107 Besides Ānandavardhana whose views on Doṣa in the Dhvanyāloka are not only followed by Mammaṭa but also **codified** for the first time in his Kāvyaprakāśa, in consonance with the theory of Rasadhvani.

108 Autsukya or Eagerness is the Sañcāribhāva mentioned here by name. Now, had it been suggested by gestures like flurry etc., its naming would have been redundant. But since the word Autsukya is needed here, its mention by name does not offend too much.

109 Hemachandra observes in the gloss (p. 170. v. 200 ff) that to try to heighten a Rasa after it has reached the climax is as disgusting an attempt as the attempt to smell a faded flower with a renewed passion. cf. Dhv. Āl. III. 19.

110 Hemachandra quotes Ānandavardhana's famous dictum on Aucitya here : "Anaucityādṛte nānyad etc." (Dhv. Āl. III) to drive home the point that appropriateness of characterisation, speech, dress, time, physical conditions should be observed. The fact that Hemachandra concludes his discussion of the Rasadoṣas by quoting this memorable Kārikā (a saṅgraha śloka), clearly shows that Hemachandra abides by the teachings of the master, i.e. Ānandavardhana in whose opinion, Aucitya or propriety is the most fundamental principle governing the delineation of Rasa in poetry. Now, the corollary of this is that when Rasabhaṅga (i.e., the Kāvyārtha) or hindrance to the progress of Rasa takes place, the principle of propriety is compromised. In other words, Doṣas which mar the sentiment of a poem spring from lack of Aucitya or Anaucitya. Thus Anaucitya, as Ānandavardhana and Mahimabhaṭṭa (and even Kuntaka) state, is the greatest Doṣa in a poem. Therefore, the deterrents of Rasa are called Rasadoṣas. And this is what Mammaṭa also says. Hemachandra more clearly states that Doṣas are those that detract from or mar the Rasa.

111 Mammaṭa's Kārikā (K.P. VII. 54) contains a Doṣa called 'Anabhihitavācyam' i.e. omitting necessary or Dyotaka words. This explains Hemachandra's Avaśyavācyam etc. in Viveka (pp. 202-4) which is based on Vyaktiviveka II.

112 In the Sāhityadarpaṇa, we have 'Vācyasya anabhidhānam' which is Nyūnapadatva in a way according to Hemachandra. The difference is that in Nyūnapada, the deficiency relates to Vācakapadas, whereas in Vācyānabhidhāna, it relates to Dyotakapadas like Api **etc.**; since 'Upasargāṇāṁ vācakatvaṁ nāsti kevalaṁ dyotakatvam'.

113 Viveka, p. 211.

114 The dictum is 'Yattadornityasambandhaḥ'. The Viveka comments on this under Tadeti (p. 211).

115 Vide K. P. VII, Prof. Chandorkara's Ed. p. 82 (Footnote).

116 Mahimabhaṭṭa believes, quite originally, that the harshness of a metre is also an impropriety or Dūṣaṇa of the Word (Śabda-anaucitya) because it serves the cause of the Rasa, very much like the figures of words such as alliteration etc. However, its harshness does not depend on the word alone and as such it is not discussed along with Vidheyāmarśa etc. (Vide V.V. II., p. 181, R. P. Dvivedi's Ed.) Mahimabhaṭṭa thus considers Metre as a Śabdālaṁkāra and clarifies this later in these words : "Ata eva Yamakānuprāsayoriva **Vṛttasyāpi** śabdālaṁkāratvam upagatamasmābhiḥ." For a discussion of this topic, vide Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's interesting article : "A Novel View of Mahimabhaṭṭa : On the place of Metre in Poetry"–Essays in Sanskrit Literary Criticism, pp. 137-144. Hemachandra's treatment of this fault is, therefore, quite in keeping with the best tradition of Ānandavardhana, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Mammaṭa.

117 Hemachandra gives some more illustrative verses (254-255). In 255, we find that the metre is Dodhaka, a light jolly dancing metre always used to describe things in a lighter vein. But the verse describes lamentations. The metre, therefore, is unsuited to the pathetic sentiment. Hence the blemish of Hatavṛttatva; for Dodhaka suggests a comic tone.

Generally Mandākrāntā, Puṣpitāgrā, etc., suit the Pathetic; Pṛthvī, Sragdharā, etc., suit the Erotic; Śārdūlavikrīḍita, Śikhariṇī, etc., suit the Heroic; and Dodhaka suits the Comic.

It will be of interest to note here that the second chapter of Kṣemendra's Suvṛttatilaka discusses the excellences and blemishes of metres in general. Kṣemendra also lays down their special usage by dividing poetry into four types on the basis of matter ond form and

stresses propriety of metres. This work is important from a literary view point also. Hemachandra's work on metres is the Chando'nuśāsana. It follows the traditional scheme and contains only the definitions of metres; it does not give examples. Vide, Dr. Suryakant, Kṣemendra Studies, pp. 78-88.

118 Vide V.V. II, p. 301, Mahimabhaṭṭa gives alternate verse to remove the fault. On Vivek page 216, Hemachandra reproduces a passage from the V.V. (p. 288) under Pratyavocata etc., though he drops some expressions and verses in between. The point at issue in this present para is that the fault of Prakramabheda is akin to Vidheyāmarśa but as a fault it depends more on difference of manner of treatment rather than on non-predication. It involves propriety of Word, e.g., in Tālājāyanti etc. An unbroken harmony of **start** and **end** is good for poetry. Any breach ot that harmony is indeed a fault. The quotation from Vāmana (5-1-1) does not apply here.

119 Vide S. C. Sen Gupta's "Towards A Thery of the Imagination" pp. 152-53.

120 The Doctrine of Doṣas in Sanskrit Poetics in "Essays in Sanskrit Criticism" pp. 163-64.

Chapter Five :

121 Kāvyapradīpa explains Acalasthitayaḥ and gives three characteristics of Guṇa. Vide K. P. P. (Nir. Ed.), p. 274. (K. P. VIII. 1 ff).

122 'Santamiti etc.' is explained ably by K. P. P., p. 275 (K. P. VIII. 2 ff).

123 Kāvyapradīpa also disposes of Udbhaṭa's views on the distinction between Guṇas and Alaṁkarās, p. 278 (K. P. VIII 2 ff).

Bhoja follows Vāmana and quotes him on the nature of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra. Vide Dr. V. Raghavan's Bhoja's Śr. Pr. 353. Also read pp. 300–301. Vāmana holds that Guṇas are properties creating charm in poetry, whereas figures are the causes of the excess of charm and quotes Yuvateriva etc. and Yadi bhavati etc. (3. 1. 1–2).

124 cf E. kāvalī vv. 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8, p. 147 K.P.T.'s Ed.

125 Dr. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa, p. 198.

126 Dr. S. K. De, HSP-II, p. 219.

127 Ibid, p. 220, f.n. 3.

128 Dr. De points out that this exposition of Mammaṭa follows and expands Dhv. Āl. II. 8–11 and observes : "But it is possible that the original hint of **associating these effects on the mental condition of the reader with three Guṇas** was supplied by Bhaṭṭanāyaka (Locana p. 68) who speaks of the enjoyment (Bhoga) of Rasa as being characterized by the mental conditions of expanding .... pervading ... and melting...." HSP. p. 220.

129 Dr. V. Raghavan holds that Mammaṭa's work is the earliest we have now, which worked out the theory of Guṇas formulated by Ānandavardhana, by refuting other Guṇas and by dismissing them, some as Alaṁkāras etc., and some as the reverses of Doṣas. Mammaṭa follows Ānandavardhana and Abhinava completely and refutes Udbhaṭa and Vāmana on Guṇa and defines the three Guṇas. Vide Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 343.

130 Ibid. pp. 336–7.

131 Kāvyānuśāsana, I. 12 ff.

132 Ibid, I. 12 ff, p. 34.

133 Bh. Sr. Pr., pp. 337-8.

134 Mammaṭa's three grounds (K.P. VIII. 72) may be compared with Hemachandra's three grounds : (1) Lakṣaṇa-vyabhicāra (2) Antarbhāva (3) Doṣābhāvatva.

135 (A) Yuvateriva etc. Vāmana's, and

(B) Yadi bhavati etc. VKAS 31. 2 ff.

Bhoja quotes these verses and adds a third of his own to these to emphasize the view that it is only when the body poetic has already the beauty of the Guṇas that it can be beautified by the addition of Alaṁkāra. Vide Dr. Raghavan's 'Bhoja's Śr. Pr.,' p. 301.

136 Cf. Dhv. Āl. II. 7 (gloss) and Locana thereon.

137 Ānandavardhana's word Ārdratā (Dhv. Āl. II.6 f and II. 8) is explained by Abhinava (Locana p. 207) as Softening of the heart and removal of properties such as anger, fierceness, etc.

138 Vide Viveka, p. 290.

139 Dr. V. Raghavan, 'Some Concepts of Alaṁkāraśāstra', p. 139. Also read 'Bhoja's Śr. Pr.' pp. 291-92-93, for first differentiation between Guṇa and Alaṁkāra in Daṇḍin.

140 'Some Concepts of Alaṁkāraśāstra', p. 139.

141 Ibid, p. 141.

142 Ibid, p. 143.

143 Ibid, p. 144.

144 Ibid, p. 146.

145 Ibid, p. 190 (cf. Rudrata II.9 ff).

146 Dhv. Āl. III. 6 also endorses this 'change in the fixed nature of composition'. N.B.: Saṁghaṭanā is under discussion here. Viśvanātha also (S.D. IX. 5) follows this lead. So Hemachandra is in good company.

147 Mammaṭa (K. P. VIII. 77) is more specific when he comments on the same verse to point out the departure (from rules) in respect of diction, compounds and letters.

148 Bhoja's S. p. p. 336.

149 Ibid, p. 338.

150 Ibid, p. 339.

151 i.e. pp. 287-288 in the K. A. S. MJV 2nd ed. used here.

152 Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 339.

153 Vide Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's paper : 'Maṅgala a Neglected Name in SK Poetics' included in "Studies in Indian Aesthetics and Criticism", pp. 109-120.

154 Vide Bhoja's S.P. pp. 265-270 (on Guṇa).

Also vide, C. R. Devadhara's paper on The Arthaguṇa Śleṣa in 'A Volume of Studies in Indology presented to Dr. P. V. Kane' (1941) pp. 147-154.

Prof. Devadhara says Bhoja, Mammaṭa, Hemachandra, Viśvanātha (S.D. VIII. 6), Jagannātha and Commentators hold that Arthaśleṣa is cleverness in the combination of ingenious incidents. Thus Śleṣa is a feature of plot-construction. This is referred to as Ghaṭanāśleṣa. Vāmana refers to Śudraka's work as abounding in this device.

155 Samādhi is slackness and closeness of style, so arranged as not to cause disgust. It consists in the ascent and descend of Caesura (Yati). (Vide Vāmana's Vṛtti quoted in K.P.P. p. 331).

156 "The **verbal** and **ideal** forms of 'sweetness' have been called Vāg-rasa and Vastu-rasa respectively." - Dr. D. K. Gupta, 'A Critical Study of Daṇḍin', p. 151.

On Daṇḍin's Mādhurya, read Dr. V. Raghavan, Bhoja's S.P., p. 274.

157 Vārtā is Upacāravacana and Varṇanā is Praśaṁsāvacana. Vide Dr. D. K. Gupta, Ibid, pp. 158–159.

158 Bhoja's S. P., p. 289.

159 Vāmana talks of Rasa in connection with his Kānti. If Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin held Rasa as Alaṁkāra, Vāmana termed it a Guṇa, i.e., the Arthaguṇa Kānti.

Chapter Six

160 Cf. Dhv. Āl. II. 18.

161 Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, p. 151.

162 Bhāmaha again refers to the twofoldness of poetic figures (V. 66).

Dr. V. Raghavan notes thess two sets of Bhāmaha (Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 378).

163 While Mammaṭa bases this classification on Anvayāvyatireka, Ruyyaka adopts Āśraya-āśrayibhāva as the basis. Vide, Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 380 etc.

164 Vide, KASS (N.S. Ed.), pp. 5–7.

165 Ibid, p. 7.

166 Mr. Banahatti regards Anuprāsa and the Vṛttis as a new feature of Udbhaṭa's work. The Vṛttis do not exist in Bhāmaha's work. Mammaṭa's treatment of Anuprāsa is very similar to Udbhaṭa's. Vide KASS B.S.S. ed., BORI, 2nd ed. 1982, Notes, p. 12.

167 Daṇḍin treats Anuprāsa under Mādhuryaguṇa as its verbal aspect corresponds to Vṛttyanuprāsa. See D. K. Gupta, Ibid, p. 236.

168 The word Tātparya in the definition of Laṭānuprāsa is explained by Pradīpakarā as अन्वयभेद. The difference between

Laṭānuprāsa and Ananvaya lies in this that while in the former Ś'abdārthapaunaruktya only is aimed at, in the latter case the same words occur on the maxim : "Śabdabhedād arthabhedaḥ."

The Laṭānuprāsa is fivefold according as a whole Pada is repeated or a Pada, Prātipadic etc. are repeated.

169 For the rule is that no figure of speech should mar a Rasa. Cf. Bhoja's def. of Citra in S. K. (II. 358-9).

170 Vide K. A. S. p. 329, "Tathāhi - yathā etc." The point is that we should not hold that when a figure is based on the resemblance of Guṇa and Kriyā, it is Upamā; and when there is only verbal resemblance, it is Śleṣa. The truth is that even a verbal resemblance may give rise to Upamā.

171 Vide Bhoja's Śr. Pr., pp. 127-128.

172 Pradipakāra provides the rationale for treating Upamā first (p. 308 N. S.). It lies at the root of many figures of sense.

Vide V. S. Sowani's article on "A History and Significance of Upamā" in Annals of the Bhandarkar Inst. Vol. I (2), pp. 87-98 (1919-20).

Cf. Dr. R. S. Betai's critical analysis and forthright observations in his paper "Treatment of Alaṁkāras in The Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemachandra", published in JOGRS XII No. 4/88, 1960, pp. 355-56.

173 Vide KASS, p. 18 (N. S. Ed.)

174 Hemachandra wants to include Ananvaya in Upamā; hence he drops the word 'Bhede' found in Mammaṭa's def. of Upamā. But he is aware of the finer distinctions involved here.

175 Cf. K. P. X. 93 and X-100-101 for Rūpaka and Atiśayokti (their connection and distinction).

176 Mammaṭa's def. of Prativastūpamā (K. P. X. 101) excludes Nidarśanā and Dṛṣṭānta.

177 Hemachandra combines Paryāya and Parivṛtti. Prof. R. B. Athavale indicts him for doing so. (K. A. S., Vol. II, p. 224).

178 Vide Dr. R. S. Betaiś paper (f. n. 175)

179 Daṇḍin sets out the supremacy of Svabhāvokti in Literature. Hemachandra uses Daṇḍin's phraseology (VI. 15). Mammaṭa stresses action or form inherent in one's nature (Sp. a child etc.). For Bhāmaha (II. 93) it is natural description. But Kuntaka (V. I. I.11-15) opposes it tooth and nail. (vide Dr. S. K. De HSP. Vol. II, p. 187.) Hemachandra refutes Kuntaka's views in the Viveka Commentary under 'Jāti' and derives support from Mahimabhatta's views on Poetic imagination. (Viveka, p. 380)

180 Hemachandra's Smṛti, Bhrāntimān and Viṣama are interconnected (VI. 24-26) and Samādhi and Samuccaya combine to form one figure i.e. Samuccaya.

181 Hence Kāvyaling is also dropped (Viveka, p. 397).

182 Saṁkara and Samṣṛṣṭi represent the combination of figures. While in the former, tha combined figures are not discernible, in the latter they are. The former is a chemical mixture like milk and water, but the latter, is separable mixture like rice and sesamum. Mammaṭa gives **Three** but Hemachandra gives **four** varieties of Samṣṛṣṭi.

183 Dr. Raghavan traces the beginnings of the two theories or doctrines of differentiation between figures of word and sense to Rājanaka Tilaka's commentary on Udbhaṭa's KASS. Mammaṭa derived his method (K. P. IX under Śleṣa) from it. Tilaka's son Ruyyaka developed his

Āśrayāśrayibhāva doctrines from the same source. Vide Bhoja's Śr., Pr. p. 380. Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya pinpoints instances of Hemachandra's indebtedness to Rājanaka Tilaka's Udbhaṭa-Viveka ('Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century etc.', p. 123; also f.n. 26b.)

184 HSP-II, p. 243, f.n. 2.

Chapter Seven

185 Vide, "Studies In Nāyaka-Nāyikābhed" by Dr. Rakesagupta, 1967, pp. 37-38.

186 Vide, Rudraṭa K.A. XII. 9-12 and Śṛṅgāratilaka (S.T.) I. 23-28.

187 Dr. Rakesagupta, Ibid, p. 39.

188 Ibid, p. 39.

189 Ibid, p. 41.

190 Ibid, p. 41 and K.A.S.VII. 31 (gloss), p. 421.

191 Vide, 'Studies In Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda', pp. 56 and 60.

192 Ibid, p. 56. Also see S.T. I. 117-131 and D.R. II.

193 "Nayati vyāpnoti itivṛttaṁ phalaṁ ca iti nāyakaḥ" - K.A.S., p. 406.

194 D.R. I.12 : "Adhikāraḥ phalaswāmyaṁ adhikārī ca tatprabhuḥ."

195 The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama, pp. 203-4.

196 D. R., Hass, p. 40 (Tr.).

197 Cf. 'The Rasārṇavasudhākara of Śiṅgabhūpāla', I. 61-62.

198 Into (1) Dhīroddhata etc. and (2) Anukūla etc.

199 K. A. S., p. 411; D.R. II. 10 (Avaloka). Cf. Hass, p. 42 (D.R. I.6).

200 'Treatment of Love in Sanskrit Literature' by Dr. S. K. De, p. 48 etc.

201 K.A.S. VII. 23 ff.

202 "Avaruddhāpi parastrītyucyate."

203 D. R. (II. 20, 21) says : "Nānyoḍhā'ṅgirase kvacit."

But love for a maiden may be employed at will, in connection with the principal or the subordinate sentiments. Cf. Dhanika's remarks (D.R. II. 28 ff) which Hemachandra paraphrases.

204 R. II. 21 gives the same idea in almost the same terms.

205 Cf. D.R.II.23 with Avaloka.

206 Cf. D.R.II. 22-23a with Avaloka.

207 According to Hass, the D.R. admits but 128 varieties. Vide The Daśarūpa, p. 58 (Notes).

208 Vide Dr. S. K. De, Treatment of Love in S. K. Litt., p. 19. Vide also N. N. Bhattacharya's "History of Indian Erotic Literature", Chap. VII, pp. 47-49, 56-57.

209 Dr. S. K. De, Ibid, p. 52.

210 Dr. S. K. De, Ibid.

Chapter Eight

211 Vide Dr. V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śr. Pr., pp. 540-41, etc.

212 A. K. Warder (Indian Kāvya Litt., Chap. VI) critically reviews the Mahākāvya 'form'.

213 Bhoja's Śr. Pr. pp. 402-3. Dr. Raghavan explicitly states (p. 709) : "Especially, the various elements of Śabdavaicitrya, Arthavaicitrya and Ubhayavaicitrya given by Hemachandra on pp. 334-341 are Bhoja's Guṇas and Alaṁkāras of Śabda, Artha and both with reference to the

Prabandha as a whole. The commentary of Hemachandra here, is, again nothing but a reproduction from the Śr. Pr."

214 The term 'Vākyārthābhinaya' is intimately connected with Dhanañjaya's theory of Rasa. Vide D. R. IV.

215 On the meaning of these three technical terms of Drama and Dance viz. Nāṭya, Nṛtya and Nṛtta, read K. M. Varma's study of these concepts in his monograph "Nāṭya, Nṛtta and Nṛtya : Their Meaning and Relation".

216 Vide Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p.5 36.

217 Vide D. R. with Avaloka and Laghuṭīkā (Ed. T. Venkatacarya) pp. 7–10 (I. 7-9a). Also read Ibid, Intro. pp. XXXII–XXXV.

218 Bhoja's Śr. Pr. p. 538.

219 Ibid, p. 538

220 Dr. Raghavan (Ibid, p. 540–41) writes: "Of Saṭṭaka, there is no mention at all in Dhanañjaya. Bhoja's position is ...... there is surely a variety similar to Nāṭikā..... It is called Saṭṭaka and it differs from the Nāṭikā only in as much as it has no Viṣkambhaka and Praveśaka, and is throughout in only one language..... Śārdātanaya adds the Toṭaka to the Nāṭikā and the Saṭṭaka as types derived from the Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa....."

221 Cf. Bhoja's words quoted by Dr. V. Raghavan :
"Vākyārthābhinayo'yaṁ prakīrtito nāṭakādibhedena I
Dvādaśavidhapadārthābhinayamatha yathāsthitaṁ vakṣye II"
Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 544.

222 Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 546.

223 Hemachandra also describes them as "Rūpakam". It is the Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha that employs the term "Uparūpaka" for these minor shows, for the first time. Cf. S. D. (VI.3-6).

224 'The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama', p. 30.

225 Dr. Gupta critically reviews Daṇḍin's views on Kathā etc. Vide 'A Critical study of Daṇḍin', pp. 124-126.

226 Hemachandra's varieties include Bhoja's Ākhyāyikā, Nidarśana, Pravahlika, Manthullika, Maṇikulyā, Kathā, Parikathā, Khaṇḍakathā, Upakathā, Bṛhat-kathā and Akhyāna. Hemachandra also adopts tne Sakalakathā of Ānandavardhana. He mentions the Upakhyāna variety in the commentary (p. 463). Vide, Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 619 etc.

227 pp. 708-709.

228 i.e. pp. 449-466 of the revised edition (1964).

229 Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 312

230 Vide Hemachandra's gloss (pp. 455–460) and the Viveka Vyākhyā (pp. 455–460) which represent the passages in question.

231 Bhoja's Śr. Pr., p. 315.

232 Ibid, pp. 403-404. cf. K.A.S. p. 460 (Gloss and the Viveka).

233 Bhoja's Śr. Pr., pp. 404-405.

Chapter Nine

234 Quoted in 'Language, Thought and Culture', p. 32.

235 Ibid, pp. 121–22.

236 Ibid, p. 132.

237 Quoted in French by R. Gnoli (The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, (Intro.). Tr. fr. the French by Achille Forler, Director, Alliance Francaise, Ahmedabad (1984).

238 'Meditations on A Hobby Horse etc. pp. 5 & 11.

239 Paul Henley, "Language, Thought and Culture", p. 148.

240 Vide A. Sankaran, Some Aspects of Litt. Criticism in S. K., p. 68.

241 Paul Henley, Ibid, p. 231.

242 Vide 'Psychological Basis of Alaṁkāra Litt.' in 'Sir Asutosh Mookerji Silver Jubilee Volume', Calcutta University Publication, III(2), 1925.

243 'The Pattern of Criticism', Milwaukee (1953), p. 28.

244 Published by Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, 1940 (with a foreword by M. M. S. Kuppuswami Sastri).

245 Vide K. Ram Pisharoti's 'The Dhvanyāloka' (with Locana) puablished in Indian Thought, 1917, pp. 287–288.

Also cf. "Poetic or artistic delight, which is its fruit par excellence, is of the order of Brahmāsvāda, but differs from its fruit in being temporary". Dr. V. Raghavan, Aspects of Indian Poetics, p. 15.

246 'The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Ind. Philo.', Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Vol. V. (I-II), 1923-24, pp. 1-2.

247 T. N. Sreekantaiyn, " 'Imagination' In indian Poetic etc." , 1980, p. 13.

248 Vide Dr. S. K. De, HSP (I–II) pp. 41–42 for a concise, historical review of the concept of Pratibhā.

249 'The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy', Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 126–128.

250 ' "Imagination" in Indian Poetics etc.', p. 21. Vide also Dr. K. Krishnamoorthi, "Essays in Sk. Criticism"pp. 187–198.

251 Wimsatt & Brooks, Litt. Criticism, pp. 6, 99, 100-1.

252 Vide Dr. S. K. De, HSP (I–II), pp. 42–44.

253 Sr. R. G. Bhandarkar Commemorative Volume BORI, Poona, 1917 pp. 375-386.

254 Ibid, p. 386.

255 Studies in Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra, 1983, pp. 1-18.

256 Ibid, p. 17.

257 Studies in Ind. Aestetics & Criticism, p. 179. Rājaśekhara classifies Haraṇa into avoidable and acceptable. Vide, Ibid, p. 184.

258 Ibid, p. 184.

259 Vide Kṣemendra Studies by Dr. Suryakanta, Poona-2, 1954, pp. 50-62. Vide also Dr. S. K. De HSP (II) p. 37, f.n. 5 and pp. 292-298 for a general idea of Kaviśikṣa and the literature on it.

260 Vide, 'Studies in Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra', pp. 20-23; 24, 26-27. Dr. Kulkarni's essay 'Sanskrit Rhetoricians on Poetic Conventions' is a brilliant, critical exposition of the topic. Vide, Ibid, Chap. 2.

261 Ibid, p. 24.

262 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar Vol. BORI, Poona, 1917.

263 Vide Dr. S. K. De, HSP (II) pp. 322-25. Also see Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, Chap. VIII, p. 297.

264 The Sāhityadarpaṇa, Notes, p. 15.

265 Vide K.A.S., Vol. II, Notes, pp. 32, 33, 38, etc.

266 "Language Thought and Culture", pp. 187, 195.

267 Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. II, p. 18.

268 The Language Poets Use, p. 69. On Metaphor, see 'Literary Criticism', pp. 69-70, 643-4.

269 Cf. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, p. 264. Also see Dr. P. V. Kane's Notes to S.D. II.

270 Literary Criticism, p. 284; also p. 294.

271 'Studies in Ind. Aesthetics and Criticism', p. 124. Also see p. 127.

272 Ibid, pp. 165–167. Also vide 'The Indian Theories of Meaning', pp. 278–9 & f.n. 2.

273 Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists, pp. 119–120.

274 Vide, Prof. R. B. Athavale, K.A.S., Vol. II, Notes, pp. 41–42; 50–67.

275 Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Hemachandra and the Eleventh Cent. K. Poeticists, pp. 119-120.

276 Vide Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's article on Prauḍhokti in 'Studies in Ind. Aesthetics etc.' pp. 185–86.

277 Vide 'The Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics', pp. 187-8.

278 N. C. Starr, The Dynamics of Literature, Columbia University, New York, 1945.

279 Vide, The Indian Poetic Tradition, p. 22.

280 Vide Kṣemendra Studies, pp. 76–77; Dr. S. K. De HSP-II, pp. 80, 282. As a criterion of taste, Aucitya is related with Sahṛdayatva or Criticism (Ibid p. 285).

Chapter Ten

281 Vide Dr. S. K. De HSP-II, Chap. VIII, pp. 243-4. Vol. I, p. 203.

Dr. P. V. Kane, HSP (1961 Ed.) pp. 288-89. For a summary of B. P. Bhattacharya's defence of Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana and Dr. Kane's review thereof, vide Ibid, pp. 288-89 with the footnotes.

For Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's opinion, read "The Sources of Hemachandra's Kāvyānuśāsana" (Chap. 13) in 'Studies In Sanskrit Sāhityaśāstra', p. 153.

For Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya's remarks vide his paper "Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists" in JOAS, 1957, p. 128.

Also see Shri Trilokanath Jha's paper on Hemachandra's Indebtedness to Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka in respect of Doṣas.

Mr. Jha offers a critical and comparative review of the second Vimarśa of the Vyaktiviveka and the third Adhyāya of the Kāvyānuśāsana in its threefold textual aspects and draws candid conclusions in regard to Hemachandra's method of adoption (vide **ibid** pp. 26-28, 31-33). Thus he notes that Hemachandra substitutes Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśatva for Mahimā's Vidheyāvimarśa; Bhagnaprakramatva for Prakramabheda; Asthānapadatva for Kramabheda; Adhikapadatva or Ādhikya for Paunaruktya; Nyūnapadatva for Vācyāvacana and Avācaka for Vācyāvacana. However, Hemachandra does not follow the terminology with strict uniformity. Mr. Jha's paper is a good example of sincere investigation. It was published in JOBRS, Vol. XLIII, (I-II).

282 Vide Prof. A. B. Dhruva's Foreword (p. 10) and Prof. R. C. Parikh's Introduction to K.A.S. Vol. II, Part-I, pp. CCCXIII-CCCXPVII; Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Ibid, pp. 128-129.

283 A Summary of B. P. Bhattacharya's views is given by Dr. P. V. Kane in his HSP., pp. 288-289 (f.n.1).

284 Vide Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's paper on The Sources of Hemachandra's K.A.S., Studies in SK. Sāh. Śāstra, p. 152.

285 Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Hemachandra etc., p. 118.

286 Vide Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya's "Hemachandra and the Eleventh Cent. etc.", pp. 120-21.

287 'Studies in Sk. Sāhityaśāstra', p. 154.

288 Ibid, p. 122.

289 'Studies in Sk. Sāhityaśāstra, p. 154.

290 Ibid, p. 151.

291 Ibid, p. 154.

292 Hemachandra and the Eleventh Cent. etc., pp. 123-25.

293 'Studies in Sk. Sāhityśāstra', p. 151.

294 Ibid

295 'Śṛṅgāramañjarī of Saint Akbar Shah', Introduction, p. 15.

296 Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya, Ibid, pp. 121-22.

297 Vide, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, Studies in Sk. Sāhityasāstra, pp. 153-54.

298 S. P. Bhattacharya, Ibid, p. 129.

Chapter Eleven

299 Vide Prof. R. C. Parikh's Introduction to the K.A.S. (2nd Revised Ed.), pp. 32-40; Hemachandra's Dvyāśraya Kāvya, S. P. Narang, pp. 1-2.

Also vide Prof. S. P. Bhattacharya's article "Hemachandra and the Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists".

300 Vide, Buhler's 'Life of Hemachandra', p. 9.

301 Ibid, pp. 9-10.

302 Ibid, p. 11.

303 Ibid, pp. 11-13.

304 Ibid, p. 18.

305 Ibid, p. 36.

306 Introduction to K.A.S., p. 68.

307 Hemachandra's Dvyāśraya, etc., pp. 6-14.

308 Buhler, Ibid, p. 48.

309 Prof. R. C. Parikh, Intro., Ibid, p. 70.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I Original Sanskrit Texts

Alaṁkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka with Vimarśinī (2nd edition)
Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, 1979

Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṁkāra
Ed. P. V. Naganath Shastry
Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi (2nd ed.), 1970

Bhāvaprakāśanam of Śārdātanaya
Ed. Dr. Madan Mohan Agrawal (2nd ed. 1983)
Chowkhamba Surabharati Granthamala, Varanasi

The Candrāloka of Piyūṣavarṣa Jayadeva with the Comm. of Vidyānātha Pāyaguṇḍa
Ed. M. G. Bakre, The Gujarati Printing Press, 1914

Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa with the Comm. of P. C. Tarkavāgīśa
Kumudaranjana Ray, Calcutta, 1956

Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa with the Comm. of Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara
Ed. V. Narayana Iyer, Madras, 1952

Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin, Belvalkar S. K.
Oriental Book Supplying Agency, Poona, 1924

The Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin
Ed. Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, BORI, Poona, 1938

Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin (Text in full with Eng. Tr. and Notes on I-II)
C. Sankara Rama Sastri & S. Visvanath
Third Ed., Madras, 1963

The Daśarūpa of Dhanañjaya,
Ed. Tr. George C. O. Hass,
Motilal Banarasidass, 1962

The Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya with Avaloka and Laghuṭīkā
Ed. T. Venkatacarya, Adyar, Madras, 1969

Deveśvara's Kavikalpalatā with his own Ṭīkā
Bibliothica Indica, Calcutta, Śakābda 1834

Dhvanyāloka with Locana with Bālapriyā and Divyāñjanā
Ed. Pattabhirama Shastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 135, 1940

Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy
Karnataka University, Dharwad, 1974

Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana (Text etc.), Udyota I (2nd ed.) 1965 and Udyota II (First ed.) 1957
B. P. Bhattacharya
Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta

The Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara with Tarala
Ed. K. P. Trivedi, First Ed., B.S.S., 1903

Kalpalatāviveka
Ed. M. L. Nagar and H. Shastry
L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1968

Kāvyālaṁkārasūtrāṇi with Vṛtti of Vāmana
N. S. Press, Bombay, 1953 (4th ed.)

Kāvyālaṁkārasūtravṛtti with Kāmadhenu
Ed. N. N. Kulkarni, Poona, 1927

(Vāmana's) Kāvyālaṁkārasūtrāṇi with
Kāmdhenu of Gopendra Tripurahara
Ed. R. G. Bhatta (Benares Sanskrit Series), 1908

Kāvyālaṁkārasārasaṅgraha of Udbhaṭa
Ed. N. D. Banahatti
B.S.S., BORI, Poona, 2nd Ed., 1982

Kāvyapradīpa of Govinda Thakkura, Kavyamala (24),
(Reprint, 1982)

Kāvyāprakāśa with Saṅketa of Māṇikyacandra
Govt. Oriental Library Series 160, Mysore, 1922

Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa with Bālabodhinī of Pt. Vāmanāchārya
Jhalakikar, Sixth Ed., Poona, 1950.

Kāvyaprakās'a or The Poetic Light Vol. I and
Vol. II (Text, Transl. and Two Comms.)
Dr. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1970

The Kāvyaprakāśa Ullāsa VII (Text with Notes)
Prof. D. N. Chandorkar, Poona, 1941

The Kāvyaprakāśa Mammaṭa
S. S. Sukhthankar, Bombay, 1941.

The Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa (I-II-III-X)
A. B. Gajendragadkar, Bombay, 1939

Kāvyaprakāśa with Someśvara's Saṅketa
Vol. I (Text) & Vol. II (Introduction, etc.)
Ed. Prof. R. C. Parikh
Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur, 1959

Kāvyamīmāṅsā of Rājaśekhara
G.O.S. No. 1, 1934

Kāvyaśāstra Section of the Agnipurāṇa
R. V. Sastri
Delhi University Publication, Delhi, 1969

The Kāvyanuśāsana of Hemachandra with his Gloss
Ed. Pt. Śivadatta and K. P. Parab
Revised by W. L. Śastri Panaśikara
2nd Ed., Kāvyamālā – 70, Bombay, 1934

Kāvyānuśāsana of Ācarya Hemachandra Vol. I (Text),
Vol. II (Introduction – Notes)
Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. R. B. Athavale, First Ed. 1938
with a Foreword by Dr. A. B. Dhruva
Śri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay

Kāvyānuśāsana with Alaṁkāracūḍāmaṇi and
Viveka of Ācārya Hemachandra with two Annonymous Tippaṇas
Second Revised Edition
Prof. R. C. Parikh and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni
Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay, 1964

Kāvyānuāśsana – Avacūri of Pt. Suśilavijayagaṇi
Botad (Saurashtra), V. S. 2013

Kāvyānuśāsana Chap. I, Vol.I
(A Sanskrit Commentary 'Prakāśa')
by Shri Vijayalāvaṇyasūri
Botad (Saurashtra), V, S. 2012

The Kāvyānuśāsana of Vāgbhaṭa (Secondus) with gloss,
Kavyamala No. 43, N.S.P., 1915 (2nd ed.)

Kṣemendra's –
1. Aucityavicāracarcā K.M. I, 1886
2. Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa K.M. IV 2nd Ed.
3. Suvṛttatilakam K.M. II, 1932

Mahāraja Bhojarāja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Vols.I–II)
Ed. G. R. Josyer, Mysore, 1969

Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa with Tr. (Complete)
M.M. Dr. Sir Ganganath Jha
Bhartiya Vidya Prakaśana, Varanasi–1, 1967

Mammaṭa's Śabdavyāpāravicāra (with Hindi Comm.)
Dr. R. P. Dwivedi
Chowkhamba Vidya Bhavana, Varanasi, 1974

Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra & Guṇacandra
(with their own commentary)
Ed. G. K. Shrigondeker and Pt. L. B. Gandhi
O. I. Baroda, 2nd Ed. (G.O.S. XLVIII)

Nāṭyaśāstra with Abh. Bhā. (G.O.S.)
Vol.I 1956, 1980

Vol.II
Vol.III 1956
and Vol. IV (28-37) (1964)

The Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha with Ratnāpaṇa
Ed. K. P. Trivedi, B.S.S., 1909

Rasagaṅgādhara of Jangannātha (I-II-III)
Pr. Sri Madanamohana Jha
The Chowkhambha Vidyabhavana, Vārāṇasī 1969

Rasagangādhara (I-II)
Prof. R. B. Athavale (Guj. Ed.)
University Book Production Board
Ahmedabad, 1974

Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṁkāra with Namisādhu's Commentary
N. S. Pr. (2nd Ed.), Bombay, 1928

Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṁkāra
Dr. Satyadeva Chawdhari
Vasudeva Prakaśana, Delhi, 1965

Rudrabhaṭṭa's Śṛṅgāratilaka (K.M. III)

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇam of Bhojadeva
(with Pt. Sri Ratneswara's Comm. on I-III
and Sri Jivanandavidyāsagara's Comm. on IV-V)
Calcutta, 2nd Ed., 1894

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa with Ratnadarpaṇavyākhyā, Vol.I
Dr. Kamesvaranath Miśra, Chowkhamba Orientalia, 1970

Sāhityadarpaṇa (I, II, X)
M. M. P. V. Kane
Motilal Banarasidass, 1965

Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha Kavirāja with Vivṛtti
Ed. by Durgaprasada Dvivedi
Meherchand Lachhmandas Delhi, 1982

Śiṅgabhūpāla's Rasārṇavasudhākara by Dr. R. P. Dwivedi
Sagar University, 1960

Śṛṅgāramañjarī of Saint Akbar Shah
Ed. Dr. V. Raghvan (with Introduction in English)
Archelogical Department Publication, Hydrabad, 1951

Vāgbhaṭālaṁkāra of Vāgbhaṭa (Primus)
K. M. No. 48, N.S. Pr., Bombay, 1916 and With Simhadevagani's
Comm. First Ed., N.S.P., Bombay, 1895

Vākyapadīya (I-II) of Bhartṛhari
(Studies In The Vākyapadīya Vol. I)
K. Raghavan Pillai
Motilal Banarasidass, 1971

Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka
Ed. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy (with Tr. & Introduction)
Karnataka University, 1977

Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka
Ed. Dr. S. K. De (with Introduction etc.)
Firma K. L. M. (3rd Ed.) 1961

II Critical Works In English

Dr. G. K. Bhatt — Tragedy and Sanskrit Drama Popular, Bombay, 1974

Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya — A History of Rūpaka in the Alaṁkāraśāstra (Foreword by Dr. T. S. Nandi) Chawkhambha Orientalia, Varanasi, 1982.

N. N. Bhattacharya	History of Indian Erotic Literature. Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1975
Prof. Sivaprasada Bhattacharya (S. P. Bhattacharya)	Studies In Indian Poetics Firma K. L. M. 1981
Dr. George Buhler	The Life of Hemachandrācārya (Tr. fr. the German by Dr. Manilal Patel) Sentiniketan, 1933
Krishna Chaitanya	Sanskrit Poetics (A critical and Comparative Study) Asia Publishing House, 1965
Tarapad Chakrabarti	Indian Aesthetics & Science of Language, Calcutta, 1971
P. C. Chatterji	Fundamental Questions in Aesthetics, Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla, 1968
Dr. Siddheswar Chattopadhyay	Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-Ratna-Kośa Calcutta, 1974
Dr. S. N. Dasagupta (and Dr. S. K. De)	A History of Sanskrit Literature (Classical Period) Vol. I. University of Calcutta 1947
Dr. S. K. De	1. History of Sanskrit Poetics (Combined Ed.) Firma K. L. M. 1960 2. Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics Firma K. L. M., 1959

3. Ancient Indian Erotics and Erotic Literature Firma K. L. M., 1959

4. Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics University of California Press, 1963

William Empson — Seven Types of Ambiguity Third Ed., London, 1953

Dr. S. D. Giyani — Agnipurāṇa – Study, Chowkhambha Publ., 1964.

Reniero Gnoli — The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. LXII, 1968

P. K. Gode — Studies In Indian Literary History, Vol. I, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1953

Dr. V. K. Gokak (Presented to) — Indian Response To Poetry in English Macmillan, 1970

E. H. Gombrich — Meditations On A Hobby Horse and other essays on the theory of Art (3rd ed.) Phaidon, 1978

Dr. Manamohan Gosh — The Nāṭyaśāstra, Eng. Tr. Notes, Introduction, I-XXVII Calcatta, 1950

Dr. D. K. Gupta — A Critical Study of Daṇḍin and his works, Meherchand Lachmandas, Delhi, 1970

Dr. Rakeśagugta

1. Psychological Studies In Rasa, Aligarh, First Ed., 1950
2. Studies In Nāyaka–Nāyikā–Bheda (D. Litt. Thesis), 1967

S. C. Sen Gupta

Towards A Theory of The Imagination, Oxford University Press, 1959

Victor M. Hamm

The Pattern of Criticism Milwaukee, U.S.A., 1953

Paul Henle (With others)

Language, Thought and Culture The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959 2nd Ed.

M. Hiriyanna

1. Sanskrit Studies, Mysore, 1954
2. Art Experience, Mysore, 1954

Pramod Kale

The Theatric Universe (A Study of the Nāṭyaśāstra) Popular, Bombay, 1874

Dr. P. V. Kane

History of Sanskrit Poetics Motilal Banarasidass, 1971

A. B. Keith

1. A History of Sanskrit Literature, Oxford University Press, First Ed. 1920 (Reprint, 1956)
2. The Sanskrit Drama Oxford University Press (First Pub. 1924, Reprint 1954, 1959).

M. Krishnamacariar — History of Classical Sanskrit Literature
Madras, 1937

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy — 1. The Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics (2nd ed.)
Delhi, 1982.
2. Essays in Sanskrit Criticism (2nd ed.), 1974 Karnataka University, Dharward
3. Studies In Indian Aesthetics & Criticism, Mysore, 1979

Dr. V. M. Kulkarni — Studies In Sanskrit Sāhityaśastra, B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan, 1983.

P. C. Lahiri — Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetic
New Delhi, 1974

D. R. Mankad — The Types of Sanskrit Drama
Karachi, 1936

Dr. T. G. Mainkar — The Theory of The Sandhis and The Sandhyaṅgas, Ajanta, 1978.

J. L. Masson and M. V. Patawardhan — 1. Aesthetic Rapture (I. II) Deccan College, Poona, 1970.
2. Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics, Poona, 1969.

Robert Millar & Ian Currie — The Language of Poetry
London, 1970

Dr. H. R. Miśra — The Theory of Rasa in Sanskrit Drama
Vindhyachal Prakasan, Bhopal, 1964

Pramoda Das Mitra (& Dr. L. R. Ballantyne) — The Mirror of Composition (Tr. of the Sāhityadarpaṇa)
Motilal Banarasidass, 1956

Dr. Ramaranjana Mukherji —
1. Literary Criticism in Ancient India, Calcutta, 1968
2. Imagery in Poetry-an Indian Approach, Clacutta, 1972.

J. Middleton Murry — The Problem of Style (Six Lectures), Oxford University Press, London, 1976

Dr. T. S. Nandi —
1. The Origin and Development of the Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, 1973.
2. Dhvanyālokalocana (Guj. Ed.)
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, 1973.

Winifred Nowottny — The Language Poets Use
University of London, London, 1965

Dr. Satya Pal Narang (S. P. NARANG) — Hemachandra's Dvyās'raya-kāvya-A Literary and Cultural Study, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1972

Dr. K. C. Pandey	Comparative Aesthetics Vol.I (Indian Aesthetics), Banaras, 1950
Dr. V. Raghavan	1. Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa Punarvasu, Madras, 1963. 2. Some Concepts of The Al aṁkāraśāstra, The Adyar Library, Adyar, 1942 3. An Introduction To Indian Poetics (with Prof. Nagendra), Macmillan, 1970 4. The Number of Rasas, The Adyar Library and Research Centre (3rd Ed.), Adyar, 1975.
Dr. K. Kunjuni Raja	Indian Theories of Meaning The Adyar Lib. and Research Centre (Vol,19), Madras, 1963
Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu	The Contribution of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannāth to Sanskrit Poetics Vol.I, Nirajana Publishers, Delhi,1983
Krishna Rayan	Suggestion and Statement in Poetry University of London, 1972
Dr. Suryakanta	Kṣemendra Studies Oriental Book Agency Poona, 1954
Dr. T. N. Sreekantaiya	'Imagination' in Indian Poetics and other Literary Studies Mysore, 1980

Dr. A. Sankaran — Some Aspects of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit or The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani, 2nd Ed., Madras, 1973

Gaurinath Sastri — A Study in the dialectics of Sphoṭa (Revised New Ed.), Motilal Banarasidass, 1980

Prof. A. C. Shastri — Studies in Sanskrit Aesthetics P. Gosh & Co., Calcutta, 1952

Mukund Madhav Sharma — The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. LXIII, 1968

Dr. S. N. Shastri — The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama, Vol.I The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol.XIV, 1961

N. C. Starr — The Dynamics of literature, Columbia University Press, 1945

Eva Schaper — Prelude To Aesthetics, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1968

P. Pañcāpageśa Śāstrī — The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure (Annamalai University SK. Series No. 6), Annamalai University, Annamalaai Nagar, 1940

Dr. G. H. Taralekar — Studies in the Nāṭyaśāstra, Motilal Banarasidass, 1975

Dr. K. H. Trivedi — The Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Ramacandra and Guṇacandra– A critical Study, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-9, 1966

Stephen Ullman — Meaning and Style Oxford, 1973

Paul Valery — Aesthetics Vol. XIII (Introduced by Herbert Read) Ed. Jackson Mathew, Aoutledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1964.

K. M. Varma —
1. Seven Words In Bharata : What Do They Signify Orient Longmans, 1958
2. Nāṭya, Nṛtta and Nṛtya – Their Meaning and Relation, Orient Longmans, 1957

Dr. G. Vijayavardhana — Outlines of Sanskrit Poetics, Chowkhamba Sk. Studies (LXXVI), 1970

A. K. Warder — Indian Kāvya Literature Vol. I Motilal Banarasidass, 1974

Y. S. Walimbe — Abhinavagupta on Indian Aesthetics, Ajanta, 1980

Henry Wells — The Classical Drama of India, Asia Publishing House, 1963

Rene Welleck & Austin Warren — Theory of Literature, Panguin, (Third Ed.), 1968.

William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Cleanth Brooks — Literary Criticism – A Short History, Yale University, Ind. Ed., 1964

Aspects of Indian Poetics, Publications Division, Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1969

III. Special Volumes

1 A Volume of Studies in Indology Presented to Prof. P. V. Kane (or Festschrift Prof. P. V. Kane) 1941

2 Baladeva Upadhyaya Felicitation Volume, 1983 Ed. G. C. Tripathi, Allahabad-2

3 Charudev Shastri Felicitation Volume 13, Delhi, 1974

4 Prof. M. Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume, Mysore, 1952

5 Recent Studies in Sanskrit and Indology being Prof. Jagannath Agrawal Felicitation Volume Ed. D. K. Gupta 1982

6 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays, BORI, Poona, 1917

7 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume–III (2) 1925

8 Umeshamishra Commemoration Volume, 1970 Gaṅgānath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad-2

IV. Names of Articles & Journals

1 "Hemachandra And The Eleventh Century Kashmir Poeticists"

by Prof. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya (S. P. Bhattacharya) in Journal of the Asiatic Society, Letters and Science, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1957 pp. 117-129.

2 "An English Translation of Dhvanyāloka with a Summary of Locana in English" by K. Rama Pisharoti of Ernakulam College in 'Indian Thought', Vols 9-10, 1917.

3 "A History And Significance of Upamā" by V. S. Sowani in 'Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute" 1919-20 Vol.I (2), pp. 87-90.

4 Principal Gopinath Kaviraja's Article "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy" in 'Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, 1923-24, Vol.V (I-II).

5 "Treatment of Alaṁkaras in the Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemachandra" by Dr. Rameschandra S. Betai in the "Journal of the Gujarat Research Society" Vol. XXII No. 4/88, 1960, Khar, Bombay.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I sincerely thank the following philanthrophists and trusts for extending token financial support by way of Thesis Publication Grant:

Doshi Bros., Mahim, Bombay–400 016; Echjay Forgings Pvt. Ltd., Kanjur Marg, Bombay-400 078; Samir Diamonds, Bombay-4; Sevantilal Kantilal Trust, Bombay-4; Sheth Vadilal Sarabhai Derasar Trust, Bombay-400 004; Dr. Bhanuben Mahendra Nanavati Public Charitable Trust, Sunflower Hospital, Bombay-400 056; Shreshthi Kasturbhai Lalbhai Smarak Nidhi, Ahmedabad-380 002; Shri Arunodaya Foundation, Ahmedabad; Parshvanath Corporation, Ahmedabad-14; Tejpal Vastupal Jain Charity Trust, Kalikund, Dholka (Gujarat).

I am also obliged to the following Jain Libraries and Shvetamber Murtipujak Jain Associations of Ahmedabad for their co-operation by way of advance orders for a few copies, inspired by the words of Learned Acharyas Shri Rajayashasūriji, Acharya Shri Devendrasagarasūriji, Acharya Shri Vijaya Bhadrankarsūriji, Acharya Shri Padmasagarsūriji and Acharya Shri Vijay Ramasūriji :

Acharya Nitisurishvaraji Pustakalaya, Acharya Surendrasurishvra Jain Tatravajnana Shala, Dharnidhar Derasar, Labdhinagar Chaturmasa Samiti and the Svetamber Murtipujaka Jain Sanghs of Navarangpura, Pankaj Society, Shanti Nagar, Usmanpura, Sabarmati, Ambawadi, Keshavanagar, Jhaveri Park, Jain Nagar, Lavanya Society and Agamodharak Gnanashala, P. B. Charitable Trust, Paramanand S. M. Jain Sangh, Pandit Virvijay Jain Upashraya, Shri Godiji Parshavanath Trust (Naroda), etc.

